THE ADJUDICATOR TO HER MAJESTY’S LAND REGISTRY

 

 

Case Number: REF/2005/0776

REF/2005/0779

 

Title Number: ESX214291 and ESX189553

 

Property: Land and Parish Room at Eridge Green, East Sussex

 

Applicants: Mary Agnes Holland and Leslie Cave

 

Respondents: The Nevill Estate Company Limited

 

Heard at: Procession House London EC4

on 6^th and 7^th September 2006

 

Before: Mr Owen Rhys sitting as Deputy Adjudicator

 

 

The Applicants appeared in person, with the assistance of Mr Paul Halden

 

Mr John Furber QC, instructed by Messrs Keogh Caisley, appeared for the Respondent

 

 

 

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D E C I S I O N

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KEYWORDS: Right of Reverter – Adverse Possession – Intention to Possess – Charities – Unincorporated Association – Parish Club and Reading Room –– Literary and Scientific Institutions Act 1854 – Limitation Act 1939 – Reverter of Sites Act 1987

 

 

CASES CITED: Norwich Corporation v Brown (1883) 48 LT 898

Hills (Patents) Ltd v UCH Board of Governors [1956] 1 QB 90

re Rowhook Mission Hall [1985] Ch 62

 

 

 

 

THE APPLICATIONS

 

1. There are before me two separate references from the Chief Land Registrar, made under section 73(7) of the Land Registration Act 2002 on 17^th May 2005. The Applicants in both cases are Mary Agnes Holland and Leslie Cave, who, as I shall explain below, claim that they represent a body known as the trustees of the Eridge Village Hall. Although Mr J G Freelove was also named in the original Forms AP1, he has sadly since died and the applications have proceeded without him. The Respondent in both cases is also the same, namely The Nevill Estate Company Limited. The applications relate to two separate titles, ESX214291 and ESX189553. The Respondent is the registered proprietor of both titles. The hearing took place over two days, and I had the benefit of a very useful site view carried out in the presence of the parties and/or their representatives. The Applicants represented themselves at the hearing, with the assistance of a Mr Halden, who, as I understand it, is a former Land Registry employee. The Respondent was represented by Mr John Furber QC of Counsel. I heard oral evidence from Mr and Mrs Holland for the Applicants, and from Lord Abergavenny for the Respondent.

 

2. The first reference arises from the Applicants’ application to rectify Title No ESX214291, by removing from it the area currently occupied by the building constructed in 1884 and known as the Parish Hall or Room, Eridge Green, East Sussex (“the Parish Hall”). The land in question is coloured red on the plan attached to the Statutory Declaration of Mr J G Freelove, made in support of the application in Form AP1 dated 1^st November 2004. Although there appears to have been some confusion as to the extent of the land comprised in the application, it has been accepted on all sides that it relates to the entirety of the land within the physical boundaries of the site, which I shall describe in more detail below. The second application relates to an area of enclosed land immediately to the south-west of the Parish Hall, currently registered in Title No ESX189553, and coloured green on the plan attached to Mr Freelove’s first Statutory Declaration. The Applicants claim to be entitled to be registered as proprietors of this land on the basis of adverse possession, and also apply to remove it from the Respondent’s title.

 

THE SITE

 

3. The land and building in question can be seen in the photographs attached to the Land Registry Survey, which is annexed to the Applicants’ Statement of Case. The sketch plan attached to the Survey identifies all the main physical features. I shall now summarise these. The Parish Hall itself is a brick building which bears a plaque indicating that it was built in 1884. The main door opens onto the road, which is to the north-west. There is a side passage along the north-eastern flank wall, and a gate is set back from the road. This passage runs between the flank wall and the north-eastern boundary of the site, which consists of a brick wall separating it from the adjoining property known as Chestnut Cottage. The Parish Hall itself appears to have at least two additions from the original building, and I heard some evidence about these as I shall explain in due course. The first addition consists of a flat-roofed brick single-storey structure which currently houses the lavatories: this is built on the north-eastern corner of the building. It appears on a visual inspection that the brickwork is not identical to that of the main structure. Further south and away from the road, there is a wooden extension, also along the eastern side, which protrudes slightly from the rear (southern) elevation of the Parish Hall. At the rear there is also a small wooden toolshed which houses items belonging to the pre-school to which I shall refer. The land on which the Parish Hall is constructed is at a higher level than the fields to the south, and there is a short bank which runs down to those fields. At the top of the bank, behind the building, there is a crude fence made from scaffolding poles, and at the bottom of the bank – adjacent to the field – there is a bramble hedge and sheep-proof post and wire fence. It is accepted that the application relates to the land up to this post and wire fence – in other words, it includes the bank.

 

4. The land coloured green on Mr Freelove’s plan (“the Adjoining Land”) – part of Title No ESX189553 – consists of a level, grassed and roughly triangular area adjacent to the Parish Hall on its western side. A door opens into it from the Hall. It is enclosed by a post and rail fence and gate along the road to its north, and by a neatly trimmed leylandii hedge to the south, which curves to meet the road at the extreme western point of the land. The hedge is planted along the top of the bank which runs down to the fields to the south, and is in effect a continuation of the rough fence which is at the top of the bank behind the Parish Hall. The same stock-proof fence that exists at the bottom of the bank behind the building continues first in a westerly and then a northerly direction behind this triangular piece of land. This is clear from the Survey sketch plan. It may be noted that there is a gap in the hedge at its westernmost point, currently closed by a panel of wire or plastic netting.

 

5. It follows from the above description that the Parish Hall and the Adjoining Land form one, self-contained site. Although the gate into the Adjoining Land from the road is not locked, the entire site is enclosed, and the Parish Hall itself is capable of being locked and is kept locked when not used. I have heard evidence as to the levelling of the Adjoining Land and the planting of the hedge which I shall refer to in due course. As appears from the photographs, the Adjoining Land is a neatly mown grassed area, with flower borders where it adjoins the flank wall of the Parish Hall. I should mention that the road to the north and west of the entire site was originally the main A26 Tunbridge Wells to Lewes trunk road, but at some time – possibly in the 1970s – the village was by-passed and the main road now runs some tens of metres to the north.

 

THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE

 

6. The matters in dispute are, on their face, relatively straightforward, but they do give rise to a number of latent difficulties. I shall deal first with the claim to the Parish Hall. The Applicants’ case is based on the terms of a Grant dated 11^th November 1893 (“the 1893 Grant”), made by the First Marquess of Abergavenny in favour of The Hon Henry Gilbert Ralph Nevill and Sir Walter Prideaux and “…..the Incumbent and Churchwardens of the Ecclesiastical District of Eridge Green….” as Trustees. The 1893 Grant is made pursuant to the terms of the Literary and Scientific Societies Act 1854 (“the 1854 Act”), and was for the express purpose of:

“a site for a Parish Club and Reading Room for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of the Ecclesiastical District of Eridge Green and for no other purpose whatsoever to be under the sole management and control of the said Trustees their heirs successors and assigns….”.

 

Although the 1854 Act contains a statutory reverter, the 1893 Grant includes an express reverter in the following terms:

“Provided always that in case the said lands so granted by way of gift as aforesaid or any part thereof shall at any time hereafter cease to be used for the purposes of a Parish Club and Reading Room or in case the said lands shall by operation of law or any other means cease to remain vested in or under the sole control of the said Trustees or any new Trustees to be appointed as hereinafter mentioned then the same shall immediately revert to and become again a portion of the Abergavenny Settled Estates ……Provided always and it is hereby further declared that the Incumbent and Churchwardens for the time being of the said Ecclesiastical District shall always be ex officio trustees of these presents..”.

 

The deed also provides that the power of appointing new trustees is vested in the Incumbent and Churchwardens for the time being.

 

7. The Applicants claim that they are the successors in title of the Trustees appointed under the 1893 Deed, and as such are entitled to be registered as proprietors of the Parish Hall. They contend that the registration of the Respondent was a mistake. They say that the Respondent never had a valid paper title, since at all material times the land remained vested in the trustees of the 1893 Deed. The Respondent denies this, and contends that at some point prior to 1968 there was a reverter under the terms of the 1893 Deed, and therefore it had a good paper title as at the date of registration. The reverter occurred either (a) because the Parish Hall had ceased to be used for the purposes authorised by the 1893 Deed, or (b) because it had ceased to be under the sole control of the Trustees. The Applicants primary position is that no reverter occurred: but if there was a reverter, the Applicants have been in adverse possession of the Parish Hall for more than 12 years, and therefore they have barred the Respondent’s title.

 

8. It seems to me that the first application – relating to the Parish Hall – raises at least the following issues:

(1)               Has the reverter under the 1893 Deed taken place?

(2)               If so, when did it occur, and to whom did the land revert?

(3)               If reverter did not occur, who is entitled to be registered as proprietor of the land in place of the Respondent?

(4)               If it did occur, has the revertee’s title been barred by operation of the Limitation Acts and, if so, by whom was the title barred?

Before considering these issues in detail, I shall identify the principal documents relied on by the parties in connection with this part of the case, and summarise the history of the Parish Hall insofar as that history appears to be common ground between them. As it happens, there are not many disputes of fact between the parties.

 

9. The original grant was, as I have said, made by the First Marquess in 1893. In 1941 a meeting of the Parochial Church Council (“the PCC”) took place, the minutes of which have been produced and are exhibited to Mr Freelove’s Statutory Declaration. This meeting was chaired by the Vicar. The Churchwardens would have been members of the PCC, and it is possible therefore that some of those named as present were Churchwardens (and ex officio trustees of the 1893 deed). The then Marquess and Marchioness were present – this would, I think, be the Fourth Marquess – together with a number of other individuals. It was resolved that a new sub-committee should be set up, answerable to the Parish Room Trustees, to manage it. This was followed by a document dated 1^st January 1942, executed by the Fourth Marquess, which records the agreement between the Parish Hall Trustees and the Committee of Management appointed by them – this document being attached to the present Marquess’s witness statement. This agreement includes the following provision: “The Committee of Management shall take full control of the Hall both financially and otherwise”. In 1958 Mr Freelove became Chairman of the body which continued to manage the Parish Hall – I shall consider below the nature of that body. Mr Freelove also wrote a letter dated 10^th December 1999, which the Respondent relied on, in which he stated that “In 1958 the Marquess of Abergavenny called a meeting of the villagers of Eridge and asked them to form a new committee for the running of Eridge Village Hall”. It appears from the other letter attached to the Respondent’s Skeleton Argument – from Mrs Holloway dated 11^th December 1999 – that “The officers of the Committee changed in 1958, when Mr J Freelove succeeded the Marquess as Chairman …”. It appears, therefore, that the Marquess – being John Henry Guy, the Fifth Marquess – ceased to be Chairman of the Committee in 1958, handing over to Mr Freelove who remained in that post until 1976. I should perhaps add that the Respondent did not object to the admission of any of the evidence adduced in the form of witness statements or letters by the Applicants, whether or not those witnesses were able to give evidence orally before me.

 

10. The next event of significance was the registration of “Eridge Village Hall” as a charity, pursuant to section 4 of the Charities Act 1960, in October 1963. This was done at the request of a body called “the Village Hall Committee”, through their solicitors Messrs Cripps, Harries Hall. It appears from the Applicants’ evidence that Brigadier Geoffrey Hall, the Senior Partner of the firm, was himself a member of the Committee, which has the same composition as the Management Committee of the Parish Hall and is in fact the same body. Since that time, the Management Committee has submitted its accounts to the Charity Commission, save for a period in the 1990s when there was some uncertainty as to whether a charity scheme would be made, and generally has conducted itself in accordance with the requirements of the charities legislation. A number of substantial structural and cosmetic improvements to the Hall have been made since 1963. These have been paid for out of funds generated by the income of the Hall, but principally from public monies in the form of grants made to the charity, as administered by the Committee. These improvements include the construction of the substantial extensions which I have referred to earlier in this Decision.

 

11. On 5^th November 1968 the Fifth Marquess – who had ceased to be Chairman of the Committee in 1958 – executed a Conveyance and Deed of Discharge (“the 1968 Conveyance”). This is a complex document. It relates to a very considerable number of parcels of land, including (as part of “the Green Land” as defined in the 1968 Conveyance) “Parish Room, Eridge Green”. It appears from the recitals that the Green Land formed part of the land subject to a strict settlement, and this had become vested in the Fifth Marquess as tenant for life. However, he had ceased to become entitled to exercise the powers of a tenant for life – possibly through forfeiture – and by the 1968 Conveyance he vested the land in his brother, Lord Rupert Nevill, who became the tenant for life. This is the deed which formed the root of title when the Respondent became registered as proprietor of the Parish Room in 1996. I have not seen any of the documents relating to the Abergavenny family settlements. The Respondent places great emphasis on this deed which, according to Mr Furber QC, is evidence of the fact that the 5^th Marquess must have known that a reverter had taken place prior to this time. Otherwise, he would be conveying land which he did not own.

 

12. In 1994 there was some correspondence relating to the Parish Hall and the Adjoining Land. First, Mr Christopher Nevill (as he then was – he is the current Lord Abergavenny) wrote on behalf of the Respondent on 24^th January 1994 asking Mr Holland in his capacity as “Chairman Eridge Green Parish Hall Committee” to provide details of the insurance cover relating to the Parish Hall. He wrote that

“The Hall and the land it was built on were provided by Lord Abergavenny [the 5^th Marquess] …. .and handed over to your Committee who act as trustees for the Parish Hall. Lord Abergavenny tells me that in the unlikely event of the village no longer needing the use of the village hall, the whole lot would return back to the estate once more.”

Subsequently, there was correspondence between Mr R Todd, on behalf of the Nevill Estate Company Limited and Mr Holland, Chairman of the Committee. This related to the Committee’s use of the Adjoining Land. In summary, Mr Todd asked the Committee to pay a nominal rent for the use of the land, but Mr Holland, on behalf of the Committee, refused this request. Mr Todd’s letter dated 13^th June 1994 also stated that the Company “has a reversionary interest” over the Parish Hall, and refers to the Committee as “the Parish Hall Trustees”. Mr Holland told me that he had arranged for a copy of the 1893 Deed to be provided to Mr Todd, who did not appear to have one himself.

 

13. It appears that the Parish Room was registered in the Respondent’s name in 1996, together with a considerable quantity of other land. The Adjoining Land had already been registered, it appears, some years earlier, in 1989 or 1990.

 

14. By 1999 a controversy had arisen as to the legal ownership of the Hall. In that context, the Fifth Marquess – John Henry Guy Lord Abergavenny – wrote a letter to Mrs Holland. The Fifth Marquess was of course present at the meeting at 1958 in which Mr Freelove had taken over from him as Chairman of the Committee, and was the grantor under the 1968 Conveyance. He wrote to say that:

“This is a very confused issue and I only wish I could remember exactly all the details of what happened in the past. I do remember that there was a time when the Hall was no longer used and it looked as though it might revert to me but I cannot remember any correspondence about the matter. All I remember is that a new Committee was formed and a lot of alterations and modernisations were carried out…..I cannot remember ever accepting the Hall back.”

 

15. I also note that there was extensive correspondence in 1998 and 1999, involving the Diocese, the Charity Commission and the Respondent, with regard to the ownership of the Parish Hall. This was triggered, I believe, by attempts to establish a Charity Commission scheme for the Hall. It appears from the letter dated 23^rd April 1998 from the Reverend Dore to the Charity Commission that he had discussed the proposal with the Fifth Marquess (John Henry Guy Lord Abergavenny) who was apparently happy with the proposed arrangement. From that correspondence – see, for instance the letter from the Reverend Dore dated 23^rd April and from the Diocese dated 14^th July 1998 – it appears that the Church originally maintained the view that the trusts of the 1893 Deed still continued, and that the Incumbent of the amalgamated parish of Frant with Eridge, the Rev Dore, remained a trustee. Subsequently, the Rev Dore conceded that there had been a reverter under the 1893 Deed, and that he was therefore no longer a trustee – see his letter of 5^th May 1999. This view seems to have been based on the assertion contained in the letter from Christopher Nevill (the current Lord Abergavenny) dated 19^th August 1998, namely that “The Hall …...fell into disrepair in the 1960’s when the use was abandoned and it was conveyed to my father in 1968.” The father referred to was Lord Rupert Nevill, the brother of the Fifth Marquess.

 

16. In the course of the discussions from 1998 onwards, it became apparent that the Respondent had become registered with title to the Parish Hall. I understand that there was a previous attempt to rectify or alter the register in order to remove the Hall from the Respondent’s title. This did not succeed. However, no point has been taken by the Respondent on this, and I accordingly leave it out of account in reaching my decision on the applications which are before me.

 

17. I shall now turn to the issues which I must resolve. First and foremost is the question of reverter. Clearly, it is only if there has been a reverter that the Respondent was entitled to be registered as proprietor. For reasons which I shall explain, it does not follow that the Applicants will succeed even if the reverter did not take place, but that issue may not arise and I shall leave it to one side for the moment.

 

18. Before considering the evidence, I shall set out the legal framework. The reverter can take place in either of two situations, specified in the 1893 Deed. These situations are as follows:

(1)   “that in case the said lands so granted by way of gift as aforesaid or any part thereof shall at any time hereafter cease to be used for the purposes of a Parish Club and Reading Room or

(2)   “in case the said lands shall by operation of law or any other means cease to remain vested in or under the sole control of the said Trustees or any new Trustees to be appointed as hereinafter mentioned”.

It appears from the authorities that reverter is automatic. If the material event occurs, the title automatically reverts to the grantor without the need for any additional re-conveyance: see cases such as re Rowhook Mission Hall [1985] Ch 62 [U1] . It must follow, I think, that reverter does not depend on any conscious act by any party: the only question is whether the triggering event has occurred, and it matters not whether anyone has actually directed his or her mind to the question, or indeed whether any interested party is aware of the fact that reverter has occurred. I mention this for a reason. It is entirely clear to me that, until very recently at least, no-one seems to have been aware that a reverter had taken place. As far as one can see, all the public utterances by the Fifth Marquess that are on record suggest that he was unaware of the reverter, even though he was the person to whom (in effect) the estate would have reverted, at least after 1954. Equally, it was not until persuaded to a contrary view, in 1999, that the Reverend Dore believed that the 1893 Trust had come to an end. Even Mr Christopher Nevill, now the Sixth Marquess, seems to have believed as recently as 1994 that reverter had not occurred. When eventually he began to argue for a reverter, he did so on the grounds that “The Hall ….. .fell into disrepair in the 1960’s when the use was abandoned”. It was not suggested in the course of this hearing that this ground could be supported: reverter was contended for on entirely different grounds. Although no doubt the parties’ subjective understanding may have some relevance when considering, on the balance of probabilities, whether there is sufficient evidence to show a reverter, and it may be relevant to a plea of estoppel (which has not been argued before me), it cannot be determinative of the issue.

 

19. As I have said, the Respondent contends that the reverter has occurred on two grounds. With regard to user, Mr Furber QC submitted that the evidence of Mr and Mrs Holland, as to the activities carried on in the Parish Hall since 1976 at least, demonstrates that the original purposes of the 1893 Deed have not been followed in recent years. I should point out that the Respondent did not, essentially until Mr Furber’s closing submissions, identify the precise grounds for reverter on this basis. The correspondence with the Land Registry in which the Respondent objected to the application – see, for instance, the detailed letter dated 19^th January 2005 – is quite vague as to the alleged non-user. The Respondent’s Statement of Case merely says baldly that “At some date unknown, the land conveyed ceased to be used for the purpose of a Parish Club and Reading Room.” Lord Abergavenny wrote to the Reverend Dore that there had been a complete disuse of the Hall. No evidence as to the activities carried on at the Parish Hall prior to that time is available, save for peripheral indications such as the reference to jam-making in the 1940 Minutes mentioned below. Although Mr Furber QC was unable to offer me a definition of "Parish Club", he emphasises that that the Hall has not been used as a "Reading Room" for many years and if for no other reason that prevents the use of the Hall from being authorised. I may add that he did not seek to define "Reading Room", but no doubt that expression is tolerably clear. I consider that it is a place where books or periodicals are available to be read by members of the Parish, similar to a public library. After all, the 1893 Deed was made pursuant to the 1856 Act which was expressed to be for the purpose of encouraging literary and scientific endeavour.

 

20. I must therefore deal with two preliminary points. First, what is the meaning of "Parish Club"? Secondly, to what extent is it necessary for both identified uses - as Parish Room and Reading Room - to be carried out?

 

21. As I have said, the Respondent did not offer me a definition of "Parish Club", concentrating entirely on the "Reading Room" element. I infer from this that it considers the present use to be within the definition of "Parish Club". For my own part, I agree. A Parish Club, as I would understand it, is synonymous with “Parish Hall” or “Parish Room”, namely a facility intended to be at the service of the parishioners. As I understand the evidence give, it has consistently been used for the following purposes: (a) meetings of local institutions such as the Womens’ Institute and the Parish Council; (b) gatherings and lectures of local societies, such as the Horticultural Society; (c) functions, such as weddings, for members of the local community; and (d) since at least 1989, as a playschool or pre-school known as Little Acorns. The witnesses were not asked whether the users of the Hall were exclusively members of the Parish, but it seemed clear that the use was overwhelmingly by local people. In the circumstances, I am entitled to hold that the use of the Parish Hall falls within at least the first part of the authorised use. I may add, for what it is worth, that the Minutes of the 1941 Meeting, already referred to, indicate that the Marchioness of Abergavenny (the wife of the potential revertee, who was present at the meeting) was pleased to donate a sum of money for the purchase of a hot plate to be used for community jam-making. This suggests that those most closely concerned with the terms of the 1893 Deed themselves appear to have thought that this use fell within the authorised purposes. This accords with common sense and was no doubt entirely consistent with the spirit of the original gift, in 1893: the Parish Hall was the obvious available space for parish or community activities generally.

 

22. The next question is perhaps more difficult. If the Hall has been used as a Parish Room, but not as a Reading Room, is the user outwith the scope of the 1893 Deed? It is true to say that the uses referred to in the Hollands’ evidence do not include that of a Reading Room, in the sense of a library type of facility. Reading does of course take place there, but that does not make it a Reading Room. If both limbs of the authorised use must be carried on at all times, that is clearly not the case. If that is the correct construction of the clause, there must have been a reverter at some point after 1976. Alternatively, if the Hall may be used for one of the specified purposes only – or if the description “Parish Club and Reading Room” is intended to identify one composite use – then reverter would not have occurred. My inclination would be to find that the second construction is correct. Reverter is a draconian outcome, and it seems anomalous to me that the parties could have intended that the gift would be revoked merely because one of the two specified activities fell into disuse, if the community was continuing to benefit from the other activity. Putting the opposite case, if the Hall were being used as a Reading Room only, it would seem perverse that this should effect a reverter, when one of the expressed purpose of the 1854 Act is to “afford greater facilities for the Establishment of Institutions for the Promotion of Literature..” If I had to make a finding on this point, I would therefore conclude that the cesser of one of the two named authorised purposes did not effect a reverter. Alternatively, that the description was a composite one intended to include the permitted activities but not require that both should be carried on. I would add at this point that no authority was cited to me in this connection, which has not assisted me in reaching a conclusion. However, for reasons I explain below, I do not need to make any definitive ruling on this point.

 

23. The second limb of the reverter argument relates to the alleged cesser of the Trustees’ control of the management of the site. A reverter will occur when the premises ..”cease to remain vested in or under the sole control of the said Trustees or any new Trustees to be appointed as hereinafter mentioned..”. The Respondent argues that this cesser occurred in 1958, and relies primarily on the evidence contained in the letter from Mr Freelove to which I have already referred. It is contended that Lord Abergavenny called a meeting of the villagers in that year, and asked them to form a new committee to manage the Parish Room. There is no evidence that the Incumbent or Churchwardens of the Parish was present at this time, nor that any of the trustees appointed by the 1893 Deed were (if still living). The Respondent invites me to infer that Lord Abergavenny must therefore have considered himself entitled to take control, because a reverter had already occurred. Accordingly, it is said that at this point in time at the latest, the Parish Hall moved from the control of the Trustees and into the control of Lord Abergavenny, and, through him, into the control of the Management Committee. This inference is supported, the Respondent argues, by the terms of the 1968 Conveyance by the same Lord Abergavenny, in which he purports to dispose of the Parish Hall to his brother Lord Rupert Nevill. He would not have included the Parish Room in the conveyance, it is said, unless he had been aware that the reverter had occurred and therefore that he could make title to the land.

 

24. I must therefore consider whether the arrangements made in 1958 demonstrated that the Parish Room at that point ceased to remain vested in or under the sole control of the Trustees of the 1893 Deed. If so, the reverter will have occurred then if it had not already done so. By 1958, I assume that all the Trustees who were initially appointed in 1893 had died. There is no evidence that any new appointments had been made. Strictly, I think, the legal estate will have vested in the personal representatives of the last Trustee to die. However, the 1893 Deed also provides that the Incumbent and Churchwardens of the Parish are “ex officio” trustees. I am not clear as to how this is meant to operate. Such persons are clearly entitled to be appointed as trustees, but I am not sure that the land could be said to be “vested” in them in the absence of some vesting instrument. This formulation could, therefore, give rise to some difficulty, in deciding whether the Hall was indeed vested in the Trustees by 1958. The second limb of the reverter – the necessity for “sole control” by the Trustees – is however much clearer. There can be little doubt what this means. The Hall ceases to be in the “sole control” of the Trustees if, for instance, there is even a sharing of responsibility for the management of the Parish Hall with another party.

 

25. I shall now turn to the events of 1958. Our knowledge is almost entirely derived from the letters I have referred to above. There was also some evidence from the Hollands, to the effect that they understood that in 1958 Mr Freelove had taken over as Chairman of the Committee from Lord Abergavenny. My analysis of the events is as follows. In 1940 there was a decision to delegate the management of the Hall to a Sub-Committee. This was followed by the curious, unilateral, deed executed in January 1941 by Lord Abergavenny, in which he confirms that management of the Hall is vested in the Committee. There is no evidence as to what occurred between 1941 and 1958. By 1958, it appears that there were numerous vacancies on the Committee and Lord Abergavenny (the successor to the Fourth Marquess who had executed the 1941 deed) wished to retire from the Chairmanship of the Committee. It seems to me that in asking for “new” committee members, he was simply asking for parishioners or others to fill the existing vacancies. There is no evidence that any new committee was set up ab initio, and no good reason for considering that the 1958 Committee was anything other than a rejuvenated continuation of the Management Committee originally set up in 1940. Lord Abergavenny handed over the reins to Mr Freelove and the Committee continued to manage the Hall. However, there is no evidence that the Incumbent or any Churchwardens were present at the meeting, nor that they were consulted in any way prior to the meeting or indeed afterwards. According to the Hollands, at least since 1976 the management of the Hall has been conducted without reference to any other person or body, other than those attending the AGM. There is no reason to believe that the position was any different prior to that date. The whole point of the original establishment of the Committee was to vest the day to day management of the Parish Hall in a sub-committee. Although it was originally envisaged that the Committee would report to the PCC, this seems to have been diluted by the 1941 Deed and, in practice, at least by 1958 and thereafter, the Committee was autonomous, answerable only to the community at an Annual General Meeting. Subsequently it applied for registration as a charity, submitted returns to the Charity Commission, raised funds from various public bodies, and carried out extensive works of improvement and extension to the building. It must follow, I think, that the Trustees – both those originally appointed in 1893 and their successors by representation, and the so-called “ex officio” trustees – ceased to be in “sole control” of the Parish Hall certainly no later than 1958, as the Respondent submits.

 

26. At that point, therefore, the land reverted to the Abergavenny Settled Estates. That means, I think, that it reverted to the then life tenant, namely the Fifth Marquess. In 1968 he disposed of the Parish Hall (together with a great deal of other land) to his brother, Lord Rupert Nevill, who became the tenant for life of the Abergavenny Settlement. It seems that Lord Rupert Nevill conveyed the Parish Hall to the Respondent some time in the 1990’s. As I have already stated, the Respondent became the registered proprietor on first registration in 1996 or thereabouts. I therefore accept the Respondent’s submission that when the Fifth Marquess disposed of the Parish Hall in 1968, he did indeed have title to it, whether he realised it or not.

 

27. However, that does not conclude the matter. As I have said, the Management Committee assumed control of the Parish Hall no later than 1958. It did not do so, in my judgment, “on behalf of” Lord Abergavenny as the Respondent submits. Although it appears from the evidence, such as it is, that he convened a meeting of the village in 1958 in order to rejuvenate the Parish Hall Committee, there is no evidence that he did so other than in his capacity of Chairman. It may be that the Fifth Marquess simply recognised his position as the successor of the original grantor, and in effect the Patron of the Parish Hall. However, there is no evidence that he regarded himself as the owner of the Parish Hall. Such evidence as exists as to how he considered his status – and I have referred to this evidence above – strongly suggests that he did not consider that there had been a reverter. In particular, I have regard to the letter that he wrote to Mrs Holland on 16^th July 1999, coupled with the evidence of Mr and Mrs Holland with regard to what he said at the meeting in 1976. These indications strongly suggest that he did not consider that the estate had reverted to him in 1958 or at any other time. In my view, the overwhelming likelihood is that when he retired from the Committee in 1958, all parties continued to believe that the trusts of the 1893 Deed continued. This remained the understanding of the relevant parties until well into the 1990’s – indeed, as far as the Fifth Marquess was concerned, until his death. It is perfectly true that the Fifth Marquess continued to take an interest in the affairs of the Parish Hall after 1958, as one would expect someone in his position to do, but there is noting to indicate that he did so in the capacity of an owner. Indeed, after 1968 he ceased to be the paper title owner by virtue of the 1968 Conveyance. When he called the meeting in 1972 at which Mr and Mrs Holland became Committee members, he had no status as owner of the land, but probably acted out of a sense of responsibility to the local community. He remained the holder of the Abergavenny title, but not of the Parish Hall.

 

28. Mr Furber QC relies on the terms of the 1968 Conveyance, whereby the Parish Hall was conveyed by the Fifth Marquess. It is said that he must therefore have believed that the reverter had taken place. In view of his direct statement in the 1999 letter, and the other evidence, I do not consider that this inference is correct. It is perfectly possible, indeed likely, that a mistake was made. After all, the 1968 Conveyance deals with a great number of parcels of land, and it is quite possible that the trusts affecting the Parish Hall were simply overlooked. The Parish Hall was built in 1885 but was not granted to the Trustees until 1893. It may well have formed part of the Settled Estate from 1885, and the schedules to the 1968 Conveyance simply reflected the historic position. Whether or not a reverter had occurred in 1958, it seems to me that all relevant parties conducted themselves thereafter on the basis that the 1893 trusts remained on foot.

 

29. I must now consider whether this has any implications for the parties. For the reasons I have given, I find that as from 1958 the Management Committee operated as an autonomous entity, effectively managing the Parish Hall as sole owners. The members conducted themselves as owners would do, renting out the Hall (and the Adjoining Land) for suitable purposes, using the income, and funding and carrying out extensive works of repair and improvement. They were not answerable to anyone else, and certainly not to Lord Abergavenny. The Committee, or rather an officer thereof, kept the keys of the Parish Hall. What is abundantly clear is that the Committee did not regard any other person or body as entitled to operate the Hall, or deal with it as owner.

 

30. The Committee did not however consider itself to be the beneficial owners. The evidence, culminating in the very applications to the Land Registry which gave rise to this dispute, is consistent on this score. For example, Mr Freelove makes clear in his Statutory Declaration dated 14^th July 2004 that he believed that the Management Committee held the Parish Hall as “defacto trustees” on the terms of the 1893 Deed. The Charity Commission itself accepted that the Committee were “de facto” trustees – see the letter dated 2^nd May 2000 [C 13]. Other witnesses, and some of the documentation, refer indiscriminately to the Committee as the Trustees of the Hall. Their self-perceived status is apparent from the fact that the Applicants have applied to be registered in their capacity as trustees of the Eridge Village Hall. Of course, their belief that they are trustees of the 1893 Deed is mistaken for two reasons. First, because the land had reverted to the Abergavenny Settled Estate no later than 1958. Secondly, because, as a matter of law, the land was (prior to reverter) vested in the personal representatives of the last appointed trustee, alternatively in the “ex officio” trustees named in the 1893 Deed, namely the Vicar and Churchwardens. On any footing, the Management Committee members were not legal trustees of the 1893 Deed, and the expression “de facto trustees” has no legal status.

 

31. In my judgment, and subject to resolving the point I refer to below, the Management Committee had barred the title of the true owners of the Parish Hall by 1970, or possibly 1974 at the latest, by means of adverse possession of the Hall itself. Since the Reverter of Sites Act 1987 was not retrospective in effect, I can ignore its provisions for these purposes. As I have explained, the manner in which the Committee operated the Hall amounted in my judgment to factual possession. The fact that the Committee members mistakenly considered themselves to be the owners of the Hall, albeit as trustees on the trusts of the 1893 Deed, does not deprive them of the necessary animus possidendi. Indeed, such a mistaken belief may be the strongest indication of an intention to possess, since the squatter must in those circumstances necessarily intend to exclude the paper owner: see Jourdan on Adverse Possession at paragraph 9-13 and the cases referred to. If the reverter occurred in 1958, the property vested in the Fifth Marquess, the then tenant for life. In 1968 the property passed to Lord Rupert Nevill pursuant to the 1968 Conveyance. As a reversioner, he may have been entitled to the benefit of the extended limitation period available to reversioners [U2]  under Section 7(4) of the Limitation Act 1939, in which case the period expired 6 years after he became entitled, in 1968. On any footing the limitation period expired in 1974 or thereabouts. From that time onwards, the paper owner’s title was barred.

 

32. However, there is a question as to whether an unincorporated body such as the Management Committee is able to acquire title by adverse possession. Little if any argument was addressed to me on this point, and I was not taken to any case law. It is clear that an inchoate body of persons, such as the inhabitants of a Parish, cannot acquire title – see Norwich Corporation v Brown (1883) 48 LT 898 at 900. The rationale is that it is not possible for a number of individuals, who do not themselves have possession of the land, to aggregate their disparate user. “….the possession must not be in one man one day, and in another another.” On the other hand, it is possible for one or more persons to have joint possession of land: see Jourdan at 7-37. Indeed, in another context it was held in Hills (Patents) Ltd v UCH Board of Governors [1956] 1 QB 90 that a hospital board of governors could be both in occupation and possession of land.

 

33. It seems to me that there is no good reason why the Committee of Management of the Eridge Parish Hall – a body which has charitable status and which has consistently managed the Hall as owner since 1958 – should not be regarded as having been in possession of the Hall during that period. This situation is not like the one in the Norwich Corporation v Brown case: here, the Committee is in collective and continuous possession of the land throughout the required period. The Committee of course can only occupy through the medium of individual committee members, who, as in the normal case of unincorporated associations, may hold the land on trust for the association, or simply for the purposes of the association. In the present case the application to the Land Registry was made by three members of the Committee: if their application were to succeed, their title would have to reflect the fact that they held the property not beneficially but on whatever charitable trusts affect the Parish Hall. Since the 1893 Deed has terminated, and the Committee are not the trustees, I do not consider that they are holding on the trusts of that instrument. However, that is not an issue which I need to resolve. An alternative way of looking at the matter is to regard the individual committee members as being in possession. On this basis, it is clear that Mr Freelove, for instance, was in possession from 1958 until his death in 2004. Squatters may rely on successive periods of adverse possession, provided that each successive occupier is authorised by his predecessor – Jourdan at 6-38. As each Committee member is replaced by another, I do not see why the periods of their possession cannot be aggregated. This outcome is, in my view, common sense.

 

34. Accordingly, I hold that the members of the Management Committee, both collectively and individually, shared possession of the Parish Hall from 1958 until the present day. By 1974 at the latest, therefore, they acquired title to the land on which the Parish Hall was built – being the land now registered under Title No ESX214291 – by adverse possession. I do not think it could seriously be alleged that the quality of possession enjoyed by the Committee during this period was not adverse to that of the paper owner.

 

35. That is sufficient to dispose of the application insofar as it relates to the Parish Hall itself. The Applicants also lay claim to the Adjoining Land. This was never subject to the trusts of the 1893 Deed. The Applicants’ evidence as to its use has not been challenged. The land has used by the Committee since the early 1960s for functions and other village purposes. It was levelled and fenced by the Committee and at its expense. Accordingly, I find that the Committee has been in uninterrupted possession of it since some time in the early 1960’s, without the permission of the paper owner, initially the Fifth Marquess and then Lord Rupert Nevill until he disposed of it to the Respondent, thereafter occupying it on a leaseback arrangement. Again, the Committee used the Adjoining Land as an adjunct to the Parish Hall, and the members did not consider that it was owned by them beneficially. Having regard to the undisputed evidence, I find that Committee acquired title to the Adjoining Land by adverse possession by no later than 1977 (a maximum of 12 years after 1965). The Applicants, as representatives of the Committee, are entitled to be registered as proprietors. Again, they hold the land on the same trusts and for the same purposes as they hold the Parish Hall.

 

36. Although there has been some reliance by the Respondent on correspondence in the 1980’s and 1990’s as amounting to an acknowledgment of title – which would stop time running – it is clear that title had already been barred by that time. Any acknowledgment – even if it existed, which I very much doubt – would be too late to have any legal effect.

 

37. In conclusion, therefore, I direct that the Chief Land Registrar should give effect to both of the Applications made on 1^st November 2004. Perhaps I should also record the fact that Lord Abergavenny, who gave evidence before me, was anxious to stress that the Respondent, in resisting the applications, did not wish to obtain any personal benefit from the land in question. He said that the Respondent, and the Nevill family, was simply concerned to ensure that the continued use of the Parish Hall – which he did not object to – should be placed on a “more modern” footing, in his words. He also made it clear that he did not have any reservations as to the probity or personal qualities of the Applicants or the Committee generally, or the way in which the Committee has managed the Hall over the years. There was certainly nothing in the evidence which could have supported such a view. It is true that there have been past attempts to resolve this issue by agreement, which have involved the Charity Commission, the Sussex Rural Community Council, the Diocese of Chichester, as well as the parties and their advisors. It is a matter of regret that agreement was not possible, but I am not in a position to make any findings as to who was to blame for that, nor would it be appropriate for me to do so even if I had sufficient evidence before me. However, I very much hope that this Decision will now lay the matter to rest once and for all, and in future allow the Parish Hall to be used for the benefit of the village, in accordance with the past generosity of the Nevill family as manifested both by the original gift, and by the close interest taken and the financial support given by subsequent generations of that family.

 

 

 

Dated Friday 6^th October 2006

 

 

 

 

By Order of The Adjudicator to HM Land Registry