1. The Claimants application dated 25th May 2016 is dismissed

2. The Claimant’s application dated 20th June 2016 is dismissed

3. There be summary judgement for the First Defendant in respect of the allegations made in the following paragraphs of the Amended Particulars of Claim, and those paragraphs be struck out of the Amended Particulars of Claim:

     a. Paragraph 130 to 150

     b. Paragraph 163.2

     c. Paragraph  173.2 [the order stated “172.2”, but this was a slip: see paragraphs 24 and 65 of the July judgment]

     d. Paragraphs 174 to 185

     e. Paragraphs 196 to 203

     f. Paragraphs 204 to 217

     g. Paragraph 226.4

     h. Paragraph 238.2

     i. Paragraphs 239 to 259

     j. Paragraphs 264 to 274

     k. Paragraphs 292.2 and 292.3

     l. Paragraphs 294 to 305

     m. Paragraphs 329 to 338

     n. Paragraphs 339 to 346

     o. Paragraphs 369 to 399

…

  For the avoidance of doubt, the prospect of the Claimant seeking permission to appeal and, if successful in obtaining permission, appealing my decision is not a reason for delaying preparation for trial.

(1)               heads 1, 2, 3 and 11 were entirely unaffected by the October order;

(2)               heads 6 and 9 were affected only to the extent that certain subparagraphs were struck out;

(3)               moreover, while some parts of heads 5 and 10 were struck out, other substantial parts of those heads were unaffected by the October order.

(1)               The physical and mental resources required when undertaking the tasks of preparing for and conducting a trial are all too easy to underestimate. Experienced advocates have warned that those tasks strain every nerve and sinew. The tasks of preparing and conducting a trial impose huge pressures on litigants in person. By striking out the relevant part of the claim, the court saves the litigant in person from the burden of preparing, and fighting at trial, parts of the claim which the strike out procedure has identified in advance as being bound to fail.

(2)               Striking out such parts of the claim will also benefit the litigant in person in relation to possible costs consequences. This is particularly so where the other side would incur a great deal of expense when answering the relevant part of the claim, both at trial and in advance of the trial. The future costs incurred by the other side on those parts of the claim will be substantial. Under our civil procedure system litigants in person are potentially exposed to an order that they must pay those costs. Thus, even if there are parts of the claim on which the litigant in person succeeds at trial, that victory may be a bitter one. This is because costs orders running to tens of thousands of pounds may be made against them in relation to parts of the claim which have failed at trial. Litigants in person have often found themselves facing ruin by attacking their opponents on too many fronts, with costs orders against them vastly outweighing any such amounts as may have been awarded in their favour. When striking out a part of the claim, the court will usually direct that the claimant pay the other side’s costs to date of that part. That will no doubt be painful. Nevertheless, because it was a claim which was bound to fail, the striking-out order minimises the pain and protects litigants from being at risk of an order that they pay future costs of the part of the claim in question.

(1)               Experience has shown that mediation can have immense value at this stage, and indeed at earlier and later stages.

(2)               Where a case involves more than one head of claim, energy and resources should be concentrated on such of the heads of claim as plainly merit going to trial.

(3)               A head of claim will plainly merit going to trial only if, after standing back and impartially considering the other side’s answer to it, the head of claim is so strong on the law and on the facts, and so important, that it clearly justifies both:

(a)               finding the resources that would be needed to advance the head of claim at trial; AND

(b)               running the risk of an adverse costs order it the head of claim were to fail.

(4)               If no head of claim plainly merits going to trial, then urgent steps need to be taken to try to settle the case before the other side incurs more costs which the litigant in person may become liable to pay. If settlement discussions are fruitless, consideration should be given to discontinuing the case: see chapter 17 of the Handbook for Litigants in Person.

(5)               There may well be heads of claim which, even though they have not been challenged on a strike-out application, or have survived a strike-out application, should nevertheless be abandoned. Heads of claim fall into this category where:

(a)               they do not justify diverting resources which need to be devoted to other heads of claim with stronger prospects of success; OR

(b)               there is too great a risk that the litigant may lose and have to pay not just the other side’s costs on the head of claim to date, but also additional costs incurred by the other side in further preparation in answer to the head of claim and in successfully defeating it at trial.

(6)               Argument on a strike-out application, and the court’s judgment on such an application, may well assist in assessing whether there are heads of claim in the case which should be abandoned.

(7)               If a firm decision is taken not to pursue such heads of claim, the court and the other side should usually be told at once that they will not be pursued. Here, too, it may be useful to consider whether to utilise the procedure for discontinuance under CPR 38: see chapter 17 of the Handbook for Litigants in Person.

A1. Procedural rules in respect of the hearing were not complied with and therefore the appellant was not heard.

A2. The decision to dismiss took into account the respondents’ arguments and took insufficient account of the appellant’s arguments.

A3. A written narrative judgement has not been provided by the Court therefore preventing proper consideration by the appellant for reasons for dismissal.

B1. In a number of instances the actual claim made has not been considered

B2. Representations relating to claims for ‘punitive damages’ were neither requested nor heard.

B3. Representations made by the appellant relating to defamation had not been taken into account. The judgement is factually wrong in many respects and is based on statements made by the respondent, with little account of the appellants’ arguments.

… was not recorded as an estate expense contrary to normal practice that all estate expenses should be taken from the estate bank account and recorded in the estate accounts.

29. [29.1] The claimant’s complaint is that a payment [the firm] made to [Ms Wiles] should have been paid into the Estate. [29.2] The facts alleged self-evidently do not disclose a cause of action: the £500 was a payment made by [the firm] to a client to compensate her for the inconvenience it had, regrettably, caused to her by not answering a letter from her with appropriate dispatch.

If transcripts are not provided “as of right” to unrepresented parties, it is assumed that represented parties receive transcripts as of right. This would introduce a note of (general) bias against unrepresented parties …

(1)                in section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980, stipulated that an action for defamation may not be brought after the expiration of from the date on which the cause of action accrued;

(2)               in section 32A of the same act, given the court a power, in certain circumstances, to direct that section 4A shall not apply to the action or to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.

(1)               Mrs Chambers noted that Mr Rooney had not filed a defence to head 12 on the merits. She said this contravened CPR 16. However it was in accordance with the overriding objective for Mr Rooney to seek, and for the judge to grant, an early determination of whether head 12 would be allowed to proceed under s 32A. If the court determined not to allow it to proceed, then much time and expense would be saved. Nothing in CPR 16 prohibited this course. Mrs Chambers relied on CPR 16.5(5), but if Mr Rooney’s application were successful then head 12 would no longer be part of the amended particulars, and in relation to head 12 CPR 16.5(5) would not arise. It does not matter for this purpose that Mr Rooney’s application was issued after Mrs Chambers’s application had been issued.

(2)               The judge ruled against Mr Rooney when he sought early determination of limitation defences to other heads of claim. Mrs Chambers contrasted this with the Judge’s approach to head 12, effectively accusing the judge of inconsistency. As Mrs Justice Andrews pointed out, however, in relation to head 12 there was no need to wait until trial for relevant factual findings to be made. The judge decided the matter putting Mrs Chambers’s case at its highest as to when she first found out about the statements complained of.

(3)               Mrs Chambers advanced arguments that it was enough that her original particulars of claim made assertions of defamation in general terms. For reasons given below, these arguments do not assist Mrs Chambers, as the original particulars of claim were too late. Nevertheless it is right to record that in that regard she accused the judge of unjustly treating CPR 17 and 18 as requiring a claim to be re-dated so that it was only made on a later date when particulars were given. Mrs Chambers added that the judge’s approach “may strongly infer bias”. These arguments are without merit. Even on Mrs Chambers’s own case, her original claim failed to set out the content of defamatory statements that she relied upon, failed to set out the dates of such statements, and failed to identify the persons to whom such statements were addressed. It requires no more than common sense to realise that a litigant cannot pre-empt a time bar merely by bringing an action which describes a head of claim in general terms. Such a head of claim will not amount to an action for libel within in the meaning of the Limitation Act if the alleged defamatory statement is not identified. I find it difficult to believe that Mr and Mrs Chambers did not understand this.

(4)               In support of the renewed application Mrs Chambers seeks to rely on s 32 of the Limitation Act. Under s 32 the limitation period is postponed in certain circumstances, including those where facts relevant to the right of action have been deliberately concealed from a claimant by a defendant. Deliberate concealment is a very serious allegation. Nothing in the material before me indicates that there is any arguable case that Mr Rooney was guilty of deliberate concealment. Mrs Chambers relied on a letter dated 27 July 2011 sent to her by Mr Rooney. This letter perfectly properly adopted the stance that the firm could not make available to Mrs Chambers documents including data relating to another private individual (such as Ms Wiles) unless consent were given by that individual. Mrs Chambers suggests that this stance was contrary to a finding of the Information Commissioner’s Office. Even if this were substantiated, which it is not, the letter provides no basis for thinking that a claim of deliberate concealment could be made good.

(1)               where the date on which a claimant becomes aware of relevant facts is more than one year after the cause of action for an allegedly defamatory statement accrued, s 32A does not say that it is only on that date that time starts to run;

(2)               what section 32A provides is that in those, among other, circumstances the court may consider allowing the claimant to proceed despite expiry of the one year period in section 4A;

(3)               in that regard s 32A, among other things, says in subsection (2)(b)(ii) that the court should take account of the extent to which action was taken promptly once the claimant knew whether or not the facts in question might be capable of giving rise to an action.

… where the defendant’s conduct has been calculated ... to make a profit … which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff.

There are grounds for believing that [Mr Rooney] did in fact profit from many of his actions of negligence, and it is believed that these profits were intentional.

(1)               I have not identified any aspect of what took place in the court below which gives any cause for concern that the court could have, but did not, do something to redress the balance between the parties in terms of representation or otherwise. This includes a general concern expressed by Mr Chambers orally that the time that was allowed by the judge did not recognise how long it took to research matters. For the reasons given elsewhere in this judgment, those instances where Mrs Chamber says she should have had more time concerned points where further time would not have assisted her.

(2)               Those who conduct litigation in person need to appreciate that steps which might redress any imbalance are more likely to assist if the litigant in person can stand back from the fray, and interpret what has been said by opponents and by the court objectively and in context.