QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
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JOHN CAREY (as representative of the Estate of Lydia Carey) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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VAUXHALL MOTORS LIMITED |
Defendant |
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PAUL BLEASDALE QC and STEPHEN GLYNN (instructed by Moran & Co) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 3, 4, 5 and 6 December 2018
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Crown Copyright ©
HHJ WALDEN-SMITH :
Introduction:
The Relevant Time Period
"… the development of malignant mesothelioma is rare in people who have not been exposed to asbestos and in the majority of cases there is evidence of either direct or indirect exposure to asbestos. Mesothelioma can develop after low level exposure to asbestos, and there is no threshold dose of asbestos below which there is no risk."
Liability can found against any Defendant who negligently exposed an individual to asbestos to such an extent which made a material contribution to the risk of contracting mesothelioma.
The Law
"The test in every case ought to be whether the Defendant can reasonably foresee that his conduct will expose the Plaintiff to the risk of personal injury. If so, then he comes under a duty of care to that Plaintiff. If a working definition of "Personal Injury" is needed, it can be found in section 38(1) of the Limitation act 1980. "Personal Injuries" includes any disease and any impairment of a person's physical or mental condition."
and further, approving the words of Holland J at first instance:
"…there is nothing in the law that circumscribes the duty of care by reference to the factory wall … if the evidence shows with respect to a person outside the factory that he or she was exposed to the knowledge of the defendants, actual or constructive in terms of dust emissions not materially different to those giving rise within the factory to a duty of care, then I can see no reason not to extend to that extramural neighbour a comparable duty of care,"
In Maguire v Harland & Wolff, Mance LJ (in the minority) held:
"The law should not require absolute precision about the identity of the persons to whom injury might reasonably foreseeably be caused. It seems to me sufficient that Harland and Wolff's conduct, in allowing Mr Maguire to become excessively contaminated to a quite unnecessary extent and to leave the yard in that state, clearly expanded the risks of asbestos to an extent which might affect third parties as well as Mr Maguire himself outside their yard."
and, Judge LJ (expressing the majority view) that
"The principle approved in Maggerson and Hancock in relation to environmental exposure to asbestos dust has potential application to cases of familial exposure. In summary, a family member is not precluded from establishing liability based on environmental contamination with asbestos dust. In an appropriate case, the environmental principle may apply to members of an employee's family as to anyone else living in the immediate vicinity of premises working with asbestos…"
"If (1) C was employed at different times and for differing periods by both A and B and (2) A and B were both subject to a duty to take reasonable care or to take all practicable measures to prevent C from inhaling asbestos dust because of the known risk that asbestos dust (if inhaled) might cause a mesothelioma, and (3) both A and B were in breach of that duty in relation to C during the period of C's employment by each of them with the result that during both periods C inhaled excess quantities of asbestos dust and (4) C is found to be suffering a mesothelioma, and (5) any cause of C's mesothelioma other than the inhalation of asbestos dust at work can be effectively discounted, but (6) C cannot (because of the current limits of human science) prove, on the balance of probabilities, that his mesothelioma was the result of his inhaling asbestos dust during his employment by A or during his employment by B or during his employment by A and B take together, is C entitled to recover damages against either A or B or against both A and B?
…where conditions (1)-(6) are satisfied C is entitled to recover against both A and B. That conclusion is in my opinion consistent with principle, and also with authority (properly understood). Where those conditions are satisfied, it seems to me just and in accordance with common sense to treat the conduct of A and B in exposing C to a risk to which he should not have been exposed as making a material contribution to the contracting by C of a condition against which it was the duty of A and B to protect him. I consider that this conclusion is fortified by the wider jurisprudence reviewed above. Policy considerations weigh in favour of such a conclusion. It is a conclusion which follows even if either A or B is not before the court."
"The rule in its current form can be stated as follow: when a victim contracts mesothelioma each person who has, in breach of duty, been responsible for exposing the victim to a significant quantity of asbestos dust and thus creating a "material increase in risk of the victim contracting the disease will be held to be jointly and severally liable for causing the disease."
"…the real question is whether the dust from the swing grinders materially contributed to the disease. What is a material contribution must be a question of degree. A contribution which comes within the exception de minimis no curat lex is not material. I do not see how there can be something too large to come within the de minimis principle but yet too small to be material. "
The Evidence of Mrs Carey
Overalls
Potential exposure to asbestos
What asbestos was in the Dunstable plant and what was Mr Carey's exposure
Conclusion