QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Serious Organised Crime Agency |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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DAVID GALE TERESA MANDY GALE DAVID KENNETH GALE (Proceedings stayed pending determination of trial). JUNE PATRICIA PEEL (by her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor (Proceedings stayed pending determination of trial). |
Respondents |
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Mr David Lederman QC, Mr Jonathan Lennon (instructed by Rahman Ravelli Solicitors) for the 1st & 2nd Respondents. 3rd and 4th Respondents did not appear and were not represented.
Hearing dates: To be inserted:
4-6, 9-13, 16-20 February 2009
JUDGMENT
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Griffith Williams
:PART A
INTRODUCTION
"We have not identified any independent documentary evidence which would support DG's and TG's assertion that the assets they have accumulated have been derived from legitimate activities. We have not identified evidence of declared income (or tax payments) in the UK, Spain, USA and Portugal which would provide evidence of the means to support the family and allow for the significant accumulation of wealth. There is evidence of unlawful conduct and in particular complex financial dealings indicative of money laundering and concealment. As a consequence, though it is for the Court to decide, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the property and assets have been obtained by unlawful conduct and are recoverable property."
i) a web of lies, false names, multiple passports, nominees and off-shore corporate fronts;ii) at least 68 bank accounts both on and offshore and in a number of different jurisdictions which together have received millions of pounds from unidentified sources;
iii) needlessly complicated bank transfers and
iv) fleeing his country of residence (from the UK to Spain, from Spain to the USA and from USA to Portugal via the Bahamas) when he feared the authorities were or maybe interested in his criminal activities.
The claimant relies also on evidence of: -
v) his criminal record from his youth until when he was 32 years old together with his criminal associates;
vi) police intelligence material which reveals that he was suspected of drug trafficking in the United Kingdom before he emigrated to Spain and on his return to the United Kingdom between 2001 and 2005;
vii) an attempt to breach the Interim Receiving Order within days of service by opening a new bank account in the name of Mrs Peel with a transfer of 167,000 from a Solbank account;
viii) the compromise of proceedings bought in Ireland to restrain funds which were the proceeds of crime;
ix) his access to funds, not identified by the Interim Receiver or disclosed to the Interim Receiver, which he has used to fund his living expenses from July 2005 to date.
THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
240 General purpose of this Part
(1) This Part has effect for the purposes of(a) enabling the enforcement authority to recover, in civil proceedings before the High Court or Court of Session, property which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct,(b) enabling cash which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct, or which is intended to be used in unlawful conduct, to be forfeited in civil proceedings before a magistrates' court or (in Scotland) the sheriff.
(2) The powers conferred by this Part are exercisable in relation to any property (including cash) whether or not any proceedings have been brought for an offence in connection with the property.
241 "Unlawful conduct"
(1) Conduct occurring in any part of the United Kingdom is unlawful conduct if it is unlawful under the criminal law of that part.(2) Conduct which
a) occurs in a country outside the United Kingdom and is unlawful under the criminal law of that country, and(b) if it occurred in a part of the United Kingdom, would be unlawful under the criminal law of that part,
is also unlawful conduct.
(3) The court or sheriff must decide on a balance of probabilities whether it is proved
(a) that any matters alleged to constitute unlawful conduct have occurred, or(b) that any person intended to use any cash in unlawful conduct.
242 "Property obtained through unlawful conduct"
(1) A person obtains property through unlawful conduct (whether his own conduct or another's) if he obtains property by or in return for the conduct.
(2) In deciding whether any property was obtained through unlawful conduct
(a) it is immaterial whether or not any money, goods or services were provided in order to put the person in question in a position to carry out the conduct,(b) it is not necessary to show that the conduct was of a particular kind if it is shown that the property was obtained through conduct of one of a number of kinds, each of which would have been unlawful conduct.
Chapter 2 Civil recovery in the High Court or Court of Session
Proceedings for recovery orders
243 Proceedings for recovery orders in England and Wales or Northern Ireland
(1) Proceedings for a recovery order may be taken by the enforcement authority in the High Court against any person who the authority thinks holds recoverable property.(2) The enforcement authority must serve the claim form
(a) on the respondent, and(b) unless the court dispenses with service, on any other person who the authority thinks holds any associated property which the authority wishes to be subject to a recovery order,
wherever domiciled, resident or present.
(3) If any property which the enforcement authority wishes to be subject to a recovery order is not specified in the claim form it must be described in the form in general terms; and the form must state whether it is alleged to be recoverable property or associated property.
(4) The references above to the claim form include the particulars of claim, where they are served subsequently.
266 Recovery orders
(1) If in proceedings under this Chapter the court is satisfied that any property is recoverable, the court must make a recovery order.
(2) The recovery order must vest the recoverable property in the trustee for civil recovery.
(3) But the court may not make in a recovery order
(a) any provision in respect of any recoverable property if each of the conditions in subsection (4) or (as the case may be) (5) is met and it would not be just and equitable to do so, or(b) any provision which is incompatible with any of the Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)).
(4) In relation to a court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conditions referred to in subsection (3) (a) are that
(a) the respondent obtained the recoverable property in good faith,(b) he took steps after obtaining the property which he would not have taken if he had not obtained it or he took steps before obtaining the property which he would not have taken if he had not believed he was going to obtain it,
(c) when he took the steps, he had no notice that the property was recoverable,
(d) if a recovery order were made in respect of the property, it would, by reason of the steps, be detrimental to him.
(6) In deciding whether it would be just and equitable to make the provision in the recovery order where the conditions in subsection (4) or (as the case may be) (5) are met, the court must have regard to
(a) the degree of detriment that would be suffered by the respondent if the provision were made,(b) the enforcement authority's interest in receiving the realised proceeds of the recoverable property.
(7) A recovery order may sever any property.
(8) A recovery order may impose conditions as to the manner in which the trustee for civil recovery may deal with any property vested by the order for the purpose of realising it.
(9) This section is subject to sections 270 to 278.
304 Property obtained through unlawful conduct
(1) Property obtained through unlawful conduct is recoverable property.
(2) But if property obtained through unlawful conduct has been disposed of (since it was so obtained), it is recoverable property only if it is held by a person into whose hands it may be followed.
(3) Recoverable property obtained through unlawful conduct may be followed into the hands of a person obtaining it on a disposal by
(a) the person who through the conduct obtained the property, or(b) a person into whose hands it may (by virtue of this subsection) be followed.
305 Tracing Property etc
(1)Where property obtained through unlawful conduct ("the original property") is or has been recoverable, property which represents the original property is also recoverable property
(2)If a person enters into a transaction by which
(a)he disposes of recoverable property, whether the original property or property which (by virtue of this Chapter) represents the original property, and(b)he obtains other property in place of it,
the other property represents the original property
316 General interpretation
(3) For the purpose of deciding whether or not property was recoverable at any time (including times before commencement), it is to be assumed that this Part was in force at that and any other relevant time.
I shall refer later in the Judgment to the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 1980.
THE ISSUES
8. i) Have the claimant proved that DG's wealth was the product of the unlawful conduct alleged and if so
ii) is the identified recoverable property, or any part of it, the proceeds of such unlawful conduct and if so
iii) is any part of their claim statute barred?
PART B
THE APPROACH TO THE EVIDENCE
Burden and standard of proof
"Although there is a single civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities, it is flexible in its application. In particular, the more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities.Thus the flexibility of the standard lies not in any adjustment to the degree of probability required for an allegation to be proved (such that a more serious allegation has to be proved to a higher degree of probability, but in the strength or quality of the evidence that will in practise be require for an allegation to be proved on the balance of probabilities".
The qualification which Lord Carswell added was, at paragraph 28: -
"It is recognised by these statements that a possible source of confusion is the failure to bear in mind with sufficient clarity the fact that in some context or tribunal has to look at the facts more critically or more anxiously than in others before it can be satisfied to the requisite standard. The standard itself is, however, finite and unvarying. Situations which make such heightened examination necessary may be the inherent unlikelihood of the occurrence taking place (Lord Hoffmann's example of the animal scene in Regent's Park)[1], the seriousness of the allegation to be proved, in some cases, the consequences which could follow from acceptance of proof of the relevant fact. The seriousness of the allegation requires no elaboration; a tribunal of fact will look closely into the facts grounding an allegation of fraud before accepting that it has been established. The seriousness of consequences is another facet of the same proposition; if it is alleged that a bank manager has committed a minor peculation, that could entail very serious consequences for his career, so making it the less likely that he would risk doing such a thing. These are all matters of ordinary experience, requiring the application of good sense on the part of those who have to decide such issues. They do not require a different standard of proof or a specially cogent standard of evidence, merely appropriately careful consideration by the tribunal before it is satisfied with the matter which has to be established".
Delay
Property obtained through unlawful conduct
"471. In civil proceedings for recovery under Part 5 of the Act the Director need not allege the commission of any specific criminal offence but must set out the matters that are alleged to constitute the particular kind or kinds of unlawful conduct by or in return for which the property was obtained.
2. A claim for civil recovery cannot be sustained solely upon the basis that a respondent has no identifiable lawful income to warrant his lifestyle.
50. Mr Crow invited me to make it clear that my first answer to the preliminary question meant that the Director need neither allege nor prove the commission of any specific criminal offence, and that she must not merely set out the matters that are alleged to constitute the particular kind or kinds of unlawful conduct, but that she must prove that, on the balance of probabilities, the property was obtained by or in return for a particular kind or one of a number of kinds of unlawful conduct."
" It is sufficient in my view for the director to prove that a criminal offence was committed, even if it is impossible to identify precisely when or by whom or in what circumstances and that the property was obtained by or in return for it. In my view Sullivan J was right therefore to hold that in order to succeed the Director need not prove the commission of any specific criminal offence in the sense of proving that a particular person committed a particular offence on a particular occasion. Nonetheless, I think it is necessary for her to prove that specific property was obtained by or in return for a criminal offence of an identifiable kind (robbery, theft, fraud or whatever) or, if she relies on Section 242 (2), by or in return for one or other of a number of offences of an identifiable kind. If, as I think, that is what the judge meant in paragraph 50 of his judgment, I respectfully agree with him".
"Thus, as Section 242 (2) (b) provides, the Director does not have to prove the commission of a specific criminal offence or offences but must identify and prove the matters alleged to constitute the kinds of unlawful conduct by which the property was obtained, and it is not sufficient "solely" (my emphasis), to establish a lifestyle inconsistent with any identified income. It is for the court to decide (on the balance of probabilities) whether the matters alleged to constitute unlawful conduct have been proved: Section 241 (3)."
"115. I also echo what Langley J said on the emphasis to be put on the qualifying adverb "solely" in the context of proof of obtaining property through unlawful conduct, by reference to a comparison between lifestyle and identifiable sources of income. Such a comparison will not in itself be sufficient but as in Olupitan so in the present case the claimant is entitled to ask the court to look at the totality of the evidence and the whole picture which emerges. As Langley J said at paragraph 23 "it is one thing to point to unexplained lifestyle, it may be another, if an explanation is offered but rejected as untruthful and taken with other evidence"
118.I also consider that the court is entitled to take a commonsense approach to the inferences to be drawn from the manner in which the Respondent chose to store his accumulated cash and from the failure of the respondent to keep any business records in the context of the evidence as a whole.
119.Equally, as the Receiver said in evidence, one would expect any successful law abiding businessman to keep some sort of record no matter how simple, of what he was buying, what he was selling and the amounts of his overheads if only to work out the sort of profit he was making and which were his most profitable items. The criminal dealer in, for example, illicit drugs will of course eschew any record by which his activities might be detectable".
The Portuguese Proceedings
The approach to the Receivers' Report
"29.It is obviously clear from this legislative framework and these statutory provisions governing the appointment of the Receiver and her investigative and reporting functions under the supervision of the court rather than the Director, that the Receiver is not the agent of any of the parties. In my judgment, she is kin to an officer of the court and is reporting and giving evidence to the court in that capacity independent of the parties. It is further obviously right that the Receiver's report should be used in advance of the final hearing as a means by which to establish such facts as can be agreed between the parties and to identify the matters in dispute in need of resolution by the court. Further, in principle, I am prepared to accept that the Receiver's findings as to recoverable property should be given considerable persuasive weight by the court and to that extent her report enjoys special status.
30.However, this said, I also agree with the respondent's submissions that the Receiver's findings of recoverable property are not binding on the court, that it is the primary evidential material underlying her finding and said by her to justify them, which is of crucial importance together with any additional evidence called before the court and that it is the duty of the court, in determining any area of dispute between the parties carefully to scrutinise and weigh that evidence in order to determine whether the claim to recoverable property is made out The statutory provisions referred to do not alter either the burden or standard of proof which is upon the claimant to establish the existence of recoverable property on the balance of probabilities by cogent evidence. The findings of the receiver do not in themselves reverse the burden of proof so as to put any onus on the respondent to disprove her findings "
PART C
KEY INDIVIDUALS
"There is clear evidence of cognitive impairment in the 70 year old lady who may have suffered herpes simplex encephalitis. She shows mild generalised intellectual loss, mainly for non-verbal functions. She has a very severe short-term memory impairment for verbal and visual material. She is disoriented, confabulating and confused. She has mild word finding difficulties. Visual special functions were normal, verbal fluency was normal. Assessment of front lobe functioning was limited. She has severe anxieties. There is no depression. She has severe amnesic syndrome, mild intellectual loss, mild word finding difficulties but no dysphasia or visuo-spacial disturbance. This profile points to by-lateral temperal lobe damage and is consistent with the affect of herpes simplex encephalitis".
PART D
MONEY LAUNDERING
The early years
- 145, Garden Lane, Chester which he said he owned for about 5 years but could not remember the sale price;
- 11 Hoole Bank, Chester which he said he owned for a few years but could not remember the details of sale;
- 49 King George Avenue, Bournemouth which he said was sold for £35,000 but he could not remember the purchase price.
Business Interests in Spain
(i) Kwik Print SA;
(ii) A bar known as the ' The Printers Drink';
(iii) A bar/ nightclub known as 'Rosie O'Grady's';
(iv) A restaurant known as 'Pip's Bistro';
(v) The fish and chip shop in Marbella;
(vi) Selling prestige cars and boats.
I am satisfied that these business interests, such as they were, cannot explain any part of the £1.3 million or so deposited in the Allied Dunbar Isle of Man accounts between 1989-1992. There can be only one conclusion as to the sources of such funds and that is that they were the proceeds of unlawful conduct.
Spanish Properties
- 10, Bramall Hall Lane, Hazel Grove, Stockport: purchased in
1953 and sold in 1956.
- 3, Sandhurst Road, Mile End, Stockport: purchased in 1955 and sold in 1960.
- 54, Tollbar Road, Christleton, Chester: purchased in 1960 and sold in 1962.
- Croft Cottage, School Lane, Guilden: purchased in 1962 and sold in 1968 according to DG this was a derelict property bought for approximately £200 which his father, with the help of DG and his brothers, renovated. I observe that while DG was 18 years old in 1968, his brothers were aged 16 and 12 years respectively. DG said the house and its adjacent land was sold separately with developers buying the land on which more than 20 houses were built and so there was a considerable profit made on the sale. Such a development, even forty years on, would be verifiable.
- 18, Park Road, West Kirby, Wirral: purchased in 1968 and sold in 1972 DG stated this was a nursing home and once the occupants had died, his father converted the property into luxury flats.
- Penchogwyn, Llanfairpwll, Anglesey: a log cabin overlooking the Menai Straits purchased in 1972 and sold in 1978 after DG's father had converted it into a dormer bungalow.
- Shop Nebo, Pensarn, Angelsey: a shop with living accommodation above purchased in 1978 there is no information about the sale date but DG said his mother had to give up the business following an accident at a wholesalers prompted by my own knowledge of this part of Anglesey, DG agreed that Pensarn is a hamlet "off the beaten track".
- Berwyn Cottage, Berwyn, Near Amlwch, Anglesey: purchased in 1980 DG said his father started to renovate the property but died before he could complete the work and so his mother arranged for others to complete it.
- Lingmel, 164, Deganwy Road, Deganwy: according to DG this was purchased in 1982 and sold in 1985. Land registry records reveal it was sold on 30 October 1989 for £79,500.
- 141c, Marine Drive Rhos-on-Sea: this was purchased on 4 November 1988 for £35,000 and sold on 30 January 1997 for £57,000.
- 7, Maes-y-Mor, Penrhyn Bay, Llandudno: DG said his mother bought this on 14 February 1997 in a dilapidated condition and sub-contractors did the renovation work: the purchase price of £59,000 was met from the proceeds of sale of 141c, Marine Drive with an additional payment to cover the balance and legal costs: JP sold this property on 21 March 2002 for £159,000 with the net proceeds of £155,572.75 being credited to one of her bank accounts with Barclays Bank (BAR 3249) on the same day.
- 4, Winchester Close, Rhos-on-Sea was purchased on 14th December 2002 for £144,244.72: on 14 November 2002, £141,666 from an unknown source was paid into JP's Barclays Bank account (BAR 1388); the Receiver considers that is likely to be related to a draft of £140,000 dated 28 March 2002 from BAR 3249 (see above) together with interest. On 29 November 2002, £144,244.72 was paid out of this account to the client account of Bone & Payne her solicitors, for the purchase of 4, Winchester Close on 14 December 2002: JP sold the property on 17 December 2004 for £195,000, according to DG because she wanted to 'downsize' and had less time to look after the garden.
- 67, Llandudno Road, Penrhyn Bay: JP purchased this property on 30 April 2004 for £115,000: the purchase monies came from her Barclays Bank Accounts - £11,500 from BAR 3249, £20,445.75 from BAR 1388 via BAR 3249 and a payment of £85,000 to her solicitors, described by them as a loan from her son. The Receiver identified a payment of £85,000 from JP's Barclay's Account (BAR 1388) to DG's Alliance and Leicester Account on 10 January 2005.
El Sardinell
Casa Manana
(i) the property was owned by John Knight who was represented by his brother, a convicted armed robber and there is an established pattern of DG associating with persons with criminal convictions; (ii) the Land Registry documents record that John Knight purchased the plot of land on which Casa Manana was subsequently built for Ptas3 million and that at the time DG bought it it was worth Ptas7 million in my judgment it is unlikely that land and property values will be overstated and so the purchase price has the hallmarks of money laundering, which on the balance of probabilities I find; (iii) While Ms Sanz stated that JP had been a client since 1988 when she bought Casa Manana "maintaining since then a very good professional relation (sic) having advised and legally assist (sic) her in various commercial businesses showing a very polite professional and personal attitude to this office", that is not evidence which I consider reliable - as the Receiver's experience of Ms Sanz was she did not speak English and needed an interpreter and there is no evidence that JP was at any time involved in commercial businesses, this assessment must be approached with caution and it is significant that McGowan said he met JP on two or three occasions "but I can't remember her involvement in any property transactions".
I shall consider later in the judgment two further properties which were purchased in Spain - Las Hortensias and Mezquilla together with the evidence of the purchase of 110 Corhampton Road, Bournemouth on 11 June 1990.
Property Acquisitions by DG in Spain
Sales of Cars & Boats
The United States of America
Property & Business Interests in Portugal
Between 1993 and 9 September 1998, DG and TG paid no tax in Portugal. The Receiver has identified over the five year period deposits from unknown sources into Portuguese bank accounts in DG and/or TG's name of £198,000, investments in bonds with Bayman of £90,000, $170,000 and $45,950 and the purchase in the names of off-shore companies of three properties.
Casa Alturias
Colina Branca
Casa Paraiso
US.$100,000 from the Merrill Lynch account in the name of DG and TG paid to Idalho Coelho, their lawyer in Portugal he refused to disclose any information about this sale to the Portuguese police on the grounds of professional secrecy;
£20,000 from Jyske Bank, Gibraltar account 5250 in the name of DG and TG, which had itself been credited by a transfer of £26,140 from another Jyske Bank account No.5850 in the name of DG and TG and by a credit of £92,847 from the proceeds of sale of 110 Corhampton Road (see below), themselves ultimately traced to unknown sources and by four cheques together worth £101,250 from unknown sources. The monies from the Jyske account 5850 comprised £10,786 from Burton Copeland (part of the proceeds of the sale of Melbourne Beach), £14,353.15 from Idalalho Coelho from an unknown source and £1,000 from DG's former tutor (the rental payment in respect of Colina Branca see above). The Receiver stated it is unclear why £37,733 more than was in fact required was provided to the lawyer Coelho. I have concluded that with the exception of the cheque payment of £1,000 from the tutor paid into the Jykse account (which probably, on the last in, first out principle, formed no part of the £26,114 transferred to the Jykse 5260 account (see Chart 7), the monies used to purchase the three Portuguese properties can be traced back to unknown sources or to sources linked to unlawful conduct.
11, Priory Quay: Investigations by the Receiver revealed that the vendors accepted, on 11 March 1999, TG's offer on behalf of JP (who then lacked the mental capacity to run her own affairs) to purchase 11 Priory Quay and that on 23 February 1999 TG sent instructions to Merrill Lynch International requesting that they release two bankers' drafts of $250,000 and $200,000 (the then equivalent of £280,374 and so 92% of the asking price, but the bank refused to release the drafts because the signature of DG (who of course was then in a Portuguese prison) did not correspond with his signature which they held on file. Despite a request from the Receiver, TG has not said whether completion took place and why the property was to be purchased in the name of JP with monies belonging to DG and TG. The evidence of George Kunjumon, an administrative manager of Merrill Lynch International, was that on 23 February 1999 a fax was received requesting the issue of the two drafts to a 'J Diffey' to be sent to an address in Bournemouth. The fax had an address in Portugal but the originating fax number was in the UK and marked 'Phil the Print'. That fax purported to bear the signatures of DG and TG. On 1 March 1999, TG phoned and was advised of the non-corresponding signature of DG. She said she would obtain another signature from him. At 1158 hours that day, another fax was received from the same fax number in the UK purporting to be from DG. Later that day, in another telephone call with TG, when Mr Kunjumon explained the difficulty with the signature, he suggested both TG and DG should attend at the bank. TG said that was not possible as DG was working in Portugal; she said he had a thumb injury and so could not hold the pen properly. On 2 March 1999, someone purporting to be DG telephoned Mr Kunjumun, saying he had had a thumb injury and implying there was difficulty with outgoing correspondence. An interesting detail in the evidence of Mr Kunjomun is that there was background noise and he could hear English being spoken my view is this may well have been a call from DG in prison. On 3 March, TG telephoned and expressed her anger at not having received the funds and threatened she would instruct a solicitor. On 4 March, Merrill Lynch received a letter from Edge, Leyden & Ellis, on behalf of TG saying they intended to get a notarised signature from DG. On 16 March, TG, accompanied by a woman, attended at the bank when she handed over documents purportedly including a notarised signature of DG but it was not accepted as authentic and, despite correspondence from the solicitors, the drafts were not issued. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities both that the various signatures of DG were forged and that TG knew they were forged but nonetheless attempted to persuade Merrill Lynch to issue the drafts. Her persistence provides evidence to prove both that she was a moving force behind the attempts to purchase the two properties and that she was managing their financial affairs while DG was in custody.
- 5 Rosssiter's Quay: Investigations by the Receiver revealed that on 20 March 1999 (20 days after Merrill Lynch refused to release funds) TG reserved Plot 2 for EREB Ltd upon payment of £250 but cancelled it seven days later. TG has not answered the Receiver's request for information as to how she intended to fund the purchase of the property but in her evidence she said the choice of the company name was DG's.
And so, in a period of weeks, TG had committed herself, on behalf of JP and EREB Ltd to purchase properties with a combined purchase price of about £600,000. I agree with the Receiver that she could only have done that if she had access to considerable funds. I would add her involvement in these transactions, and in particular her direct dealings with Merrill Lynch detailed above, provides compelling evidence of her direct involvement in money laundering.
110 Corhampton Road
Glendale Road, Southbourne, Bournemouth
120 Hurn Road, West Christchurch
"9.214. I have advised DG and TG that their current responses to our queries in respect of 120 Hurn Road are unacceptable, given that the property was purchased during the last 7 years and was bought for £250,000, I do not find it credible or acceptable that they cannot recall where the money used to purchase this property was derived from (exhibit 2-41, page 6 and 2-49, page 5). In the absence of this information I am unable to ascertain the origin of these funds."
9.215. To summarise the proceeding paragraphs, 120 Hurn Road was funded by way of four transfers into Preston's client account during January 2001, two from JP in the amount of £209,289.70, £48,723 from Merrill Lynch and £64,955 from an unknown bank account at Abbey National Gibraltar. This funding provided an excess payment of £60,941.17 which was refunded to DG's Nat West account on 22 February 2001 (exhibit 9 104).
9.216 It has not been possible to verify the origin of the funds remitted by DG and TG nor have I been able to ascertain the origin of the funds provided by JP as set out in paragraphs 9.189-9.197."
(i) The £64,955.21 from the Abbey National Gibraltar account are the proceeds of another property transaction or from a source which DG and TG have deliberately not disclosed; whatever the origin of those funds, I am satisfied they were the proceeds of unlawful conduct;(ii) The Receiver has not been able to conclusively link the £48,723 of funds to the proceeds of sale of Melbourne Beach, as the monies in the Merrill Lynch account have been mixed with unknown funds of £52,000 from McEvoy and a further $45,157 remitted in excess of the monies received from the sale of Melbourne Beach;
(iii) There are these unusual features on 23 January 2001, DG presented Preston and Redman with a bank draft in the sum of £64,955.21 drawn on Abbey National Gibraltar when the solicitors had no need of it because they already had enough money to complete the purchase, and on 25 January 2001, there was the transfer of £44,788.70 from the JP's Woolwich account. After completion and deduction of disbursements and legal fees, Preston and Redman had an excess of £60,941.17 in their client account which was transferred back to DG's Nat West account on 22 February 2001. Asked to explain this, DG said "I have no information although I am willing to co-operate fully by commenting on any information which the interim receiver can provide" and said it might have been lodged to purchase other properties. TG offered the same explanation. I observe that if this was the reason for having more money on the Preston and Redman client account, it is surprising both that there is no attendance note to that effect and that the money was transferred back so soon. In my judgment, on the balance of probabilities, these arrangements bear all the hallmarks of money laundering.
(iv) The Attendance Note dated 18 January 2001 proves the 'hands on' role of DG in the purchase and the letter dated 17 January2001 purportedly by JP but in fact by TG proves she participated in the unlawful conduct. Her contradictory evidence, initially confirming DG's evidence about the source of the £59,180, demonstrates she knew about the accounts but there is even more compelling evidence as to that from "the candlestick" evidence (see above).
118, Hurn Road, Bournemouth
£13,500 from Jykse Bank, with unknown funds and known funds derived from unknown sources DG said that a transfer of £19,900 on 28 August 2001was the proceeds of sale of a Mitsibushi to Wordsell; if that is correct, that would be a Mitsibushi registered to TG in 1996 and re-registered to Wordsell, the estate agent, on 14 June 1998; it cannot have been the Mitsibushi purchased in Portugal by DG on 29 August 1997 because that was not sold by Wordsell until 21 November 2002 or the Mitsibushi purchased from the Poole Car Centre on 17 January 2002 for £33,000. Even so, the Receiver has not discovered the funding sources and has concluded that the funding is likely to be connected to unlawful conduct. When he was cross-examined, DG was asked why the Jyske account had been credited with a cheque for £27,000 from Jonathan Diffey, TG's brother and a postman in Bournemouth; he told the Receiver that he was "looking after" the money for him;
£64,004 from Merrill Lynch accounts which came from a mixture of known and unknown sources;
£60,941 from surplus monies paid to Prestons for the purchase of 120 Hurn Road this, I am satisfied was a device to launder money;
£15,312 from unknown sources;
£294,331 from accounts held with Northern Rock Guernsey, a mixture of known and unknown funds, with the known funds themselves a mixture of known and unknown funds. When cross-examined, DG said he had no idea where £43,533 which was withdrawn from the Northern Rock 4804 account to close it, came from.
Mezquita
Las Hortensias
"Mr Gale has instructed me that although his mother is the legal owner, he has contributed some 800,000 towards this and so may (my emphasis) have a beneficial interest in this property".
Other Property the subject of Schedule 2 of the Order
Bank Accounts
These brief summaries are sufficient to demonstrate that the accounts were used for money-laundering purposes.
PART E
DRUG TRAFFICKING
Criminal Conduct
The Receiver has been provided with a police intelligence report dated 15 April 1998 which reads "His [AS] mate was David Gary Cedric Moore he featured in Customs operation Silver Wings in early to mid 1980s AS then moved to Spain at about the same time as Moore who was forced to leave UK. He has associated with the likes of Ronnie Knight, a London gangster". This evidence must be approached with considerable caution and care but the admission against interest of DG to the Portugese magistrate and evidence linking DG with the Knights (see above) provide support for the information. I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that DG left the UK to avoid arrest for drug trafficking.
The 'Hanja'
(i) Colin Allen was a friend of DG who was involved in the purchase of Calle Fluvia No 9.(ii) A crew/passenger list in respect of the 'Hanja' completed for the Gibraltar Port Authorities on 16 May 1990 (and so a year or so before the drug trafficking) recorded DG as the registered owner with an address 'Tideswell Limited, 28 Irish Town, Gibraltar'. It is common ground that the registered owner of the boat was Tideswell Limited. The list was completed by the yacht's master and so the inference must be that he understood DG owned the boat he was sailing.
(iii) A crew/passenger list in respect of the 'Hanja' completed for the same port authorities on 8 March 1990 recorded the registered owner as Tideswell Limited and the Master as Philip Moore, DG's brother. Among the crew was Kevin Barry, who was implicated in the Portugese drug trafficking (see below).
(iv) During the Spanish trial, Kevin Chapman (one of the accused) in his own defence said in answer to a question from the public prosecutor that DG and his brother had travelled on the 'Hanja' to Puerto Sherry to see the motorbike racing and he was led to believe that DG was the owner.
The 'Eagle'
"It seems to us that that without a shadow of a doubt there are no proven facts permitting the conviction of the defendant for the three crimes for which he is accused, since the objective elements of each of the types of crimes refer to above have not been proved, much less the subjective elements of each of them. The matter consequently seems insufficiently proved to us, namely the Jeep, Cherokee which was seized at the time of the unloading of the hashish have been parked a few days before at the house of the defendant Nor has it been proved that the accounts he held alone or together with his wife, namely in Portugal, were the exclusive (my emphasis) fruits of such activity (drug trafficking). Nor has it been proved that the defendant together with those who were his co-defendants had formed the objective of together dedicating themselves to drug trafficking in Portugal."
PART E
CONCLUSIONS
• I agree with the Receiver that DG and TG have accumulated significant wealth for which there is no evidence of lawful sourcing.
• DG was engaged in drug trafficking in the UK before he left to live in Spain: this conclusion is based upon his admissions to the Portuguese authorities (paragraph 126 above) which corroborates UK police intelligence reports both before he moved to Spain and subsequently.
• There is no evidence of him earning anything other than modest earnings from any business interests he had in Spain his earnings would have been no more than enough to contribute to his living expenses and certainly insufficient to explain any capital savings or the capital savings he and TG made; in the unlikely event that any part of those earnings formed part of his and TG's capital savings, then they were sourced from criminal conduct.
• There is no evidence that DG made any money from lawful property speculation, development or investment in Spain or elsewhere I reject out-of-hand DG's evidence and the evidence of TG that his property interests were funded by his mother; her tax records contradict his claims that she was a person of financial substance; his capital base was at all times, the proceeds of crime: he used his mother's name to launder the proceeds of crime in Spain and latterly in the UK.
• While the picture is not clear and it may be that some of the monies for the purchase of Mezquita and Las Hortensias can be traced to the proceeds of sale of El Sardinell and Casa Manana, all were purchased with laundered monies and/or the proceeds of drug trafficking.
• DG owned the 'Hanja' and used Tideswell Ltd and his brother, Philip Moore as 'fronts' to hide that interest Tideswell was the name chosen for a company which owned a boat and DG said in evidence that he named the company that was incorporated for his flying business, 'Airswell':
• DG lied about his links to the purchase of Calle Fluvia No 9; I am satisfied he was not a broker but was behind the decision, both in identifying its convenient location and in the provision of funds:
• DG and TG made no attempt to challenge the freezing order over their Allied Dunbar Isle of Man accounts because they knew no challenge would succeed; similarly, they did not challenge a freezing order in Ireland, preferring to reach a compromise by which they accepted.
• DG's associations with drug traffickers cannot be a coincidence there were Allen and Barry as well as his brother Christopher, who with Barry was arrested trying to smuggle 21 kilograms of cannabis into France; as Barry and Christopher Moore lacked funds, my conclusion is that either DG provided the funds for the purchase of that cannabis or was in some way associated with its carriage into France on route to the UK.
• The use of false passports and false names, while consistent with money laundering, is equally consistent with drug trafficking:
• The construction of the isolated airstrip, the use of light aircraft, the links with Morocco provide evidence that DG was close to the source of supply of cannabis; although DG claimed the aircraft was not large enough to transport much by way of weight, I am satisfied there was enough room to transport significant amounts.
• The use of bank accounts, nominees, offshore accounts, offshore companies and the complicated transactions summarised above and shown on the relevant charts appended hereto relating to the acquisitions of 110 Corhampton Road, Melbourne Beach, Casa Paraiso, Glendale Road, 118 & 120 Hurn Road, Mezquita and Las Hortensias are not only redolent of money laundering but provide the cogent and compelling evidence from which I am prepared to infer on the balance of probabilities that DG and TG were actively involved in money laundering from the date they moved to Spain.
PART F
THE LIMITATION ACT 1980
27A Actions for recovery of property obtained through unlawful conduct etc
(1)None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (civil recovery of proceeds of unlawful conduct).(2)Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of twelve years from the date on which the Director's cause of action accrued.
(3)Proceedings under that Chapter are brought when
(a) a claim form is issued, oran application is made for a property freezing order, or]
(b) an application is made for an interim receiving order,
whichever is the earliest?
(4)The Director's cause of action accrues in respect of any recoverable property
(a) in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of property obtained through unlawful conduct, when the property is so obtained,(b) in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of any other recoverable property, when the property obtained through unlawful conduct which it represents is so obtained.
32 Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake
(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4A) below, where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or(b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or
(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake;
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
References in this subsection to the defendant include references to the defendant's agent and to any person through whom the defendant claims and his agent.
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.
(3)Nothing in this section shall enable any action
(a) to recover, or recover the value of, any property; or(b) to enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property;
to be brought against the purchaser of the property or any person claiming through him in any case where the property has been purchased for valuable consideration by an innocent third party since the fraud or concealment or (as the case may be) the transaction in which the mistake was made took place.
(4)A purchaser is an innocent third party for the purposes of this section
(a) in the case of fraud or concealment of any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action, if he was not a party to the fraud or (as the case may be) to the concealment of that fact and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that the fraud or concealment had taken place; and(b)in the case of mistake, if he did not at that time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.
(4A)Subsection (1) above shall not apply in relation to the time limit prescribed by section 11A(3) of this Act or in relation to that time limit as applied by virtue of section 12(1) of this Act.]
(5)Sections 14A and 14B of this Act shall not apply to any action to which subsection (1) (b) above applies (and accordingly the period of limitation referred to in that subsection, in any case to which either of those sections would otherwise apply, is the period applicable under section 2 of this Act).]
" the effect of section 27A is to exclude property representing the original property obtained unlawfully if the original property obtained unlawfully was itself obtained more than 12 years before commencement of the proceedings "
and submitted that as the property was obtained outside the limitation period, the property nor any property which it represents is recoverable. That is a selective citation from a judgment in an appeal which was concerned with what constitutes an arguable case on an application for an interim receiving order under POCA, the proper approach to the 12 year period of limitation for the recovery of property obtained by unlawful conduct on such an application and the effect of section 32 upon the 12 year period of limitation. Read as a whole, it is clear that Waller LJ was not saying that an expired limitation period cannot recommence. Indeed, by reference to the speeches of Lord Nicholls and Lord Keith in Sheldon v- RHM Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd [1996] 1 AC 102, he concluded (paragraphs 57 & 58) :-
"57 if one were to hold that section 32 concealment had no application to section 27A that would mean that even deliberate concealment from the ARA within the 12 year period would not extend the period of limitation. That, it seems to me, is very unlikely to have been parliament's intention. Furthermore, unless section 32 in some respects applies to section 27A, it is difficult to see why, having regard to section 1 of the 1980 Act, section 27A was placed within part 1 at all.
58.Thus I think it arguable that concealment from the ARA during their investigations will lead to the limitation period recommencing once the concealment is discovered or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered".
Decision