QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT |
Claimant |
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RAYTHEON SYSTEMS LIMITED |
Defendant |
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Joe Smouha QC and Emily Wood (instructed by Clifford Chance LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 16 January 2015
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Akenhead:
Remission or Setting Aside – The Law and Practice
"(3) If there is shown to be serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award, the court may—
(a) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration,
(b) set the award aside in whole or in part, or
(c) declare the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part.
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration."
"In a number of the situations set out in the Arbitration Act 1996, s 68(2), remission of the award to the arbitrators is the obvious remedy, eg, where the award is incomplete (ground (d)) or uncertain or ambiguous (ground (f)), where the award does not comply with statutory or agreed formal requirements (ground (h)) or where there is an admitted error in the award (ground (i)). Setting the award aside, possibly coupled with the removal of the arbitrators, may, however, be the only sensible option in exceptional circumstances whether serious irregularity relates to the conduct of the proceedings and there are further aggravating circumstances which render remission inappropriate. The pre-1996 authorities, particularly those under the 1996 Act, establish that the quashing of the award, with or without the removal of the arbitrators, will be appropriate in the following situations:
(a) Where there has been a serious miscarriage of justice affecting evidence and the arbitrators cannot reasonably be expected to be able to approach the matter afresh. The mere fact that the arbitrators have decided the case on inadmissible or undisclosed evidence will not necessarily have this result; much depends upon an objective view of what of what might be expected of the arbitrators on remission.
(b) Where one or both of the parties has justifiably lost confidence in the arbitrators in the light of the manner in which the arbitration has been conducted. The test of this matter, as laid down by the Court of Appeal in Hagop Ardahalian v Unifert International SA, the Elissar, is objective: do there exists grounds on which a reasonable person would think that there was a real likelihood that the arbitrator would not determine the issues according to the evidence? Possibility of lack of impartiality, in that the arbitrator has indicated that he favours one party over the other, is the most common reason for setting aside under this head, and the combined power to set aside the award…
(c) Where the outcome of remission would require a full hearing or re-hearing.
(d) Where remission would inevitably lead to the award being reversed.
(e) Where the conduct of the arbitrator is such as to show that, questions of partiality aside, he is, through lack of talent, experience or diligence, incapable of conducting the reference in a manner which the parties are entitled to expect:[Bremer Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v Ets Soules ey Cie [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 160, 164].
(f) Where the delay between the arbitration hearing and the outcome of the judicial proceedings is such that the parties and the arbitrators cannot reasonably be expected to remember what transpired that the original proceedings, a situation likely to give rise to further dispute in the absence of an entirely fresh hearing.
…An application to remove the tribunal may be successful if the parties have justifiably lost confidence in its ability to conduct the remitted proceedings fairly, although the mere fact that the tribunal is guilty of serious irregularity does not itself mean that confidence cannot be placed in it, particularly where the arbitrators are experienced and of high repute."
There are numerous authorities cross referred to in the above quotation, other than the Bremer case, some 20 relating to the period prior to the coming into effect of the Arbitration Act 1996 and only 6 relating to the period afterwards. Professor Merkel (rightly) does not suggest that the above is in some way an exclusive list. One may have to be somewhat cautious in relation to some cases from the pre-1996 Act period because it was not then a statutory prerequisite in the establishment of misconduct on the part of arbitrators that substantial injustice should have been caused, unlike the 1996 Act regime for serious irregularity.
"The matter has been debated whether this is a case where the Court should exercise its jurisdiction to set the award aside or merely to remit the award to the tribunal in whole for reconsideration.
I have come to the conclusion, however, that notwithstanding the provisions of s. 68(3), this is a place where it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration. In practice, the whole arbitration is going to have to be reopened and probably re-pleaded. There is probably going to have to be further evidence of a whole new series of submissions and orders made for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion on the question of liability.
In those circumstances, it seems to me that it would be quite wrong for the arbitrators to build anything on the structure of the award which they have already made and I have no doubt whatever that this is the paradigm of a case where the award ought to be set aside."
It is reasonably clear that this was not a case based on Section 68(2)(d), albeit that the judge did not specifically identify which ground of serious irregularity was relied upon.
"The question arises whether the award should be remitted or set aside. I make it plain that this is not a case where there has been any personal impropriety on the part of the board in any possible sense. It sometimes happens that a court may take the view that an essential matter has not been addressed and therefore there is in law a serious irregularity without imputing anything in any way personally censorious of the arbitrators concerned. I see no reason at all why the people who heard this appeal should not continue to deal with the matter.
But the question is whether, in the state of affairs the case has now reached, it is appropriate that there should be a fresh start or a reconsideration. I do think there are serious problems about a reconsideration. Reconsideration implies working upon the earlier material plus such supplementary submissions as may be allowed. The problem here is that, 12 months on from the appeal, I doubt whether anybody has a clear or reliable recollection of exactly how things were argued. The fact that there are now differences of recollection between those who represented the parties demonstrates that only too clearly.
This is not a case where there has been an award only part of which is under challenge. The challenge successfully has been to the whole of the award because of a failure to address the central point in the way which was required.
I think that in those circumstances justice requires that there should now be a clean start. For that reason, and not because of any suggestion of any personal impropriety on the part of the arbitrators, I think that the appropriate course is to set the award aside. [Counsel for Ascot] has indicated that Ascot will not seek to widen the points which it took on this appeal. If anybody is not content with that being publicly recorded, it could be put into the form of an undertaking. I doubt that that will be necessary."
"The arbitrator's misconduct of the proceedings in these respects mean that the award must, therefore, either be set aside or remitted for consideration in whole or in part. Consideration of the appropriate course in this regard is also linked with a further question of whether the arbitrators should be removed.…
The legal test is whether a reasonable person would no longer have confidence in the present arbitrator's ability to come to a fair and balanced conclusion on the issues if remitted. The arbitrator has, in the instant case, drawn conclusions from and about documentation and reached decisions on a number of factual issues which would, in my judgement, make it invidious and embarrassing for him to be required to try to free himself of all previous ideas and to redetermine the same issues on for the evidence.
As [Counsel] acknowledged, the present arbitrator is evidently conscientious and would, no doubt, apply every conscious effort to complete redetermination. But that exercise would, itself, in the circumstances, create its own undesirable tensions and pressures. Some costs will be wasted, although the respective statements of case will probably be capable of reuse.
I have come to the conclusion, (1) that what has gone wrong in this case is of a seriousness and nature that does require the whole interim award to be set aside - it is not possible to pick and choose aspects that might appear objectionable - and (2) that the appropriate course is to order the removal of the arbitrator with a view to appointment of a fresh arbitrator. I repeat that this is no reflection on his general competence and arises because it would, in the circumstances, be inappropriate to require him to try to redetermine what he has already once determined on a wrong basis."
"The question whether an arbitrator should be removed or the matter remitted to an arbitrator in the case of misconduct may well depend upon the answer to the objective question formulated by [Mance J] in Lovell Partnerships Northern…[at Page 99 quoted above]".
Although this case and the Lovell case were misconduct cases, I see no reason to believe that, where the Court forms the view, following a finding of serious irregularity under Section 68(2), that a reasonable person would no longer have confidence in the arbitrators' ability to come to a fair and balanced conclusion on the issues if remitted, that view may well underpin a conclusion that it would not be appropriate to remit.
"It would not be appropriate to send the matter back to the same tribunal where there was a question of bias or the risk of pre-judgment or partiality. This would obviously be so where the basis of the appeal had depended upon bias or misconduct, but is not limited to such case."
Having considered the impact of a "Totally flawed decision" he went on to consider what he called a "Second bite":
"There must be a very careful consideration of what Lord Phillips in English [English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409] called 'A second bite of the cherry'. If the tribunal has already made up its mind, on the face of it, in relation to all the matters before it, it may well be a difficult if not impossible task to change it: and in any event there must be a very real risk of the appearance of pre-judgment or bias if that is what a tribunal if asked to do. There must be a very real and very human desire to attempt to reach the same result, if only on the basis of the natural wish to say 'I told you so'. Once again the appellate tribunal would only send a matter back if it had confidence that, with guidance, the tribunal, because there were matters which it had not, or had not yet, considered at the time it apparently reached a conclusion, would be prepared to look fully at such further matters, and thus be willing or able to come to a different conclusion is so advised."
This guidance was quoted with apparent approval by Morris Kay LJ in Boardman v Nugent Care Society [2013] ICR 927 at Paragraph 29.
Material Factors
"3.1 the legal consequences of the fact that [Z] did not comply with the contract provisions, as it was required by the [Agreement] to do, in order to be entitled to contend that failure to achieve contractual Milestones was other than the sole responsibility of [Z]…and
3.2 although it is common ground that the Tribunal had to judge the reasonableness and proportionality of the termination for cause pursuant to Clause 69.1.2(i) the tribunal failed to make any assessment of the nature and seriousness of any relevant Default(s) on the part of [Z] which prima facie entitled a termination for cause, in order to consider whether, in light of the same, it was objectively reasonable proportion to terminate the Agreement."
4.1 that the calculation of compensation should follow the method agreed by the parties in the category in accordance with express provisions;
4.2 that the assessment of compensation should not exceed the amount that would have been recoverable had the agreement been performed according to its terms.
4.3 that [Z] should not be permitted to recover sums on a global basis without any consideration of its own actual or possible breaches of contract."
"46…It was Y's case that all or substantially all the delay was the actual fault and responsibility of Z; to that, as a matter of evidence, reliance was placed on the absence of effective notices under Clauses 23 and 25 to support this actually fundamental case. In essence, the arbitrators never grappled with this point, preferring in effect to say that because the Process Requirements are just that, namely a process, HS in this case for Y had to be seen to go through the process, even if the result was such as to lay the real fault and responsibility for the delays entirely at the door of Z. Because the arbitrators found that in a number of what they believed were important respects HS, either on the basis of inadequate or incomplete briefing or otherwise, did not consider whether, and if so to what extent, Y had caused or contributed to any of the Defaults and relied upon and referred to the MPRG recommendation, although the process which led to that recommendation was non-compliant with Clause 69.1.2(i), it never got around to considering what might have been considered to be a basic point, which was Y's case that substantially all the delay was down to Z. There was a concentration on what HS did or did not do in relation to the possible responsibility of Y in fact for the delays but the tribunal did not consider the scenario that Z may have been responsible for all the delay.
47. I would be more understanding of the tribunal's position if it had actually addressed that scenario…
48. At first blush, Z's argument (that the tribunal was there making it clear that this was an important failure of the process and therefore in effect leading to non-compliance with the condition precedent Process Requirements) is not unattractive. However, the tribunal makes much of the fact that Z was alleging significant contributions to the delays by Y (see for instance Paragraph 410 of the award) but also of the fact that reports on submissions to HS consistently avoided any suggestion of Y either causing or contributing to the delays (see for instance Paragraph 412). The tribunal does not however consider whether it was factually justified for those making submissions to HS not suggesting that Y caused or contributed to delays. Put another way, the tribunal attributes a failure to comply with the conditions precedent to a failure to address possible (and one presumes something more than fanciful) contributions to causing delay by Y, primarily by employees or other agencies, but it does not consider what might be considered to be a very obvious material issue, which was Y's case that Z was wholly or substantially responsible for all the delay. Put yet a third way but rhetorically: could HS or those advising HS be criticised as not complying with the Process Requirements if all the delay was in fact caused and contributed to only by Z?"
"overlooked the need to address the issue of Claim A4 being a global claim and therefore to address the fault and responsibility of Z (if any) in relation to the delay, disruption and inefficiencies which it seems to have been common ground had occurred to a significant extent before the termination."
"The Tribunal would be being asked to carry out an impossible task: assessing fairly whether or not termination was valid by reference to responsibility for delay in circumstances where:
1. They had previously found it to be invalid;
2. They wrongly failed to consider responsibility for delay despite being presented with copious material and submissions on the matter; and
3. They have structured their whole approach in a way in which the Court had found serious irregularities which had caused one party substantial injustice." [Skeleton Paragraph 6.2 iii]
(a) Both grounds under Section 68(2)(d) were towards the more serious end of the spectrum of seriousness in terms of irregularity. It is not for the Court to speculate why the tribunal felt that it did not need to address the issues concerned. However, the fact that the tribunal took some 16 months after final oral submissions to produce their award might lead a fair minded and informed observer to wonder (rightly or wrongly) at least whether (sub-consciously) the tribunal was seeking some sort of shortcut. This is more apparent in relation to the Quantum Ground where in the reasoning, whilst arguably unobjectionable in the view formed by the tribunal that the unjust enrichment claim could properly be based on cost, there is no hint or suggestion that the tribunal applied its mind to the very large amount of evidence placed before it to the effect that much or indeed all of the delay to the project was the responsibility of Z and therefore that the cost associated with that delay should come out of the cost equation. This was particularly so in the context of a finding by the tribunal (Paragraph 724 of the award) to the effect that there was "considerable uncertainty as to the sums which had already been paid in relation to the Transferred Assets" and of the reasoning process by which the tribunal thereafter arrived at the figure of £126,013,801 as the cost which could, not unfairly, be described as somewhat "thin".
(b) Like Mance J on the Lovell case, I can see that it would be "invidious and embarrassing [for the tribunal] to be required to try to free [itself] of all previous ideas and to re-determine the same issues" and that even for a conscientious tribunal seeking to re-determine such issues the exercise could well "create its own undesirable tensions and pressures". Of course, it is not possible to predict what this tribunal would do if matters were remitted to them. If however, albeit conscientiously and competently, the tribunal in effect reached exactly the same conclusions as before, that might well lead to a strong belief objectively that justice had not been or not been seen to have been done.
(c) I do not see that it is likely that there will be any significant re-drawing of the issues in the arbitration. Indeed, I would anticipate that, on many of the individual issues on which each party lost, the losing party would not seek to re-argue them; the sanction will be costs so that, if a party which lost on a given factual or legal issue before the current tribunal argues it again and loses it before the new tribunal, it should not be surprised when it faces an indemnity cost sanction, whatever the overall result. I am of course conscious that in setting aside the whole award for re-hearing by a different tribunal that a number of findings, both legal and factual, which were outside the parts of the award which were successfully challenged on the application, may be re-opened before the new tribunal but I anticipate that it will be a foolhardy party who, without obviously good reason, seeks to do so. Much of the arbitration will however have to be reopened given the scope of the issues not addressed, in any event.
(d) I would anticipate that much of the factual and expert evidence, adduced before the current tribunal, would re-deployed before the new tribunal; if anything, it would be rationalised to reflect concessions made by witnesses in cross-examination before the current tribunal. The experts, who are likely to have produced joint statements, are, I suspect, unlikely to change their views materially. There has already been substantial disclosure and one suspects that little if any further disclosure would be required. Although, undoubtedly there will be substantial costs in pursuing the arbitration before another tribunal, the "extra over" cost compared with a remission to the current tribunal will be relatively insubstantial in the context of claims and cross claims which run to nine-figure sums. I would very much doubt for instance that there would need to be another hearing running to anything like 42 days before the new tribunal albeit that I can see that there would be more hearing time required with the new tribunal compared with the old tribunal being re-deployed.
(e) I would also very much doubt that the current tribunal, having probably not considered in any detail the evidence relating to the delays on the project and the responsibility for such delays for two years or more (to date), will have any significant recall of that evidence. Given the probability that any re-hearing and re-consideration of the evidence will not happen for some months yet, the eventual time lapse after the giving of the evidence will be closer to 3 years. If, of course, appeals are pursued, depending on the timing of the appeal, that time lapse may edge closer to 4 years delay. As the parties know, I have given permission to appeal to both sides both in respect of the first and this judgment.
Costs
The award will be set aside for resolution by a different arbitral tribunal. Z will pay 80% of Y's costs of the proceedings, to be assessed on the standard basis. Z shall pay Y by way of an interim payment on account of costs £146,000.