QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
BRISTOL DISTRICT REGISTRY
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Mr Karl Stevens |
Claimant |
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Equity Syndicate Management Limited |
Defendant |
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Mr McBride (instructed by Lyons Davidson) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 26th February 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Burnett :
The facts of this case
a) The daily rate is often rather higher than available to anyone seeking to hire a car in the market place;
b) The period of hire often seems rather long;
c) The period of hire may start sometime before repairs on the vehicle commence.
The case before the judge
a) Was the claimant impecunious in the sense that to have hired a car directly would have exposed him to a loss or burden which was unreasonable?
b) If not what was the 'Basic Hire Rate' of an equivalent vehicle on the market in the locality in which the claimant lived?
c) Was the period of hire reasonable?
Submissions
1) That the judge was bound to conclude on the evidence that the claimant was impecunious. In those circumstances the full claim relating to hire charges was recoverable.2) If, contrary to that submission, the finding on impecuniosity was sustainable, the judge was wrong to arrive at the Basic Hire Rate by averaging the rates charged by four different hire companies at many different local locations. Authority determines that the need is to identify a single Basic Hire Rate. (see paragraph 23 below). Mr McBride, on behalf of the defendant, accepts that the approach adopted by the judge was wrong. It is fair to say that the judge was led into error.
3) In any event, the judge was too selective in his chosen figures. The evidence showed a range from £33.83 per day to £142.86 (net of VAT) and with variable non-waiveable excesses. The proper approach was to look at the highest figure in the market disclosed in the schedules of evidence before the judge.
4) The judge was wrong to reduce the period of hire to 19 days, that is to say disallow the first nine days, because the evidence before the judge showed that the initial delay followed the stripping of the car to determine precisely what parts were needed, and then the need to wait for those parts to arrive.
1) That the finding relating to impecuniosity was one open to the judge on the evidence before him and should not be disturbed on appeal.2) That, whilst accepting that the judge should not have averaged the figures in the way he did, the figure he arrived at is sustainable. It might well have been lower.
3) That the evidence relating to the activity, or lack of it, in the repairing garage in the first nine days they had the car in their possession is unsatisfactory. The judge was entitled to the conclusion he reached.
Impecuniosity
"5. In Dimond v Lovell Mrs Dimond could have found the money needed to hire a replacement car until she was reimbursed by Mr Lovell or his insurers. The case proceeded on this basis. Understandably enough, she preferred to take advantage of the services of an accident hire firm. But what if the innocent motorist, like many people, is unable to afford the cost of hiring a replacement car from a car hire company? Unlike Mrs Dimond, he cannot find the necessary money, so unless he can use the services of a credit hire company, he will be unable to obtain a replacement car. While his car is being repaired he will have to make do as best he can without a car of his own. If this happens, he will be without his own car and in practice will receive little or no recompense for the inconvenience involved.
6. My Lords, the law would be seriously defective in this type of case if the innocent motorist were, in practice, unable to obtain use of a replacement car. The law does not assess damages payable to an innocent plaintiff on the basis that he is expected to perform the impossible. The common law prides itself in being sensible and reasonable……..
7. The conclusion I have stated does not mean that, if impecunious, an innocent motorist can recover damages beyond losses for which he is properly compensateable. What it means is that in measuring the loss suffered by the impecunious plaintiff by loss of use of his own car the law will recognise that, because of his lack of financial means, the timely provision of a replacement vehicle for him costs more than it does his affluent neighbour. In the case of an impecunious plaintiff someone has to provide him with credit, by incurring the expense of providing a car without receiving immediate payment, and then incur the administrative expense involved in pursuing the defendant insurers for payment. ……………..
9. There remains the difficult point of what is meant by 'impecunious' in the context of the present type of case. Lack of financial means is, almost always, a question of priorities. In the present context what it signifies is an inability to pay car hire charges without making sacrifices the plaintiff could not reasonable by expected to make. I am fully conscious of the open–ended nature of this test. But fear this will lead to increased litigation in small claims courts seem to me exaggerated."
"Many car owners are, of course, well able to provide what is needed to satisfy the hirer that the money which is needed to pay for the hire is available. If they choose to use the services of a credit hire company they must accept as a deduction from their expenditure the extra cost of doing so. The full cost of obtaining the services of a credit hire company cannot be claimed by the motorist who is able to pay the cost of the hire up front without exposing himself or his family to a loss or burden which is unreasonable."
"I do not find that Mr Stevens was someone who was impecunious, giving the expression the meaning found in the cases that have been outlined to me."
Basic Hire Rate
"32 The third possible method and the one preferred by this court in Burdis at [139] is to look at "…actual locally available figures". However, the court also emphasised, at [146], that "… a person who needs to hire a car because of the negligence of another must, subject to mitigating his loss, be entitled to recover the actual cost of hire, not an average [cost of hire]". I would, with respect, endorse that statement. Once the court has concluded that it was reasonable for the claimant to hire the type of car that he did, then the task of the court is to find what constitutes the BHR for the particular type of car actually hired. As this court put it at [147] in Burdis:
"[The claimant] can go round to the nearest hire company and is prima facie entitled to recover the amount charged whether or not the charge is at the top of the range of car hire rates. However, the basic principle is qualified by the duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss. What is reasonable will depend on the particular circumstances".
33 In practice, therefore, on the issue of what BHR is recoverable in a case where the claimant who has hired on credit is not "impecunious", a judge may have two sorts of evidence. First, he may have direct evidence, in the form of published rates, from the actual credit hire company that hired the replacement car which demonstrates either that the credit hire rate and the BHR for that type of car is the same or it is different and what the difference is. Secondly, the judge may have evidence of the BHR charged by other car hire companies in the area for the type of car actually hired. From that he will be able to ascertain, on a balance of probabilities, what the BHR for the actual type of care hired was and so arrive at the measure of damages recoverable, subject to the issue of the reasonable time for hiring the car"
"…..if there is evidence of a range of basic hire rates, then the highest reasonable rate should be taken, because the obligation of the claimant is only to do what is reasonable."
That submission was not accepted. The evidence was that there was a range of Basic Hire Rates some of which where rather more than the credit hire rate (see para [73]). Yet the Court of Appeal clearly contemplated allowing a Basic Hire Rate which was less than the credit hire rate but determined not to do so, on the basis of special factual circumstances which existed in that case (see para [81]).
"How does one estimate the value of these additional benefits that Mrs Dimond obtained? It seems to me that prima facie their value is represented by the difference between what she was willing to pay [the credit hire company] and what she would have been willing to pay an ordinary car hire company for the use of a car. As the judge said, [the credit hire company] charged more because they offered more."
Aikens LJ considered that the Court of Appeal in Burdis had adopted the same approach.
Period of Hire