QUEEN''S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
JRM (by his father and litigation friend TRM) |
Claimant |
|
- and - |
||
KING'S COLLEGE HOSPITAL FOUNDATION TRUST |
Defendant |
____________________
David Evans QC (instructed by Kennedys Law LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 17-19,22,25th May 2017
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
GILBART J :
Introduction
i) he suffered the acute spinal cord injury around the time of his birth;
ii) it consisted of vascular injury to the spinal cord due to occlusion of a branch of the anterior spinal artery. The two potential causes of that were
either
a) traumatic injury causing tearing of the lining of the artery (arterial dissection), and subsequent clot formation within the vessel;
or
b) occlusion due to a blood clot or placental emboli travelling from elsewhere and lodging in the arterial lumen.
iii) if the court accepted that there was excessive force and traction from instrumental delivery, it was agreed that the most likely mechanism of injury is the arterial dissection referred to above. If there was no significant trauma, then an embolic source was more likely.
i) the clinicians dealing with the mother’'s care failed to have regard to an elevated CRP (C-Reactive Protein) blood test result, and to her being in pain and producing offensive liquor, and failed to advance the delivery by means of induction, which delay in delivery led to the use of forceps and the consequent injury;
ii) in any event, the obstetrician delivering JRM negligently used the forceps when JRM was in the OL position.
a) The treatment pre delivery
b) Conduct of the delivery, including evidence on JRM’'s condition after delivery;
c) Legal principles
d) Discussion and Conclusions.
(a) Treatment pre delivery
i) whether there was any reason to think that the mother was suffering from chorioamnionitis (“"CA”"), and if so when;
ii) whether an elevated C-Reactive Protein (“"CRP”") reading, which was found on the morning of 26 February 2009, but not reported to the ward until later that afternoon, would have led to the induction of labour before 28th February;
iii) whether it was proper clinical practice not to induce labour on the day before actual delivery;
iv) whether a pessary, which had been inserted into the mother’'s cervix as part of a clinical trial, should have been removed on the day before delivery;
v) whether the use of forceps was caused by the delay.
“"Admit
FBC (Full Blood Count), CRP x 2 per week;
CTG;
Erythromycin PO (Orally) 10/7 (That is an antibiotic)
If any signs labour/infection for removal of pessary (As per Harris Birthright instructions);
D/W Ms Jain (Another consultant) – Happy with plan.”"
“"Feeling well T=N (normal) no blood yesterday
plan-continue erythromycin
FBC/CRP today (MW informed) MOD (mode of delivery discussion)…
Recommend vaginal delivery with full monitoring. LSCS (caesarean section) if signs of distress in either baby.”"
“"CRP 105.7-from 26th February 2009
WCC 16.03
Key, P UT (uterus) – Normal tender
Plan-continue observation repeat WCC/CRP, needs good quality CTG today any signs clinical infections will need delivery”"
(b) Conduct of the delivery, including evidence on JRM’'s condition after delivery
i) The evidence of the scans and assessment of the mother performed by Dr Wee-Liak (William) Hoo MBBS DFFP, a senior registrar in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, on the morning of 28th February 2009;
ii) The evidence of the obstetrician who delivered the baby, Dr Ismaiel Mahfouz, MSc, MRCOG, CCT, then a Senior Registrar, and of Dr Hoo, who was present;
iii) The evidence of the mother and father;
iv) The evidence of the bruising of JRM, as shown by
a) the photographs
b) the contemporaneous notes of those caring for the child after birth;
v) The independent expert evidence of Professor Bennett and Mr Walkinshaw, called by the Claimant and Defendant respectively
vi) The evidence on the likelihood of there being an alternative explanation for the injury to the spinal cord.
Bruising and the use of forceps
a) the first note made in on 28th February 2009, records the claimant at 6.00 am as being bruised to the face, chest and arms on arrival in the NICU, and before a face mask was applied for respiration, or intubation attempted;
b) a retrospective note written by a Consultant Dr Bhat of a visit at 12.30 on the same day, records the child having areas of bruising over face, scalp and limbs;
c) a Nursing Care Plan drawn up on that date records him as being “"very bruised- mainly head/face/abdomen;”"
d) at 19.30 pm on that date he was recorded in the day nursing entry as “"still very bruised;”"
e) on 1st March 2009 at 7.00 am he was noted as having a bruised face and left shoulder. The nursing care plan prepared that day describes him as “"very bruised over facial area and left shoulder.”" At 19.15 the same day he was described as “"very bruised”" and “"a bit puffy;”"
f) on the next day 2nd March, he was described as “"still bruised and oedematous.”" The Nursing Care Plan described him as “"bruised- face and chest and left shoulder.”" The same description was given in the Nursing Care Plans of 3rd – 5th March 2009 inclusive:
g) a report written by a Dr Murthy on `2nd March 2009 uses this description: “"Baby was admitted……Noted to be heavily bruised.”"
h) on 6th March 2009 the Nursing Care Plan noted “"bruised on face and chest area since birth.”" It was noted again on 7th March 2009 but some improvement was noted. On the 8th March 2009, the terms of the note of 6th March were repeated. On 9th March 2009, the note is to the same effect;
i) on 10th March 2009, the bruising to face and chest was noted as being “"lessen”" (sic).On 12thMarch, nothing is noted about bruising. A reference to bruising to chest and face was made on 14th March. On 15th March the note refers to bruising on his upper torso which was resolving.
j) a clinical history written on 11th March by a Consultant in the NICU, Dr Silke, says this: “"Clinical details:……29/40 forceps delivery. Bruising ++.”"
k) on 20th August 2009 a letter was sent to a respiratory paediatrician at Great Ormond Street Hospital enclosing “"a comprehensive summary of his neonatal course and his current status.”" It was written by Dr Reyes on behalf of the Consultant in the NICU. It records the following
“"Delivery: Difficult forceps assisted vaginal delivery after spontaneous premature rupture of membranes……..
Resuscitation: (JRM) was noted to be bruised and oedematous at birth…..”"
It then describes how he was ventilated, intubated and given CPR, and was then taken to the NICU.
l) a letter was written to JRM’'s General Practitioner by a Dr Wellington at the Defendant’'s hospital. It said this
“"(JRM) had a very stormy neonatal course. (JRM) was born by vaginal forceps delivery……..It was a difficult extraction and at birth (JRM) was bruised and oedematous……”"
m) a transfer letter was sent on 14th October 2009 from the NICU to the High Dependency Unit. It stated that JRM had had a “"difficult forceps delivery”"
n) a very similar description appears in the High Dependency Unit (“"HDU”") admission form of the same date.
(c) Legal Principles
“" 60 These issues must be evaluated against the appropriate legal test which was established in the seminal case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582. The essence of the test was distilled by Lord Scarman in Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 as follows:
""a doctor is not negligent if he acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice.""
61 This test was further elaborated upon and expanded by the House of Lords in the case of Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 in which Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated as follows:
""the court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of opinion that the defendant''s treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice. In the Bolam case itself, McNair J. stated [1957] 1 W.L.R. 583, 587, that the defendant had to have acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a ""responsible body of medical men."" Later, at p. 588, he referred to ""a standard of practice recognised as proper by a competent reasonable body of opinion."" Again, in the passage which I have cited from Maynard''s case [1984] 1 WLR 634, 639, Lord Scarman refers to a ""respectable"" body of professional opinion. The use of these adjectives -responsible, reasonable and respectable--all show that the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis. In particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the weighing of risks against benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter.
…in cases of diagnosis and treatment there are cases where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant''s conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence (I am not here considering questions of disclosure of risk). In my judgment that is because, in some cases, it cannot be demonstrated to the judge''s satisfaction that the body of opinion relied upon is reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. In particular, where there are questions of assessment of the relative risks and benefits of adopting a particular medical practice, a reasonable view necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have been weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible.
I emphasise that in my view it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable. The assessment of medical risks and benefits is a matter of clinical judgment which a judge would not normally be able to make without expert evidence. As the quotation from Lord Scarman makes clear, it would be wrong to allow such assessment to deteriorate into seeking to persuade the judge to prefer one of two views both of which are capable of being logically supported. It is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion cannot be logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the bench mark by reference to which the defendant''s conduct falls to be assessed.""
(d) Discussion and Conclusions
i) The CRP reading and the clinical signs of pain and offensive liquor should have led to an earlier delivery by induction. That was negligent on the part of the Defendant. Damage was caused by the way in which the delivery was carried out, with an OL presentation being mistaken for an OA one;
ii) Whatever the conclusions with regard to the CRP reading, the delivery was negligently conducted.
i) JRM suffered the acute spinal cord injury around the time of his birth;
ii) he suffered vascular injury to the spinal cord due to occlusion of a branch of the anterior spinal artery. The two potential causes of that were either traumatic injury causing tearing of the lining of the artery (arterial dissection), and subsequent clot formation within the vessel, or occlusion due to a blood clot or placental embolus travelling from elsewhere and lodging in the arterial lumen.
iii) if the court accepted that there was excessive force and traction from instrumental delivery, it was agreed that the most likely mechanism of injury is the arterial dissection referred to above. If there was no significant trauma, then an embolic source was more likely.
i) occurred around the time of birth;
ii) is consistent with the use of excessive force and traction from instrumental delivery, which if it occurred was the more likely of the two potential causes of injury.
The fact that he was found to have endured an injury at around the time of birth, which injury and its cause were consistent with the application of excessive force and traction, is of course itself capable of being evidence of their application. Acceptance of the alternative explanation for the injury requires one to accept that this child was the subject of a tragic coincidence. If the NICU records had been different, that might have been less easy to exclude. Taking all matters together as one must, the alternative explanation is impossible to accept.