QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Re : Ørsted Hornsea Project Three (UK) Limited Injunction Hearing |
Claimant |
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Hearing dates: 19th April 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Martin Spencer Monday, 19 April 2021
(12.52 pm)
Judgment by MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER
"If it will not be possible to hold a trial before the period for which the plaintiff claims to be entitled to an injunction has expired, or substantially expired, it seems to me that justice requires some consideration whether the plaintiff would be likely to succeed at a trial. In those circumstances, it is not enough to decide merely that there is a serious issue to be tried. The assertion of such an issue should not operate as a 'lettre de cachet', by which the defendant is prevented from doing that which, as it later turns out, he has a perfect right to do, for the whole or substantially the whole of the period in question. On a wider view of the balance of convenience it may still be right to impose such a restraint, but not unless there has been some assessment of the plaintiff's prospects of success. I would emphasise 'some assessment', because the courts constantly seek to discourage prolonged interlocutory battles on affidavit evidence. I do not doubt that Lord Diplock, in enunciating the American Cyanamid doctrine, had in mind what its effects would be in that respect. Where an assessment of the prospects of success is required, it is for the judge to control its extent."
"The authorities cited to me in argument in my view established the proposition that where a public fishery in tidal waters exists no person including the Crown has the right to exclude the public or substantially to interfere with fishery (safeguarding navigation being one exception)."
The learned judge went on to say that the Crown's beneficial ownership of the foreshore or seabed is subject to the public's right to fish, as recognised by Mr Justice Parker in Lord Fitzhardinge v Purcell [1908] 2 Ch 139 at page 166.
"It is a public nuisance to obstruct or hinder the free passage of the public along the highway by land or water. A private individual has a right of action in respect of a public nuisance if he can prove that he has sustained particular damage other than and beyond the general inconvenience and injury suffered by the public, and that the particular damage which he has sustained is direct and substantial."
"The owner of an easement, profit-à-prendre or other incorporeal right can sue for the disturbance of its right. The interference will be actionable if it is substantial and it will not be substantial if it does not interfere with the reasonable use of the right of way or similar right in question. If therefore the owner of an exclusive right of fishing in a particular place finds that the fish are being driven away or destroyed by the fact of a person in fouling or disturbing the water, he may bring an action against the wrongdoer because the object of such actions is essentially to vindicate a right of property claimed by the owner, it is only necessary for him to prove that his right has been infringed and it is not necessary to prove actual damage."
"We consider that, since an interim injunction can be granted in appropriate circumstances against 'persons unknown' who are Newcomers and wish to join an ongoing protest, it is in principle open to the court in appropriate circumstances to limit even lawful activity. We have had the benefit of submissions from Ms Wilkinson on this issue. She submits that a potential gloss to the fourth Ineos requirement might be that the court may prohibit lawful conduct where there is no other proportionate means of protecting the claimant's rights. We agree with that submission, and hold that the fourth Ineos requirement should be qualified in that way."