QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
Between:
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CLAYMORE SERVICES LIMITED |
Claimant |
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v |
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NAUTILUS PROPERTIES LIMITED |
Defendant |
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Official Court Reporters
Cliffords Inn, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1LD
Telephone: 0207 269 0396
MR ALEXANDER NISSEN QC (instructed by Pinsent Masons) appeared on behalf of Nautilus Properties Ltd
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Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE JACKSON:
Part 1: Introduction
Part 2: The Facts
"On behalf of Nautilus Properties Limited, I confirm our intention, subject to contract, to enter into an agreement with you for the above works, in accordance with the general terms of your tender and terms and conditions of the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract, with Contractor's Design 1998 Edition. You are hereby authorised to proceed with your preparations for the above works, the commencement of which is subject to the following terms:
1. You will continue negotiations with our consultant Quantity Surveyors, W T Hills, to ascertain the Contract Sum for the works and any sectional parts thereof.2. You will undertake to complete the works within an agreed period, such period to be confirmed and agreed with Nautilus Properties Limited prior to the commencement of the works.3. You will accept all of the liabilities in respect of the design and execution of the works, as required by the proposed form of contract.4. You will act as Principal Contractor in accordance with the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994, which includes the production of the Construction Phase Health and Safety Plan.A condition of this Letter of Intent is that you are required to enter into a formal contract within the general terms of the tender documentation as soon as possible. Should the contract not be executed for any reason, you will be paid your costs resulting from actions taken by you pursuant to the provisions of this letter, during the period from the date of this letter until the earlier date of the date on which you cease work on site, or the date on which you are instructed to cease work on site. Such costs will be computed on a basis related to the terms of your tender. No further claim will be accepted, whether for additional costs, overhead recovery, loss of profit or otherwise, in the event of the formal contract not being executed for any reason."
"Accordingly, the claimants submission that a contract between the parties was created by its signed acknowledgement of receipt of the Letter of Intent is plainly wrong, both in fact and in law. There is no offer. There is no acceptance and therefore there is no agreement. Furthermore there was not an intention to enter into legal relations, as evidenced by the use of the words "subject to contract". The Letter of Intent is incomplete and uncertain as to terms to evidence an agreement. It was simply an authorisation to proceed with the preparation for the works. It was not an instruction to proceed with any works. These are the words used in the document, which should be given their plain English meaning to determine the intention of the parties."
"Based upon the evidence and argument put before me by the parties, I am persuaded by the respondent's contention that the words "subject to contract" in the respondent's Letter of Intent, read as non-binding upon the parties. No contract could come into existence until such time as the parties executed the formal agreement referred to in the letter, viz. the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract with Contractor's Design 1998 Edition. It is common ground that no such agreement was executed by the parties. There is therefore, no contracted writing as required by s. 107 of the Act."
Part 3: The Present Proceedings
"Further, Claymore is entitled to and claims interest pursuant to Section 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 on such terms as are found to be due to it, at such rate for such period as the court thinks fit."
Part 4: The Period During Which Interest Accrues
"The second group of cases concerns the conduct of the plaintiff. If, for example, the plaintiff has been guilty of unreasonable delay in prosecuting his claim, the court may decline to award interest for the full period from the date of loss. This may be to encourage plaintiffs to prosecute their claims with diligence and also because such conduct may lull a Defendant into a false sense of security, leading him to think that the claim will not be pursued against him."
"In awarding interest the judge is exercising a discretion. In the great majority of cases the plaintiff could have proceeded with greater dispatch; and yet it may well be wrong to deprive him of interest particularly as the defendant will have had the use of the money. I therefore think that we should approach this matter on the basis that the court should arrive at a final figure which will be fair, generally speaking, to both parties."
"Usually this period will run from the date of the writ to the date of trial, but the court, may in its discretion, abridge this period when it thinks it is just to so do. Far too often there is unjustifiable delay in bringing an action to trial. It is, in my view, wrong that interest should run during a time which can properly be called an unjustifiable delay after the date of the writ. During that time the plaintiff will have been kept out of the sum awarded to him by his own fault. The fact that the defendants have had their use of the sum during that time is no good reason for excusing that fault and allowing interest to run during that time."
"As Mr Twigg observed, the test of unjustifiable delay has been applied on a number of cases, see, for example, Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Limited [1968] 2 QB 229 per Diplock L J at pp 256B, 257D, Birkett v Hayes [1982] 1WLR 816 and Wright v British Railways Board [1983] 2 AC 773. Mr Twigg argued that this was, in his words, "an ordinary fire case" and should have been heard within the four years of the fire. He invited the court to say that that was the maximum for which interest, if any, should be awarded. Whether a hearing where speeches and evidence occupy some 10 days is an ordinary case, I am not prepared to say. In La Pintada Compagnia Navigacion SA v President of India [1983] 1 Lloyds Rep 37, Storton J had expressed the view that reprehensible delay should be dealt with by a reduction in the rate of interest rather than by a reduction of the period for which it was paid. With respect to that view, I do not consider this is a case in which such a course would be appropriate.
So far as the matter of the Metal Box and Massey Ferguson claims are concerned, I am of the opinion that from an early stage it must have been clear to the Loss Adjustors that the defendant's insurers were not going to go down without a fight. I do not regard the failure formally to deny liability as sufficient justification to delay the commencement of proceedings. On the other side, as I find in my judgment, the defendant's servants on the ground never from the outset disputed the cause of the fire was the stacking of the cartons too close to the lamps, and it was never challenged that one of them said that they may have done so. The total period from the fire to the Judgment is, put broadly, nine years and two months; from Writ to Judgment, four years and seven months. For the reasons that I have given, I consider that the appropriate period for which interest should be awarded in those two cases, is seven years."
"If interest is withheld the defendant receives a windfall. He has free use of funds which, if he had performed his obligation to pay, would not have been in his hands, since the English Courts have no jurisdiction to order compound interest, the defendant will enjoy the further benefit of relatively inexpensive use of funds, even if finally ordered to pay interest for the entire period from the cause of action arising until Judgment. Whereas, in a case such as Birkett v Hayes, where the claim cannot be quantified for a long period after the cause of action has arisen, and the proceedings commenced, it is not difficult to see unfairness to the defendant in requiring interest to be paid on the whole of the sum not then quantifiable, it is much harder to detect any unfairness to a defendant left with substantial funds in his hands, and knowing perfectly well the amount of the claim during the whole of the material time, from the initial presentation of the claim. If there is no material previous to the defendant by reason of the delay, it is difficult to see why the interests of justice should normally require that when he knows that amount claimed, he should have an even larger benefit bestowed on him than he would derive from his unjustifiably refusing to pay the claim. Having regard however to the way in which Lord Justice Lawton (with whose judgment Lord Justice Eveleigh agreed, as did implicitly Lord Denning M R) expressed the principle, it would appear that justification for depriving the successful plaintiff of interest must be that he has caused his loss of use of the money by his own fault rather than that it would be unfair or unjust to the defendant that he should have to pay interest during the delay.
This countervailing consideration would be consistent with the compensatory function of the interest jurisdiction.
In cases where the delay and the degree of fault are so substantial that the predominant cause of the plaintiff being out of his money can be seen to be his own failure to prosecute the claim, rather than the defendant's maintenance of his defence, it is not difficult to see the policy should be that a successful plaintiff should not be compensated for loss of use of the money. However, in order for it to be said that the plaintiff's fault has displaced the defendant's fault as the predominant cause of the plaintiff being kept out of his money, the delay in question would have to be very substantial and not merely relatively short periods of weeks or months, during which, in commercial litigation, lulls in activity inevitably occur and the plaintiff's fault would have to be very substantial as where an action has inexcusably been allowed to go to sleep for years."
"(5) Where a claimant assured has been guilty of excessive delay, whether in making the original claim or in pursuing it, then the starting point (or on occasion the rate of interest) may be adjusted adversely to him. The rationale for such an approach has sometimes been expressed as a form of sanction for delay but can, I think, equally and more consistently with principle, be expressed in terms that in such a case it is wrong to view the claimant as kept out of or deprived of the use of money, payment of which he has delayed in seeking. A more striking illustration will be circumstances in which a claimant consciously, and for his own reasons, chose not to pursue a claim immediately and notified the potential defendant to that effect. To a limited extent that is said to have been the position of KAC in this case. It is not, I think, sensible to regard a party who positively chooses not to make a claim when first available to him, as one who is deprived of, or kept out of his money."
"In the absence of any explanation for the period of delay in bringing proceedings, I consider that there was unreasonable delay. This was also the predominant cause of the claimants being kept out of their money. There seems to be no reason why the claimants could not have issued proceedings in September 1995; the delay until September 1997 is wholly inexplicable. I do, however, have to bear in mind that during that period interest rates were high and therefore underwriters derived a substantial benefit. That is a significant factor - see the judgment of Waller L J in Adcock v Co-operative Insurance Society [2000] LIRLR 657 and 662. In the circumstances therefore, it seems to me that it would not be right to deprive the claimants of the whole of the interest during the two year period from September 1st 1995 to September 1st 1997. I will therefore award the claimants interest only at half the rate that would otherwise have been payable during that period."
(1) Where a claimant has delayed unreasonably in commencing or prosecuting proceedings, the court may exercise its discretion either to disallow interest for a period or to reduce the rate of interest.
(2) In exercising that discretion the court must take a realistic view of delay. In the case of business disputes, litigation is for all parties an unwelcome distraction from their proper business. It is not reasonable to expect any party to take every litigious step at the first possible moment, or to concentrate on litigation to the exclusion of all else. Delay should only be characterised as unreasonable for present purposes when, after making due allowance for the circumstances, it can be seen that the claimant has neglected or declined to pursue his claim for a significant period.
(3) When determining what disallowance or reduction of interest should be made to mark a period of unreasonable delay, the court should bear in mind that the defendant has had the use of the money during that period of delay.
Part 5: The Rate of Interest
"I do not think the modern law is that interest is awarded against the defendant as a punitive measure for having kept the plaintiff out of his money. I think the principle now recognised is that it is all part of the attempt to achieve restitutio in integrum. One looks, therefore, not at the profit which the defendant wrongly made out of the money he withheld - this would indeed involve a scrutiny of the defendant's financial position - but at the cost to the plaintiff of being deprived of the money which he should have had. I feel satisfied that in commercial cases the interest is intended to reflect the rate at which the plaintiff would have had to borrow money to supply the place of that which was withheld. I am also satisfied that one should not look at any special position in which the plaintiff may have been; one should disregard, for instance, the fact that a particular plaintiff, because of his personal situation, could only borrow at a very high rate, or on the other hand, was able to borrow at specially favourable rates. The correct thing to do is to take the rate at which plaintiffs in general could borrow money. This does not, however, to my mind, mean that you exclude entirely, all the attributes of the plaintiff, other than that he is a plaintiff. There is evidence here that large public companies, of the size and prestige of these plaintiffs could expect to borrow at 1 per cent. over the minimum lending rate, while for smaller and less prestigious concerns, the rate might be as high as 3 per cent. over the minimum lending rate. I think it would always be right to look at the rate at which plaintiffs, with the general attributes of the actual plaintiff in the case (though not, of course, with any special particular attribute), could borrow money as a guide to the appropriate interest rate. If commercial rates are appropriate I would take 1 per cent. over the minimum lending rate as the proper figure for interest in this case…. But in commercial cases it seems to me that the rate at which a commercial borrower can borrow money would be the safest guide. I should add, perhaps, that the proper question is: At what rate could the plaintiff borrow the required sum and not what return could the plaintiff have expected if he had had invested it."
"Although the decision of Forbes J in the Tate and Lyle case was neither referred to in the judgment nor cited in the Polish Steam Ship Co. case I do not conclude that the cases which refer to the practice in the Commercial and Admiralty courts have the effect of precluding evidence as to the rate of which persons with the general attributes of the plaintiff could have borrowed the money. In the FMC (Meat) Ltd case and the Polish Steam Ship Co case no evidence had been adduced on this question. In the BP Exploration case no evidence had been adduced in relation to the sterling part of the award; but evidence was adduced and admitted by Robert Goff J on the dollar element.
I conclude therefore, that the practice of the Commercial Court amounts to no more than a presumption which can be displaced if its application would be substantially unfair to one party or the other. I do not treat Donaldson J's short dictum 'If they can draw money at less… the best of luck to them' as inconsistent with this conclusion.
But if the presumption is to be displaced the burden must clearly lie on the party who seeks to displace it."
Part 6: Conclusion