TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL | ||
B e f o r e :
____________________
TIME GROUP LIMITEDClaimant/
Respondent and - COMPUTER 2000 DISTRIBUTION LIMITED Defendant/
Appellant
for the Claimant/Respondent
Ian Mill Q.C. with Andrew Hunter (Morgan Cole, solicitors) & Nicholas Stadlen Q.C. with Robert Onslow (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, solicitors) for the Defendant/Appellant
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
First, a chip associated with the mother board was allegedly defective.
Second, there was alleged to be a fault in the hard disk.
“Frontline (Computer 2000) undertakes and warrants that it will not at any time commence, advance, maintain or pursue any claim or assist or encourage a third party in any claim against the IBM companies in relation to the agreement or any similar agreements between IBM Companies and third parties.
Frontline shall keep the terms and existence of this deed confidential and shall not disclose any details to a third party unless under a legal or regulatory duty to do so.”
“I considered bringing proceedings against IBM Corporation in early February 2000. At that stage I retained my current New York counsel – Mendes & Mount – and asked them to consider the form of any claim against IBM Corporation.
During early 2000, I realised that I had been tricked into buying what I had been told were leading edge PCs. I then conducted further enquiries which led me to believe that IBM US directed IBM UK to sell the chips with known defects. Thereafter I intended to pursue IBM Corporation for pecuniary damages as a result of their fraud. Only when I was sure that I could settle the UK action and still retain the right to pursue IBM Corporation in New York did I agree to allow my lawyers to sign the UK Settlement agreement.”
“All of these matters are relevant to the circumstances of the present case against Frontline. They amount to clear evidence in support of Time's case that the PCs were defective and there was a known risk of problems when used in conjunction with software that utilised the DMA chip in a particular way. These circumstances once known to Time in about February 2000 made and make it difficult for Frontline to gainsay the problems with the PCs in the way that IBM had consistently denied them prior to and during the original proceedings.
By the stage that Time had discovered this relevant evidence, the trial of the preliminary issues was listed for hearing in May 2000. Even though the trial was subsequently re-listed for hearing on 10th July 2000, it was far too late to bring in Frontline in time for the trial. The trial date would have been lost, taking pressure off IBM, and there was potential for removing the focus and direction of the litigation.
Moreover, Time considered that there was greater chance of settlement with Frontline in later proceedings, if either it had proved its case against IBM first, or if the case against IBM was out of the way. Although Time would probably not have been able to tell Frontline what its terms of settlement were, the very fact that Frontline would know that the case had been resolved to avoid the matter going to trial would be a strong indication that Frontline might have difficulty in avoiding liability because IBM had felt the need to settle the case.”
“IBM will pay, within 15 days after the execution of this Agreement. and Time will accept £6,000,000 in full and final settlement of all claims by Time and its affiliated companies against IBM of whatever nature, whether or not yet asserted, wherever they could be brought relating to the facts and matters in the Proceedings including, in particular, the three contracts for the sale of personal computer systems dated 27 May 1994, 15 August 1994 and December 1994.
Subject to any obligations of law, the existence and terms of this settlement agreement shall remain confidential between the Parties and their legal advisers.”
The initials IBM were defined in the agreement as referring to IBM UK. In the affidavit in the US proceedings to which I have referred, Mr. Mohsan said that if IBM had requested a release in favour of IBM US he would not have settled for such a term.
“Whilst we are not able to provide you with copies of documents disclosed by IBM in connection with other proceedings (to which both IBM and Time Group Limited were parties), we are able to supply you with a copy of the papers provided to us by FTDI, the designers of defective DMA chip. As you can see from these papers, it is clear that the defect in the word count register was identified in 1993 - over a year before the contract between you and Time and, moreover, the IBM commissioned FTDI to develop a fix to the defect in the word count register. The fixed chip had the reference number 82C3480XMVL (the XMVL chip). Remarkably, however the XMVL chip did not find its way into the Blue Lightning PCs, notwithstanding the fact that the XMVL chip went into production from August 1993.
Whilst we appreciate that you operated at all times in complete ignorance of the deception practised by IBM, the fact of the matter is that our claim in respect of the 4,030 PCs must be directed in the first instance to you, the party from whom we acquired the PCs. We must leave it to you to pursue any claim over against IBM should you wish to go down that route.”
Those passages about deception were in no way relevant to Time’s then proposed action against Computer 2000 since that action lay simply in contract. But the passages were a clear hint as to how to join IBM in the proceedings and pass the claim on to them despite Computer 2000’s settlement agreement with IBM.
“It is my recollection of events following receipt of a letter from Time Group advising us of their intention to take legal action against us and prior to the issue of the writ, I had a telephone conversation with Tahir Mohsan in which he advised me that this was a business issue and he hoped it would not affect our existing trading relationship. Time Group were still a customer and utilising their account and credit line. He explained to me that it was not Computer 2000 that he wished to seek redress from but IBM. He felt IBM were at fault but for legal reasons he had to take action against us. This he said would force IBM to take responsibility. It was an amicable conversation and Tahir Mohsan was at pains to make it clear he did not have an issue with Computer 2000”.
In response to that evidence, Mr, Mohsan said:
“Mr Tiltman correctly says in his witness statement that Time's action against Frontline was a business issue and that for legal reasons, Time had to take action against Frontline to seek redress in respect of the Blue Lightning PCs sourced from Frontline. I emphasised that although Time had contracted with Frontline, it did not blame Frontline, but that it was IBM's fault and IBM should take responsibility for it.”
“I have no doubt whatsoever that Time has brought these second proceedings in order to make an additional recovery from IBM, and that it has used C2000 as a “Pawn” in its attempt to pursue IBM. Time's managing Director, Tahir Mohsan has made this absolutely clear to me both in telephone conversations and in correspondence. Details of this are as follows.
My first telephone phone call with Mr. Mohsan was very shortly after the letter before action. In this phone call, Mr. Mohsan told me that Time was going to issue proceedings against C2000, but that it had no interest in making any recovery from C2000. The call was amicable and Tahir was almost apologetic for having imposed the litigation on C.2000. He told me that C2000 should bring Third party proceedings against IBM as IBM would then agree to pay to get rid of the litigation.”
“I have had several conversations with Tony Taylor. At no time in any of those conversations have I said that Time is not interested in making a recovery of damages from Frontline. Indeed Time's only recourse in these proceedings is to make a recovery from Frontline: it cannot recover from IBM, only Frontline can make a recovery from IBM. I did say to Mr Taylor that I hoped Frontline should not suffer financially as a result of the proceedings and that Frontline should look to IBM for reimbursement.”
“Following this phone call, I instructed Computer 2000’s solicitors to seek to mediate with Time. However, Time refused to mediate without IBM being made a party to the mediation”.
That statement is misleading if it is read as meaning that the first suggestion of the involvement of IBM in mediation came from Time. In a witness statement dated 10 January, 2002, Mr. Taylor clarified the matter. Correspondence shows that Mr. Taylor was considering Time’s suggestion that Computer 2000 should join IBM in the proceedings and it was he, Mr. Taylor, who suggested a mediation involving IBM and it was after he made that suggestion that Time agreed to a mediation but insisted that if there was to be a mediation all parties including IBM should be involved. IBM refused to get involved and Time let the matter drop. There were letters dated 9, 10, 21, 22 August and 14 September, 2000 passing between Computer 2000, Time and IBM on this topic.
“Tahir from Time called with the following message:
He is concerned that our solicitor is not senior enough within Morgan Cole to handle the case. He feels she does not understand the dynamics of the case or appreciate the time constraints the case is under.
We must issue a writ against IBM as the case is now just over 6 years old and we are running out of time.
IBM have also sent a letter to Morgan Cole telling us to “go away”. Tahir needs to see this but our solicitor has not had instructions from us to let him see it.
Tony – Tahir would like you to escalate the case within Morgan Cole and arrange for the Writ to be issued.”
Mr.Mohsan challenged that summary of his telephone message only by saying that by the words, “escalate the case within Morgan Cole” he meant, put the case in the hands of someone more senior within Morgan Cole. Even with that meaning, which I accept, the message is clear that he wanted IBM to be brought into the action as a matter of urgency. If this had been a straightforward action against Computer 2000, Mr. Mohsan would have had no interest in seeing the letter from IBM nor would he have had any interest in IBM being joined as a party. Indeed, joining IBM as a party would inevitably increase the costs and would probably slow the action down.
“Following this e-mail I spoke to Mr Mohsan by telephone. I cannot recall the exact date of the call but I remember Tahir once more made it very clear to me that he didn't want Computer 2000 to suffer financially due to this action, and that he had no choice but to include us in his attempt to recover monies from IBM. On several subsequent telephone conversations the exact dates of which I cannot recall Mr Mohsan made similar remarks and left me in no doubt that he did not want Computer 2000 to suffer any loss but his intention was to recover damages from IBM.”
“he wanted me to speak to Computer 2000 to advise them that Time had no real interest in pursuing a legal case against Computer 2000, but rather were using it in order to win moneys from IBM. He also stated that he was aware of the existence of an agreement between Computer 2000 and IBM …. that potentially limited the actions that Computer 2000 could take against IBM, but that he felt that Time and Computer 2000 acting together could circumvent this.”
Mr.Menzies responded to that evidence with a statement that broadly agreed with Mr.Gass. He said:
“I asked him if he was prepared to speak to Frontline to facilitate a meeting between Time and Frontline for a discussion of how to progress the case. I said that Time considered IBM rather than Frontline was to blame and Time had no real complaint about Frontline's conduct but would like an opportunity to explain its case to Frontline, in particular to explain the complex evidential basis on which Frontline might be able to join IBM as a third party. I explained to Mr Gass that, in my view, rather than attack Time, Frontline would be better advised if it directed its energies against IBM. I suggested that if Frontline involved IBM there was an opportunity to find a solution whereby Frontline might not be ultimately left out of pocket. This seemed to me to be a perfectly legitimate and proper proposal to make.”
In his second witness statement, made after the opening submissions, Mr. Menzies said:
“I make this 2nd witness statement in order to clarify my 1st witness statement. It has been said in submissions made by IBM's Counsel that because my 1st witness statement did not specifically deny the words attributed to me in Mr Gass's statement that I must be taken to have agreed that I used those words. This is incorrect. For the avoidance of doubt I did not say that Time had "no real interest in pursuing a legal case against Computer 2000" but were "using it in order to win monies from IBM' nor did I say that "Time and Computer 2000 acting together could circumvent" the agreement between IBM and Computer 2000. Those words are not mine and I did not use them. What 1 actually said in my conversation with Mr Gass is set out in my 1st witness statement”.
I accept what Mr.Menzies says in his second witness statement, but I also accept that Mr.Gass was accurate in his statement of the impression that that the conversation made on him, though he may not be word perfect in his account. It is clear from the first statement of Mr. Menzies that:
(a) Time did not want Computer 2000 to suffer financially.
(b) Time wanted Computer 2000 to join IBM as a third party.
(c) Time wanted an opportunity to explain to Computer 2000 how to get round the Computer 2000 settlement agreement with IBM, which must have been the misrepresentation point.
“DRAFT LETTER
STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL
(NOT T0 BE SHOWN IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO IBM)
TONY TAYLOR
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
SUBJECT TO CONTRACT
Dear Tony,
TIME V. COMPUTER 2000
Later today, our respective solicitors are appearing in court in an effort to secure access to evidence which will be helpful both to Computer 2000 and to Time. Needless to say, IBM are making every possible effort to put procedural obstacles in our way. Happily, however, our respective legal teams, both solicitors and Counsel are to the extent permitted by the Rules co-operating in seeking to resist IBM’s approach.
So as to make this approach easier and indeed to put it on a formal footing, I would like to propose that we enter into an agreement along the following lines:
1. Time agrees that it will not seek to make any claim against Computer 2000 which is greater than Computer 2000’s recovery in its Part 20 proceedings against IBM.
2. Computer 2000, in turn, undertakes to use its best endeavours, (which Time appreciates may not succeed) to pursue Part 20 proceedings against IBM using all available evidence and, in turn, agrees to co-operate with Time in terms of litigation tactics.
I, of course, appreciate that in advocating the above approach I am foregoing the prospect of making any recovery against Computer 2000 in the event that Computer 2000 is unsuccessful in joining IBM into these proceedings as a Part 20 Defendant or in the event that having joined IBM as a Part 20 Defendant, Computer 2000 is unsuccessful in those Part 20 proceedings. That is a risk, however, that I am prepared to take based on my belief that you will be successful both in joining IBM and in successfully pursuing Part 20 proceedings. In saying this, I do not expect IBM to wish to have a trial in any form which will introduce into the public domain its shady handling of the Blue Lightning issue. My experience of pursuing IBM in the past is that, after an enormous amount of bluff and bluster, they settle when the risk of publicity and public scrutiny becomes unavoidable. I have no doubt they will approach this particular piece of litigation in the same way. My risk is accordingly a minimal one and I hope therefore that the approach outlined above is one that we can both work within.
Yours sincerely,
Tahir Mohsan”
“These ‘phone calls culminated in a letter which Mr. Mohsan sent to me dated 10th July 2001. This letter was headed: “STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL (NOT TO BE SHOWN IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO IBM)” it stated:
“Further to my recent telephone conversation, I would suggest the following:
1. Time agrees that it will not seek to make any claim against Computer 2000 which is greater than Computer 2000’s recovery in its Part 20 proceedings against IBM.
2. Computer 2000, in turn, undertakes to use its best endeavours, (which Time appreciates may not succeed) to pursue Part 20 proceedings against IBM using all available evidence and, in turn, agrees to co-operate with Time in terms of litigation tactics.”
Mr. Mohsan then continued with a paragraph in the same terms as the last paragraph of the draft letter and concluded:
“In order to move this forward, I require you to send me a letter back, without prejudice subject to contract, that strongly agrees with this in principle “
Mr. Taylor continued:
“Needless to say, I did not send a letter back as requested by Mr Mohsan. This letter set down in black and white what Mr Mohsm had previously explained to me - i.e. that the purpose of proceedings against C2000 was to get a recovery from IBM not C20OO. Time was using the claim against C2000 as a tactic to drive IBM to the negotiating table and force it to pay further money to Time.
Needless to say, I regarded Mr. Mohsan's proposal as unacceptable. I did not respond to it in writing as requested. I had one further phone call with him in which I told him that C2000 would not enter such an arrangement.”
(a) A senior executive destroyed all Computer 2000’s relevant documents after the settlement with IBM after being assured by another senior executive that they would no longer be needed. Time say that they will provide documents to Computer 2000 but Computer 2000 do not know what additional relevant documents have been destroyed. There are classes of documents that Time will not be able to supply, for example complaints from customers.
(b) By failing to join Computer 2000 as defendant to the 1998 action, Time gave itself a lead of 2 years in the preparation of documents, evidence and experts’ reports and if this action proceeds Computer 2000 will have to try to catch up long after the event.
(c) In evidence and early submissions, Computer 2000 also made a point that they may have been prejudiced in their ability to call the oral evidence of certain witnesses. That point was fairly effectively destroyed and was not mentioned in closing submissions for Computer 2000. However, it remains true that the evidence of witnesses is likely to have been dimmed and witnesses for Computer 2000 will not be able to refresh their memory from documents that were destroyed.
(1) could the issues raised in the second action have been raised in the first action?
(2) should those issues have been raised in the first action?
“This form of abuse of process has in recent years been taken to be that described by Sir James Wigram V-C in Henderson v Henderson 3 Hare 100, 114-115.
“In trying this question, I believe I state the rule of the court correctly, when I say, that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time”.
Thus the abuse in question need not involve the reopening of a matter already decided in proceedings between the same parties, as where a party is estopped in law from seeking to relitigate a cause of action or an issue already decided in earlier proceedings, but, as Somervell LJ put it in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, 257, may cover "issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them”.
A series of cases, mostly in recent years, has explored this form of abuse.”
Lord Bingham then went on to review a number of those cases. In the course of that review he said, at page 83:
“In Brisbane City Council v Attorney General for Queensland [1979] AC 411 the Privy Council expressly endorsed Somervell LJ's reference to abuse of process and observed, at p 425:
"This is the true basis of the doctrine and it ought only to be applied when the facts are such as to amount to an abuse: otherwise there is a danger of a party being shut out from bringing forward a genuine subject of litigation."
Then at page 89 in the last paragraph Lord Bingham said:
“It may very well be, ….that what is now taken to be the rule in Henderson v Henderson has diverged from the ruling which Wigram V-C made, which was addressed to res judicata. But Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not. Thus while I would accept that lack of funds would not ordinarily excuse a failure to raise in earlier proceedings an issue which could and should have been raised then, I would not regard it as necessarily irrelevant, particularly if it appears that the lack of funds has been caused by the party against whom it is sought to claim. While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party's conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent, the rule has in my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice.”
“Two subsidiary arguments were advanced by Mr. Ter Haar in the courts below and rejected by each. The first was that the rule in Henderson v Henderson 3 Hare 100 did not apply to Mr. Johnson since he had not been the plaintiff in the first action against GW. In my judgment this argument was rightly rejected. A formulaic approach to application of the rule would be mistaken. WWH was the corporate embodiment of Mr. Johnson. He made decisions and gave instructions on its behalf. If he had wished to include his personal claim in the company's action, or to issue proceedings in tandem with those of the company, he had power to do so. The correct approach is that formulated by Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [19771 1 WLR 510 where he said, at p 515:
“Second, it seems to me that the substratum of the doctrine is that a man ought not to be allowed to litigate a second time what has already been decided between himself and the other party to the litigation. This is in the interest both of the successful party and of the public. But I cannot see that this provides any basis for a successful defendant to say that the successful defence is a bar to the plaintiff suing some third party, or for that third party to say that the successful defence prevents the plaintiff from suing him, unless there is a sufficient degree of identity between the successful defendant and the third party. I do not say that one must be the alter ego of the other: but it does seem to me that having due regard to the subject matter of the dispute, there must be a sufficient degree of identification between the two to make it just to hold that the decision to which one was party should be binding in proceedings to which the other is party. It is in that sense that I would regard the phrase 'privity of interest."'
On the present facts that test was clearly satisfied.
The second subsidiary argument was that the rule in Henderson v Henderson 3 Hare 100 did not apply to Mr. Johnson since the first action against GW had culminated in a compromise and not a judgment. This argument also was rightly rejected. An important purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant against the harassment necessarily involved in repeated actions concerning the same subject matter. A second action is not the less harassing because the defendant has been driven or thought it prudent to settle the first; often, indeed, that outcome would make a second action the more harassing”.
“There is, of course, no doubt that Mr. Johnson could have brought his action as part of or at the same time as the company's action. But it does not at all follow that he should have done so or that his failure to do so renders the present action oppressive to the firm or an abuse of the process of the court. As May L.J. observed in Manson v. Vooght [1999] BPIR 376, 387 it may in a particular case be sensible to advance claims separately. In so far as the so-called rule in Henderson v Henderson suggests that there is a presumption against the bringing of successive actions, I consider that is a distortion of the true position. The burden should always rest on the defendant to establish that it is oppressive or an abuse of process for him to be subjected to the second action.”
And at page 119, Lord Millett said:
“The rule in Henderson v Henderson 3 Hare 100 cannot sensibly be extended to the case where the defendants are different. There is then no question of double vexation. It may be reasonable and sensible for a plaintiff to proceed against A first, if that is a relatively simple claim, in order to use the proceeds to finance a more complex claim against B. On the other hand, it would 1 think normally be regarded as oppressive or an abuse of process for a plaintiff to pursue his claims against a single defendant separately in order to use the proceeds of the first action to finance the second, at least where the issues largely overlap so as to form, in Sir James Wigram V-C's words, at p 115, "the same subject of litigation".
Particular care, however, needs to be taken where the plaintiff in the second action is not the same as the plaintiff in the first, but his privy. Such situations are many and various, and it would be unwise to lay down any general rule. The principle is, no doubt, capable in theory of applying to a privy; but it is likely in practice to be easier for him to rebut the charge that his proceedings are oppressive or constitute an abuse of process than it would be for the original plaintiff to do so.”
“An application to strike out the third party claim was upheld by the judge and Mr. Seddon appealed. In the course of a judgment with which Nourse and Ward LJJ agreed, Auld LJ said, at pp 1490-1491:"In my judgment, it is important to distinguish clearly between res judicata and abuse of process not qualifying as res judicata, a distinction delayed by the blurring of the two in the courts' subsequent application of the above dictum [of Sir James Wigram V-C in Henderson v Henderson Hare 100]. The former, in its cause of action estoppel form, is an absolute bar to relitigation, and in its issue estoppel form also, save in 'special cases' or 'special circumstances': see Thoday v Thoday [19641 P 181, 197-198, per Diplock LJ, and Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [19911 2 AC 93. The latter, which may arise where there is no cause of action or issue estoppel, is not subject to the same test, the task of the court being to draw the balance between the competing claims of one party to put his case before the court and of the other not to be unjustly hounded given the earlier history of the matter. Thus, abuse of process may arise where there has been no earlier decision capable of amounting to res judicata (either or both because the parties or the issues are different) for example, where liability between new parties and/or determination of new issues should have been resolved in the earlier proceedings. It may also arise where there is such an inconsistency between the two that it would be unjust to permit the later one to continue."
It is plain from that citation and in particular from the words in brackets in the last paragraph that Lord Bingham was approving the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bradford & Bingley Building Society v. Seddon that abuse of process may arise when the parties or the issues in the two actions are different. At page 1491, Auld L.J. spelt out his decision on this point in greater detail:
“In. my view, it is now well established that the Henderson rule, as a species of the modern doctrine of abuse of process, is capable of application where the parties to the proceedings in which the issue is raised are different from those in earlier proceedings. Indeed, it is inherent in Sir James Wigram V-C.'s reasoning that, as a general rule all persons who are to be sued should be sued at the same time and in the same proceedings where such a course is reasonably practicable, and whenever it is so and is not taken then, in an appropriate case the rule may be invoked so as to render the second action an abuse: see, e.g., Yat Tung Investment Co. Ltd. v. Dao Heng Bank Ltd. [1975] A.C. 581; Bragg v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 132; North West Water Ltd. v. Binnie & Partners [1990] 3 All E.R. 547; M.C.C. Proceeds Inc. v. Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All ER 675 and per Potter L.J. in Morris v. Wentworth-Stanley [1999] 2 W.L.R. 470, 481”
(a) The decision “should be a broad merits based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focussing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.” See per Lord Bingham in Johnson v. Gore Wood.
(b) The categories of abuse of process are not closed: per Lord Diplock in Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 536D, and per Stuart-Smith LJ in Ashmore v. British Coal [1990] QB 338 at 352D, and per Sir David Cairns in Bragg v. Oceanus Mutual [1982] 2 Lloyds Rep 132, 137, 138-139.
(c) It is serious matter to dismiss an action for abuse of process of the court.
(d) However, when abuse is revealed, the court has a duty, not a discretion, to dismiss the action: per Lord Diplock ibid.
(e) There is no presumption against successive actions in contract raising similar issues. There are cases where it is perfectly proper to bring successive actions for breach of contract raising similar issues against different parties: per May L.J. in Manson v. Vooght [1999] BPIR 376 at 387 – 388.
(f) There are cases where it is perfectly proper to bring an action against a defendant intending that the only effective recovery shall be from a third party joined by that defendant.
(g) The onus of proof of abuse is on the party alleging abuse of the process of the court: per Lord Bingham in Johnson v. Gore Wood at page 90.
(h) There is a public interest in finality in litigation including the public interest in efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation: ibid.
“It is accepted that Time could have included Frontline in the original proceedings in 1998 but it is submitted that it was entitled to take the view that there were legitimate reasons for not pursuing Frontline at that time. These were:
1) Frontline and IBM were separate suppliers and did not need to be sued together. Time was not keen on having to fight two suppliers together. 2) Time took the view that the case against IBM on the motherboard or DMA defect was one where IBM knew about its product in a way that Frontline could not. Time believed that there was a motherboard defect but knew relatively little about its nature, but IBM asserted that it was a software incompatibility problem. There was a risk that Time could be proved wrong when disclosure against IBM took place. It was unattractive to sue Frontline at that time until the motherboard defect became clearer with the risk of having to pay Frontline's costs as well as IBM'S; 3) The case on the DMA defect developed and only properly emerged by the end of January/February 2000. Until then it was not known that IBM had discovered the defect which was acknowledged by manufacturer of the DMA chip, had ordered a revised chip to be made, but then took a risk in selling the defective chip in PCs sold to OEM customers such as Frontline and Time. Nor did Time know until then that IBM put out an official statement that misleadingly asserted that the problem was to do with recent games rather than accept that one of the PC components was defective. When this evidence emerged it became clear that Time had a strong enough case to warrant proceedings against Frontline; 4) By that time, it was too late to join Frontline in time for the preliminary issue to be held in May, and subsequently re-listed for July. It would mean losing the date for the trial of that preliminary issue, potentially removing the focus of the litigation on a point of substance which was likely to result in a finding of liability against IBM and taking the legitimate pressure off IBM to settle the case earlier rather than later. 5) It was considered that a separate claim against Frontline might be easier to settle once the IBM claim was out of the way and if IBM had settled that might be a warning signal to Frontline that IBM’s case had been weak.”
“[The defendant’s] failure to strike out over a long period of time is potent evidence not only that the action was not seen as abusive at the time but also that, on the facts, it was not abusive. The indicia or true abuse are not so obscure that an experienced professional party, advised by leading counsel …, will fail to recognize them”.
In the case before me, Computer 2000 is not a professional party and I do not know when leading counsel was first instructed on their behalf, but they have throughout been advised by very competent solicitors and junior counsel and the point is the same.
90. Finally, I should say something about the unresolved application by Time for further disclosure of documents for which IBM and C2000 claim privilege and they also say that the documents are irrelevant to this application. Mr. Hochhauser Q.C. for Time said in relation to the application for further disclosure that he “reserved his position”. Time and those representing them suspect that the documents may show some collusion of a discreditable nature between IBM and C2000. Quite apart from the unsatisfactory form of that application and the lack of evidence in support of it, it has to be said that even if those documents did disclose some form of collusion, that would not affect the public interest that this action should be dismissed.
ORDER: