England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
On transfer from
THE NOTTINGHAM COUNTY COURT
Claim No 3NG01313

		Combined Court Centre The Law Courts 60 Canal Street Nottingham NG1 7EL
		22/11/2013

The Hon. Mr Justice Popplewell:

1. These are the reasons for making an extended civil restraint order against Mr Wicks.
2. The court's power to make civil restraint orders ("CROs") arises pursuant to CPR Rule 3.11. Practice Direction 3C identifies the three forms of CRO which may be made. By paragraph 3.1 an Extended CRO may be made where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit.
3. What is meant by persistence in this context was explained by the Court of Appeal in Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004]1WLR88 at paragraph 42 as follows:

"We do not include the word "habitual" among the necessary criteria for an extended cibvil restraint order, but there has to be an element of persistence in the irrational refusal to take "no" for an answer before an order of this type can be made".

See also R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2007] 1 WLR 536 at paragraphs 68-69

4. On 18 November 2011 Mr Wicks issued claim number 1QZ35198 in the Nottingham County Court against Miss Parkin for monies lent, claiming £1,228. On 21 November 2011, he issued a further claim number 1QZ36100 against Miss Parkin and J Wren for work done, claiming £560. Defences were served on 19 and 21 December 2011 in the two actions. During the course of those proceedings Mr Wicks was the subject of bail conditions, and subsequently a restraining order, arising out of his prosecution for harassment of the defendant Miss Parkin. This meant that he was prohibited from contacting Miss Parkin save through the County Court.
5. At a preliminary hearing on 21 March 2012 District Judge Nicolle consolidated the two actions and made case management orders including orders that

(1) Mr Wicks file with the court in duplicate further and better particulars of claim;

(2) Within 14 days of receipt of the further and better particulars of claim, the defendant file with the court in duplicate a defence to the further and better particulars of claim (paragraph 5 of the order);

(3) The court was to serve the further and better particulars on the defendant on behalf of the claimant (paragraph 4 of the order).

6. On 13 April 2012 Mr Wicks filed his further and better particulars of claim. He says that he was subsequently told by a member of staff in the court office that it was sent to the defendant on 23 April 2012. However a document on the court file is marked with a manuscript annotation that it was sent to the defendant on 10 May 2012.
7. The defendant filed her particularised defence which is dated 10 May 2012. There is a dispute about when it was filed.
8. On 14 May 2012 Mr Wicks filed an application for judgment in default being an application that judgment be entered because the defendant was in breach of the order of District Judge Nicolle by not filing her particularised defence by 9 May 2012. Court staff referred the application for judgment to District Judge Nicolle. By the time she came to consider the application the particularised defence had been filed. She declined to enter judgment.
9. In her reasons she said:

"The claimant's letter of 29 April 2012, amounting to further and better particulars of claim, was sent by the court to the defendant on 10 May 2012. The defendant filed her defence on 24 May 2012, 12 days after deemed service of the claimants further and better particulars and this was handed to the claimant, by the court, on 31 May 2012. It was not appropriate to strike out the defence."

10. The letter advising Mr Wicks of the decision went on to explain: "If the claimant wishes to appeal, he must do so, following the correct procedure and paying the appropriate fee". Mr Wicks did not appeal that decision.
11. The case was consolidated with a further claim (1QZ35198), and came to trial on 6 June 2012. It was heard by District Judge Nicolle and determined on its merits. She handed down a reserved judgment on 6 July 2012 in which she gave judgment for the Mr Wicks on his claim in the sum of £398.11, against which she allowed a costs set off of £97.50; and judgment for the defendant on her counterclaim.
12. Meanwhile on 16 May 2012 Mr Wicks had issued another claim against Miss Parkin for monies lent in action 2QT54948 claiming £322.01. A defence was entered on 14 June 2012 and on 16 July 2012 District Judge Nicolle struck out that claim as an abuse of process.
13. On 25 June 2012 Mr Wicks commenced another action against Miss Parkin (in the name of Mrs Armstrong) being claim 2QT70212 claiming £150. On 7 August 2012 that claim was struck out by District Judge Nicolle on the grounds that it contained no legally recognisable claim.
14. On 25 September 2013 Mr Wicks commenced claim 3NG01313 against Miss Parkin and six other individuals. The individuals named as 2^nd to 6^th defendants were members of the court staff at Nottingham County Court. District Judge Nicolle was named as the 7^th defendant. The claim alleged a failure to comply with District Judge Nicolle's order of 21 March 2012 and sought to bring a claim against her and the court staff for contempt of court, as well a a claim for sexual discrimination. It was referred to the Designated Civil Judge, HHJ Godsmark QC for directions as to how it should be dealt with. On 26 September 2013 HHJ Godsmark QC made an order that:

(1) the claim form shall not be served;

(2) the claim is struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4 as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and/or as an abuse of the court's process;

(3) The claim is totally without merit.

15. His reasons were set out in writing. They were as follows:

"The background facts are not clearly set out in the Particulars of Claim but consideration of the court file 1QZ36100 shows in essence that:-

[there was then a recitation in sub paragraphs (a) to (h) of the history of the litigation, to one aspect of which I shall return]

Each claim is identically framed and alleges:-

1. Contempt of Court. This appears to be based on non-compliance with District Judge Nicolle's order of 21 March (i.e. para. 4- Court to serve Defendant on behalf of the claimant; and para. 5 Defendant to file a defence to Claimant's further and better particulars of Claim within 14 days of receipt).

2. Sexual discrimination under CPR Rule 1 in the form of bias to Miss Parkin

These claims are misconceived

Paragraph 5 of the 21 March 2012 order – service of defence

1. This order was directed at Miss Parkin only. None of the other defendants were subject to it. Allegations that anyone other than Miss Parkin could have been in breach are baseless.

2. Even if Miss Parkin was late serving her further defence (which is not clear) on considering the Claimant's application to enter judgment District Judge Nicolle was entitled to exercise her case management powers, grant relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9 if necessary and refuse to enter judgment. If the Claimant disagrees with that decision he could have appealed. He did not do so.

3. The order of District Judge Nicolle was a case management direction made by her. She had power to alter or vary the order or grant relief from sanctions. She did so. That has not been appealed. She cannot be said to be in contempt of her own case management direction.

4. The other defendants are all members of the court staff. They were not party to the Claimant's litigation against Miss Parkin. District Judge Nicolle's case management directions were not directed at any of them personally.

5. Resort to CPR81 is misconceived. If reliance is placed on CPR 81.4 then the allegations are incapable of amounting to contempt – and there was no CPR 81.9 penal notice attached to the order of 21 March 2012. If reliance is placed upon CPR 81.12 then no permission has been sought or granted.

Paragraph 4 of 21 March 2012 – Court to serve Claimant's Particulars

6. This provided a mechanism for service only. The order was not an order of the court directed to any individual.

7. There was no breach of paragraph 3. The Claimant's further particulars were sent to the Defendant. She provided her further Defence in response.

8. If it is alleged that the court did not send the Claimant's particulars to the Defendant timeously there was no time for service by the court included by the order. There was no breach.

9. Resort to CPR 81 is misconceived. If reliance is placed on CPR 81.4 then the allegations are incapable of amounting to contempt – and there was no CPR 81.9 penal notice attached to the order of 21 March 2012. If reliance is placed on CPR 81.12 then no permission has been sought or granted.

Sexual Discrimination

10. The allegation of sexual discrimination is unparticularised and appears to amount to the assertion that the defendants are all female and must thus be discriminating against the male Clamant. That bald assertion will not support a claim for sexual discrimination under CPR Rule 1 or at all."

16. HHJ Judge Godsmark QC's order contained the usual provision where an order has been made without a hearing that Mr Wicks might apply to have it set aside. He made such an application, which was heard by HHJ Judge Godsmark QC at a hearing attended by Mr Wicks on 13 November 2013. Having heard Mr Wicks in person, HHJ Godsmark QC ordered that his order of 26 September 2013 should stand and the claim remain struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and/or as an abuse of the court's process. He confirmed the claim as being totally without merit. He made arrangements for a hearing on 20 November 2013 to give Mr Wicks an opportunity to make representations as to why an extended civil restraint order should not be made, providing a draft.
17. I conducted such hearing, having transferred the claim into the High Court of Justice for the purposes of determining whether an Extended CRO should be made, and retransferring it to Nottingham County Court thereafter.
18. The summary of the proceedings which I have set out above identifies the important stages of the procedural history. But this brief summary does not do justice to the volume of activity in which Mr Wicks has engaged. He has bombarded the court with numerous letters and phone calls, sometimes as many as about 30 a day. In addition the court staff have been inundated with calls from Mr Wicks on various extensions throughout the office. This included calling on one particular extension which is designated for emergency out of hours calls. In addition he has regularly attended the court. In all these ways he has taken up a very considerable amount of the time of the court staff.
19. On one such occasion on 15 August 2012 he had to be forcibly removed by security officers to prevent harassment of court staff. On 23 August 2012, he issued an invoice addressed to the Nottingham County Court in respect of this visit claiming a total of £600 for "injuries sustained at above public authority… due to counter staff and above public authority vendetta as failure resolve complaints back since May 2012 (sic)". He commenced proceedings by claim 2YN53548 against the Ministry of Justice in relation to the claim covered by the invoice. On the Ministry of Justice's application, District Judge Williscroft, sitting at Derby County Court on 10 January 2013, struck out the claim as disclosing no reasonable grounds and as an abuse of the court's process. The claim was certified as totally without merit. No application was made to set aside or appeal that order.
20. On another occasion when he was visiting the Court building he threw himself against a glass sliding door causing the glass to break. He initially claimed that he had been pushed into the door by security personnel, but this was disproved by CCTV footage of the incident. He was subsequently convicted at the Magistrates Court of causing criminal damage and ordered to pay compensation.
21. At the hearing before me Mr Wicks appeared in person and asked that the matter should be stayed or adjourned because he had made a complaint to the police in relation to his treatment throughout these claims, alleging perverting the course of justice, falsifying judgments, misfeasance in public office and fraud. He told me that the allegations made to the police covered the handling of his claims by the court staff, the court management, District Judge Nicolle and His Honour Judge Godsmark QC, all of whom he alleged had been guilty of criminal conduct.
22. At the heart of his complaints in relation to District Judge Nicolle and HHJ Godsmark QC was the way they had dealt with the dates relating to the filing and service of his further and better particulars of claim. District Judge Nicolle in her judgment had referred to the further and better particulars as being by way of a letter of 29 April 2012. That was indeed an error. There was such a letter of that date, which was also sent to the Defendant on 10 May, but that was not the letter which contained the further and better particulars. Mr Wicks also suggested that His Honour Judge Godsmark QC had made an error in the recitations to his decision of 13 November 2013 at sub paragraph (d) where he referred (correctly) to the Claimant filing his further and better Particulars on 13 April 2012 and went on to say: "That document is marked as having been sent to the Defendant on 10 May 2012". That did not involve any error on the part of HHJ Godsmark QC. I have reviewed the court file and the document is indeed marked in manuscript which has been written on it that it was sent to the Defendant on 10 May 2012.
23. The only error in District Judge Nicolle's decision, notified to Mr Wicks on 7 August 2012, was in her reference to the further and better particulars of claim being contained in a letter of 29 April 2012, whereas they were dated 13 April 2012. Both were served on 10 May. That error does not have any bearing on her reasoning. As HHJ Godsmark QC correctly observed it was a case management decision within her powers. Moreover the decision she made was not the subject of an application to set aside, nor was it appealed.
24. Mr Wicks also complained that His Honour Judge Godsmark QC had made an error in sub paragraph (e) of his recitations in suggesting that the Defendant filed her particularised defence on 15 May 2012, whereas District Judge Nicolle had recorded the defence as having been filed on 24 May 2012. It is unclear from the court file which date is correct. HHJ Godsmark QC recognised that the date of filing of the defence was unclear in paragraph 2 of his Reasons which I have quoted above. But again it does not matter which is correct for the purposes of the decision which District Judge Nicolle made. She made her decision on the basis of the later date.
25. During the course of the hearing before me, Mr Wicks made numerous allegations that the court staff and the judges involved in handling his claims had been guilty of criminal behaviour. I explained to him that a failure by a party to comply with a procedural direction in a civil claim is not necessarily a criminal offence. He refused to accept that that was so. He explained that he did not accept the validity of any of the judgments of District Judge Nicolle, District Judge Williscroft, or HHJ Godsmark QC and intended to proceed not just with a criminal complaint, and an insurance claim, but also with further damages claims arising out of the handling of his proceedings by the court staff and the judges involved.
26. In Nowak v The Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB), Leggatt J recently explained the rationale for civil restraint orders in the following terms:

"58. As explained by the Court of Appeal in the leading case of Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88, the rationale for the regime of civil restraint orders is that a litigant who makes claims or applications which have absolutely no merit harms the administration of justice by wasting the limited time and resources of the courts. Such claims and applications consume public funds and divert the courts from dealing with cases which have real merit. Litigants who repeatedly make hopeless claims or applications impose costs on others for no good purpose and usually at little or not cost to themselves. Typically such litigants have time on their hands and no means of paying any costs of litigation – so they are entitled to remission of court fees and the prospect of an order for costs against them is no deterrent. In these circumstances, there is a strong public interest in protecting the court system from abuse by imposing an additional restraint on their use of the courts' resources."

27. I have concluded that an extended civil restraint order is called for in Mr Wicks' case. He has made two claims which have been identified as totally without merit and a further two which have been struck out as an abuse of process or as showing no legally recognisable claim. He has bombarded and harassed court staff so as to occupy a disproportionate amount of the limited time and resources which are available in the administration of the business of Nottingham County Court. It is clear from the history of these claims that he is not prepared to accept the decisions of the court at any level, or to pursue the proper appeal processes, but rather is bent on continuing to pursue his complaints by commencing further claims as necessary despite having been told that they have no merit. It is also clear from what he told me during the hearing that he is not prepared to accept the decisions of the court. For these reasons it is apparent that unless restrained Mr Wicks is likely to make further claims or applications which are totally without merit in relation to these claims. He is also likely to continue to take up time and resources communicating with Court staff about them.
28. It is therefore necessary and proportionate that the court system be protected from the abuse which Mr Wicks has demonstrated and threatens by imposing the restraint which is reflected in an Extended CRO in the following terms:

ORDER

Before the Honourable Mr Justice Popplewell sitting at Nottingham County Court, 60 Canal Street, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire, NG1 7EJ

UPON the action having been transferred to The High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division for the purposes of making this order, and thereafter retransferred to Nottingham County Court

AND UPON HEARING Christopher Wicks at a hearing on 20 November 2013

AND UPON PERUSING the Court files in actions 3NG01313, 1QZ35198, 1QZ36100, 2QT54948, 2QT70212, 2YN53548

AND UPON IT APPEARING THAT, as more particularly set out in the judgment, Christopher Wicks has persistently made claims and applications which are totally without merit and that, unless restrained, is likely to issue further claims and/or applications and/or appeals which are totally without merit

ORDER (NOTE: THIS IS AN EXTENDED CIVIL RESTRAINT ORDER)

TO CHRISTOPHER WICKS;

You must obey the terms of this Order. If you do not obey, you will be guilty of a contempt of court and you, CHRISTOPHER WICKS, may be sent to prison

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

29. CHRISTOPHER WICKS is forbidden for a period of two years from the date of this Order (until 21 November 2015), whether personally or through any servant or agent, from:

(1) issuing any new proceedings in any County Court in England and Wales which involve, or arise out of, or in any way relate to:

i. the matters leading to actions 3NG01313, 1QZ35198, 1QZ36100, 2QT54948, 2QT70212 and 2YN53548, or any of them; or

ii. the subject matter of such actions, or any of them; or

iii. the course, conduct or disposal of such actions, or any of them.

and

(2) issuing any application, appeal, or other process, or taking any step in this action, or in actions 1QZ35198, 1QZ36100, 2QT54948, 2QT70212 and 2YN53548, or any of them, or in any other action in any County Court in England and Wales involving or arising out of or in any way relating to any of the above matters;

and

(3) communicating with any member of Court staff about any of the above matters;

without first obtaining permission in accordance with paragraph 2 below.

This prohibition applies to any and all such activity save only for an application for permission to appeal against the making of this order, which must be made to the Court of Appeal in accordance with paragraph 7 below.

For the avoidance of doubt this prohibition applies, amongst other things, to any such steps which in any way relate to the decisions or conduct in the course of those actions by any Judge, any officer of the Court, any member of Court staff or management, any security personnel, the Ministry of Justice, the police, any organ or department of government or public service, or any officers, agents or employees of any of the foregoing; and to any such steps which in any way relate to the applications, communications, inquiries, requests and attendances at Court Centres by Christopher Wicks in the course of those actions.

30. If CHRISTOPHER WICKS wishes to apply for permission to issue any proceedings or take any such step as is described in paragraph 1 above, then an application must be made in writing to District Judge Douce at Derby County Court, Combined Court Centre, Morledge, Derby DE1, 2XE and the application will be dealt with on paper alone. If District Judge Douce is absent or otherwise unavailable, such application shall be passed to another District Judge at Derby County Court.
31. If CHRISTOPHER WICKS wishes to appeal from any decision of District Judge Douce (or other District Judge) made in accordance with paragraph 2 above, he/she must seek permission to appeal from (i) The same judge adopting the same procedure (ie an application in writing to be dealt with on paper alone by District Judge Douce or other District Judge); and thereafter (ii) His Honour Judge Godsmark QC adopting the same procedure (ie an application in writing to be dealt with on paper alone by His Honour Judge Godsmark QC). For the avoidance of doubt, no further appeal shall lie to any judge or to any court from a decision of His Honour Judge Godsmark QC refusing permission to appeal.
32. Any amendment or discharge of this order can be made only by His Honour Judge Godsmark QC. If CHRISTOPHER WICKS wishes to seek an amendment or variation, he/she must first seek permission of District Judge Douce to make the application to His Honour Judge Godsmark QC. Such application (for permission to make the application to His Honour Judge Godsmark QC) is to be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 2 above (ie an application in writing to be dealt with on paper alone by the District Judge) and will be subject to the procedure set out in paragraph 3 above in respect of any application for permission to appeal any decision of the District Judge.
33. If any form of Proceedings, Application Notice, Appellant's Notice, Petition, or any other form of document which is within the scope of this order is purportedly issued, or filed, or served upon any party without the said permission having first been obtained (which acts or any of them for the avoidance of doubt will constitute a breach of this order and a contempt of Court) that party shall not be required to appear and respond, and the purported application / proceedings shall stand struck out without being heard. Further, no such application or other process will be issued by the Court.
34. In the event of the retirement, indisposition, or other unavailability of District Judge Douce, another District Judge may be assigned to this order by His Honour Judge Godsmark QC. In the event of the retirement, indisposition, or other unavailability of His Honour Judge Godsmark QC another judge may be assigned to this order by any Designated Civil Judge or High Court Judge.
35. THIS ORDER does NOT prevent you, without the prior permission of District Judge Douce or His Honour Judge Godsmark QC, from making an application for permission to appeal against this order by filing an Appellant's Notice in the Court of Appeal (Civil Appeals Office Registry, Room E 307, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL).

22 November 2013