QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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NXS |
Claimant |
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London Borough of Camden |
Defendant |
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Mr Steven Ford (instructed by Browne Jacobson LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 8-10 June 2009
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mrs Justice Swift DBE :
The claim
Brief summary
The issues
Breach of duty
Factual Causation
Injury
Limitation
Quantum
The history
The family
The claimant's birth
1976
"We agreed the circumstances at home were very difficult and that she'd feel less angry if she had her own home and help with the baby's care. She agreed, but she only wants Gospel Oak Nursery, and she only wants to live in this part of Camden, and she wants a decent flat not old property etc. I told her that if she was too particular as to area, it would take much longer to house her."
"We discussed the whole question of [the claimant's] reception into care; what this could mean for [the claimant] especially if the period till re-housing was very long and with the danger [of] the mother/child relationship being damaged; the uncertainty of the surroundings and child's future when placed under these circumstances. [Miss P] sensed I might be trying to dissuade her and said so adding "I'm only asking for the baby to be f--cking fostered", and later "All right then don't take her and it'll be your fault if she gets hurt". At the same time she had said earlier she did not think [the claimant] was in any danger and when I reminded her of this she repeated this but insisted she didn't want the baby to remain in the atmosphere of violence at home".
"On the other hand, if one is concerned enough about the violence at home one has to weigh up the pro's and con's".
"Faith Coller had been sufficiently anxious about the possibility of another aggressive incident occurring over the weekend 1st/2nd May that she had collected the child from the child minder on Friday pm. However, having left the child at RFH, she was not able to obtain a Place of Safety Order from the Magistrate…as he felt that there were insufficient grounds. It was most unfortunate that Faith had not communicated this to the paediatric ward. (The whole question of the magistrate's decision and the basis of bringing the child to the hospital is being considered by Area 4, Kate Atherton and possibly Leo Goodman as Assistant Director.)".
"NAI see review passed to Hugh Toomey".
I shall refer to the possible significance of that entry later in this judgment .
1977
1978
"CHILD STILL ON NAI REGISTER".
1979
"….shrieking and threatening her mother and finally kicking her and calling her every unpleasant name, including you're only an f…..g, dirty old Greek peasant".
"I'll kill [the claimant] when I see her. I'll kick the twins out of [E's] stomach".
Miss Coller noted that, moments later, Miss P was talking quite normally. Mrs P told Miss Coller that the claimant had an ordered existence when she was with E but not when she was with Miss P, who gave her no regularity in her life at all.
1980 and 1981
1982
"The main involvement I have had since 1974…has been over school attendance, disruptive and violent behaviour on the part of [Miss P] and [AB] both of whom had pregnancies, and their subsequent rehousing … and general supportive work with several family members. [The claimant] was on the At Risk Register for several years. Her case is now being dealt with by the Talacre Team, Area 4".
1983-1987
1988
1989
"There does not seem to be a file in its own right for [Miss P] and [the claimant] so old family file and these papers are all we've got…. Admin tell me no other papers."
The file relating to Miss P and the claimant has never been located.
"[Miss P] said that [the claimant] has been a "noose around her neck", a burden which she has not enjoyed having. This has been the case since she has been a young baby. [Miss P] also maintains and feels that [the claimant] has held her back from realising her potential. Even to this day, [the claimant] remains a "noose around her neck"".
"[AB] explained that [the claimant] has been physically and mentally abused from her conception. She said that [Miss P] would punch her pregnant belly in the hope that it would probably induce a miscarriage. She would also punch her belly and say "I don't want you".
[AB] told me that ever since the birth of [the claimant] she has been abused on a regular basis up until the most recent incident. She explained the uncontrolled rage of [Miss P] has existed for a very long time…".
"[Miss P] explained the present situation and the problems she was experiencing with [the claimant]. [Miss P] said that [the claimant] had driven her to the verge of resorting to smacking and being aggressive with her. She said she would often smack her on the bottom which would invariably leave marks on her skin. [Miss P] was worrying about her handling of the situation in relation to chastising. She said that she frequently over-reacted to [the claimant's] attitude and behaviour, tending to hit her unnecessarily. [Miss P] spoke of her dislike of [the claimant] and said that sometimes she wants to beat her to pulp. [Miss P] acknowledges that she flies of the handle very quickly and has a very bad temper which she finds very difficult to control".
"[Miss P] had openly talked about this with [Mrs Petch] and had also threatened [the claimant] with sending for him [i.e. G] as a punishment. Andrew [Maynard] reported that [Miss P] and [the claimant] had been sharing a bed and he feels that something may have gone on. [Mrs Petch] had also sensed that there was a secret that [the claimant] must not talk about".
"Lots of innuendoes about possible sexual abuse but nothing definite".
1990-1993
The criminal proceedings
The claimant's evidence
Physical and emotional abuse
Sexual abuse
"[The claimant] provided a reasonable account with such details she is able to recall and discuss to the police and Dr Mason".
The claimant's attempts to gain access to documents relating to her
"We have been consulted by the above named and believe you are aware that our client was the victim of abuse during her childhood and as a result was under the care of your department for many years.
Our client wishes us to enquire into the events concerning her upbringing and care by Camden during that period but in order to do this we need sight of as much documentation as possible.
We assume such papers are held by your department although these may be in storage and thus take time to make them available.
We enclose consent and await hearing.
We should point out that at present we have formed no view on this matter".
The evidence of AB
The defendant's evidence
The expert evidence
Background
The period from November 1975 to February 1977
The period from February 1977 to January 1989
"4(b) On the assumption (for the purposes of this question) that the Claimant is found by the court to have been physically and emotionally abused by her mother between February 1977 and January 1989 can it be agreed that if there had been competent social work monitoring and regular visits to the Claimant including discussions with the Claimant alone, then with competent assessment it would have been ascertained that the Claimant was being:
(i) physically and emotionally abused by her mother;
(ii) required to be removed from her mother's care?
We are agreed that this would have been likely had there been consistent monitoring throughout the period. We are also agreed that Social Services probably ceased to monitor at some point during the early 1980s.
David Lane notes that when [the claimant's] case was re-opened, mother dominated visits by Social Workers and excluded [the claimant] from discussion, preventing her from expressing her concerns. If this pattern had been evident in the early 1980s, mother might have concealed her cruelty towards [the claimant] from Social Workers, and it was noted later that [the claimant] remained loyal to her mother and did not complain.
Maria Ruegger thinks it unlikely on the basis of the albeit scarce information available for the period up to 1980 and the more detailed material for the period post 1989, that the mother engaged with the authorities sufficiently to allay concerns.
4(c) Can it be agreed that given the history up until 1977 it was lack of competent care to fail to monitor the claimant sufficiently closely to ascertain the abuse that was on the balance of probabilities in fact occurring?
Assuming that this question applies to the period from February 1977, we are of the opinion that no opinion can be formed about the quality of monitoring in this period given the absence of records. "
The period after 1989
The law on limitation
"(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which -
(a) the provisions of section 11 … of this Act prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents; and
(b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents;
the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates."
((1A) and (2) are not relevant for these purposes)
(3) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to -
(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff;
(b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed by section 11 …;
(c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant;
(d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action;
(e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages;
(f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received".
"…deals with that question under section 33, which specifically says in subsection (3)(a) that one of the matters to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion is "the reasons for … the delay on the part of the plaintiff" ".
He went on to observe at paragraph 49:
"The judge is expressly enjoined by subsection (3)(a) to have regard to the reasons for the delay and in my opinion this requires him to give due weight to evidence, such as there was in this case, that the claimant was for practical purposes disabled from commencing proceedings by the psychological injuries which he had suffered."
"If, as I think to be the case, section 14 should be construed in this manner, which is less favourable to a claimant, there requires to be a more liberal approach to the exercise of discretion than has always been the case. For the reasons which my noble and learned friends and I have set out, that less favourable construction of section 14 is correct in principle, but it must follow that the favourable factors which have hitherto been taken into account in reaching a conclusion under section 14 should form part, and in appropriate cases a very significant part, of the judge's determination in exercising his discretion under section 33".
"85 First, insofar as future claims may be expected to be brought against employers (or others allegedly responsible for abusers) on the basis of vicarious liability for sexual assaults rather than for systemic negligence in failing to prevent them, they will probably involve altogether narrower factual disputes than hitherto. As Lord Hoffmann suggests, at paragraph 52, that is likely to bear significantly upon the possibility of having a fair trial.
86 Secondly, through the combined effects of Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd and departing from Stubbings v Webb, a substantially greater number of allegations (not all of which will be true) are now likely to be made many years after the abuse complained of. Whether or not it will be possible for defendants to investigate these sufficiently for there to be a reasonable prospect of a fair trial will depend upon a number of factors, not least when the complaint was first made and with what effect. If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations-see section 33(3)(b)) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible after a long delay.
87 Hitherto the misconstruction of section 14(2) has given an absolute right to proceed, however long out of time, to anyone able to say that he would not reasonably have turned his mind to litigation (more than three years) earlier (the Bryn Alyn test described by Lord Hoffmann at paragraph 36). It is not to be supposed that the exercise of the court's section 33 discretion will invariably replicate that position. "
"…the context in which that discretion is to be exercised is plain enough. Its effect will be to reimpose a liability on the defender which has been removed by the expiry of the limitation period. The issue on which the court must concentrate is whether the defender can show that, in defending the action, there will be the real possibility of significant prejudice…The burden rests on the party who seeks to obtain the benefit of the remedy. The court must, of course, give full weight to his explanation for the delay and the equitable considerations that it gives rise to. But proof that the defender will be exposed to the real possibility of significant prejudice will usually determine the issue in his favour. This is a question of degree for the judge by whom the discretion … is to be exercised".
"… In my view, however, as the prejudice resulting from the loss of the limitation defence will always or almost always be balanced by the prejudice to the plaintiff from the operation of the limitation provision the loss of the defence as such will be of little importance. What is of paramount importance is the effect of the delay on the defendants' ability to defend. The specific example given in section 33(3) (b) so indicates…".
The parties' submissions
The claimant's submissions
The defendant's submissions
Discussion and conclusions on the basis of the available documents
The physical and emotional abuse
The sexual abuse
The relevance of later events
Important features
The expert evidence
The file on Miss P and the claimant
Registration
Breach of duty
Limitation
Factual causation