REF/2009/0239

 

 

THE ADJUDICATOR TO HER MAJESTY’S LAND REGISTRY

LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE FROM HM LAND REGISTRY

 

 

 

BETWEEN

(1) BRYAN MARTIN LAUGHTON

and

(2) JUNE ANN LAUGHTON

 

APPLICANTS

 

and

 

(1) ANTHONY ROBER NAYLOR

and

(2) BARBARA ANN HAWKINS

 

RESPONDENTS

 

 

 

Property Address: Marsh Lane Farmhouse, Marsh Lane, South Cockerington, Louth LN11 7EQ

Title Numbers: LL181158 and LL219187

 

 

Before: Sara Hargreaves sitting as (Deputy) Adjudicator to HM Land Registry

 

 

Sitting at: Victory House

On: 25^th February 2010

 

 

Applicant Representation: Mark Diggle instructed by Sills & Betteridge LLP, Lincoln

Respondent Representation: William Evans instructed by Bowermans, Oxford

___________________________________________________________________________

DECISION

___________________________________________________________________________

 

 

KEYWORDS – unregistered legal easement created 2000 – s70(1)(a) LRA 1925 –s27(1)(2)(d), s29(1)(2)(a)(ii), paragraph 3 Schedule 3, paragraphs 9 and 10 Schedule 12 LRA 2002, application for summary judgment under Rule 32A Adjudicator to HM Land Registry (Practice and Procedure) Rules 2003 (as amended)

 

 

 

1.                  This is a decision on the Applicants’ application for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 32A Adjudicator to HM Land Registry (Practice and Procedure) Rules 2003 (as amended) on the grounds that the Respondents have no real prospect of succeeding in the proceedings and there is no other compelling reason why the proceedings should not be disposed of summarily. The dispute relates to an easement of way which the Applicants as registered proprietors of LL219817 (the red land) contend they have over the Respondents’ registered title LL181158 [1] (the blue land). In order to consider the application, it is necessary to consider the application in the context of the reference, the conveyancing history, and respective contentions on certain factual aspects.

 

2.                  I had the benefit of a bundle prepared by the Applicants’ solicitors, to which reference is made where appropriate, and Mr Diggle had filed a skeleton argument.

 

The application and reference

 

3.                  The dispute between the parties was referred to the Adjudicator on 11^th February 2009. By Form AP1 dated 15^th August 2008 the Applicants applied to change the respective registers of the parties to note that the Applicants’ land has the benefit and the Respondents’ land the burden of an easement, referred to in the AP1 as an easement of necessity [2]. The evidence in support of the application is set out in the Second Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 8^th August 2008. [3] As will be seen, that declaration was prepared on the basis that the Second Applicant lacked access to all the relevant documents evidencing the conveyancing history, and on the basis that when her husband had sold the land to the Respondents’ predecessors, the Summerlins, in January 2000, there had been an intention on both sides to register a right of way over the Summerlins’/Respondents’ land for the benefit of the Applicants’ retained land, that intention being thwarted for reasons she could not explain. That retained land being otherwise landlocked, the application was made on the basis that the Applicants have an easement of necessity over the Respondents’ land: see paragraphs 7-14 of the statutory declaration. The application was brought about by the Respondents’ objections to the use of their land by the Applicants’ tenant farmer, that objection being generated by the fact that the Respondents contended that when they bought the blue land, the register did not refer to it being subject to any right of way.

 

4.                  In the course, I think, of preparation by HMLR of the case summary which accompanies the reference to the Adjudicator, Bowermans for the Respondents wrote a letter to HMLR dated 3^rd February 2009 [4] making certain points about the Respondents’ position, but asserting that, in any event, there was no implied easement because investigations had unearthed an express reservation of a right of way over their land set out in a transfer dated 6^th January 2000, a copy of which they enclosed, the two concepts being mutually exclusive. It is the expressly reserved easement which dominated the Applicants’ submissions at the hearing, but which is not the subject matter of the reference. HMLR sent a reply to Bowermans on 9^th February 2009 [5] and a lengthy letter to the Applicants’ solicitors dated 3^rd March 2009 [6], replying to their letter of 17^th February 2009 [7], pointing out that the subject matter of the reference is the implied easement.

 

5.                  What appears to have happened is that the transfer dated 6^th February 2000 was sent by Bowermans to HMLR on 3^rd February 2009 after they discovered it, having made investigations of their vendors, the Summerlins. The Applicants therefore knew there was another factor to take into account but have not issued another application to HMLR expressly relying on what is now called their primary case in reliance on the transfer dated 6^th January 2000. The Respondents took no particular point on this at the hearing, maintaining a firm objection to all of the Applicants’ submissions, whether based on the express reservation or an implied reservation. In the circumstances I will deal with the application as it was argued before me, before dealing with the consequences. It should be acknowledged that Bowermans objected to the Applicants’ application in correspondence with HMLR in October 2008 on the grounds that there was no implied reservation of an easement, their researches establishing at that stage that there was an express reservation of a right of way in January 2000 [8]. On that basis, maintained Bowermans (in that correspondence), the application should be rejected and the Applicants should make another application for rectification of the register of LL181158, to which the Respondents would also object.

 

Chronology

 

6.                  The chronology is taken from that prepared by Mr Diggle, on behalf of the Applicants. Originally the red and blue land was owned and farmed by the First Applicant’s mother, Dorothy Boyland. By way of a general description, the blue land consists of a farmhouse and outbuildings on an acre or so of land; the red land is a field behind, access to which is the subject of the dispute and which is gained over a strip of land 43 feet wide and marked on various plans, as the green land (the best version is at p36 of the bundle). The green land provides access off Marsh Lane to the red land and forms part of the eastern end of the blue land.

 

7.                  Mrs Boyland conveyed the red and blue land to herself and the First Applicant (with other land) on 6^th April 1972 [9].

 

8.                  In July 1990 the First Applicant’s father died. The farmhouse on the blue land was split into two flats, occupied by Mrs Boyland and the Second Applicants’ parents respectively. In 1995 the red land was let to Robert Nicholson and he farmed it until 2000, when it was taken over by Conisholme Farms Limited, which entered into a new farm business tenancy on 22^nd June 2005.

 

9.                  At a date unknown to me (but before 2000) Mrs Boyland died and the First Applicant became the owner of the red and blue land. He decided to market Marsh Lane Farmhouse, and instructed Masons Estate Agents. The particulars of sale are at p50 of the bundle and at p51 they state as follows under the heading “Access: The vendor wishes to retain a right of access of 43 feet in width from Marsh Lane at the easterly end of the property to the land at the rear for all purposes and at all times as shown hatched in red on the attached 1:2500 plan”.

 

10.              The Summerlins wanted to buy the property and wrote a letter dated 11^th November 1999 outlining their offer [10] and saying “9. We would undertake to provide and maintain a right of access of 43 feet in width from Marsh Lane at the easterly end of the property to provide the vendor with access to the fields at the rear of the property.”

 

11.              At the beginning of 2000 the red and blue land was in the sole name of the First Applicant. On 6^th January 2000 he transferred the blue land using form TR1 to himself and the Second Applicant [11]. Box 12 includes the following specific provision: “There is reserved out of the [blue land] for the benefit of the Transferor’s retained land [the red land] a right of way at all time[s] and for all purposes with or without vehicles and agricultural machinery of all descriptions over the area hatched blue [ie the green land] on the plan.” The Second Applicant did not have this document when she prepared her statutory declaration. The land was not then registered.

 

12.              This transfer predated the transfer to the Summerlins by a matter of weeks. On 7^th January 2000 the Applicants agreed to sell the blue land to the Summerlins. The contract, which is at p17 of the bundle and incorporates the 3^rd edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale (no submissions arising out of that), was also not available to the Second Applicant when she prepared her statutory declaration. It contains the following: “Incumbrances on the Property: All of those matters referred to in the draft Transfer supplied herewith.” Special condition 2 provides: “The property is sold subject to the incumbrances on the property and the buyer will raise no requisitions on them.”

 

13.              On 13^th January 2000 the Applicants transferred the blue land to the Summerlins (p21, again not available to the Second Applicant when she made her statutory declaration). There was no express reference to the right of way in favour of the red land. The blue land was first registered on 23^rd February 2000 and the register of title contains no reference to the right of way.

 

14.              On 26^th September 2002 the First Applicant transferred the red land (and other land) to himself and the Second Applicant [12] (though neither party suggest that anything in particular turns on that).

 

15.              The Summerlins marketed Marsh Lane Farmhouse in the summer of 2007. The Respondents visited the property on 11^th August 2007. On 22^nd November 2007 the First Respondent downloaded an aerial photograph of the property from Google Earth [13] which is “ARN1” at p258, (and suffers from some sense of distortion in that the blue land has been digitally highlighted in green [14]).

 

16.              On the 8^th December 2007 the Respondents visited the property again; the First Respondent’s account of what he saw on the green land is at p256-7. Although dated 8-2-07, it appears that the Seller’s Property Information Form was signed off on the same day. Question 7.4 [15] asks “Are there any other formal or informal arrangements which someone else has over your property?” the answer to which is stated as follows: “Previous owner of property has retained right of access over 43 feet at north east end of property to give access to field at rear of property.” Bowermans raised an additional enquiry at p100: “Please clarify the reply as we can find no reservation of right contained in the copy land register entries supplied.” The answer, given by Harrowells LLP on 28^th January 2008 is at p103: “Our client advises that this was merely an informal agreement.”

 

17.              The Summerlins transferred the blue land to the Respondents on 7^th February 2008 [16], and not long after that, the First Respondent was objecting to the use of the green land by the Applicants’ tenant, with the result that the Applicants felt obliged to make the application to HMLR to which I have referred.

 

The documents

 

18.              The Applicants were unable to produce the documents noted above (ie the January 2000 transfers and the contract with the Summerlins) for the reasons set out in paragraph 10 of the Second Applicant’s statutory declaration: see p33. The best explanation for the history of the documents which I can find in the bundle is set out in Bowernmans’ letter to HMLR dated 3^rd February 2009, to which I have already referred, with which Bowermans enclosed the two January transfers and the contract with the Summerlins. The writer informed HMLR that on inspecting the file relating to the Summerlins’ purchase of the blue land from the Applicants (obtained from the Summerlins’ solicitors), the contract “has attached to it a draft” of the transfer between the First Applicant and the Applicants. The writer said he did not have a copy of the transfer to the Summerlins (which must have been unearthed subsequently) “but it would appear from familiar pencil markings” on the contract and transfer dated 6^th January 2000 that “the Land Registry saw both of these documents when the Summerlins applied to register their title” to the blue land.

 

Statement of case: Applicants

 

19.              The upshot is that the Applicants’ statement of case [17] pleads a case which steps beyond the strict parameters of the application and the reference, at least if one adopts the analysis suggested by HMLR at p285-7. (In that letter HMLR states that the reference relates to the easement of necessity, and distinguishes the two alternative approaches.) In particular the Applicants contend (their primary case) that the reservation of the right of way in the transfer of 6^th January 2000 amounted to a legal easement which took effect as an overriding interest pursuant to s70(1)(a) LRA 1925, and after October 2003, binds the blue land pursuant to paragraph 9, Schedule 12 LRA 2002. Alternatively, the Applicants contend that the easement overrode the disposition to the Respondents by virtue of s29 and paragraph 3(2) Schedule 3 LRA 2002.

 

20.              The Applicants’ secondary case is that there was an implied reservation of a right of way (as an easement of necessity) on 13^th January 2000 which took effect as an overriding interest pursuant to s70(1)(a) and paragraph 9 Schedule 12, as above alternatively paragraph 3 Schedule 3 would apply.

 

Statement of case: Respondents

 

21.              Apart from joining issue on the factual issues raised, the Respondents’ statement of case [18] denies that the reservation of the right of way in the 6^th January transfer could amount to an overriding interest; alternatively, if it does amount to such, then paragraph 3 Schedule 3 of the 2002 Act would apply on the disposition to the Respondents by virtue of paragraph 9(2) Schedule 12 of the LRA 2002 and further, that none of the provisions of paragraph 3 “save” the easement. So the Respondents’ case on the primary issue meets the Applicants’ analysis head on.

 

22.              As to the Applicants’ secondary case, the Respondents contend that there can be no implied easement where there an express easement is reserved, and there are factual issues dealing with the Applicants’ case on necessity though the denial that, without the access through the blue land, the red land is landlocked, lacks any basis in fact on the papers before me.

 

Agreement at the hearing: the overriding interest point

 

23.              By the time the parties started their submissions on this application, both counsel had agreed that the Applicants’ position on the application of s70(1)(a) LRA 1925 is correct [19]. That means that both parties accept as a matter of fact that there was an express reservation of a right of way in the transfer dated 6^th January 2000, (which is a finding I would make if I had to, but for their agreement on this point). The position in paragraph 11 of the Applicants’ statement of case was accepted by the Respondents’ counsel and he was right to do so. In other words even though the Summerlins were registered as proprietors with title absolute without express notice on the register of the right of way reserved in favour of the red land, the blue land was subject to the (legal though unregistered) easement which was created because under the 1925 Act it took effect as an overriding interest under s70(1)(a). How this was dealt with by the Summerlins on the transfer by the Summerlins to the Respondents is not a matter on which I have to express any opinion in order to deal with the application for summary judgment though I have no doubt that it is of significance to the parties in other respects.

 

24.              The status of the unregistered legal easement as an overriding interest under s70(1)(a) LRA 1925 is critical to the Applicants’ application.

 

The Applicants’ submissions: paragraph 9 Schedule 12

 

25.              On the basis that the right of way took effect as an overriding interest under the 1925 Act, the Applicants’ case was that when the 2002 Act came into force, the provisions of paragraph 9 Schedule 12 would apply, thereby preserving its status as an interest which would override the disposition to the Respondents. This point was outlined in brief in paragraph 12 of Mr Diggle’s skeleton argument, with a rejection of the Respondents’ submission that paragraph 3 Schedule 3 would apply instead, without the exception. In more detail the Applicants’ argument is as follows.

 

26.              Starting with the situation as at 13^th October 2003, paragraph 9 Schedule 12 (dealing with transitional provisions) provides:-

 

“9.(1) This paragraph applies to an easement or profit a prendre which was an overriding interest in relation to a registered estate immediately before the coming into force of Schedule 3, but which would not fall within paragraph 3 of that Schedule if created after the coming into force of that Schedule.

(2) In relation to an interest to which this paragraph applies, Schedule 3 has effect as if the interest were not excluded from paragraph 3.”

 

The material easement in this case is (i) an overriding interest (ii) relating to a registered estate (iii) immediately before 13^th October 2003 and (iv), it would not fall within paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 if created after 13^th October 2003 because it would be an equitable easement and paragraph 3 of Schedule3 applies to legal easements. This is because an express easement which is not registered takes effect after 13^th October 2003 as an equitable easement until it is registered: see s27(1)(2)(d) LRA 2002. These transitional provisions deal with a limited class of pre-October 2003 legal unregistered easements.

 

27.              Therefore, the Applicants submit, paragraph 9(2) continues to apply, and “Schedule 3 has effect as if the interest were not excluded from paragraph 3” ie paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 includes as a class of overriding interests those easements which fall within paragraph 9 Schedule 12. In support Mr Diggle cites a number of supporting commentaries, for example Harpum and Bignell’s Registered Land (1^st ed 2004), see chapter 11. At 11.13 the authors note that after the 2002 Act comes into force the only legal easements which override a registered disposition are those which are in existence when the 2002 Act comes into effect, but are not registered, as in this case (and those which subsequently arise by prescription or implied grant, which does not arise for consideration). At 11.14 the authors set out four alternative legal easements which will override a registrable disposition after the 2002 Act applies and these are based on paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 [20], as to which Mr Diggle made further submissions which I deal with below. Further, his position is supported by 11.18 which refers to Schedule 12 paragraph 9 as providing that “any easement or profit that was an overriding interest immediately before the Act came into force .. will retain that status”. Exactly the same conclusion is reached (unsurprisingly) by the authors of Megarry & Wade, Law of Real Property, 7^th ed at para 7-098, footnote 659, see also Wolstenholme & Cherry’s Annotated Land Registration Act 2002, p201, p152, and Ruoff & Roper Registered Conveyancing 17.023.

 

28.              In my judgment this analysis is correct, and is sufficient for the Applicants to succeed on their main point as argued before me.

 

The Applicants’ submissions: s29 and Schedule 3 paragraph 3

 

29.              Mr Diggle’s second submission takes s29(2)(a)(ii) LRA 2002 as a starting point for the alternative argument that if he is wrong about the application of paragraph 9 Schedule 12, then the easement was exercised in the period of one year ending with the date of the disposition to the Respondents, and therefore it overrides that disposition by virtue of Schedule 3 paragraph 3(2). S29(1) states the general principle that “any interest affecting the estate immediately before the disposition whose priority is not protected at the time of registration”, is postponed to the disposition which is completed by registration. That general principle is reversed in circumstances within s29(2), the relevant provision being s29(2)(a)(ii) which preserves the priority of any interest falling within any of the paragraphs of Schedule 3 including paragraph 3. If paragraph 9 Schedule 12 provides that the exception in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3 does not apply to easements within paragraph 9, they must fall within paragraph 3 Schedule 3, and on the facts of this case, fall within s29(2)(a)(ii).

 

30.              The difficulty with this argument is the relationship between an easement within paragraph 9 Schedule 12 and paragraph 3 Schedule 3. If the point about paragraph 9 is to “save” a class of easements if they would otherwise not come within paragraph 3 Schedule 3, then it seems to me that the easement in this case does not have to be cross checked against the provisions of paragraph 3 Schedule 3 as they apply to legal easements (as defined by the LRA 2002) after 13^th October 2003. See Ruoff & Roper 17.023 and 17.024.

 

31.              If however Mr Diggle is right, and the provisions of paragraph 3 Schedule 3 can be or must be applied independently of paragraph 9 Schedule 12 to the unregistered legal easement in this case then I find that the easement would satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3(2) because the evidence before me demonstrates that the easement “has been exercised in the period of one year ending with the day of the disposition”: see pages 134-135 and p245 [21]. There is no reasonable prospect of the Respondents challenging this evidence and they did not seek to do so in submissions, relying instead on a point of construction which I deal with below.

 

32.              The reason why Mr Diggle seeks to rely on paragraph 3(2) if he has to, is that he submits that paragraph 3 as a whole means that a legal easement or profit a prendre which is not registered under the Commons Registration Act 1965 and which at the time of the disposition “(a) is not within the actual knowledge of the person to whom the disposition is made, and (b) would not have been obvious on a reasonably careful inspection of the land over which the easement or profit is exercisable will not amount to an overriding interest” will not override except where the conditions of paragraph 3(2) are satisfied. See footnote 20 above. The provisions of paragraph 3(2) operate as a get out clause if (a) and (b) cannot be established.

 

33.              Although he made strenuous submissions to the effect that the Respondents (a) knew and (b) the easement would have been obvious [etc] I would hesitate where the facts on which he relied were disputed by the Respondents, to make a finding at this stage on an application for summary judgment, to the effect that the easement could satisfy one or other of the provisions in paragraph 3(1)(a) or (b) in order to override. Should the Applicants have to rely on proving a positive 3(1)(a) or (b) to succeed, there would in my judgment be a compelling reason to have a trial.

 

The Respondents’ submissions: paragraph 9 of Schedule 12

 

34.              Having accepted, correctly, that the material easement amounted to an overriding interest under s70(1)(a) LRA 1925, Mr Evans made a number of submissions to seek to avoid the result imposed by paragraph 9 of Schedule 12. First he submitted that paragraph 10 of Schedule 12 applied until 13^th October 2006 so that paragraph 9 is irrelevant. Paragraph 10 provides:

 

“For the period of three years beginning with the day on which Schedule 3 comes into force, paragraph 3 of the Schedule has effect with the omission of the exception.”

 

The effect of this is that any legal easement that is not registered in this period will take effect as an overriding interest in relation to a registered disposition in this period whenever the legal easement was created. At the end of the three year period “an unregistered legal easement will only have effect if it falls within paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 (with the exception operating but subject to paragraph 3(2) of that Schedule) or was an overriding interest at the time when the Schedule came into force and continues to be protected by virtue of paragraph 9 above”: Wolstenholme & Cherry p 201. Paragraph 10 in my judgment is a red herring because the relevant disposition from the Respondents’ point of view took place in 2008, after the three year period had elapsed. The critical issue, as Mr Evans then accepted, became the application of paragraph 9 Schedule 12 and paragraph 3 of Schedule 3.

 

35.              But he argued that whilst the provisions of s29 LRA 2002 were overridden (for want of a better word) by the provisions of paragraph 10 Schedule 12 for 3 years from 13^th October 2003, from 13^th October 2006 s29 required the application of paragraph 3 Schedule3 to consider whether any easement would qualify as an unregistered interest which would override the disposition to the Respondents.

 

36.              As this argument seems to me to render paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 virtually useless in the context of the submissions made by Mr Diggle, which are supported by the authorities to which I have referred, I reject it. In my judgment the question whether the easement overrode the disposition to the Respondents in February 2008 falls in the circumstances of this case to be dealt with by paragraph 9 of Schedule 12.

 

The Respondents’ submissions: paragraph 3 of Schedule 3

 

37.              To deal with the Applicants’ alternative case on paragraph 3 of Schedule 3, Mr Evans was forced to confront the provisions of paragraph 3(2), not by arguing that the Applicants could not come within the requirements on the facts, but by arguing that paragraph 3(2) would not apply as a matter of construction of paragraph 3 Schedule 3 (this is apart from the qualifications I have expressed in paragraph 30 above as to whether the Applicants can or need to resort to paragraph 3 except insofar as it does not exclude easements within paragraph 9 of Schedule 12). In the course of his submissions on this point I drew his attention to Wolstenholme & Cherry p153 note (ii) which echoes Harpum & Bignell (footnote 20). The references support Mr Diggle’s submissions, to which Mr Evans’ response was that those notes (and therefore footnote 20) are wrong.

 

38.              It is easier to deal with his argument, which was convoluted, if I set out paragraph 3(2):

 

“The exception in sub-paragraph (1) does not apply if the person entitled to the easement or profit proves that it has been exercised in the period of one year ending with the day of the disposition.”

 

He contends that the opening words of paragraph 3(2) “the exception” relates to the words “except for an easement or profit a prendre which is not registered under the CRA 1965”. He says the saving in 3(2) does not save an easement which comes within (a) (not within actual knowledge) and (b) (not obvious on a reasonably careful inspection [etc]). The Respondents therefore contend that whether the easement in this case comes within paragraph 3(2) is clearly a triable issue. Therefore, if he is right, he submits that I would not be able to conclude that the conditions of paragraph 3(2) are made out to justify a finding in the Applicants’ favour because it does not rescue easements which are not within 3(1)(a) and (b) as to which the Respondents are entitled to a hearing.

 

39.              Mr Diggle called this argument “ingenious”. In my judgment it is flawed and unsustainable as a matter of construction for the reasons I have given above in paragraphs 31 and 32. Without more to challenge the authorities to which I have referred, the restrictive construction on which Mr Evans is constrained to rely to challenge the application of paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 3 on the clear facts of this case (if the Applicants need to rely on it), is unworkable.

 

The implied easement argument

 

40.              The Applicants’ argument that there is in any event an implied easement of necessity which takes effect as a legal easement for the purposes of the above arguments (with the same effect for the Applicants so far as the relevant statutory provisions are concerned under s29 and Schedule 3) raises two points. The first, which is whether one was created or could be created in the light of the express reservation in 2000, depends on an investigation of facts and would not be appropriate for summary judgment. It does not merely depend on the fact that without an implied easement, the red land is landlocked, though that point (which I have already indicated does not seem capable of challenge by the Respondents) would be significant. The second is that if the Applicants establish that one has been created, it would satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 3.

 

Conclusion

 

41.              The Applicants have succeeded in establishing that they have the benefit of a legal easement which overrode the interest of the Respondents at the date of the relevant disposition on the basis of the application of paragraph 9 of Schedule 12, and, if applicable, paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 3. This conclusion is based on the agreement that the transfer of 6^th January 2000 created an express reservation of a right of way, as to which I would make a finding if I had to, as I have stated already.

 

42.              I would therefore grant the Applicants the relief they seek at this stage. On the case as argued before me by both counsel the Applicants have satisfied me that they would be entitled to relief under Rule 32A because the Respondents have no real prospect of defending the case as argued otherwise, and there is no other compelling reason why there should be a trial as opposed to a summary disposal.

 

43.              For the avoidance of doubt I consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the Applicants’ application as if the objection had not been made, and that includes a requirement pursuant to Rule 41 (if required) to note the express reservation of the right of way in the terms set out in the transfer of 6^th January 2010 on both registers of title.

 

 

 

BY ORDER OF THE ADJUDICATOR TO HM LAND REGISTRY

 

 

 

 

DATED 26^TH MARCH 2010