QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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MICHAEL PHILLIPS ARCHITECTS LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) CORNEL CLARK RIKLIN (2) SUSAN OGLESBY RIKLIN |
Defendants |
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Andrew Fenn (instructed by Hannah & Mould) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 15 and 23 April 2010
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Akenhead
Introduction
The Background
The Course of these Proceedings
The Law and Practice
"(1) The court may make an order for security of the costs if-
(a) it is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that is just to make such an order; and
(b) (i) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (2) applies…
(2) The conditions are-
(c) the claimant is a company… and there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if ordered to do so…"
Thus, the threshold to the Court having jurisdiction where the claimant is a company is that there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if ordered to do so. Once the threshold is established, the Court has a broad discretion as to whether to order security for costs and if so in what amount.
"The relevant principles are, in my judgement, the following.
1. As was established by this Court in Sir Lindsay Parkinson and Co Ltd v Triplan Ltd … [1973] QB 609, the court has a complete discretion whether to order security, and accordingly it will act in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
2. The possibility or probability that the plaintiff company will be deterred from pursuing its claim by an order for security is not without more a sufficient reason for not ordering security…By making the exercise of discretion under s 726 (1) [ of the Companies Act] conditional on it being shown that the company is one likely to be unable to pay costs awarded against it, Parliament must have envisaged that the order might be made in respect of a plaintiff company that would find difficulty in providing security…
3. The court must carry out a balancing exercise. On the one hand it must weigh the injustice to the plaintiff if prevented from pursuing a proper claim by an order for security. Against that, it must weigh the injustice to the defendant if no security is ordered and at a trial the plaintiff's claim fails and the defendant finds himself unable to recover from the plaintiff the costs which had been incurred by him in his defence of the claim. The court will properly be concerned not to allow the power to order security to be used as an instrument of oppression, such as by stifling a genuine claim by an indigent company against a more prosperous company, particularly when the failure to meet that claim might in itself have been a material cause of the plaintiff's impecuniosity…but it will also be concerned not to be so reluctant to order security as it becomes a weapon whereby the impecunious company can use it inability to pay costs as a means of putting unfair pressure on the more prosperous company…
4. In considering all the circumstances, the court will have regard to the plaintiff company's prospects of success. But it should not go into the merits in detail unless it can clearly be demonstrated that there is a high degree of probability of success or failure…
5. The court in considering the amount of security that might be ordered will bear in mind that he can order any amount up to the full amount claimed by way of security, provided that it is more than simply a nominal amount; it is not bound to make an order of a substantial amount…
6. Before the court refuses to order security on the ground that it would unfairly stifle a valid claim, the court must be satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is probable that the claim would be stifled. There maybe cases where this can be properly be inferred without direct evidence…
However, the court should consider not only whether the plaintiff company can provide security out of its own resources to continue the litigation, but also whether it can raise the amount needed from its directors, shareholders or other backers or interested persons. As this is likely to be peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiff company, it is for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that it will be prevented by an order of the security from continuing the litigation…
7. The lateness of the application Security is a circumstance which can properly be taken into account…"
"It is often argued that the application for security for costs, if allowed, would stifle a genuine claim. In consequence, the courts have refined this element of the discretion under CPR Part 25. It seems to me that the following principles are relevant to the present application:
"9 (a) Where an order for security for costs against the claimant company might result in oppression, in that the claimant company would be forced to abandon a claim which has a reasonable prospect of success, the court is entitled to refuse to make that order, notwithstanding that the claimant company, if unsuccessful, would be unable to pay the Defendant's costs (see Aquilla Design (GRB) Products Ltd. -v- Cornhill Insurance plc [1988] BCLC, 134, Court of Appeal);
(b) Before the court refuses to order security on the ground that it would unfairly stifle a valid claim, the court must be satisfied that in all the circumstances it is probable that the claim would be stifled (see Keary Developments Ltd. -v- Tarmac Construction Ltd. [1995] 2 All E.R., 535, Court of Appeal);
(c) In all but the most unusual cases, the burden lies on the claimant company to show that, apart from the question of whether the company's own means are sufficient to meet an order for the security, there will be no prospect of funds being available and forthcoming from any outside source (see Kufaan Publishing Ltd. -v- Al-Warrack Bookshop Ltd., March 1st, 2000, Court of Appeal (unreported))."
"I would interpose at this point that, even where a claimant or appellant is resident abroad, there may of course be special factors indicating that any order for costs will be satisfied in some other fashion. The interesting possibility was raised before us that a claimant or appellant who has insured against liability for the defendants' costs in the event of the action or appeal failing might be able to rely on the existence of such insurance as sufficient security in itself. I comment on this possibility only to the extent of saying that I would think that defendants would, at the least, be entitled to some assurance as to the scope of the cover, that it was not liable to be avoided for misrepresentation or non-disclosure (it may be that such policies have anti-avoidance provisions) and that its proceeds could not be diverted elsewhere. The new arrangements for the funding of litigation certainly appear capable of throwing up possible imbalance, in so far as they permit contingency fee arrangements with uplifts potentially recoverable from losing defendants, but enable claimants to pursue litigation without insuring or securing the defendants' fees. The claimant's contingency fee arrangement in the present case is, however, without uplift."
"33. At more than one point of the judgment below, and at more than one point of the argument before us, the inflationary effect on costs of the claimants' CFA with their solicitors has been canvassed. In a paragraph cross-headed "The relevance of the conditional fee agreement" Eady J said this:
"It has already been recognised that when considering "unfair pressure" it is relevant for the court to take into account the fact that a claimant is pursuing his or her case with the benefit of a conditional fee agreement with a substantial uplift – especially if there is no "after the event" insurance ("ATE"): see e.g. the observations of Mance LJ in Nasser at [60]. Here it has, after a considerable lapse of time, finally been acknowledged on the Claimants' behalf by their solicitor that there is no ATE insurance that is likely to be of any value whatsoever to the Defendants should they succeed. What is more, as I understand it, there is no challenge to the Defendants' assumption that in this particular case there is likely to be a 100% uplift."
34. What Mance LJ said in Nasser was this:
[set out above]
35. Thus a claimant's (or for that matter a defendant's) entry into a CFA with his solicitor has by itself no impact on the case for or against the making of an order for security for costs. This proposition now marches with the decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd (No.2) [2005] UKHL 61 that the enabling provisions of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s.58, as amended, are compatible with article 10 of the Convention, their differential impact being a matter for Parliament. What may matter, however, is what insurance the claimant has obtained against the eventuality of having to pay the defendant's costs. A claimant who has satisfactory after-the-event insurance may be able to resist an order to put up security for the defendant's costs on the ground that his insurance cover gives the defendant sufficient protection.
36. In the present case, however, we are told that the claimants have after-the-event insurance, but that the policy is voidable or the cover ineffective if their eventual liability for costs is consequent upon their not having told the truth. We have not been told what the premium was, but since the outcome of this case will depend entirely upon which side is telling the truth, one wonders what use the insurance cover is. If the claimants win, they will have no call on their insurers. If they lose, it is overwhelmingly likely that it will be on grounds which render their insurance cover ineffective."
"3. The claimants now seek permission to appeal the order for security for costs… the main ground on which permission to appeal is sought by the claimants relates to what is said to be the judge's apparent acceptance that, in theory, an …ATE insurance policy… could be used as an alternative to payment in the court, or acceptable bank guarantee, as a means of providing security for the defendants' costs. The order does, however, provide that the insurance policy should give the defendants "equal or better security" than that afforded by a payment into court or a bank guarantee.
4. The claimants, through their Counsel Mr Douthwaite, submit that this requirement can never be met, since payment into court or a bank guarantee given to the defendants is a complete security, while it is inevitable that an insurance policy is less secure, partly because it is not a promise to the defendants but to the claimants; and partly because the policy gives to the insurers many opportunities to cancel the policy for breach of its terms, quite apart from any insurer's inherent right to avoid the misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The difficulty with Mr Douthwaite's submission is that it was the claimants themselves who proposed the policy as an effective means of providing security for costs before they had even obtained the policy. Thus, the judge did not know anything about the terms it would contain and may well have assumed, for all one knows, there might be an anti-avoidance provision. It was for this reason that he, as it seems to me, accepted the defendants' argument, post his judgement, and incorporated the requirement in his order that the policy should afford equal or better security than the traditional methods of giving security for costs.
5. It would, in my judgement, be most unjust to the defendants to prevent them from pointing out that the policy in fact gives them much less security than the traditional form of security for costs. If the judge had been informed of, or had foreseen, the problems that have arisen out of the terms of the ATE policy now that it has been acquired, he would almost certainly, in my view, not have given the claimants the option of providing security by reference to the ATE insurance in the first place.
6. In fact, it is in any event doubtful if the judge did accept in principle the suitability of an ATE policy. He said in paragraph 10 of his judgement:
" Whilst in principle I find that they should be in the order of the security of costs, the alternative to that is the claimant providing evidence that it has acquired the relevant insurance cover which would satisfy the defendants that that would be equal to, or even better than, payment of monies into court in respect of security."
7. That, to my mind, is saying that the defendants are entitled to be satisfied that any ATE policy propose is not in fact equal to, or better than, payment into court, and to reject it if not unreasonably so satisfied.
8. However all that may be, it would, in my judgement, be quite inappropriate for this court now to give permission to appeal to allow the claimants to argue that the equal or better security provision should be deleted, when it was for their benefit that the judge made reference to the ATE insurance in his order. It would be especially inappropriate in a case where the claimants had not even procured the policy on which they were proposing to rely when they made submissions as to its adequacy to the judge.
9. In fact, for the reasons which I have endeavoured to give, it is most unlikely that any standard form of ATE insurance could provide a suitable alternative to the standard forms of order the security of the costs. The claimants, not surprisingly, cannot comply with the third option contained in the order and must, in my judgement, now, therefore, comply with option A or B."
(a) There is no reason in principle why an ATE insurance policy which covers the claimant's liability to pay the defendant's costs, subject to its terms, could not provide some or some element of security for the defendant's costs. It can provide sufficient protection.
(b) It will be a rare case where the ATE insurance policy can provide as good security as a payment into court or a bank bond or guarantee. That will be, amongst other reasons, because insurance policies are voidable by the insurers and subject to cancellation for many reasons, none of which are within the control or responsibility of the defendant, and because the promise to pay under the policy will be to the claimant.
(c) It is necessary where reliance is placed by a claimant on an ATE insurance policy to resist or limit a security for costs application for it to be demonstrated that it actually does provide some security. Put another way, there must not be terms pursuant to which or circumstances in which the insurers can readily but legitimately and contractually avoid liability to pay out for the defendant's costs.
(d) There is no reason in principle why the amount fixed by a security for costs order could not be somewhat reduced to take into account any realistic probability that the ATE insurance would cover the costs of the defendant.
The ATE Insurance in this case
"We would not cover any costs awarded to the defendants as a result of the counter-claim being successful."
Whilst it is not appropriate for this Court to make any final conclusions about this endorsement, it is at the very least ambiguous. The Policy elsewhere says that the insurer will pay the Defendants' legal costs. However, there is a realistic scenario whereby the Claimant may succeed in establishing an entitlement on its claim to fees in the sum of £X but its claim is defeated by way of set off in respect of a greater sum awarded to the Defendants on their counterclaim. Thus, it could be said with some force that a costs order in favour of the Defendants in relation to their costs of defending the Claimant's claim was "awarded as a result of the counter-claim being successful", therefore activating this endorsement and entitling the insurers not to pay out in respect of such defendants' costs.
"your own disbursements other than barristers fees and opponents legal costs and disbursements if:
(a) you lose or your claim is discontinued…"
Without knowing the terms of the CFA entered into by the claimant, it is at least possible that the £100,000 indemnity covers solicitors' fees and expert costs. Depending on the amount, the indemnity cover available for the "opponent's legal costs and disbursements" may be eroded.
"If we believe that there are not reasonable prospects of recovering damages (or other remedy) from the opponent then cover will end."
It is therefore (highly) arguable that the Insurers, for instance when it has seen the witness statements and expert report of the Defendants, will in all honesty no longer believe that there are reasonable prospects of success and will be able to terminate the cover and thus remove any protection in which the Defendants might have.
"Your policy only covers you during the period of insurance and provided that…
4. We believe that it is more likely than not that your claim will be successful."
That underlines the point made in the preceding paragraph.
"Failure to keep to any of these conditions may lead the insurer to cancel your policy, refused to pay or withdraw from an ongoing claim."
This would appear to provide the insurer with a relatively easy route in effect to avoid the policy and any payment obligations which it would otherwise have where there is anything more than an insignificant breach of the conditions. Examples of the responsibilities of the insured are listed in Clause 1 of the conditions:
"You must
(a) observe and keep to the terms of this policy.
(b) not do anything that hinders us or the solicitor.
(c) tell us immediately if anything that may materially alter our assessment of the claim…
(e) provide us with everything we need to help us handle any claim…
(i) minimise anything that the insurer has to pay and try to prevent anything happening that may cause a claim under this policy…"
Thus, it is readily foreseeable that the Insurer could in the context of live litigation readily be in a position, if it so wished, to avoid paying.
"If you make any claim which is a fraudulent or false, the policy shall become void and all benefit under it will be forfeited."
Although there is no issue of fraud raised on the pleadings in this case, the Claimant's claim is based on the time said to have been spent. The money claim, for just under £150,000, is based on time recorded by a number of different members of the Claimant's staff. At first blush, it might be thought that a claim for £150,000's worth of architectural time for a project, which was estimated to cost some £383,000 (and thus about 40% of that cost), in circumstances where it seems to be the case that after three or four months' work, the contractor having gone into administration and the Claimant is said to have done little further work, seems very high. Obviously, and I can make no findings about this, it is at least within the realms of possibility that there could be findings of fact that the time claim was more than insignificantly exaggerated. In those circumstances it could well be open to the insurer to avoid the policy under Clause 8. This also raises the insurers' right to avoid the policy if there was a material misrepresentation or non-disclosure in the period leading up to the provision of cover.
"(c) The insurer may cancel the policy immediately…and reclaim any payments made under the policy, if
(i) you fail to meet any of your responsibilities under this policy; or…
(iv) you make any claim which is fraudulent or false
(d) The insurer may cancel the policy immediately, if
(i) your conditional fee agreement terminates for whatever reason, or…
(iii) we believe your claim is unlikely to be successful
(e) The insurer may cancel the policy at any time by giving at least 21 days' notice to you…"
Any failure by the Claimants to fulfil its "responsibilities" could lead to cancellation. If the CFA, which has not been disclosed, terminates, the policy can be cancelled. If the insurer, in good faith, gets to the stage at which it believes that the Claimant's claim is unlikely to be successful, for instance after the disclosure of documents or after the exchange of witness statements or expert reports, the insurer appears to have an unfettered right to cancel and avoid paying under the policy. Finally it has a right to cancel the policy for no reason (bad or good); that seems to be to be an extraordinary insurance provision. Whilst it might be said it is subject at the very least to a need on the part of the insurer to act in good faith, it is potentially a draconian right. There is nothing in the Policy which spells out what the financial consequences of a cancellation are. It is at least highly arguable that the insurer, following a valid cancellation, has no obligation to indemnify the insured unless the obligation had already accrued, for instance if there was already a court order requiring the Claimant to pay the Defendants' costs. It is at least foreseeable that, if the cancellation occurred before the commencement of the trial, the insurer would have no obligation with regard to costs orders made thereafter. This would negate any potential benefit or security with regard to the Defendants' costs.
The Claimant's Financial Position
The Amount of Security
The Merits of the Claim
Stifling of the Claimant and its Claim
(a) The Claimant's impecuniosity is established by their latest abbreviated unaudited accounts for the year ending the 31 March 2009. However, on the Claimant's own case, as set out in its Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, it did not invoice for these fees until 26 May 2009. Whilst it is conceivable that its entitlement to payment arose earlier, it might be considered the author of its own misfortune by not invoicing until the time that it did.
(b) Without some evidence explaining what is within the figures for "Debtors" and " Current liabilities Amounts due within one year", the Court simply could not determine whether the non-payment of fees by the Defendants materially contributed to their being only £1386 as the "total assets less current liabilities" for the year ending 31 March 2009.
(c) Set off is a valid defence in English Law. If the Counterclaim is valid, it is capable of giving rise to an effective set off which the Defendants would have been entitled to raise. In those circumstances, the Claimant would not have been entitled to payment at least to the extent of the set off. The Court can not determine on this application the validity of the Counterclaim and therefore can not determine in fact whether the impecuniosity of the Claimant was caused by the Defendants.
The Effect of the Counterclaim
The Exercise of the Discretion