QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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DSN |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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BLACKPOOL FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED |
Defendant |
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Michael Kent QC and Nicholas Fewtrell (instructed by Keoghs LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 27-31 January 2020
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Griffiths :
The issues
i) Should the limitation period be extended under the discretion provided by section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980?ii) Was DSN sexually abused by Roper and what was the extent of the assault?
iii) Is the Defendant vicariously liable?
iv) What is the causation and effect of DSN's psychiatric diagnoses?
v) What damages is DSN entitled to?
Outline chronology
The evidence
i) The Blackpool FC manager (Sam Ellis).ii) The manager of an under 13s team in Blackpool called Poulton Youth whose son went on the New Zealand trip in 1987 (Frank Sharp).
iii) A volunteer part-time youth scout, physio and coach for Blackpool FC during the period in question, although he did not give precise dates (William Hurst).
i) DSN (the claimant).ii) LDX (who was abused by Roper between the ages of 11 and 13 in the early 1980s, but ended up with a bigger and more successful club than Blackpool FC).
iii) Graham Wright (who came across Roper when he was 11 or 12, was very seriously abused by him, and played for his Nova Juniors side until he was 14).
iv) Mark Bradshaw (who met Roper when he was about 13 years old in 1982, and went on to play for Blackpool FC as an adult until 1990).
v) David Erhardt (who met Roper when he was 13 or 14 in 1983 or 1984, who played for Nova Juniors);
vi) Colin Greenall (who met Roper when he started training with Blackpool FC at the age of 15 in about 1979, before going on to sign as an apprentice and eventually as a very successful full-time first team player, leaving in 1987 for another club);
vii) CFS (who was seriously abused by Roper between the ages of 11 and 16 and eventually reported it to Chapman in about 1984 or 1985; he signed schoolboy and then apprentice forms with Blackpool after playing for Nova Juniors);
viii) Michael Davies (who signed for Blackpool FC as an apprentice in 1982 when he was 16, after previously playing as a schoolboy, and stayed there for a playing career which lasted until 1995, after which he continued as a coach and was on two occasions caretaker-manager);
ix) ANF (who was sexually abused both by Roper and another person associated with another club, first met Roper when he was 11 in 1981 and played for Nova Juniors until signing schoolboy forms with a better club than Blackpool FC at the age of 14);
x) Steven Harrison (who signed for Blackpool FC as an apprentice when he was 15 in 1967, signed as a professional there in 1971 and stayed until 1978).
In addition, another witness in this category provided a witness statement and was expected to give evidence, but was prevented from doing so because of ill health. I received his witness statement in evidence on a hearsay basis, while recognising that, because he was not cross examined, it carried less weight than the evidence of other witnesses. He was:
xi) JKL (met Roper when he was 14 in about 1987 attending trials for Blackpool FC, abused by him, played occasionally for Nova Juniors).
i) DSN's wife, whose witness statement was agreed and who was not, therefore, cross examined.ii) Kenneth Chadwick, who was the Chairman of the Board of Blackpool FC 1981-1990 (and stayed on as Life Vice President after that).
iii) David Johnson who was the Company Secretary between about 1980 and about 1988-89.
iv) Christopher Wilson, a solicitor from the firm acting for the Defendant, who gave evidence about the effect of delay on his searches for witnesses and documents.
The issues
(1) Should the limitation period be extended under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980?
"33.— Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries or death.
(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which—
(a) the provisions of section 11… of this Act prejudice the plaintiff…; and
(b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant…;
the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.
…
(3) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to—
(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff;
(b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed by section 11…;
(c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant;
(d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action;
(e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages;
(f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received…"
"Whether or not it will be possible for defendants to investigate these sufficiently for there to be a reasonable prospect of a fair trial will depend upon a number of factors, not least when the complaint was first made and with what effect. If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing: if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations – see section 33(3)(b)) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible after a long delay."
"Courts should be slow to exercise their discretion in favour of a claimant in the absence of cogent medical evidence showing a serious effect on the claimant's health or enjoyment of life and employability. The likely amount of an award is an important factor to consider, especially if, as is usual in these cases, they are likely to take a considerable time to try. A claim that the claimant's dyslexia was not diagnosed or treated many years before at school, brought long after the expiry of the limitation period, extended as it is until after the claimant's majority, will inevitably place the defendants in great difficulty in contesting it, especially in the absence of relevant witnesses and documents. The contesting of such a claim would be both expensive and likely to divert precious resources. Courts should be slow in such cases to find that the balance of prejudice is in favour of the claimant." (emphasis added)
(2) Was DSN sexually abused by Roper and what was the extent of the assault?
"Roper was a well-known local football scout and scouted me to play for the Blackpool School of Excellence which was run by Jackie Chapman, the head coach, and Sam Ellis, the manager of Blackpool Football Club… The Blackpool School of Excellence fed players into the youth academy at Blackpool Football Club to develop into professional footballers… For the next two years, I attended Blackpool School of Excellence's training sessions with Jack Chapman and Roper…"
"Roper… told me that it was now too late to drop me off and I would therefore have to spend the night with him. I remembered feeling unsure and uncomfortable about this but I did not refuse or say no because I felt there was no other option… Roper was in my eyes, such a powerful individual. I did not feel able to challenge him or argue with him.
…When I arrived at Roper's accommodation, I was taken to Roper's bedroom and was told by Roper to get into his double bed. I offered to sleep on the floor as I did not really want to share a bed with Roper but he insisted. Despite feeling uneasy about this, I felt as if I had no alternative…"
"Roper then tried to reach over to cuddle me but I resisted by keeping my body rigid and leaning right over the side of the bed. I stayed on the edge of the bed, wrapped up in the sheet so he could not touch me.
I was absolutely terrified and, although Roper then went to sleep, I lay awake all night, right on the edge of the bed, as far away from Roper as possible. I clearly remember that I had one arm stretched out on the floor to stop myself from falling out of the bed. I stayed there for the entire night and I remember it hurt having to hold that position. I only began to feel safe when it was light outside."
(3) Is the Defendant vicariously liable?
Vicarious liability - The law
i) D2 may be vicariously liable for the tortious act of D1 even though the act in question constitutes a violation of the duty owed to D2 by D1 and even if the act in question is a criminal offence (para 20 at (ii)); andii) Vicarious liability can even extend to liability for a criminal act of sexual assault (para 20 at (iii); citing Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215).
i) The first stage is to consider the relationship between the Defendant and the tortfeasor "to see whether it is one that is capable of giving rise to vicarious liability".ii) The second stage is to examine the connection that links the relationship between the Defendant and the tortfeasor and the tortious act or omission of the tortfeasor.
"The relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability is in the vast majority of cases that of employer and employee under a contract of employment. The employer will be vicariously liable when the employee commits a tort in the course of his employment. There is no difficulty in identifying a number of policy reasons that usually make it fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability on the employer when these criteria are satisfied: (i) The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability; (ii) The tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer; (iii) The employee's activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer; (iv) The employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed by the employee; (v) The employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the employer."
"…a situation where the employee in question, at any rate for relevant purposes, is so much a part of the work, business or organisation of both employers that it is just to make both employers answer for his negligence."
"At para 35 above, I have identified those incidents of the relationship between employer and employee that make it fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability on a defendant. Where the defendant and the tortfeasor are not bound by a contract of employment, but their relationship has the same incidents, that relationship can properly give rise to vicarious liability on the ground that it is "akin to that between an employer and an employee". That was the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in E's case [2013] QB 722."
"29. It is important, however, to understand that the general approach which Lord Phillips described is not confined to some special category of cases, such as the sexual abuse of children. It is intended to provide a basis for identifying the circumstances in which vicarious liability may in principle be imposed outside relationships of employment. By focusing upon the business activities carried on by the defendant and their attendant risks, it directs attention to the issues which are likely to be relevant in the context of modern workplaces, where workers may in reality be part of the workforce of an organisation without having a contract of employment with it, and also reflects prevailing ideas about the responsibility of businesses for the risks which are created by their activities. It results in an extension of the scope of vicarious liability beyond the responsibility of an employer for the acts and omissions of its employees in the course of their employment, but not to the extent of imposing such liability where a tortfeasor's activities are entirely attributable to the conduct of a recognisably independent business of his own or of a third party. An important consequence of that extension is to enable the law to maintain previous levels of protection for the victims of torts, notwithstanding changes in the legal relationships between enterprises and members of their workforces which may be motivated by factors which have nothing to do with the nature of the enterprises' activities or the attendant risks.
30. It is also important not to be misled by a narrow focus on semantics: for example, by words such as "business", "benefit", and "enterprise". The defendant need not be carrying on activities of a commercial nature: that is apparent not only from the cases of E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2013] QB 722 and the "Christian Brothers" case [2013] 2 AC 1, but also from the long-established application of vicarious liability to public authorities and hospitals. It need not therefore be a business or enterprise in any ordinary sense. Nor need the benefit which it derives from the tortfeasor's activities take the form of a profit. It is sufficient that there is a defendant which is carrying on activities in the furtherance of its own interests. The individual for whose conduct it may be vicariously liable must carry on activities assigned to him by the defendant as an integral part of its operation and for its benefit. The defendant must, by assigning those activities to him, have created a risk of his committing the tort. As the cases of Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2006] QB 510, E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and the "Christian Brothers" case show, a wide range of circumstances can satisfy those requirements.
31. The other lesson to be drawn from the cases of Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd, E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and the "Christian Brothers" case is that defendants cannot avoid vicarious liability on the basis of technical arguments about the employment status of the individual who committed the tort. As Professor John Bell noted in his article, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability" [2013] CLJ 17, what weighed with the courts in E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and the "Christian Brothers" case was that the abusers were placed by the organisations in question, as part of their mission, in a position in which they committed a tort whose commission was a risk inherent in the activities assigned to them."
"The employer puts in the community an enterprise which carries with it certain risks. When those risks materialise and cause injury to a member of the public despite the employer's reasonable efforts, it is fair that the person or organisation that creates the enterprise and hence the risk should bear the loss."
"22. … [I]t is a fact of life, and therefore to be expected by those who carry on businesses, that sometimes their agents may exceed the bounds of their authority or even defy express instructions. It is fair to allocate risk of losses thus arising to the businesses rather than leave those wronged with the sole remedy, of doubtful value, against the individual employee who committed the wrong. To this end, the law has given the concept of 'ordinary course of employment' an extended scope.
23. If, then, authority is not the touchstone, what is? ... Perhaps the best general answer is that the wrongful conduct must be so closely connected with acts the partner or employee was authorised to do that, for the purpose of the liability of the firm or the employer to third parties, the wrongful act may fairly and properly be regarded as done by the partner while acting in the ordinary course of the firm's business or the employee's employment … (Original emphasis)
25. This 'close connection' test focuses attention in the right direction. But it affords no guidance on the type or degree of connection which will normally be regarded as sufficiently close to prompt the legal conclusion that the risk of the wrongful act occurring, and any loss flowing from the wrongful act, should fall on the firm or employer rather than the third party who was wronged. …
26. This lack of precision is inevitable, given the infinite range of circumstances where the issue arises. The crucial feature or features, either producing or negativing vicarious liability, vary widely from one case or type of case to the next. Essentially the court makes an evaluative judgment in each case, having regard to all the circumstances and, importantly, having regard to the assistance provided by previous court decisions."
"44. In the simplest terms, the court has to consider two matters. The first question is what functions or "field of activities" have been entrusted by the employer to the employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of his job. As has been emphasised in several cases, this question must be addressed broadly; see in particular the passage in Diplock LJ's judgment in Ilkiw v Samuels [1963] 1 WLR 991, 1004 included in the citation from Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141, 147-148 (at para 38 above), and cited also in Lister v Helsey Hall Ltd [2002] 1 QC 215 by Lord Steyn, at para 20, Lord Clyde, at para 42, Lord Hobhouse, at para 58 and Lord Millett, at para 77.
45. Secondly, the court must decide whether there was sufficient connection between the position in which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice which goes back to Holt. To try to measure the closeness of connection, as it were, on a scale of 1 to 10, would be a forlorn exercise and, what is more, it would miss the point. The cases in which the necessary connection has been found for Holt's principle to be applied are cases in which the employee used or misused the position entrusted to him in a way which injured the third party. Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 , Pettersson v Royal Oak Hotel Ltd [1948] NZLR 136 and Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd were all cases in which the employee misused his position in a way which injured the claimant, and that is the reason why it was just that the employer who selected him and put him in that position should be held responsible. By contrast, in Warren v Henlys Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 935 any misbehaviour by the petrol pump attendant, qua petrol pump attendant, was past history by the time that he assaulted the claimant. The claimant had in the meantime left the scene, and the context in which the assault occurred was that he had returned with the police officer to pursue a complaint against the attendant.
46. Contrary to the primary submission advanced on the claimant's behalf, I am not persuaded that there is anything wrong with the Lister approach as such. It has been affirmed many times and I do not see that the law would now be improved by a change of vocabulary…"
i) "…what functions or "field of activities" have been entrusted by the employer to the employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of his job. As has been emphasised in several cases, this question must be addressed broadly…" (para 44): andii) "…whether there was sufficient connection between the position in which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice which goes back to Holt…" (para 45).
Vicarious liability – Stage 1 - evidence
i) At the age of 11, boys could attend a licensed "Centre of Excellence" run by the Club with the approval of the Football Association "for training and coaching" (rule 44).ii) At the age of 14, the Club could register the boy as an "Associated Schoolboy", commonly referred to as 'schoolboy forms' (rule 45). It was expressly provided that "Boys under the age of 14 years are not eligible to become Associated Schoolboys and must not attend a Club for regular training or coaching" (rule 44(5)(a)).
iii) Once signed as an Associated Schoolboy, the boy was exclusive to the Club and was not free to join another club without consent or going through an appeals process (rule 45(6)).
iv) Other clubs were banned from direct or indirect approaches to an Associated Schoolboy (rule 43(10).
v) When an Associated Schoolboy completed his full-time education, his Club had first refusal on him as a Trainee or Contract Player and no other Club could sign him without paying the Club a transfer fee (rule 45(9)).
vi) Trainee Players (sometimes referred to as 'apprentices') were 16 or 17 year olds not in full time education. They were on a 2 year contract (if 16) or a 1 year contract (if 17) (rule 46).
vii) From the age of 17, a boy was eligible to be signed as a professional Contract Player by the Club (i.e a first team player). The Club had first refusal as to whether to sign its Trainees as Contract Players and the player could not sign for another club without payment of a transfer fee (rule 46(2)).
Steven Harrison
Graham Wright
LDX
Colin Greenall
CFS
ANF
Mark Bradshaw
Michael Davies
"I know that Roper was closely associated with the Club because he was given access to what I would describe as the 'inner sanctuary' of the Club. He was allowed access to the training sessions and facilities and the dressing room, something that I do not think would be afforded to someone who was not closely associated with the Club or was not employed by the Club in any capacity. Roper was definitely involved with the junior and Youth Team set up at the Club during the period of time that I was part of that set up.
… I am not aware of Roper scouting for any other teams. I am only aware of him being associated with Blackpool Football Club…"
David Erhardt
"I would say that Nova Juniors was more than a 'stepping stone' to Blackpool, it was a feeder team… Most junior teams had a link to professional clubs and I believe Nova Juniors was linked to Blackpool. If you wanted to be considered for another club, it was almost as if you had to leave Nova Juniors. It was as if there was an exclusive agreement between Nova Juniors and Blackpool – that is the way that I viewed it."
When Erhardt himself drifted away to a different local boys' team after two seasons, "the possibility of trials and any connection with Blackpool ended."
DSN (the Claimant)
JKL
Adult witnesses
Sam Ellis
Frank Sharp
William Hurst
Kenneth Chadwick
David Johnson
Vicarious liability – Stage 1 – conclusion
Vicarious liability – Stage 2 - evidence
DSN
Frank Sharp
Sam Ellis
Further meetings
"The impression I had from attending the meetings at the Tangerine Club was that the parents were looking to Blackpool Football Club for reassurance about Roper and wanted to ensure that the trip was supported and endorsed by them. Roper seemed to know everyone affiliated with the club. Roper… bragged about having introduced Alan Wright, Paul Stewart, Trevor Sinclair and David Bardsley as well as the existing apprentices, Mark Bradshaw and Simon Rooney to Blackpool Football Club. I believe Roper said this to highlight his connection with Blackpool Football Club and show the influence he had there.
Knowing that Ellis' son would be going on the trip meant I was satisfied that it was legitimate and I believed that Roper was a recruitment agent or scout for Blackpool Football Club. This settled any concerns that I had regarding Roper and I was conscious that all of the older boys that were going on the trip had signed for Blackpool and they were going to help Roper with looking after the younger players. If Blackpool had been taken out of the equation, as far as I am concerned, none of the parents would have agreed to their children going on the trip. The involvement and support provided by Blackpool Football Club made the trip legitimate, especially as the first team manager's son would also be on the trip.
…I spoke to other parents about the trip and we settled on the purpose of the trip being that Roper had organised the trip with a view to the boys going on to sign for Blackpool."
Mark Bradshaw
Conclusion on vicarious liability
(4) What is the causation and effect of DSN's psychiatric diagnoses?
"In my opinion there have been severe psychological consequences of the abuse that DSN experienced. He has had a lengthy history of specific anxieties, particularly in situations where he does not feel fully in control, for example, crossing bridges and driving at speed. In my opinion he suffers from a phobic anxiety disorder in the form of specific phobias which in the ICD0-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders is coded as F40.2. There is much research evidence regarding an association between sexual abuse and anxiety disorders. In my opinion while DSN may have suffered from anxiety in any event, it is likely that the sexual abuse experienced the feeling of not having any control over the situation has been the main causative factor in his subsequent anxiety."
"I am shocked by the approach taken by Blackpool Football Club. When I came forward, I expected the club to want to engage and to understand what had happened. The main reason I came forward was because it felt the right thing to do, but also, so that the football club could learn from its historical failings. I want to do this so children like my own wouldn't have to suffer in similar situations, and I have felt let down by the lack of empathy, engagement and humanity shown by Blackpool. Many people have commented on how brave I have been, but I do not feel brave in this process, just frightened, and at times like the vulnerable 12/13 year old boy I was."