England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		16/11/2010

Mrs. Justice Nicola Davies :

1. This is an adjourned application by the applicant, Dr Shreedhar Vaidya, to set aside the general civil restraint order ("the Order") made on 25 June 2010 by Sir Charles Gray, sitting as a High Court Judge, and sealed on 16 July 2010. The Order was made in response to an application by the respondent, the General Medical Council ("GMC"), which was issued on 8 June 2010. Dr Vaidya's application is founded on the fact the Order was made in his absence, he relies upon the following matters:

i) He was out of the country on 25 June 2010, and had informed the GMC of this fact prior to the fixing of the hearing date;

ii) He was unaware of the GMC's application before leaving the country;

iii) To issue the Order in his absence breached his rights under Article 6 (1) of the ECHR;

iv) The Order was disproportionate.

2. It is the GMC's case that Sir Charles Gray was informed of Dr Vaidya's position. The judge was familiar with requests for adjournment made by Dr Vaidya. Dr Vaidya was aware of the intention of the GMC to apply for a general civil restraint order before he left the country. The judge was entitled to proceed in Dr Vaidya's absence. In any event, Dr Vaidya's Article 6 rights are fully protected by the hearing before this court. The Order made by Sir Charles Gray was proportionate.

Background

3. Dr Vaidya was a registered medical practitioner who previously worked as a staff grade physician. On 14 September 2006 he was found guilty of serious professional misconduct by a Fitness to Practise Panel ("FPP") of the GMC, who determined that his name was to be erased from the Medical Register. The matters which came before the FPP related primarily to Dr Vaidya's conduct when working for the United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust and for working during three periods of suspension. Dr Vaidya appealed the decision of the FPP to this court pursuant to section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 ("The 1983 Act"). The majority of his challenges were rejected by Bennett J who described some of his grounds as "unsustainable", two grounds were upheld as was the finding of serious professional misconduct. The issue of sanction was referred back to the FPP. Dr Vaidya sought permission to appeal various aspects of Bennett J's decision, this was refused on papers by Waller LJ. Dr Vaidya renewed his application for permission to appeal, this was rejected by Pill LJ.
4. The remitted hearing on sanction was listed for 31 March to 4 April 2008. Dr Vaidya sought to have this hearing postponed, he issued judicial review proceedings, an application for urgent consideration being rejected by Griffiths Williams J. During the FPP hearing, repeated applications were made by Dr Vaidya to postpone the proceedings, further judicial review applications were made by Dr Vaidya, all of which were refused. In June 2008, the FPP ordered the erasure of the doctor's name and made an immediate order to suspend Dr Vaidya's registration. Dr Vaidya's appeal against the order was rejected on all grounds following a two day hearing before Plender J.
5. Dr Vaidya embarked upon a series of proceedings against the GMC, arising from his disciplinary process. On 21 October 2008 the GMC made an application for an extended civil restraint order. The matter came before Mr Kenneth Parker QC (as he then was), sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge on 11 May 2009. On that date, the judge was not prepared to make the order sought but indicated:

"I do emphasise, however, that this is very much a border line decision and I again must give a very forceful warning to Dr Vaidya that if any further claims are made – and those of course will include the current claim of 7 May 2009 – that are found by the court to be wholly without merit, having regard to the full background in this case and the persistent resort to litigation against the GMC, that it would be most unlikely that the court would then not make an order in the terms that are sought in this application."

6. Dr Vaidya continued to issue proceedings in various tribunals against a number of defendants including the GMC, NHS Trusts and individual medical practitioners. Two separate actions, Claim No. HQ09X01892 ("Claim 1892") and Claim No. HQ09X01466 ("Claim 1466"), were issued. The first against the GMC, the second against seven defendants, the first defendant being the GMC. Applications in these claims were heard by Sir Charles Gray. All applications by Dr Vaidya were rejected and applications by the defendants to strike out Dr Vaidya's claim were successful. Of note is the final paragraph of the judgment, Sir Charles Gray stated:

"Finally, I should record the fact that Mr Hare has given notice of the intention of his client to apply for a restraint order against Dr Vaidya. My supposition is that the second to seventh defendants will support that application. It will be apparent from what I have already said that I regard all the claims brought by Dr Vaidya as being totally without merit. It is nevertheless inappropriate, as well as impracticable, for me to deal with this application when this judgment is handed down. A separate hearing will have to be arranged."

This judgment was handed down on 5 May 2010.

7. The intention of the GMC to apply for a civil restraint order against Dr Vaidya was known. On 26 March 2010 James Percival made a witness statement in support of an application for the order. Dr Vaidya informed this court that since October 2008 he had been aware of the intention of the GMC to seek such an order.
8. On 12 May 2010 the GMC filed an application notice with the court seeking a general civil restraint order pursuant to CPR 3.11 and paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 3(C). Procedurally, it was not necessary for the GMC to instigate these proceedings but this court was told that it had been advised to do so in order to assist the listing of the application. The application was not stamped until 8 June 2010, notification of a hearing was given on 14 June 2010, the hearing date being 25 June 2010. On 4 June 2010, by a special delivery letter, Dr Vaidya wrote to the GMC and other courts and tribunals informing them that he would be out of the country or otherwise unable to deal with correspondence until after 10 July 2010. Specifically, the letter to the GMC referred to outstanding claims which Dr Vaidya was pursuing, it made no reference to a civil restraint order. On 10 June 2010, Dr Vaidya was in email communication with the Civil Appeals Office at the Royal Courts of Justice, this related to his appeal of Sir Charles Gray's decision of 5 May 2010. In that letter he stated: "I have no information and to date have not received any notice of hearing of any "application for a civil restraint order" or whether it has been listed." The letter further stated "as you are aware, I would be away and/or not available for dealing with any correspondence until after 10 July 2010."
9. The GMC, on being informed of the hearing on 25 June 2010, wrote a letter to Dr Vaidya on 14 June 2010 informing him of the hearing date. By a fax of 15 June 2010 Dr Vaidya's wife responded to the GMC's letter in a pro forma letter which stated: "Kindly note that Dr S Vaidya is away, or otherwise would be unavailable to deal with your correspondence up to 10 July 2010." By a letter dated 16 June 2010, Mr Percival on behalf of the GMC, sought urgent clarification of Dr Vaidya's location and movements, the reason being that there were three hearings in different matters on 25 June, 29 June and 8 July 2010. By a letter dated 18 June 2010, Mrs Vaidya replied. She confirmed Dr Vaidya's non-availability for the hearing on 25 June 2010 and stated in respect of the later hearings that Dr Vaidya would either attend or be represented.
10. At the hearing before Sir Charles Gray on 25 June 2010, Dr Vaidya did not appear nor was he represented. The GMC made an application to proceed in his absence and put before the court the correspondence to which I have referred, save for the letter of 4 June 2010. Sir Charles Gray heard the application and determined that the matter should proceed in Dr Vaidya's absence. In his judgment, he dealt with the application as follows:

"9. It is clear that Dr. Vaidya knew, because he was in court when the judgment was handed down, that it was the GMC's intention to apply for a civil restraint order. There was then an exchange of e-mails in the middle of May, when the GMC indicated that the application for a civil restraint order would be listed for hearing in London before me on Friday, 25^th June. It was apparent to Dr. Vaidya that the application would be made on that date. A further letter was sent on 14^th June by the GMC informing Dr. Vaidya of the hearing date and enclosing a sealed copy of the application notice for the civil restraint order. There had been some difference of view as to whether it was necessary for an application notice to be prepared. Whether or not it was necessary, the fact is that it was prepared and served on the 14^th June on Dr. Vaidya.

10. By way of response, as I understand it, to the receipt of that letter from the GMC Mrs. Vaidya sent a fax headed "Notification Non-Availablity Out of Country". The text of the note was as follows: "Kindly note that Dr.S.Vaidya is away or otherwise would be unavailable to deal with your correspondence up to 10^th July 2010."

11. 10^th July is a fortnight from today. In response to Mr. Vaidya's fax the GMC, by letter dated 16^th June 2010, sought urgent clarification as to Dr. Vaidya's precise location and movements between that date and 10^th July 2010. Attention was drawn by the GMC to the fact that the present application was going to be heard (as it has been) today. The GMC asked for an urgent response from Mrs. Vaidya and she did reply two days later on 18^th June 201 saying that she confirmed her husband's non-availability with respect to a hearing listed without consulting Dr. Vaidya for 25^th June 2010. She added these words:

"According to my instructions Dr. Vaidya would either attend these hearings or be represented. Of course, in the latter case, both the court and you will be notified of and by the representation. I understand the GMC is not required to attend the permission hearing of 8^th July 2010. In any event, hence no questions arises of dealing with correspondence in this matter from you on behalf of your employer-charity."

The reference to a permission is a reference to a hearing by the full court of an application for permission to appeal my judgment of 5^th May 2010.

12. As it has turned out Dr. Vaidya has neither attended or been represented at the hearing which has taken place today before me. I have had no explanation why that state of affairs has come about. It is still not known whether or not Dr. Vaidya is out of the country. In all those circumstances it seems to me right and proper that I should proceed to deal with the application on its merits. One incidental advantage of that may be that, if it is appropriate for the Court of Appeal to do so, they may perhaps be able to deal with any appeal that there may be against the present judgment on the 8^th July at the same time as the other applications."

11. The reference in paragraph 9 to an exchange of emails in May indicating a date of 25 June was incorrect. The matter was immediately clarified by Mr Hare on behalf of the GMC when the following exchange took place:

"MR. HARE: The first very early part of your judgment where you are talking about the early e-mails that were sent to Dr. Vaidya, particularly the e-mail of 11^th May, in fact at that stage the indication from listing was that the hearing would be on 18^th May, the hearing of this application. It was not until the letter of 14^th June that the 25^th June date, i.e. today's date, was given.

SIR CHARLES GRAY: I had not really noticed that."

No alteration to the Determination or Order was made as a result of the correction.

12. In his application to this court to set aside the Order, Dr Vaidya relies upon his right, pursuant to Article 6(1) to be present and heard at any hearing. On behalf of the GMC, reliance is placed upon CPR Rule 39.3 (5). It is submitted that for the Order to be set aside, Dr Vaidya must demonstrate:

a) That he acted promptly once he discovered the Order;

b) That he had good reason for not attending the hearing; and

c) That he has a reasonable prospect of defeating the GMC's application.

13. During the course of this hearing Dr Vaidya stated that he had been in India on holiday between 12 and 27 June 2010. He produced invoices for air travel and boarding passes. During this period, Dr Vaidya was in telephone contact with his wife, he was aware that the GMC had sent a letter to his wife but she told him that she had dealt with the matter. Dr Vaidya said he had no reason to return for the hearing on 25 June as he was unaware of it, his wife had not specifically told him of the hearing or the date. It is clear from the invoice which Dr Vaidya produced that had he wished to do so, he could have returned earlier to the UK, there being no additional charge for a change of ticket.
14. Dr Vaidya relied upon the authority of White v Weston [1968] 2 QB 647, in which it was held that as a summons giving notice of County Court proceedings was never properly served upon the defendant, he had a right to have the judgment set aside. The particular facts of that case were that the summons were served upon an address which the defendant had left some five months earlier and he had no knowledge of the legal proceedings. The GMC rely upon the authority of Hackney London Borough Council v Driscoll [2003] 1 WLR 2602 where it was held that once a defendant knew about proceedings against him, the court had the necessary jurisdiction to make an order against him and therefore where such an order was made against a defendant who had not been notified of the hearing date, he was not entitled to have the order set aside as of right in the same way that he would if he had no notice of the proceedings. In the circumstances, the appropriate test for setting aside any order made was that set out in CPR Rule 39.3(5). The court's attention was drawn to the judgment of Brook LJ, specifically the passage at 2607 where it was stated: "Once a defendant knows about the proceedings and participates in them, the court has the necessary jurisdiction to make an order affecting him."
15. Dr Vaidya was aware that the GMC was intending to make an application for a civil restraint order. When Dr Vaidya left the country, he was unaware that a specific application had been made or that there was to be a hearing. Dr Vaidya's position is that he had known of the possibility of such an application for over a year but the GMC had done nothing. He could not put his life on hold and therefore took a holiday notifying all relevant parties that he would be either out of the country or out of communication until 10 July 2010. In my judgment, there is merit in this submission. I am not satisfied that Dr Vaidya would meet the test enunciated by Brook LJ in Hackney London Borough Council v Driscoll. The knowledge of the possibility of proceedings is not the same as the knowledge of the actual proceedings still less participation in them. It is of note that Dr Vaidya took the trouble to inform the GMC in advance of leaving of his non-availability. It may have assisted the court on 25 June 2010 to have seen Dr Vaidya's letter of 4 June 2010 which did illustrate this point. In my judgment Dr Vaidya does have a right to be present and heard upon the GMC's application.
16. Dr Vaidya's absence at the hearing on 25 June 2010 does not of itself mean that his right pursuant to Article 6(1) has been breached, as events have been overtaken by the hearing before this court. This hearing took over one day. Dr Vaidya addressed the court at length and relied upon written submissions. Specifically, he responded to what in reality was the GMC's application for a general civil restraint order. Dr Vaidya can have been in no doubt that he was responding to the GMC's argument that a general civil restraint order was appropriate because it was the third limb of the GMC's argument pursuant to CPR Rule 39(5). In a clear and detailed skeleton argument served before the hearing, under the heading "The Reasons for a General Civil Restraint Order", Mr Hare, on behalf of the GMC, set out the test, the elements which the GMC had to demonstrate in order to obtain such an order and the specific claims and applications of Dr Vaidya relied upon by the GMC in respect of the order. Further, the skeleton argument dealt with the inadequacy of an extended civil restraint order. That Dr Vaidya was on notice of this is demonstrated by the fact that at the hearing he provided a written response to the applicant's written skeleton argument which dealt with the points raised in the GMC's skeleton.
17. On the second day of this hearing, Dr Vaidya produced a written submission entitled "Summing Up". In the submission he wrote "For avoidance of doubt; and by way of clarification, I am NOT asking the court to rule: (a) Whether GMC was entitled to make an application of GCRO (when an EXCRO was refused earlier)." This court had before it evidence upon which such an order could and was being sought. It heard submissions from both parties as to whether such an order was appropriate. There was no sound basis upon which this court should refuse to determine whether such an order was appropriate and by inference whether the GMC was entitled to make an application for a general civil restraint order.
18. Before this court Dr Vaidya was given the hearing which he says he was unable to receive, by reason of his absence from the country on 25 June 2010. I am satisfied that Dr Vaidya's right pursuant to Article 6(1) has been protected by reason of his participation in these proceedings.
19. A separate point is taken by Dr Vaidya in respect of the Order made by Sir Charles Gray on 25 June 2010, namely that it was not in the correct form and is therefore a nullity. As a matter of fact, the Order sealed by the court was not on the pro forma document supplied by the court for such an order. Insofar as there is any merit in this point, it was dealt with by Slade J on 26 July 2010 at the first hearing of this application. The judge ordered the GMC to have the Order made on 25 June 2010 drawn up on the appropriate form and served on the applicant and further ordered that the Order of Sir Charles Gray of 25 June 2010, sealed on 16 July 2010 remain in force until further order. Any defect which Dr Vaidya alleges was present in the original order was rectified by the order of Slade J.

The application for a general civil restraint order

20. The power to make such an order is contained in CPR Rule 3.11 and the Practice Direction 3(C) made thereunder. According to PD3(C) para 4.1, a judge of the High Court may make an order:

"where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate".

As such, there are two elements which the GMC must demonstrate in order to succeed on an application for such an order. They are:

1. That Dr Vaidya persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit; and

2. That in the circumstances an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.

21. The background to Dr Vaidya's numerous claims against the GMC and others was set out in three witness statements of James Percival. In summary, the position is this: since 2007 Dr Vaidya has issued proceedings in the High Court, in the Queen's Bench Division and the Administrative Court, in County Courts and the Employment Tribunal against the GMC, named individuals who have been involved in the GMC disciplinary process, NHS Trusts, named doctors employed by those Trusts, the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty's Court Service. The causes of action are many and varied. They include complaints of racial and sexual discrimination and harassment, harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, breaches of Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR, claims for professional negligence, libel, malicious falsehood, negligent misstatement, conspiracy to injure and claims pursuant to the Data Protection Act. Damages claimed in some proceedings exceed £1 million, it is of note that such damages are claimed in actions against individually named doctors.
22. Amongst this plethora of litigation, the GMC relies in particular upon the following matters:

i. Dr Vaidya's application for judicial review in R (Vaidya) v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 2749 (Admin) in respect of the FPP hearing in 2008. This was identified as totally without merit by Cranston J following consideration of the papers;

ii. Dr Vaidya renewed the application orally. Burnett J stated, R (Vaidya) v General Medical Council [2008] EWHC 2749 (Admin) paragraph 21:

"When the matter came before Cranston J, he considered that the application was totally without merit. I am bound to say I take the same view. The history of proceedings involving Dr Vaidya and the GMC paints a really rather unfortunate picture. Dr Vaidya, as it seems to me, makes applications both before the GMC and also in this court with a view to trying to frustrate the disciplinary process which has now been in train for some years. It may be that those who are now advising him might consider explaining the possibility that if there is evidence of multiple unmeritorious applications, the court might be moved, either by the GMC or of its own motion, to make a restraint order of some sort which would inhibit Dr Vaidya's ability to issue proceedings.";

iii. Dr Vaidya's claim before the Employment Tribunal in Vaidya v General Medical Council (ET/2203106/2008). This was a claim which related to the matters which had taken place before the GMC. All claims, save for a claim of harassment under the Race Relations Act, were struck out by Employment Judge Edge, the harassment claim was not allowed because it was out of time. Accordingly, all claims were struck out;

iv. Dr Vaidya's claim against Dr Brian Keighley in the Nottingham County Court. Dr Keighley was a screener in the disciplinary process of the GMC. The claim was struck out in Vaidya v Keighley (09NG07111). Dr Vaidya sought to appeal, his appeal was considered by Flaux J on 15 February 2010. Flaux J refused permission to appeal, his reasons record:

"1. In a detailed and careful Judgment (to the recording of which I have listened) the learned Judge concluded (1) that the Particulars of Claim disclosed no arguable cause of action; (2) that the claim had no real prospect of success; (3) that the claim was an abuse of process as it seeks to re-litigate matters determined in earlier proceedings between the Claimant and General Medical Council and (4) that in any event, at the time the Claim Form was issued any claim was vested as a matter of law in the Claimant's Trustee and Bankruptcy so that the Claimant had no locus standi. Accordingly the learned Judge struck out the claim under CPR Part 3.4 and entered Summary Judgment in favour of the Defendant under CPR Part 24 those conclusions were clearly correct and the proposed appeal is wholly without merit.";

v. Dr Vaidya's claims against the GMC in Nottingham County Court (09NG05216) (9 March 2010). The claim alleged breach of statutory duty contrary to Part 3 section 57 Race Relations Act 1976 and negligence and sought damages in the order of £1 million. At paragraph 32 of his judgment, HHJ Inglis stated:

"…..it is submitted by the defendants that the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court in that they involved an attack on the GMC proceedings including the Court of Appeal proceedings, which have resulted in an adverse decision to the doctor. I agree with that submission. It is an attempt to re-litigate issues, either decided by the GMC in the statutory process, or to attack the outcome when the internal procedure provides the safeguards that are necessary for proceedings to be conducted fairly. There has to be some finality to the decisions in the disciplinary process and that would be undermined if a private law action could be used to undo the result. This is the attempt that is being made. There can be no doubt that the claim is not just for declaratory relief but for substantial damages reflecting loss of earnings arising as a result of Dr Vaidya's erasure from the Register. Private law proceedings aimed at such an outcome are in my judgment plainly an abuse of the process of the court."

Further at paragraph 40 of his judgment, HHJ Inglis declared Dr Vaidya's claim to have been totally without merit. The decision was appealed by Dr Vaidya who appeared in person before Hamblen J at a full hearing in the Birmingham District Registry of the High Court on 29 June 2010. At paragraph 34 of his judgment, Hamblen J stated:

"I have carefully considered the written and oral arguments which have been clearly made by Dr Vaidya, but I am wholly unpersuaded that the judge can be shown to be arguably wrong in any of his conclusions, let alone all of them. It therefore seems to me that there is no real prospect of any appeal succeeding.";

vi. The proceedings in Claim 1892 and Claim 1466 identified in paragraph 6 above. It would appear that Dr Vaidya was alleging concealment, mistakes and dishonesty amounting to fraud on the part of the GMC and the second and third defendants. Sir Charles Gray stated that all the claims brought by Dr Vaidya were totally without merit.

23. It is the GMC's case that the above examples are more than sufficient to establish that Dr Vaidya persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit. Further, since the date of the Order, it is submitted that there is further evidence of Dr Vaidya's persistence in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit. These include the following:

i. Dr Vaidya's application for permission to appeal against the decision of Sir Charles Gray striking out both sets of High Court proceedings in Claims 1892 and 1466. This was refused by the Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Buxton in a decision dated 23 July 2010. The application was stated to be totally without merit and the order was a final order;

ii. Dr Vaidya's application for judicial review against the GMC dated 17 May 2010, this was refused on the papers by HHJ David Pearl, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge on 2 August 2010. The judge certified that the application was totally without merit. It is of note that the first defendant is described in the judicial review claim form as the Executive and Council of GMC. The core of the application relates to the orders made by the GMC in 2006 and 2008 which led to the erasure of Dr Vaidya's name from the Medical Register;

iii. Dr Vaidya's further proceedings against the GMC, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Justices for the Petty Sessional Division of Worcester in the Nottingham County Court. This action included claims for wrongful or disproportionate prosecution, indirect racially aggravated harassment, harassment, injurious and malicious falsehood, breach of Article 6, contempt of Administrative Court order, misfeasance in public office, contempt of court, breach of the Data Protection Act and further breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998. The proceedings were struck out and certified as being totally without merit by HHJ Inglis on 4 August 2010. HHJ Inglis also found the proceedings against the GMC to be an abuse of process and awarded the GMC its costs on an indemnity basis;

iv. Dr Vaidya's claim in the Employment Tribunal (ET/2202480/2010). These were proceedings brought against the "Executive and Trustees of General Medical Council". Dr Vaidya claimed compensation in excess of £3.2 million from the GMC for damage to his "professional career due to its racist harassment and injury to feelings." The claim was struck out in its entirety by Employment Judge Glennie on 17 September 2010.

24. Dr Vaidya, responding to the GMC's case makes the following points:

This application is premature. As he puts it in his skeleton argument, the conclusion cannot be reached by "speculation or wishful thinking." Dr Vaidya relies on the passage by Kenneth Parker QC in General Medical Council v Vaidya (paragraph 5 above) where he stated:

"However, I do face the following difficulty. It seems to me inappropriate in an application of this kind before me today for me to speculate as to the fate of the particular claims in the action…I do not feel able, without going into those matters in much greater particularity than would be appropriate in this application, to reach such a conclusion."

25. The second point relied upon by Dr Vaidya is that in April 2010, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request, Dr Vaidya received from the GMC further documentation relating to his complaint concerning other medical practitioners. It is his contention that the new disclosure resurrects his old cases, he now has a good claim. Alternatively, he puts his case in this way, all that occurred prior to this disclosure is "water under the bridge".
26. In May 2009 when the GMC first sought an extended civil restraint order before Kenneth Parker QC two applications had been found to be without merit, others were ongoing and it was in respect of these that the passage relied upon by Dr Vaidya relates. It is clear from the judgment that the judge regarded his refusal of the GMC application as a borderline decision and warned Dr Vaidya in the terms set out in paragraph 5 above.
27. Over a year has passed and Dr Vaidya's litigation has moved on. Before this court, and before Sir Charles Gray on 25 June 2010, are a number of rulings by judges that claims brought by Dr Vaidya are without merit. This was not the position before Kenneth Parker QC although it is one which he appears to have contemplated. In my judgment, given the subsequent rulings, this application by the GMC is not premature.
28. In support of his second point, the disclosure by the GMC in April 2010, Dr Vaidya submitted a number of disclosed documents which relate to the GMC's handling of his complaints against other doctors, specifically those with whom he previously worked at the time of the original Trust complaint. The production of these documents does not of itself undermine any of the determinations made by judges and upon which the GMC relies in support of its application. If the content of some or all of these documents were to provide an evidential basis for any amendment of any existing cause of action or the institution of further proceedings then it is open to Dr Vaidya to make application to the court. It is of note that in 2009 Dr Vaidya issued proceedings in the Grantham County Court against the GMC in respect of their alleged failure to comply with the Data Protection Act. In these proceedings Dr Vaidya claims damages for loss of earnings, these proceedings are ongoing.
29. I am satisfied that Dr Vaidya persists in issuing claims and applications which have been found to be totally without merit. The examples identified in paragraphs 22 and 23 above provide ample evidence of his conduct. In my judgment, based upon this evidence, a civil restraint order is not only justified, it is necessary.
30. The final issue to be determined is whether an extended civil restraint order would be sufficient or appropriate. It is the GMC's case that Dr Vaidya has demonstrated remarkable inventiveness in seeking to identify new causes of action before different tribunals. Examples relied upon include Vaidya v GMC and others (09NG0745) (11 November 2009) Vaidya v GMC (09GR00688) (14 December 2009) Vaidya v GMC ET/2202480/2010 (17 May 2010) R(Vaidya ) v GMC CO/5687/2010 (17 May 2010). The core of Dr Vaidya's case is the disciplinary proceedings brought by the GMC. Upon that he raises many and differing causes of action in the proceedings, he will also change the name to the same defendant e.g. Executive and Council or Trustees of the GMC.
31. In addition to claims against the GMC, Dr Vaidya has pursued claims against United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust and/or its employees or former employees arising out of his employment with the Trust. Proceedings have been instituted in the Nottingham Employment Tribunal against the Trust and consultant colleagues which have resulted in appeals to the EAT. On 23 August 2004 Dr Vaidya issued six separate claims out of the Grantham County Court, five were against the Trust or employees of the Trust. All claims were inextricably connected with and arise from his employment with the Trust. Further proceedings against individually named doctors were instituted in the Grantham County Court, the High Court and the Lincoln County Court.
32. It is clear that Dr Vaidya has been warned by judges of the consequence of repeatedly issuing proceedings. Dr Vaidya has demonstrated that he is not deterred by the threat of an extended civil restraint order. Indeed, there is evidence that he has persisted in making applications in breach of the Order made by Sir Charles Gray. Dr Vaidya sought to appeal the order made by HHJ Inglis in Nottingham County Court in case 9NG07545 against three defendants one of whom was the GMC. His application was refused by Mr Justice Kenneth Parker on 27 August 2010. These applications are in breach of the Order made on 25 June 2010. Further Dr Vaidya purported to serve upon seven defendants the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim in claim number 0GR00280 in proceedings which had been struck out on 13 September 2010 by HHJ Inglis at the Nottingham County Court. Named as defendants are the GMC, Dr Vaidya's employing Trust, consultant colleagues and named doctors who were involved in the disciplinary process at the GMC. This action demonstrates Dr Vaidya's persistence in suing the same defendants in respect of matters that have already been litigated and determined. I take account of the fact that for individual defendants the fact of legal proceedings coupled with claims for damages in excess of £1 million is extremely worrying.
33. I accept the points made by Mr Hare on behalf of the GMC. Dr Vaidya has demonstrated inventiveness in seeking to identify new causes of action before various tribunals. It is clear that Dr Vaidya is determined and resourceful, he has spent time researching the law and the possibilities of potential litigation. I am also satisfied that Dr Vaidya has paid no heed to warnings given by judges nor has the fact of the Order made on 25 June 2010 stopped him pursuing further applications and attempting to serve defendants in proceedings which have been struck out. Of note is the fact that some of these defendants are identified individuals who are entitled to the protection of the court, particularly as cases are brought upon a flimsy basis.
34. Given the history of this matter and the continuing conduct of Dr Vaidya, I do not believe that an extended civil restraint order would provide adequate protection to prospective defendants. The order that I make in respect of Dr Shreedhar Vaidya is a general civil restraint order.