QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Mark Pollock |
Claimant |
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Enda Cahill -and- Madeline Cahill |
Defendants |
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Mr Stephen Grime QC and Mr Alex Taylor (instructed by Keoghs LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 20 -24 July 2015
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice William Davis:
Introduction
The evidence – the state of the window
The evidence – who opened the window?
Who opened the window and to what extent?
- Mr Cahill claims that he was able to note the precise position of the windows on the stays at a time when he was in the bedroom in order to retrieve details of medication needed urgently by the emergency services. According to him he stood by the window for a few seconds despite the urgency of the mission on which he was engaged.
- Alice Whittaker observed the windows shortly afterwards when Mr Pollock was still lying on the ground below and when the purpose of her visit was to get some of his belongings – her observation was of the two casements open but in the opposite manner to that depicted on Mrs Cahill's photographs. She was very much less precise as to the degree to which the windows were open.
- Mr Cahill said that he made a second visit to the bedroom at about 2.00 a.m. when he further observed the windows. This was a visit of some significance. Yet the first mention in evidence by him of this visit was when he was being cross-examined.
- Mrs Cahill said that she visited the bedroom at about this time but only for a very short while and not in order to look at the state of the windows.
- Mr Smyth was told by his wife of a visit to the bedroom at some point in the early hours after the accident during which one of the Cahills had closed the window. Mrs Whittaker did not recall any such visit and the Cahills denied closing any window at any stage on the night of the accident. There is no reason to doubt Mr Smyth's recollection on this issue.
- Mrs Cahill carried out her purported reconstruction by reference to what her husband had told her the night before in the aftermath of the accident. It was not clear when the description had been given. Once Mr Pollock had gone to the hospital, Mrs Cahill on her own account was not thinking clearly yet she apparently was able to absorb and later remember the detail of how the window had been open.
- Mrs Cahill made at least one witness statement which was wholly inaccurate on the issue of whether the position of the windows had been changed between the accident and the taking of the photographs. She claimed not to have realised that it was inaccurate even though she had had to re-open the window before taking the photographs when the window concerned was the one from which Mr Pollock had fallen.
- When the George sisters visited the bedroom some days later Mrs Cahill supposedly showed them how the window had been open when Mr Pollock fell. Not only was only one window opened but, more to the point, it was opened rather less than it must have been open at the time of the accident.
How did Mr Pollock come to fall?
"My Lords, the late Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in his book "The Sign of Four", describes his hero, Mr. Sherlock Holmes, as saying to the latter's friend, Dr. Watson: "how often have I said to you that, when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?" It is, no doubt, on the basis of this well-known but unjudicial dictum that Bingham J. decided to accept the shipowners' submarine theory, even though he regarded it, for seven cogent reasons, as extremely improbable.
In my view there are three reasons why it is inappropriate to apply the dictum of Mr. Sherlock Holmes, to which I have just referred, to the process of fact-finding which a judge of first instance has to perform at the conclusion of a case of the kind here concerned.
The first reason is one which I have already sought to emphasise as being of great importance, namely, that the judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying that the party on whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to discharge that burden. No judge likes to decide cases on burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so.
There are cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course for him to take.
The second reason is that the dictum can only apply when all relevant facts are known, so that all possible explanations, except a single extremely improbable one, can properly be eliminated. That state of affairs does not exist in the present case: to take but one example, the ship sank in such deep water that a diver's examination of the nature of the aperture, which might well have thrown light on its cause, could not be carried out.
The third reason is that the legal concept of proof of a case on a balance of probabilities must be applied with common sense. It requires a judge of first instance, before he finds that a particular event occurred, to be satisfied on the evidence that it is more likely to have occurred than not. If such a judge concludes, on a whole series of cogent grounds, that the occurrence of an event is extremely improbable, a finding by him that it is nevertheless more likely to have occurred than not, does not accord with common sense. This is especially so when it is open to the judge to say simply that the evidence leaves him in doubt whether the event occurred or not, and that the party on whom the burden of proving that the event occurred lies has therefore failed to discharge such burden."
Was there a breach of duty on the part of the Defendants?
(2)The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.
(3)The circumstances relevant for the present purpose include the degree of care, and of want of care, which would ordinarily be looked for in such a visitor, so that (for example) in proper cases—
(a)an occupier must be prepared for children to be less careful than adults; and
(b)an occupier may expect that a person, in the exercise of his calling, will appreciate and guard against any special risks ordinarily incident to it, so far as the occupier leaves him free to do so.
It is argued on behalf of Mr Pollock that the reference to "such a visitor" requires the occupier to have regard to any known vulnerability. That is clearly correct. If Mr Pollock had been a sighted person, the open window would not have rendered the premises unsafe. It was the fact that he was blind that made them so.
The actions of Mr Pollock
Conclusion