England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
OUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		11/08/2006

Mr. Justice OPENSHAW:

1. On the 1 1 September 2002, following his conviction for murder before His Honour Judge Forrester QC, after a trial at the Central Criminal Court, Samir Aktar was sentenced to the mandatory term of custody for life. Following the practice of the time, the judge recommended that he serve 15 years before being considered for release by the Parole Board; that was considered by Lord Woolf CJ, who reduced the recommendation to 14 years. However, before the Secretary of State fixed the minimum term which he must serve, the process became subject to the new regime introduced by section 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. He is now an 'existing prisoner' within the meaning of Schedule 22 of the Act; the Secretary of State has referred the matter to the High Court under paragraph 6 of that schedule for the minimum term to be set, pursuant to section 28(5) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.
2. I have taken the facts from the findings of the judge, supplemented by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in refusing leave to appeal against conviction. The defendant was aged only 18 at the time. At about 1 1.15 on the evening of 28 January 2002, he was walking past Falkirk House in Maida Vale, with friends. The victim, Simon Henderson, aged just 21, was cycling past them. It was claimed by the defendant that the victim had said something insulting to him or to one of his friends; whether this was true or not was unclear, but -out of fairness to the defendant -I will accept that it was so, or at least that the defendant so believed. They all followed the young man into a nearby block of flats, where he intended to visit his father, who was unwell. The defendant, who was carrying a knife, stabbed Simon Henderson four times in the head and neck, thereby killing him. The defendant and his friends ran off. He later said to one of them: 'What is done, is done'. On arrest, and at his trial, he denied participation and blamed his two friends; indeed he still denies his guilt.
3. Section 276 and Schedule 22 of the Act are intended to ensure that no one being sentenced under this procedure receives a more severe sentence than they would have done if the Secretary of State had fixed the minimum term at the time. In order to ensure that the minimum term which I fix does not exceed what the Secretary of State would have fixed, I have applied the guidelines in force at the time. Since this murder was committed on 28th January 2002, that is to say before Lord Woolf's Practice Direction of 13th May 2002, I take the effective guidelines to be those given by Lord Bingham CJ in his letter to the judges dated 10 February 1997 (conveniently set out in paragraphs IV.49.18 -21 of the Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Consolidation) (as amended). These set a starting point of 14 years.
4. The trial judge identified these aggravating features. Firstly, the defendant was carrying a knife at the time. Second, the killing was entirely unprovoked. I entirely accept these points. However, the judge identified a third aggravating matter, being that the defendant had a previous conviction for attacking a cyclist, whom he punched; since the sentence for this offence was only an eight month Detention and Training Order, I do not myself consider this to be an aggravating factor to which any weight should attach.
5. I have read the Victim Personal Statement made by Katie O'Neil, who now cares for Simon Henderson's mother. That she needs a carer is not surprising. On hearing of his son's murder, his father (Mrs Henderson's husband) had a heart attack from shock; within a few days he had another heart attack from which he died. Simon's Henderson's girlfriend was so shocked that she miscarried. Some time later, his brother Stephen, grieving at the murder of his brother and the death of his father, committed suicide. If the effect of crimes upon victims are to have any effect on sentencers -and indeed on sentences -it is obvious to my mind that they are a highly relevant factor in this case. I might add that there is no indication that any of these matters were before the trial judge.
6. I have read the representations made on his behalf by his solicitors in their letter of 26^th September. I have also read the defendants own written representations, dated 12 February 2005. I do not understand how the defendant can express remorse, when he denies his guilt. His alleged progress in prison is unsupported by any independent evidence and certainly not of the exceptional kind, which would justify a reduction in the minimum term otherwise thought to be appropriate.
7. The only mitigation was the defendant's age. When a defendant is aged only 18, this carries considerable weight; indeed even under the new regime of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the starting point for a defendant under 18 is only 12 years.
8. For the reasons identified by the trial judge, I consider that this was a shocking murder, but the defendant's youth balances out the aggravating factors with the result that I find no alteration to the starting point is necessary. Accordingly I fix 14 years as the minimum term which he must serve before being considered for release. Had this murder been committed now, I do not doubt that this sentence would be longer but I must loyally apply what I take to be the conventional tariff of the time.
9. I order, as I am required to do, that the term of 14 years is reduced by the period of 7 months and 1 day which he spent in custody before being sentenced.
10. I am anxious that this sentence is not misunderstood or misreported. The sentence is -and remains -a sentence of custody for life. The defendant may not even be considered for release until he has served at least 14 years. That is not to say that he will then be released; indeed he will be detained unless and until the Parole Board is satisfied that he no longer resents a risk to the public. Even if the Parole Board decides then or at some time in the future to authorise his release, he will be upon licence which will extend for the rest of his life. Many prisoners are in fact detained for many years after their tariff has expired