QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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TONINO CARMINO PERSICO -and- OSMASTON BUSINESS PARK LIMITED |
Respondent Interested Party |
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The Respondent neither appeared nor was represented.
Mr Jonathan Lennon (instructed by Rahman Ravelli) for the Interested Party.
Hearing dates: 21 and 22 January 2021
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Foster DBE:
INTRODUCTION
i) whether The Property at 555 Osmaston Road, Derby DE24 8NE, title number DY236467, is held on trust for the Respondent by the Interested Party, whether in whole or in part
ii) if the answer to i) is "Yes", whether the Interim Charging Order dated 7 February 2018 should be made final.
RELEVANT PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION
"317 General Revenue functions
(1) For the purposes of this section the qualifying condition is that the National Crime Agency has reasonable grounds to suspect that—
(a) income arising or a gain accruing to a person in respect of a chargeable period is chargeable to income tax or is a chargeable gain (as the case may be) and arises or accrues as a result of the person's or another's criminal conduct (whether wholly or partly and whether directly or indirectly), or
(b) a company is chargeable to corporation tax on its profits arising in respect of a chargeable period and the profits arise as a result of the company's or another person's criminal conduct (whether wholly or partly and whether directly or indirectly).
(2) If the qualifying condition is satisfied the National Crime Agency may serve on the Commissioners of Inland Revenue (the Board) a notice which—
(a) specifies the person or the company (as the case may be) and the period, and
(b) states that the National Crime Agency intends to carry out, in relation to the person or the company (as the case may be) and in respect of the period, such of the general Revenue functions as are specified in the notice.
…"
The interpretation section within Part 6 of POCA provides:
"326 Interpretation
(1) Criminal conduct is conduct which—
(a) constitutes an offence in any part of the United Kingdom, or
…
(4) Property is criminal property if it constitutes a person's benefit from criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly); and it is immaterial—
(a) who carried out the conduct;
(b) who benefited from it.
(5) A person benefits from conduct if he obtains property as a result of or in connection with the conduct.
(6) If a person obtains a pecuniary advantage as a result of or in connection with conduct, he is to be taken to obtain as a result of or in connection with the conduct a sum of money equal to the value of the pecuniary advantage.
(7) References to property or a pecuniary advantage obtained in connection with conduct include references to property or a pecuniary advantage obtained in both that connection and some other.
(8) If a person benefits from conduct his benefit is the property obtained as a result of or in connection with the conduct.
(9) Property is all property wherever situated and includes—
(a) money;
(b) all forms of property, real or personal, heritable or moveable;
(c) things in action and other intangible or incorporeal property.
(10) The following rules apply in relation to property—
(a) property is obtained by a person if he obtains an interest in it;
(b) references to an interest, in relation to land in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, are to any legal estate or equitable interest or power;
…"
"1 Charging orders.
(1) Where, under a judgment or order of the High Court … a person (the "debtor") is required to pay a sum of money to another person (the "creditor") then, for the purpose of enforcing that judgment or order, the appropriate court may make an order in accordance with the provisions of this Act imposing on any such property of the debtor as may be specified in the order a charge for securing the payment of any money due or to become due under the judgment or order.
(2) The appropriate court is—
(a) in a case where the property to be charged is a fund in court, the court in which that fund is lodged.
(3) An order under subsection (1) above is referred to in this Act as a "charging order".
…
(5) In deciding whether to make a charging order the court shall consider all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, any evidence before it as to—
(a) the personal circumstances of the debtor, and
(b) whether any other creditor of the debtor would be likely to be unduly prejudiced by the making of the order.
…"
"(3) At the hearing the court may—
(a) make a final charging order confirming that the charge imposed by the interim charging order continues, with or without modification.
(b) discharge the interim charging order and dismiss the application;
(c) decide any issues in dispute between the parties, or between any of the parties and any other person who objects to the court making a final charging order;
(d) direct a trial of any such issues, and if necessary give directions; or
(e) make such other order as the court considers appropriate."
THE COURT'S APPROACH
"Thus it is that all the circumstances must be considered together. It has been said that circumstantial evidence is to be considered as a chain, and each piece of evidence as a link in the chain, but that is not so, for then, if any one link broke, the chain would fall. It is more like the case of a rope composed of several cords. One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be quite of sufficient strength."
i) although supported by a judgment for tax, that tax was not assessed by the Revenue, rather it was also the NCA – who seek this order.
ii) Further and unusually, there is a dispute of fact involving a third-party (that is OBPL, through Miss O'Neill).
iii) It is a corollary of this case, that the third-party must be a "willing co-conspirator in a sham arrangement to hide the Respondent's assets from the State". Ms O'Neill in effect stands accused of money-laundering.
THE EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS
i) documents lodged at the Land Registry show that on 12 May 2003 Giovanni Persico, the Respondent's cousin, together with the Respondent, bought two plots of land, DY236467 (namely, The Property) and DY234852 for the sum of £210,000. (Maria Persico's name appears with theirs on the TR1 but her name is struck through by manuscript amendment).
ii) On 29 September 2008 Giovanni Persico appears described on a handwritten fax sheet as the director and 100% shareholder of UK Land - however the company paperwork does not reflect that position. The company had been incorporated on 25 September 2008 with the registered office at 555 Osmaston Road and Raymond Hill was appointed a director on that day. He resigned on 30 August 2009 and was replaced by a man called Alan Hill, who is his brother. Subsequent investigation showed Alan Hill had no knowledge that he was a director of this company, of which he had never heard.
iii) On 17 October 2008 The Property and DY234852 were transferred into a company called UK Land and Property Investments Ltd ("UK Land") for no consideration. The document of transfer, the TR1, was signed by the Respondent, by his cousin Giovanni Persico and by Raymond Hill.
iv) On 9 November 2009 The Property (i.e. only DY236467) was transferred, again, for no consideration, out of UK Land into a company called Stockton Brook Investments Ltd. Raymond Hill signed as a director of UK Land, although he had resigned from that post on 30 October 2009. UK Land was dissolved on 4 May 2010. The police interview of Raymond Hill shows that he understood that Stockton Brook Investments Ltd was, in his words, "another company that was formed for the lads [i.e. the Persicos]". When that company was incorporated on 15 October 2009 the director was named as Cheryl Hancock, the wife of Raymond Hill.
v) At the date of Mr O'Reilly's September 2018 statement, the other plot of land DY234852 still remained registered to UK Land, although that company had been dissolved on 4 May 2010.
vi) On 7 December 2010 The Property was transferred from Stockton Brook Investments Ltd into OBPL which had been incorporated on 3 November 2010. Raymond Hill was appointed as director on the same day. Again, no consideration was paid.
vii) OBPL was formed by a professional corporate formation company, and a person from Formation Direct Limited, was the sole shareholder of OBPL until on 10 December 2010 (as recorded in the annual return dated 5 December 2012) the shareholding was transferred to Ms Ria O'Neill, i.e. three days after The Property had been transferred into OBPL. In other words, she had been appointed as sole shareholder when she was 16 years of age. Two years later on 5 December 2012 Ms O'Neill was appointed a director, the day Raymond Hill resigned.
viii) Stockton Brook Investments Ltd was dissolved on 7 June 2011. It did not trade nor submit any accounts.
i) the manner in which The Property was acquired;
ii) the way it was transferred and held;
iii) the links between the Respondent and The Property; and
iv) the parties' history of (non) engagement in the application and the Claim.
i) The Respondent made no challenge to the NCA's claim which included that he had laundered his proceeds of crime into DY235467, was in receipt of rent and was the beneficial owner of The Property.
ii) Neither the Respondent, nor anyone else involved in the transfer of DY235467 has provided any statement in support of OBPL's opposition to the application.
iii) The Respondent was the original joint purchaser of The Property.
iv) The Property was then transferred through various companies for no value.
v) Raymond Hill has shown by his evidence in interview, as well as the documentary evidence that his involvement in the companies that held The Property, was under the direction of the Persico family.
vi) Individuals and entitles involved in the transactions are linked to the Respondent.
vii) OBPL, the vehicle currently holding The Property, was incorporated on 3 November 2010 and a few weeks later, on 7 December 2010, The Property was transferred to it for no consideration.
viii) Ms O'Neill appeared to acquire the whole shareholding on 10 December 2010, just three days after OBPL acquired The Property for no consideration when she was aged just 16 – and she was not even aware of it at the time.
ix) OBPL only began to file accounts showing trade once the NCA had begun its tax investigation. Before this the accounts suggested the company was dormant.
x) The filed accounts suggested that The Property had been rented and OBPL derived rental income. No rents had been declared by the Respondent or any of the companies through which DY236467 had passed. The NCA treated the rental income as the Respondent's income and assessed him for tax on that basis - and the Respondent challenged none of it.
xi) The fact that there was a creditor of the company (OBPL) in the sum of £411,000, matching the value attributed to land suggests that someone else is the true beneficial owner of The Property, there is no value in the company.
xii) On 26 February 2014 during an interview under caution Ms O'Neill gave no comment answers to all questions regarding her or her family's connection to the land at 555 Osmaston Road.
xiii) On 25 February 2014 in an interview under caution Raymond Hill stated his role was to act on behalf of the Respondent.
xiv) When interviewed on 27 February 2014 the Respondent also gave no comment in relation to his connection to land at 555 Osmaston Road.
xv) Ms O'Neill accepts she was served with the Restraint Order, Freezing Order and the claim form against the Respondent which explicitly set out the NCA case that the Respondent was the beneficial owner of The Property. Neither she nor OBPL sought to vary or discharge any order which is inconsistent with their case that the NCA is wholly mistaken, and that The Property belongs to the Interested Party. The Charging Order was a serious clog on OBPL's commercial freedom to raise money.
CONCLUSIONS
"28…References to a "façade" or "sham" beg too many questions to provide a satisfactory answer. It seems to me that two distinct principles lie behind these protean terms, and that much confusion has been caused by failing to distinguish between them. They can conveniently be called the concealment principle and the evasion principle. The concealment principle is legally banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil at all. It is that the interposition of a company or perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identity of the real actors will not deter the courts from identifying them, assuming that their identity is legally relevant. In these cases the court is not disregarding the "façade", but only looking behind it to discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing."