BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT (QBD)
Royal Courts of Justice Rolls Building London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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ECO WORLD – BALLYMORE EMBASSY GARDENS COMPANY LIMITED |
Claimant |
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DOBLER UK LIMITED |
Defendant |
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James Bowling (instructed by Fladgate LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 26th January 2021
Further submissions: 18th & 30th March 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
"Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to BAILII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be Tuesday 3rd August 2021 at 10:30am"
Mrs Justice O'Farrell:
The Contract
i) Articles of Agreement;
ii) Trade Contract Particulars;
iii) The JCT 2011 Construction Management Trade Contract ("the Conditions"), subject to a schedule of modifications.
"the work referred to in the Agreement, as more particularly shown, described or referred to in the Trade Contract Documents, which is to be carried out by the Trade Contractor as part of the Project, including any changes made to that work in accordance with this Trade Contract."
"the design, supply and installation of facade and glazing works (the "Works") for Building A04 as part of the design and construction of Buildings A03, A04 and A05, Embassy Gardens Phase 2, Nine Elms, London SW8 5BA (the "Project")."
i) Block A is twenty-three storeys in height and provides one hundred and seventy-nine high value residential apartments and penthouses;
ii) Blocks B and C provide eighty affordable housing units over ten-storeys.
"the period for completion of the Works or such works in a Section as stated in Part 3 of the Trade Contract Particulars (item 6) or as revised in accordance with these Conditions."
"The Works shall be carried out and completed in accordance with the programme details stated in Part 3 of the Trade Contract Particulars and regularly and diligently and in such order, and at such time or times and in such manner as the Construction Manager shall instruct, subject, as respects construction but not design work, to receipt by the Trade Contractor of notice to commence work in accordance with those particulars and subject to clauses 2.25 to 2.28. If the Trade Contractor is in breach of the foregoing he shall without prejudice to and pending the final determination or agreement between the parties as to the amount of such loss or damage (if any) suffered or to be suffered by the Employer in consequence thereof forthwith pay or allow to the Employer such sum as the Employer shall bona fide estimate as the amount of such loss or damage such estimate to be binding and conclusive upon the Trade Contractor until such final determination or agreement."
"The Construction Manager shall permit the Trade Contractor to occupy so much of the site of the Project as is reasonably required for the execution of the Works, but such occupation shall not be exclusive and the Trade Contractor shall not object to the use or occupation of that part of the site by any other person engaged by the Employer on or in connection with the Project unless such use or occupation will or is likely to cause or contribute to any delay or obstruction of the Trade Contractor in the execution of the Works."
".1 The Trade Contractor shall give the Construction Manager not less than 10 (ten) Business Days' notice of the date upon which the Trade Contractor considers that the Works in any Section will be complete. The Construction Manager and representatives of the Funder shall be entitled to inspect the Works …
.2 The Construction Manager shall, within 10 (ten) Business Days of any inspection made pursuant to clause 2.31.1, notify the Trade Contractor of any outstanding matters which require to be attended to before the Works in the relevant Section can be considered to be complete in accordance with the Trade Contract Documents and the Trade Contractor shall attend to such matters …
.3 The Construction Manager shall issue a certificate as to the date when practical completion of the Works shall be deemed to have taken place for all purposes of the Trade Contract …"
"2.32.1 If the Trade Contractor fails to complete the Works or works in a Section by the relevant Date for Completion of a Section or the Works, the Employer may, not later than 5 days before the final date for payment of the amount payable under clause 4.16, give notice to the Trade Contractor which shall state that for the period between the relevant Date for Completion of a Section or the Works and the date of practical completion of the Works or Section that:
2.32.1.1 he requires the Trade Contractor to pay liquidated damages at the rate stated in the Trade Contract Particulars, or lesser rate stated in the notice, in which event the Employer may recover the same as a debt; and/or
2.32.1.2 that he will withhold or deduct liquidated damages at the rate stated in the Trade Contract Particulars, or at such lesser stated rate, from sums due to the Trade Contractor.
2.32.2 If the Employer intends to withhold or deduct all or any of the liquidated damages payable, an appropriate Pay Less Notice must be given by or on behalf of the Employer. "
"The following rates of liquidated damages will apply for the first 4 weeks (inclusive) of delay in completion of the Works beyond the Date for Completion:
• £nil per week or pro rata for part of a week.
Liquidated damages will apply thereafter at the rate of £25,000 per week (or pro rata for part of a week) up to an aggregate maximum of 7% of the final Trade Contract Sum…"
"If at any time or times prior to the date of issue by the Construction Manager of the certificate of practical completion for the Works or such works in a Section that the Employer wishes to take over any part or parts of the Works or such works in a Section, then, notwithstanding anything expressed or implied elsewhere in this Trade Contract, the Employer may take over such part or parts. The Construction Manager shall thereupon give the Trade Contractor notice identifying the part or parts taken over and giving the date when the Employer took over those part or parts ("the Relevant Part" and "the Relevant Date" respectively)."
"For the purpose of clauses 2.36 and 4.21.2, practical completion of the Relevant Part shall be deemed to have occurred on the Relevant Date."
"As from the Relevant Date the insurance obligations of the Employer other than the defects liability protection referred to in paragraph 1.2 of Schedule 3 shall terminate in respect of the Relevant Part (but not otherwise)."
".1 If any defects, shrinkages or other faults in the Works or such works in a Section appear prior to the Final Release Date due to materials, goods or workmanship not in accordance with this Trade Contract … or any failure of the Trade Contractor to comply with his obligations in respect of the Trade Contractor's Design Portion:
.1 such defects, shrinkages and other faults shall be specified by the Construction Manager in a schedule of defects which he shall deliver to the Trade Contractor as an instruction not later than 14 days after the Final Release Date; and
.2 notwithstanding clause 2.36.1.1, the Construction Manager may whenever he considers it necessary issue instructions requiring any such defect, shrinkage or other fault to be made good, provided no instructions under this clause 2.36.1.2 shall be issued after delivery of a schedule of defects or more than 14 days after the Final Release Date.
.2 Within the period specified in such schedule or instructions, the defects, shrinkages and other faults shall at no cost to the Employer be made good by the Trade Contractor …
unless the Construction Manager shall otherwise instruct …"
The Works
"3.1.3 The Parties hereby agree that the 30 April 2018 shall be the new completion date for the Works (including the Revised Scope) ("New Completion Date"). The term New Completion Date shall have the meaning of "Completion Period" where stated in the Trade Contract."
"5.2 Liquidated damages at the rates stated in the Contract Particulars may only be levied by the Employer from the New Completion Date onwards where applicable pursuant to the Trade Contract.
5.3 Any delay to the Trade Contractor from the Effective Date onwards that delays completion of the Works (as revised by the Revised Scope) past the New Completion Date are to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Contract."
The adjudications
i) the value of the final Trade Contract Sum was £9,972,627.86,
ii) EWB was entitled to liquidated damages for delay beyond the New Completion Date up to the date on which it took over part of the works;
iii) on 15 June 2018 EWB took partial occupation Blocks B and C, which amounted to deemed practical completion of those blocks and liquidated damages could not be levied after that date;
iv) Dobler was entitled to an extension of time up to 25 June 2018 and, therefore, no liquidated damages were payable.
i) he was bound by the decision in adjudication 2 that contractual liquidated damages applied up to practical completion of Blocks B and C on 15 June 2018 but not thereafter;
ii) the liquidated damages provision was not uncertain or unenforceable as a penalty; it was an exhaustive remedy for delay, excluding any entitlement on the part of EWB to general damages;
iii) EWB must pay Dobler £598,135.71 plus VAT, the sum due in respect of payment application 30.
The proceedings
i) Are the liquidated damages provisions in clause 2.32.1 void and/or unenforceable?
ii) If so, is EWB entitled to claim general damages for delay and, if so, are any recoverable damages limited by reference to the void and/or unenforceable provisions of clause 2.32.1?
i) The liquidated damages provisions in clause 2.32.1 are void and/or unenforceable.
ii) The Claimant is therefore entitled to claim general damages for delay.
iii) The recoverable damages are not limited by reference to the void and/or unenforceable provisions of clause 2.32.1.
iv) The conclusion in the Second Adjudication Decision, to the effect that the Claimant was (in principle) entitled to liquidated damages in accordance with clause 2.32.1 up to the date on which the Claimant took over part of the Works, but not thereafter, is wrong and is not binding on the parties.
v) The conclusion in the Third Adjudication Decision, to the effect that the Claimant was not entitled to claim general damages for delay, is wrong and is not binding on the parties. Consequently, the Claimant is entitled to pursue a claim for general damages for delay and Mr Harris's valuation of Application 30 and his order that the Defendant pay £598,135.71 (plus VAT and interest) to the Claimant is not binding on the parties.
Parties submissions
Whether the liquidated damages provision is void and/or unenforceable
"[31] In our opinion, the law relating to penalties has become the prisoner of artificial categorisation, itself the result of unsatisfactory distinctions: between a penalty and genuine pre-estimate of loss, and between a genuine pre-estimate of loss and a deterrent. These distinctions originate in an over-literal reading of Lord Dunedin's four tests and a tendency to treat them as almost immutable rules of general application which exhaust the field… The real question when a contractual provision is challenged as a penalty is whether it is penal, not whether it is a pre-estimate of loss. These are not natural opposites or mutually exclusive categories. A damages clause may be neither or both. The fact that the clause is not a pre-estimate of loss does not therefore, at any rate without more, mean that it is penal. To describe it as a deterrent (or, to use the Latin equivalent, in terrorem) does not add anything. A deterrent provision in a contract is simply one species of provision designed to influence the conduct of the party potentially affected. It is no different in this respect from a contractual inducement. Neither is it inherently penal or contrary to the policy of the law. The question whether it is enforceable should depend on whether the means by which the contracting party's conduct is to be influenced are "unconscionable" or (which will usually amount to the same thing) "extravagant" by reference to some norm.
[32] The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin's four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity. But compensation is not necessarily the only legitimate interest that the innocent party may have in the performance of the defaulter's primary obligations.
[33] The penalty rule is an interference with freedom of contract. It undermines the certainty which parties are entitled to expect of the law. Diplock LJ was neither the first nor the last to observe that "The court should not be astute to descry a 'penalty clause'": Robophone at p 1447. As Lord Woolf said, speaking for the Privy Council in Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, 59, "the court has to be careful not to set too stringent a standard and bear in mind that what the parties have agreed should normally be upheld", not least because "[a]ny other approach will lead to undesirable uncertainty especially in commercial contracts.
…
[35] … In a negotiated contract between properly advised parties of comparable bargaining power, the strong initial presumption must be that the parties themselves are the best judges of what is legitimate in a provision dealing with the consequences of breach."
"What is necessary in each case is to consider, first, whether any (and if so what) legitimate business interest is served and protected by the clause, and, second, whether, assuming such an interest to exist, the provision made for the interest is nevertheless in the circumstances extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable. In judging what is extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable, I consider (despite contrary expressions of view) that the extent to which the parties were negotiating at arm's length on the basis of legal advice and had every opportunity to appreciate what they were agreeing must at least be a relevant factor."
"I therefore conclude that the correct test for a penalty is whether the sum or remedy stipulated as a consequence of a breach of contract is exorbitant or unconscionable when regard is had to the innocent party's interest in the performance of the contract. Where the test is to be applied to a clause fixing the level of damages to be paid on breach, an extravagant disproportion between the stipulated sum and the highest level of damages that could possibly arise from the breach would amount to a penalty and thus be unenforceable. In other circumstances the contractual provision that applies on breach is measured against the interest of the innocent party which is protected by the contract and the court asks whether the remedy is exorbitant or unconscionable."
"… Parties agree a liquidated damages clause so as to provide a remedy that is predictable and certain for a particular event (here, as often, that event is a delay in completion). The employer does not then have to quantify its loss, which may be difficult and time-consuming for it to do…"
Also, per Lord Leggatt at [74]:
"A liquidated damages clause is a clause in a contract which stipulates what amount of money will be payable as damages for loss caused by a breach of the contract irrespective of what loss may actually be suffered if a breach of the relevant kind (typically, delay in performance of the contract) occurs. Liquidated damages clauses are a standard feature of major construction and engineering contracts and commonly provide for damages to be payable at a specified rate for each week or day of delay in the completion of work by the contractor after the contractual completion date has passed. Such a clause serves two useful purposes. First, establishing what financial loss delay has caused the employer would often be an intractable task capable of giving rise to costly disputes. Fixing in advance the damages payable for such delay avoids such difficulty and cost. Second, such a clause limits the contractor's exposure to liability of an otherwise unknown and open-ended kind, while at the same time giving the employer certainty about the amount that it will be entitled to recover as compensation. Each party is therefore better able to manage the risk of delay in the completion of the project."
Keating on Construction Contracts (11th Edition) (2021) at paragraph 10-023:
"Difficulties can arise where a single sum is stipulated for liquidated damages but the works are to be completed in sections at different times or where the employer takes possession of part of the works before completion of the whole. Unless there are effective provisions for dividing the single sum between the sections or reducing it in proportion to the part taken into possession, a claim for liquidated damages will fail."
Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (14th Edition) (2020) at paragraph 6-024:
"… in the absence of a properly completed contractual mechanism for sectional completion and accompanying liquidated damages, it has been held the liquidated damages clauses are liable to be rendered inoperable or invalidated through the Employer taking possession of a section of the works. Unless there are effective provisions for dividing the single sum between the sections or reducing it in proportion to the part taken into possession, a claim for liquidated damages will fail."
"In lieu of any sum to be paid or allowed by the Contractor under clause 22 of these Conditions in respect of any period during which the works may remain incomplete occurring after the date on which the Employer shall have taken possession of the relevant part there shall be paid or allowed such sum as bears the same ratio to the sum which would be paid or allowed apart from the provisions of this Condition as does the Contract Sum less the total value of the relevant part to the Contract Sum."
The intention was that where parts of the works were taken into possession by consent, the sum to be paid or allowed as liquidated damages should be proportionately reduced on the basis of the value of the occupied part relative to the full contract sum. The court found that the provision was inoperable by reason of the inconsistency between clause 16(e) and the Appendix; the calculation required in clause 16(e) could not be carried out by reference to a rate per uncompleted dwelling, rather than a specific rate for the whole of the works, particularly in circumstances where the works were not confined to the construction of the dwellings.
"Mr Stimpson's argument may I hope be summarised as follows. The "Works" cover not only the houses but the other items above referred to. Condition 22 refers to a failure "to complete the Works" by the extended date. As from that date the employer becomes entitled to liquidated damages until the Works are completed. Clause 16 deals with the consensual taking of possession of part of the Works. Condition 16(e) provides for the sum payable after taking possession in respect of the period during which the Works remain incomplete. The way in which the liquidated damages are dealt with is set out in the Appendix. This does not allow of the calculation to be made which is required by Condition 16(e), and one cannot operate the Appendix and Condition 16(e) in the circumstances of this case. The inconsistency can only be reconciled if provision is made in the contract for sectional completion of those parts which are taken over and to which specific liquidated damages provisions are applied …
There is no doubt that the applicants' argument is a very technical one, but I think that it is correct …
I think one must read and give effect to both conditions. I do not think one can avoid the conclusion that Condition 16(e) would apply to the present situation, and it does not seem to be consistent with the liquidated damages as set out in the Appendix.
It would of course be open to the parties to have made appropriate provision in the contract itself so as to deal with the situation …
It seems to me, therefore, that in the absence of any provision for sectional completion in this contract, the respondents were not entitled to claim or deduct liquidated damages as provided in the Appendix."
"It follows inexorably that if for the purposes of clause 24 the contents of any section were not ascertained in the contract, or any mechanism agreed between the parties whereby they could be ascertained, there is no basis for triggering the operation of clause 24 since it would be uncertain what had remained undone and when. The arbitrator so found. In my judgment his construction of the contract was correct. Clause 24 was void for uncertainty; it was incapable of operation. Clause 17.1.4 was inoperable. By virtue of that, where partial possession was given, the proportionate relief from any LADs on the section was incapable of calculation. Any LADs, referred as they were to living units, however comprised, would not bear a proper relationship to the extent of the section not take into possession."
Alternative argument as to clause 2.32
"liquidated damages at the rate stated in the Trade Contract Particulars, or lesser rate stated in the notice."
"[18] Contractual terms in which one party to the contract is given the power to exercise a discretion, or to form an opinion as to relevant facts, are extremely common. It is not for the courts to re-write the parties' bargain for them, still less to substitute themselves for the contractually agreed decision-maker. Nevertheless, the party who is charged with making decisions which affect the rights of both parties to the contract has a clear conflict of interest. That conflict is heightened where there is a significant imbalance of power between the contracting parties as there often will be in an employment contract. The courts have therefore sought to ensure that such contractual powers are not abused. They have done so by implying a term as to the manner in which such powers may be exercised, a term which may vary according to the terms of the contract and the context in which the decision-making power is given.
[21] … In Paragon Finance plc v Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1466, [2002] 1 WLR 685, the court had to consider whether there was any implied term limiting the power of a mortgagee to set interest rates under a variable rate mortgage. Dyson LJ had no difficulty in holding (at paras 32 to 36) that it was necessary, in order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties, to imply a term that the power would not be exercised dishonestly, for an improper purpose, capriciously or arbitrarily. He went on to discuss whether there should also be a term that the power would not be exercised unreasonably. He concluded that there had been a "somewhat reluctant" extension of the implied term to include "unreasonableness that is analogous to Wednesbury unreasonableness" (paras 37 to 42)."
[22] These authorities, together with Ludgate Insurance Co Ltd v Citibank NA [1998] Lloyd's Rep IR 221, 239-240, and Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1047, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 299, at paras 64, 67, 73, are helpfully summarised by Rix LJ in Socimer International Bank Ltd v Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 116, [2008] Bus LR 1304. In his conclusion, at para 66, he substitutes the more modern term "irrationality" for unreasonableness:
"It is plain from these authorities that a decision-maker's discretion will be limited, as a matter of necessary implication, by concepts of honesty, good faith, and genuineness, and the need for the absence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, perversity and irrationality. The concern is that the discretion should not be abused. Reasonableness and unreasonableness are also concepts deployed in this context, but only in a sense analogous to Wednesbury unreasonableness, not in the sense in which that expression is used when speaking of the duty to take reasonable care, or when otherwise deploying entirely objective criteria: as for instance when there might be an implication of a term requiring the fixing of a reasonable price, or a reasonable time. In the latter class of case, the concept of reasonableness is intended to be entirely mutual and thus guided by objective criteria. ... Laws LJ in the course of argument put the matter accurately, if I may respectfully agree, when he said that pursuant to the Wednesbury rationality test, the decision remains that of the decision-maker, whereas on entirely objective criteria of reasonableness the decision-maker becomes the court itself.""
"An important feature of the above line of authorities is that in each case the discretion did not involve a simple decision whether or not to exercise an absolute contractual right. The discretion involved making an assessment or choosing from a range of options, taking into account the interests of both parties. In any contract under which one party is committed to exercise such a discretion, there is an implied term. The precise formulation of that term has been variously expressed in the authorities. In essence, however, it is that the relevant party will not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or irrational manner. Such a term is extremely difficult to exclude, although I would not say it is utterly impossible to do so."
"[91] The discretion which is entrusted to the Trust in relation to service failure points and deductions in the present case is very different from the discretion which existed in the authorities discussed above. The Trust is a public authority delivering a vital service to vulnerable members of the public. It rightly demands high standards from all those with whom it contracts. There may, of course, be circumstances in which the Trust decides to award less than the full amount of service failure points or to deduct less than it is entitled to deduct from a monthly payment. Nevertheless the Trust could not be criticised if it awards the full number of service failure points or if it makes the full amount of any deduction which it is entitled to make. The discretion conferred by clause 5.8 simply permits the Trust to decide whether or not to exercise an absolute contractual right.
[92] There is no justification for implying into clause 5.8 a term that the Trust will not act in an arbitrary, irrational or capricious manner. If the Trust awards more than the correct number of service failure points or deducts more than the correct amount from any monthly payment, then there is a breach of the express provisions of clause 5.8. There is no need for any implied term to regulate the operation of clause 5.8."
"[113] … Although the Mid Essex case uses the expression "absolute contractual right" that is the result of a process of construction which takes account of the characteristics of the parties, the terms of the contract as a whole and the contractual context, not a starting point intrinsic to the term itself. It is only possible to say whether a term conferring a contractual choice on one party represents an absolute contractual right after that process of construction has been undertaken."
"[53] Absolute rights conferred by professionally drawn or standard form contracts including but not limited to absolute rights to terminate relationships and roles within relationships are an everyday feature of the contracts that govern commercial relationships and extending Braganza to such provisions would be an unwarranted interference in the freedom of parties to contract on the terms they choose, at any rate where there is no fiduciary relationship created by the agreement …"
If clause 2.32 is penal and/or unenforceable, whether any general damages are nevertheless "capped" at the level of liquidated damages otherwise payable
Keating (11th edition) at paragraph 10-029:
"There is authority in charterparty cases suggesting that a claimant can recover more than the agreed sum if it is held to be a penalty. On the other hand there are judicial indications to the contrary. It is suggested that the charterparty cases are special to the clauses in question, and that in construction contracts the question is open. It is submitted that it would be inequitable to permit an employer to avoid the effect of a provision which was penal in order to recover more. Further, where the nature of the clause is usually to limit the contractor's liability (as suggested above), there is every reason why the contractor should not be denied that limitation simply because the employer's estimate of its loss was not genuine."
Hudson (14th edition) at paragraph 6-050:
"Unless there is some independent reason why the Contractor should not have the benefit of an agreed limiting sum, restricting the Employer's general damages to the liquidated amount without further enquiry will secure any such benefit for the Contractor, if it exists, while removing the need to investigate the precise makeup of the liquidated sums. Nevertheless, while treating liquidated damages as a "cap" on general damages appears to have been recognised since the early cases, the point may be open and a more precise statement of its rationale in construction cases is still awaited."
Chitty on Contracts (33rd edition with supplement)(2020) at paragraph 26-243:
"A clause which is not a genuine pre-estimate, e.g. because it stipulates for more than the likely loss, and which is therefore a penalty, may be ignored if it is for less than the actual damage suffered. Where a charterparty contained the following clause: "[p]enalty for non-performance of this agreement proved damages, not exceeding estimated amount of freight", it was held that the clause provided a penalty and not a limitation of liability, so that the party complaining of non-performance was entitled to recover damages for his actual loss although it exceeded the estimated amount of freight. It is unsettled whether this principle applies to penalty clauses in other types of contract, so as to entitle the claimant to ignore the sum stipulated as a penalty (where it was clearly not intended to limit liability) and to sue for damages for a greater amount to compensate him for his actual loss."
McGregor on Damages (21st edition) (2021) at paragraph 16-029:
"Just as the penalty cannot augment his damages so too the claimant will not be restricted to the penalty in the rare cases where it is less than the actual damage… It was early held in Winter v Trimmer, and again in Harrison v Wright, that the claimant could ignore this penal stipulation and recover for his greater loss. The same result was reached in the last century in Wall v Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude where Bailhache J retraced the law in a very useful judgment which remains the clearest authority for the present rule. However the wording of the clause had become more complex and the earlier cases provide more useful illustrations of circumstances in which a penalty is likely to turn out less than the actual damage. The decision itself was approved soon after as to its interpretation of the particular clause as a penalty by the House of Lords in Watts v Mitsui, and, as Scrutton LJ pointed out in Widnes Foundry v Cellulose Acetate Silk Co, Lord Sumner clearly took the view that "the clause did not prevent the shipowners or charterers from recovering the actual amount of damage, though it might be more than the estimated amount of freight". In view of this line of authority, the occasional dicta which state that the penalty marks the ceiling of recovery are unacceptable. They are probably based upon the historical fact that the sum in a penal bond fixed the maximum amount recoverable."
"You cannot under it recover more than the proved damages, and if proved damages exceed the penal sum you are restricted to the lower amount. As a penalty clause may be disregarded it is always disregarded and has become a dead letter, or from another point of view, a "brutum fulmen", as Blackburn J called it in Godard v Gray LR 6 QB at p 148."
"If this clause had appeared for the first time I think it might have been construed as imposing a limitation on the damages to be recovered, but the penalty clause is an old one with a settled meaning, and the intention, if it existed, to make so fundamental a change in its effect as is suggested ought to have been much more clearly shown in order to bind the other party to the contract.
In my opinion the judgments of Bailhache J. in the present and in the earlier case before him on this point were right."
"I have no doubt that clause 13 is a penalty clause and immaterial in the present case. … The whole matter has been fully and, if I may say so, admirably discussed by Bailhache J. in the recent case of Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude. Your Lordships decided the point in Ströms Bruks Aktie Bolag v. Hutchison upon a somewhat similar clause, and I think that the present case cannot really be distinguished. My only difficulty is to understand why such a provision should be inserted at all."
"I desire to leave open the question whether, where a penalty is plainly less in amount than the prospective damages, there is any legal objection to suing on it, or in a suitable case ignoring it and suing for damages."
"Where the court refuses to enforce a "penalty clause" of this nature, the injured party is relegated to his right to claim that lesser measure of damages to which he would have been entitled at common law for the breach actually committed if there had been no penalty clause in the contract.
I make no attempt, where so many others have failed, to rationalise this common law rule. It seems to be sui generis. The court has no general jurisdiction to re-form terms of a contract because it thinks them unduly onerous on one of the parties - otherwise we should not be so hard put to find tortuous constructions for exemption clauses, which are penalty clauses in reverse: we could simply refuse to enforce them. Again, it is by no means clear that "penalty clauses" are simply void, like covenants in unreasonable restraint of trade. There are dicta either way, and in Cellulose Acetate Silk v. Widnes Foundry Lord Atkins expressedly left open the question whether a penalty clause in a contract, which fixed a single sum as payable upon breach of a number of different terms of the contract, some of which breaches may occasion only trifling damage but others damage greater than the stipulated sum, would be treated as imposing a limit on the damages recoverable in an action for a breach in respect of which it operated to reduce the damages which would otherwise be recoverable at common law."
"[9] the penalty clause is wholly unenforceable … Deprived of the benefit of the provision, the innocent party is left to his remedy in damages under the general law.
…
[87] If, as the authorities show, the penal consequences of a contractual provision fall to be determined as at the time of the agreement, and a provision found to be a penalty is unenforceable, it is impossible to see how it can be enforceable on terms."
"In English law a penalty clause cannot be enforced. For the reasons given by Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption in their judgment (at paras 84-87) I think that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jobson v Johnston was incorrect in so far as it modified a penalty clause and should be overruled."
"Liquidated damages will apply … at the rate of £25,000 per week (or pro rata for part of a week) up to an aggregate maximum of 7% of the final Trade Contract Sum…"
Conclusion
i) The liquidated damages provision in clause 2.32.1 is valid and enforceable.
ii) If, contrary to the finding on issue i), the liquidated damages provision were void or unenforceable, EWB would be entitled to claim general damages for delay, subject to an overall cap of 7% of the final Trade Contract Sum, as a limitation of liability provision.