England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		26th May 2006

Mr. Justice Holland:

1. My first judgment in this matter is dated the 11^th April 2006. In it I offered a short introduction to the situation and then dealt with various issues specific to that occasion. In the intervening period I have had two views of the locus (one on the 4^th May and the other, a private visit, on the 23^rd May) and I have received further submissions from the respective parties. By this, the resultant judgment, I seek to deal with all outstanding issues, prefacing such with a now considered and final assessment of the overall problem. Obviously there will be some repetition of that which was delivered on the 11^th April - overall it seems preferable to confine the reader to one judgment rather than produce a document that has to be read with, and is a continuation of an earlier judgment.

Introduction

2. Appended to this judgment is Plan C. This is constituted by a section of a map showing an area of Oxford that is to the north of its centre. The map is centred upon South Parks Road. This single carriageway road runs from Parks Road (to the west) to St. Cross Road (to the east). Such are Oxford's demands for traffic flow, it carries regular traffic in both directions, quite heavy at rush hours. The area adjoining the road and principally that to the north of it, is the University Science Area - an accumulation of over 40 laboratories and science departments.
3. So much of the Science Area as overlaps the road so as to extend to the south side presently includes the Chemistry Research Laboratory and the Experimental Psychology Department. At approximately half way along its length there is a south side junction with Mansfield Road. This relatively quiet side road leads past Mansfield College and, eventually, Harris Manchester College before connecting with Holywell Street. The geography is completed for the purposes of this introduction by reference to St. Cross Road. This carries the traffic to and from South Parks Road but once the vicinity of South Parks Road is left the adjacent area becomes relatively featureless.
4. Oxford University is in the process of adding a further institution to this Science Area. A Research Laboratory, substantial in size, is being erected on a site that abuts the south side of South Parks Road and the east side of Mansfield Road. There are two entrances to the site utilised by the builders: one such in South Parks Road, the other in Mansfield Road.
5. It is common ground that when constructed and in operation, it will accommodate, inter alia, experimentation upon living animals. That experimentation if carried out as is intended, that is, conforming with the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 and subject to Home Office monitoring, will be lawful and there is a strong body of opinion, expert and lay, that such is necessary and desirable for research aimed at improving the future welfare of mankind and, for that matter, of animals. Thus it is that the University looks to the law, and to this Court in particular to take all such measures as may be necessary to enable it to pursue its present and future lawful activities.
6. There is a diametrically opposed position. The prospective housing of experimentation upon living animals within the new building appals the anti-vivisection lobby. With passionate sincerity the adherents champion the present welfare of all animals; they protest at what is proposed and they are determined to do all that they can to prevent the completion of this building, alternatively the subsequent conduct of any such experimentation within the building, once completed. To the extent that this lobby is engaged in, and intent upon protest and canvassing popular support, respectively in a lawful fashion, it looks to the law, and to this Court in particular to identify and protect its rights so that such are not impaired and subverted at the behest of the University.
7. The resultant task for the Court is not easy - and is made more difficult by the impact of the activities of a different element of the anti-vivisection lobby. This element, speculative in terms of numbers, has no truck with canvassing popular support - whether or no such will ever be forthcoming in numbers sufficient to persuade the University to change its stance, the process is perceived as slow and speculative. As in other parts of the country, the tactic becomes one of targeted intimidation - persons with carefully concealed identities adopting criminal means to target individuals and organisations with sufficient persistence and ingenuity to instil fear and force compliance. Specific to Oxford and the campaign against this Research Laboratory has been the 2004 campaign conducted against the Montpellier Group (the subsidiaries of which had contracted to build the Laboratory) and its directors. Paragraph 34 of the Amended Particulars of Claim lists 19 instances of intimidatory conduct (mostly criminal in character) committed in the period 14^th March 2004 to 14^th July 2004, and for present purposes I proceed on the basis that all or most are factually well founded. Certain it is that "on about the 19^th July 2004, Montpellier resigned its contract to build the Research Laboratory, stating that it could no longer fulfil its contractual obligations because of intimidation and harassment which had been directed against shareholders and directors by animal rights activists ... The University was forced to stop construction work on the Research Laboratory until it was in a position to appoint new contractors and suppliers" (see paragraph 35 op.cit.).
8. Following July 2004 both sides stood firm. The University eventually succeeded in securing the services of replacement contractors, secret as to identity, with workers wearing identity concealing balaclava helmets. These contractors started work on the site in the autumn of 2005. For their part the activities of the extremists re-surfaced from time to time. Paragraphs 36 and 37 list 31 instances of actual or threatened intimidatory activities. For present purposes I draw attention to the following:

a. Activity in purported protest against the earlier injunction granted in November 2004 by Grigson J.

b. On the 6^th July 2005 and the 5^th September 2005 arson attacks were carried out at the boat houses of, respectively, Hertford College, Mansfield College and St. Hilda's College. On the 23^rd September 2005 the Corpus Christi College Sports Pavilion was the scene of an attempted arson. All such activities are reasonably attributed to the ultimate extremist organisation, the Animal Liberation Front, the 10^th Defendants herein.

c. The publicity advanced for the 10^th Defendants and their conduct is typified by a website message of the 22^nd January 2006:

"This ALF team is calling out to the movement to unite and fight against the University on a maximum impact scale, we must stand up, DO WHATEVER IT TAKES and blow these fucking monsters off the face of the planet. Information, tools and resources are out there for everyone to take part in smashing the University of Oxford, all you need do is find them! All that stands between the animals and victory is our fear, GET OVER IT! Fear is their most valued weapon and the animals cannot afford for us to work within their boundaries. We must target their construction companies and the University's current and future building projects. We must target professors, teachers, heads, students, investors, partners, supporters and ANYONE that dares to deal in any part of the University in any way. There is no time for debate and there is no time for protest, this is make or break time and from now on, ANYTHING GOES. We cannot fail these animals that will end up in those death chambers. Be warned Oxford University this is the beginning of our campaign. Everyone linked to your institution is right now being tracked down and sooner or later, they will be made to face the consequences of your evil schemes. Forever for the animals, Animal Liberation Front."

9. I add the following. Not only were these intimidatory tactics successful in 2004 but, as is well known from the media, similar tactics were successful in other parts of the country, latterly at Newchurch in Shropshire. Focussing on Oxford I draw attention, first, to the importance to these activists of identification of the current contractors and their directors and employees so that the 2004 intimidation can be replicated. Second, there is the warning of the extremists that anyone connected to the University and perceived by them to be potentially hostile to their aims is a potential 'target' for harassment, defamation (being made the subject of a false rumour alleging paedophilia) or criminal damage. Third, it is obvious that for the extremists public opinion, including student opinion is irrelevant: what else can be inferred from burning boat houses?
10. All this necessarily impacts upon the proceedings before me. Albeit conscious that there is a limit to the efficacy, actual or potential of a High Court injunction vis is urban terrorism the University understandably seeks a width to the terms of any order that would counter at least some of the threatened intimidatory conduct. Further, the University and the witnesses upon whom it relies cannot readily distinguish the lawful protestors from those anonymously behind the intimidation. Turn then to the lawful protestors: for all that they are able to point to activities that are consistent with respect for the law and its concerns they are inevitably judged in the light of the background events. A protestor takes a photograph outside the site: is this, as he contends, referable to the conduct of a demonstration, or, notwithstanding his contentions, is it taken with a view to identifying a contractor's employee?
11. There then is a review of the background that hopefully will suffice to introduce the issues which I have to address following recital of the chronology of this litigation.

This Litigation

12. The key chronology is as follows:

3^rd September 2004. By way of a Claim Form with accompanying Particulars of Claim this litigation commences, seeking against three individuals and seven groups or associations injunctive relief and damages.

10^th November 2004. Following an inter parties hearing Grigson J. gave a judgment and made an Order granting interim injunctive relief against one individual and three groups - undertakings were accepted from two individual Defendants. Amongst other provisions, this Order served to establish an exclusion zone covering the immediate vicinity of the Laboratory site within which protest was banned save at a designated spot and then between 1 and 5 p.m. on each Thursday.

6^th March 2006. By way of an ex parte hearing Calvert Smith J. granted further relief to the University. In particular he gave leave to join three more Defendants and he banned the use of megaphones and other means of amplification in South Parks Road, St. Cross Road and Mansfield Road. An inter parties hearing was ordered. It is this that came before me.

11^th April 2006. I made several interim orders, principally an Order banning any protest activity that could impact upon the conduct of University examinations together with a variation of foregoing orders so at to permit the use of a megaphone at the Thursday demonstration between 1 and 2 p.m. The balance of the relief sought was ordered to await this, my final judgment, following a view and a further hearing.

The Defendants

13. Issues have arisen as to some of the Defendants - it is convenient to have a\ full review:

1^st Defendant: Mr. Mel Broughton. Represented by counsel, Mr. Marc Willers, he does not dispute his status as a Defendant. That said, he offered Grigson J. an undertaking which was accepted. He makes the same offer to me.

2^nd Defendant: Mr. John Curtin. He represents himself. He does not admit that the University is entitled to any injunctive relief and he refuses to offer any undertaking. That said, he has presently foresworn illegal activity and, however reluctantly, professes loyalty to the Court's Order.

3^rd Defendant: Mr. Robert Cogswell. He represents himself. He does not dispute some entitlement to injunctive relief but prefers to offer an undertaking. That offer was accepted by Grigson J. and has been renewed to me.

4^th Defendants: Messrs Mel Broughton and Robert Cogswell representing all persons acting as members, participants or supporters or in the name of the unincorporated association known as the SPEAK Campaign to prevent or obstruct the building of the Research Laboratory at the University. As to these Defendants it is common ground that the SPEAK group is in the vanguard so far as lawful protest is concerned and can properly respond to a claim for injunctive relief. Again it is not disputed that the two individuals are sufficiently prominent in the organisation to represent it for the practical purposes of this litigation. Mr. Flint QC publicly underlined the obvious: the individuals are not doubly liable to the University, nor are they vicariously liable for the conduct of a SPEAK member.

5^th Defendants: A group known as Stop Primate Experiments at Cambridge was originally joined as a Defendant. Grigson J. struck out so much of the case as lay against this party pursuant to CPR 3.4.2.

6^th Defendants: Dr. Max Gastone on his own behalf and as representing all persons acting as members, participants or supporters or in the name of the unincorporated association known as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty ("SHAC"). Dr. Gastone represents himself. He has availed himself of his representative role to draft and file a Defence. He denies liability but at this stage does not contest joinder nor stand out against some interim injunctive relief.

7^th, 8^th and 9^th Defendants: Oxford Animal Rights Group, People Against Cruelty to Animals - West Midlands and West Midlands Animal Action. All three statements of case were struck out by Grigson J.

10^th Defendant: Mr. Robin Webb sued on his own behalf and as representing all persons acting as members, participants or supporters or in the name of an unincorporated association known as the Animal Liberation Front ("ALF"). Mr. Webb as an individual is represented by Counsel, Miss Stephanie Harrison. There is a history to these Defendants. By way of his Order Grigson J. named ALF as 10^th Defendants so as to be subject to his injunction. These Defendants did not appeal neither did they apply for variation or discharge. At that stage no individual was identified as representing the "association". Thereafter Mr. Webb made various communications to the media relating to the Oxford protest, each time in the avowed capacity of "Press Officer to the ALF". The University cites activities on the 5^th and 12^th October 2005, the 1^st December 2005 and the 2^nd February 2006. It is the Claimants' case that in effect he was utilised by the ALF so as to publicise threats and thus achieve intimidation. Typical, they say, is his statement to Channel 4 News on the 2^nd February: " ... student accommodation provided and funded by the University and student organisations who are promoting and supporting this project would be seen as legitimate targets". In the result in the course of the ex parte application to Calvert Smith J. in March 2006 the Claimants secured the addition of Mr. Webb as a party "on his own behalf and as representing ... the Animal Liberation Front ("ALF")". Belatedly Mr. Webb was allocated legal assistance so that on the 24^th May 2006 Miss Harrison submitted that the order joining him should be discharged. By way of a well-constructed submission she took two points. The first such was based upon the unreported decision of Gross J. of the 29^th May 2005, Edo MBM Technology Ltd v. Campaign to Smash EDO (2005) EWHC 837 (QB): he held that an unincorporated association could not be sued unless there was before the Court an individual capable of being sued as a representative of such association. Pause there then: she submits that Grigson J. was wrong in law to make the ALF as an unincorporated association a defendant when at that stage no representative of such association was identified. Her second point seeks to counter the obvious riposte, namely that joinder of Mr. Webb solved the problem: she submits that in point of fact his role vis ?is the ALF is not such as to render him a representative - he is no more than a journalist reporting as a matter of news that which he has learned of ALF intentions from his journalistic sources. Her third and final point focuses upon the joinder of Mr. Webb "on his own behalf". Save for the contributions to the media cited by the Claimants he had played no part in the Oxford protest and had no intention to do so - indeed he had not been to Oxford for some years. Further, if he were to take part in the Oxford protest he would regard himself as a 'Respondent' given the width and terms of the proposed Order, so as to be bound by it. As to Miss Harrison's first two points it seemed obvious that no ruling would be possible unless and until the Court received evidence specific to Mr. Webb's relationship with the ALF sufficient to sustain the required findings of fact, which evidence was not before me. In the result I have directed that so much of Mr. Webb's application as seeks to discharge his joinder as representing the ALF should be listed for a hearing on the 11^th July 2006 before another High Court Judge (I will then be on Circuit) and I have endorsed the parties timetable for interim mutual exchange of evidence and preparation of issue specific bundles. If Miss Harrison's submissions succeed then the same Judge can address her point as to the continuing role of the ALF as a then unrepresented association. In making this direction I have made it clear that for interim purposes Mr. Webb's representative role stands - the issue for July is as to whether there should be discharge. That leaves Mr. Webb's citation "on his own behalf". When asked for a basis to include him as a named defendant on his own behalf, Mr. Lawson Cruttendon could only cite Mr. Webb's activities as a media spokesman. This plainly offers no justification for a role as a named defendant on his own behalf to the Order that I am about to make. If his conduct as a media spokesman is to found an order against him then the Court is going to need an evidential and legal justification specific to him and his role. It will be for the Claimants to decide whether to raise this in July. Presently I discharge so much of the claim as is specific to him as an individual pursuant to CPR 3.4.2

11^th Defendants: Miss Amanda Richards sued on her own behalf and as representing all persons acting as members, participants or supporters or in the name of unincorporated association known as the Save Newchurch Guinea Pigs Campaign ("SNGP"). Miss Richards as an individual is represented by Counsel, Mr. Willers. Several points arise. First, she points out that her true name is Amanda King and that 'Amanda Richards' was a nom de plume adopted when acting as a spokesperson for SNGP. Pause here: in so far as she remains as a party she is obviously entitled to the description 'Amanda King' and I so order. Second, it is her case that the SNGP no longer exists as a viable organisation - having achieved its allotted aim of stopping the breeding of guinea pigs at a farm at Newchurch in Shropshire it is in the process of being wound up. Turn then to CPR 3.4.2.: there can be no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim against SNGP in that its role was specific to Newchurch, it has had no role in Oxford and in any event it is being wound up. Third, given an admission that she would consider herself with respect to Oxford activities as within the ambit of SPEAK so as to be covered by any order made against the 4^th Defendants, she queries whether there is any justification for a role as an individual Defendant. The response of Mr. Flint QC on behalf of the University to the second point is based upon a website announcement of the 13^th February 2006 - it was on the basis of such that an application was made to Calvert Smith J. to join these Defendants as parties. Turning to the announcement it records the closing of the farm at which guinea pigs were bred and continues:

"With the welcome announcement by the farm, our part has effectively run its course in that part of the country. However if the family do decide to go back on their statement, the campaign will once again swing back into action. Therefore for the foreseeable future the family's business operations will be closely monitored, until we are completely satisfied that they don't intend to renege on their promises.

So what next for SNGP? After a consultation period during which many views were considered, it has been decided that the SNGP will be giving their resources acquired over the last six years to the SPEAK campaign. We believe that Oxford has become one of the main areas in the battle to end vivisection in this country, and that it is absolutely imperative that the Oxford University laboratory is never built. We therefore ask that all our supporters join us in backing the SPEAK campaign."

Submits Mr. Flint QC, this should be taken to mean that the SNGP is now an active participant in the Oxford protest. Responds Miss King: the announcement means that as a campaigning body SNGP is no more and thus its adherents are being urged to join SPEAK so as to be covered by any order made against the 4^th Defendants. As to the third point, Mr. Flint QC submits that I should be slow to act on any submission by Miss King given her role in relation to the Newchurch campaign. Responds Miss King: I am essentially a SPEAK supporter. So much for the issues and the submissions. In the event I have no hesitation in striking out so much of the Statement of Case as lies against SNGP pursuant to CPR 3.4.2. Even if I were able to accept Mr. Flint's QC construction of the announcement as arguable it would provide a conspicuously thin basis for joinder and thus for prospective relief by way of damages and injunction. As it is, I accept the construction advanced by Miss King as according with the overall sense and with the reality of the situation as appears from her statements. Further, I strike out her joinder as a specified individual. I can see no good reason to distinguish her from other SPEAK supporters and to give her individual prominence once SNGP is removed from the action obstructs the just disposal of the proceedings, see CPR 3.4.2(b).

12^th Defendant: Mr. Greg Avery. This Defendant has provided a witness statement and Dr. Gastone made submissions on his behalf. He admits that as a participant in or a supporter of SHAC he is one of the 6^th Defendants; he submits that it is wrong and oppressive to name him as an individual Defendant. He was so joined pursuant to the ex parte Order of Calvert Smith J. and he applies pursuant to CPR 3.4.2. to set aside that Order. Mr. Flint QC responds by citing the terms of a speech made by Mr. Avery at a demonstration in Oxford on the 14^th January 2006. In the course of it he abused the Police and arguably urged the audience to forego lawful protest in favour of direct action. In reply, Mr. Avery admits that his references in this speech to the Police were intemperate but contends that overall his advocacy was in favour of lawful protest. For my part, and with more hesitation, I accede to the application to strike out. I see no advantage to anybody, least of all the Court, in having an unnecessary proliferation of defending parties. Given Mr. Avery's admission that he is caught by orders against the 6^th Defendants, I think that just disposal of the proceedings (CPR 3.4.2(b)) would be obstructed by maintaining him as 12^th Defendant. In any event, however intemperate, one speech provides a pretty thin basis for a cause of action.

13^th Defendant: Mrs Natasha Avery. This Defendant has provided a witness statement and Dr. Gastone made submissions on her behalf. She admits that as a participant in or a supporter of SHAC she is one of the 6^th Defendants; she contends that it is wrong and oppressive to make her a separate, named Defendant. In response Mr. Flint QC is only able to point to her presence at the demonstration of the 14^th January 2006 as apparent on DVD. This is obviously no basis for a case against her and I unhesitatingly set aside so much of the Order of Calvert Smith J. as joined her as 13^th Defendant.

My Order

14. I turn to the trust of this judgment. A starting point has to be the Order of Grigson J. of the 10^th November 2004. Whilst both sides urge variations it has proved to be beneficial and lasting. As to protest in the immediate vicinity, some regulation was plainly necessary; as to protest elsewhere the fact of an Order offering protection against harassment has constituted a reminder to protesters and a potential aid to those targeted. It is to be noted with satisfaction that alleged breaches have been few and no contempt proceedings have been instituted. Turning to the nature and weight of the submissions made to me it has been tempting to give effect to those that are well founded by means of simple variation of the existing Order. However as the submissions were developed I formed and expressed the view, to which I adhere, that variation as brought about by the Court's red pencil would serve to confuse and that the best solution was to discharge the earlier order and replace it with one fresh order, in substance the earlier order as varied. I say "one"; on the 11^th April I made the short order covering examination schools - this remains separate with its own defined specific purpose and a shorter duration. As to the main order two procedural points can be addressed forthwith.
15. Duration. What of the duration of the main Order? To date there is extant the University's claim as presently embodied in the Amended Particulars of Claim of the 6^th March 2006 and addressed, following my foregoing orders, to the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd 4^th, 6^th and 10^th Defendants for injunctive relief, damages, interest and, presumably, costs. So far the 1^st and 6^th Defendants have served Defences. I am asked to refer this outstanding action to Senior Master Turner (or such other Master as may be appropriate) for a Case Management Conference. This I will readily do - and the corollary must be an Order "until trial or further order." That said, all concerned (with an eye to the CPR 1.1 and the overriding objective) will hopefully consider how far relief over and above my Order (as perhaps varied from time to time) is truly required so as to justify a trial and its preparation. In any event with no obvious end to protest remotely in sight, my Order may have to stand for some time and I have urged regular review of the impact of its terms.
16. Service. Amongst the methods adopted for service of the Order of 10^th November 2004 has been personal service. In practice this frequently involves a process server darting into a crowd of demonstrators and thrusting a copy order into the hands of one such. Not surprisingly this exercise has proved to be unsatisfactory. Whether or no the individual recipient has been reasonably selected, the exercise in the charged atmosphere of a demonstration has proved to be confrontational and provocative - with the image of the law not helped by the recipient's inevitable face saving response of tearing up the document. Given the effective notoriety of the fact of an Order in Oxford, especially with protesters, personal service seems unnecessary and undesirable and in my Order I direct that it be dispensed with, save at the discretion of the University when at a location in the City of Oxford but outwith the exclusion zone.

Particular Topics

17. The Exclusion Zone. By way of this Order Grigson J. identified a so called exclusion zone. Within this area there was to be no protest activity save at a designated place on the further side of South Parks Road from the site and opposite to it. That permitted protest was limited to Thursdays - and then between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. As for the dimensions of the zone, from the site it extends westwards along South Parks Road for 50 metres and eastwards for some 40 metres. It further extends for some 55 metres down Mansfield Road. At each point of termination there is a line painted upon the pavement and at various points throughout its area copies of the Order of Grigson J. are posted.
18. In imposing this exclusion zone Grigson J. relied for authority upon a Court of Appeal decision, Burris v. Azadani (1995) 4 All E.R. 802. The nub of the decision appears in the judgment of Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. (as he then was) at page 810.

"Neither statute nor authority in my view precludes the making of an exclusion zone order. But that does not mean that such orders should be made at all readily, or without very good reason. There are two interests to be reconciled. One is that of the defendant. His liberty must be respected up to the point at which his conduct infringes, or threatens to infringe, the rights of the plaintiff. No restraint should be placed on him which is not judged to be necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff. But the plaintiff has an interest which the court must be astute to protect. The rule of law requires that those whose rights are infringed should seek the aid of the court, and respect for the legal process can only suffer if those who need protection fail to get it. That, in part at least, is why disobedience to order of the court has always earned severe punishment. Respect for the freedom of the aggressor should never lead the court to deny necessary protection to the victim.

Ordinarily, the victim will be adequately protected by an injunction which restrains the tort, which has been or is likely to be committed, whether trespass to the person or land, interference with goods, harassment, intimidation or as the case may be. But it may be clear on the facts that if the defendant approaches the vicinity of the plaintiff's home he will succumb to the temptation to enter it, or to abuse or harass the plaintiff, or that he may loiter outside the house, watching and besetting it, in a manner which might be highly stressful and disturbing to a plaintiff. In such a situation the court may properly judge that in the plaintiff's interest - and also, but indirectly, the defendant's - a wider measure of restraint is called for."

19. Turning to the future for this part of the Order, I start by recognising that the evidence to date is of loyal compliance - there have been no reported instances of protest within the zone, save as is permitted. That said, the three termination points (two in South Parks Road, one in Mansfield Road) have become venues for what is christened 'pop-up' protests: protesters assembling without prior warning at points immediately adjacent to the zone for ad hoc protests against the site, such being visible from each such location. Given that no constraint was imposed by Grigson J. over areas outside his exclusion zone, these further protests are uncontrolled as to day or time or duration.
20. For its part, the University considers that the zone is too small and before me there is an application for a substantial extension, all as appears from an appended Plan B. Perusal shows a proposed exclusion area measuring approximately 1,000 metres by 600 metres bounded by Holywell Street, Parks Road, Norham Gardens and the River Cherwell. Yet further, the University ask for an order restraining congregating, loitering or picketing within 100 yards of the boundary of this enlarged area. The justification advanced for any such enlargement relates to the University's concern to prevent protesters loitering at the edge of the existing zone with a view to monitoring the movements of site traffic as a prelude to identification and harassment of contractors and their employees.
21. Although this application for a Plan B was never withdrawn it was apparent before the end of oral submissions that it could no longer be forcefully advanced. As became obvious during my first view there were considerable advantages to the present exclusion zone that could not attach to that which the University proposed. Thus the present zone is compact, clearly designated, readily policed (as confirmed with the officer then accompanying me, Inspector Shepherd) and potentially sustainable by reference to the factors identified in Burris v. Azadani, op. cit. By contrast the proposed area was inordinately large, impossible readily to identify and owed nothing to the present issues save that everything within it was University property. The notion of a contiguous 100 yard buffer zone supplied an additional detraction. Finally, I failed to understand the purported justification. The concern of the University to preserve the anonymity of the contractors and their employees is obviously justified if harassment and intimidation is to be obviated but the relevance of any exclusion zone to this concern is far from self-evident. Whether the zone remains as it is or is in anyway extended nothing can restrain lawful use of South Parks Road, St. Cross Road and Mansfield Road as highways with concomitant opportunities to observe such vehicles as enter or leave the site. Whilst I offer no encouragement to monitoring, the fact and size of an exclusion zone is irrelevant to the practice such not amounting to demonstrating or protesting.
22. That said, I am satisfied that the present exclusion zone is too small and, still consonant with Burris v. Azadani guidelines, should be moderately increased in size. Thus, taking each termination point in turn:

a. The South Parks Road westward termination point has not been criticised in evidence to me and I see no reason why it should not stay as it is. True, a pop-up demonstration at that point can hardly fail to impact adversely upon local premises but in the event the complaints as evidenced before me have not emanated from such, possibly due to the allocation and siting of the relevant departments.

b. The South Parks Road eastward termination point is open to criticism. The siting and thus the concomitant venue for pop-up demonstrations are immediately outside the entrance to the Experimental Psychology Department that lies in the angle between South Parks Road and St. Cross Road. This is obviously unsatisfactory: a zone aimed to counter intimidation and harassment cannot be justified if its configuration invites angry assembles outside a public entrance. I am satisfied that the zone needs extending at this point so as to terminate well away from this entrance. As to where it should terminate I was initially attracted by the notion of an extension into St. Cross Road so as to terminate just beyond the block that contains this Department and, as I think, the Zoology Department. However a further site visit satisfied me that any such extension was unnecessary and unsatisfactory. A pop-up demonstration in St. Cross Road would lack a visible focus and, given relatively narrow pavements and a heavy traffic flow, would be potentially hazardous. In the result I have decided to extend the zone eastwards to a line immediately to the west of the traffic lights situate at the junction of South Parks Road and St. Cross Road. Any pop-up demonstration is thereby well removed from the entrance to the Departments and protesters may congregate in relative safety on the open space that is adventitiously on the north side of South Parks Road at a point just eastwards of the traffic lights - with the site visible.

c. The Mansfield Road termination point is similarly open to criticism. As marked on the pavement it is close to an entrance to the site and at my first view Inspector Shepherd voiced concern at the safety implications inherent in a pop-up demonstration taking part in relative proximity to vehicles negotiating the entry to the site, all within the confines of a fairly narrow road. The obvious answer is to extend the zone further south along the road - less obvious is the siting of an appropriate termination point. One concern is the presence of Mansfield College further along the road. The evidence before me includes a powerful statement from the Junior Dean, Mr. Scott Martyn, drawing attention to the adverse impact upon the College of pop-up demonstrations in the vicinity of its premises - haphazard outbursts of intimidatory noise and anger impacting upon the College and its student residents. The initial temptation was to extend the zone along the length of Mansfield Road but with some hesitation I concluded that that would be disproportionate and might encourage pop-up demonstrations in the obviously unsuitable Holywell Street area. Looking for the least unsatisfactory alternative in the course of my second view, I came to the conclusion that I should adopt what in effect was the submission of the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants (and, as I think, broadly that of the Claimants as an alternative to Plan B). Accordingly I extend the exclusion zone along Mansfield Road to a point that I fix as being at the Parking Ticket Machine that is upon the pavement beside the College Chapel. Any pop-up demonstration at this point has a focus and is removed from the College entrance and the student residential accommodation that abuts the road for a significant way to the junction with Savile Road.

23. On this topic I add the following. First, on Plan C as appended to this judgment I have identified the exclusion zone as now extended in accordance with the foregoing narrative. Second, consideration will no doubt be given to alterations to the obviously useful pavement markings and to posting copies of the now different Order. Third, it must not be thought from the foregoing that I am seeking to facilitate, still less advocate pop-up demonstrations. I have simply to take them into account as do the Police: they occur, they are not unlawful, and their occurrence necessarily impacts upon the efficiency of an exclusion zone. Whether they should take place is entirely a matter for the protesters, hopefully mindful of the potential for adverse reactions as amply evidenced before me. Fourth and finally, the exercise that Grigson J. and I respectively engage in has an inevitable trial and error element: I urge future review of my present decisions.
24. Noise In and Adjacent To the Exclusion Zone. The locus of the Thursday protest as authorised by Grigson J. has disadvantages. True, it is immediately opposite to the main entrance to the site and at the designated point there is room for protesters (who usually number 30 or less) to stand in safety, but between the protesters and the site there is the frequently busy road, the site itself is surrounded by high walls and immediately to the rear of the protesters are various laboratories and departments inevitably containing research scientists and other persons at work during the relevant Thursday hours. The Order designating this protest point said nothing about noise. Thus, protests were always noisy - and particularly so after the resumption of work at the site in the Autumn of 2005. Fuelled by anger, frustration and, on occasion, irresponsibility some protests were very noisy indeed featuring the use of megaphones to propagate chanting and abuse, supplemented with sirens and drums. At the first hearing I was shown the problem at its worst as depicted by way of a composite DVD. In my first judgment I described the viewing as 'daunting' and it was. Not surprisingly, this sort of conduct extending up to four hours on each Thursday excited many complaints from those trying to work in rooms in adjacent buildings. For the hearing before Calvert Smith J. the DVD was supplemented by witness statements provided by witnesses B, C, D, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M. Each such witness works in a building within which the Thursday protest is audible; each complains in very strong terms of the repetitive exposure to mindless and often offensive noise at times when attention is or should be directed at teaching or scientific research. The witnesses were identified by letter only because each professed fear of the consequences were he or she identified as a critic of the protest.
25. In the event Calvert Smith J. reacted to the evidence by restraining Respondents to his Order from, inter alia, "using any megaphone, klaxon, siren, whistle, drum, noise amplification device or any other instrument or other appliance used or capable of being used to generate noise within the exclusion zone ... or anywhere else in South Parks Road, Mansfield Road or St. Cross Road, Oxford".
26. Before me in April it was submitted that this had been ordered without benefit of inter parties argument and that it was too draconian. A particular point was made about the use of a megaphone wherein to convey the protesters' message across a busy road and I relented so as to permit the use of a megaphone at the Thursday protest between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. I banned use of all other devices but only within the exclusion zone
27. For the hearing before me of the 18^th May further anonymous witness statements stemming from O, P, Q, R, S, T, U and V were put before me. Again, these were research scientists and other persons seeking to work within earshot of the Thursday protests. The recurring theme was to the effect that Calvert Smith J. had provided blessed relief, that I had permitted the situation noticeably to deteriorate and that there was a deep concern lest I should be prevailed upon to relax still further what had been the March Order.
28. The present case for the Claimants is to the effect that I should restore the March Order; the Defendants' reluctant response is that I should continue my own earlier order. In the event my decision is to ban all noise amplification devices within the exclusion zone, along Mansfield Road and along St. Cross Road, save on the occasion of a lawful peaceful assembly conducted in compliance with sections 11, 12, and 14 Public Order Act 1986. In reaching this decision I have sought to make an order proportionate to the problem and the respective interests. The following call for particular mention as bearing upon this decision:

a. The focus of a Thursday protest is presumably the site and those then on it. Leave aside the obvious fact that all the latter are only too well aware of the views of the protesters, the physical set up is such that they are presumably impervious to the noise of the protest. That noise has to surmount a busy road, penetrate the walls around the site and impact upon men who are in all probability themselves engaged in necessarily noisy activities. As a tool to convey a protest message to these persons the megaphone has no obvious role.

b. And following in from a., the practical effect of the use of a megaphone is to address persons in the adjoining laboratories and departments. The alleged impact forcefully appears from the anonymised witness statements. Dr. Gastone urged me to be cautious before attaching weight to them. He suggests that anonymity undermined the value and surmised that some at least might be motivated by hostility to the protest movement. He speculated that the University might be pressurising employees into complaining. All these points weigh in the balance but not, as I think, to any great effect. I have no difficulty at all in accepting the barely tolerable effect of loud, repetitive, essentially mindless chanting and abuse recurring week after week, all directed not at those who can hear it but at those out of earshot. I have no difficulty in accepting that this impacts upon concentrated intellectual activity - were I now within close earshot of megaphone boosted protest I could not possibly write this judgment. I cannot think that individual views as to the merits of the protest have any particular relevance - save that there is some indication that with the passage of time exposure to the noise of the protest is serving to alienate people from its aims. Witness L merits citation at this point. From a point 30 metres from the site: "While I believe the shouts are aimed at the builders and those involved in animal experimentation, because the noise is so loud, intrusive and intimidating it feels as if the Protesters are shouting at me personally. I feel that I am being bullied by them - it makes me angry, unhappy and extremely tense." It is further to be noted that this witness is professedly anti-vivisectionist and fundamentally sympathetic to the protest.

c. All this would not necessarily invite a return to the March position, but it is at this stage that I bring to mind the fact that those complaining have had to put up with amplified protest noise for at least eighteen months - and that there is currently no obvious end to exposure. It is this factor, coupled with the more recent statements that has made me go back on my interim position to the extent that that permitted megaphone use on Thursdays between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. If the protests had a short, finite future life then I would adhere to the view that a balance of interests could be reconciled with a hour of weekly use. But, as I now remind myself, there is no obvious end anywhere in sight. In those circumstances I think now I was wrong so to vary the Order of Calvert Smith J: I was not just permitting megaphone use on hourly occasions over a few weeks or months but effectively indefinitely - and that in retrospect I cannot now justify.

d. As should be apparent, I have sought to give proper weight to the Defendants' position: the Thursday protest is lawful - how can we effectively register our views without some use of a megaphone so as to be heard over the noise of the traffic? My response reflects my assessment of the balance of interests as between the protesters' concern to advance a message and the impact after a prolonged period of time upon the captive audience going about their lawful business in the adjoining buildings. I may add that I am far from persuaded that in the particular circumstances of this protest amplified noise is a desirable adjunct - the alienation evident from the statements is hardly surprising. As was pointed out to me, what is essential for a repetitive protest is visibility. With that amply apparent between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. each Thursday, does noise amplification add or detract?

e. I turn to the extension of the injunction against noise to St. Cross Road. Here my concern is with the potential for amplified noise from a pop-up demonstration. With the new termination point such a demonstration can impact upon the occupants of the Experimental Psychology Department and the buildings on the opposite side of South Parks Road with a force similar to that arising from protest at the designated point - and there is no control over frequency and duration. I am satisfied that I am justified in extending noise control into St. Cross Road. I was initially tempted to extend the control to a point, say, 100 metres down this road but I can see no practical advantage to anybody. Given that St. Cross Road itself provides little incitement for protest once away from the Science Area it seems to be advantageous to have a simple ban on noise amplification over the whole length of this road.

f. With respect to Mansfield Road my reasoning is similar, adding a compassion for problems of Mansfield College as appear from Mr. Martyn's witness statement.

g. This leaves so much of South Parks Road as extends westwards from the exclusion zone. Here the balance favours the protesters. I am struck by the fact that there is no clear evidence before me evincing complaint at the impact of pop-up demonstrations in this area. It follows, as I think, that my ban on noise amplification cannot presently be justified over the balance of South Parks Road to the extent that such impacts on the use of a megaphone and this my Order will reflect. I hastened to add, first, I am not encouraging pop-up demonstrations in this area, still less am I encouraging the use of such of a megaphone. What I am seeking to do is to react to the state of the evidence before me. If future use of a megaphone prompts complaints in this area then a variation will no doubt be sought.

29. 29 Numbers. By way of his Order Grigson J. permitted up to 50 people to congregate at the designated point for a Thursday protest. By way of its present application the Claimants seek to have this number reduced to 12. However no submissions were advanced to me in support of this drastic reduction and I can discern no justification through perusal of the evidence. Indeed the only relevant evidence is to the effect that it is rare, if ever, that as many as 50 people assemble. This part of the original Order stands.
30. Processions. By way of their Application Notice the University distinguish from all the foregoing, protest by way of a peaceful procession or assembly conducted not more than once a month and compliant with sections 11, 12 and 14 Public Order Act 1986. Before me no issue was raised on this topic and accordingly I make appropriate provision in my Order. I comment as follows:

a. Save for requirements that any such procession or assembly shall be peaceful and that it should be compliant with the requirements of the Public Order Act 1986, I am deliberately leaving the balance to the Police, anticipating, as has now been established, good liaison with SPEAK. The latest such procession, that of the 22^nd April 2006, took place successfully without Court intervention and I see no reason to anticipate any further concern so as to require a more sophisticated order from me.

b. By way of the witness statements there are complaints about the potentially disruptive impact of any such procession upon ongoing academic activities. I am sympathetic but I do not see a resultant basis for interference with arrangements otherwise to be made between SPEAK and the Police. It seems reasonable to assume that in the event processions will not take place at monthly intervals (there have been two so far this year), that the University can make representations to the Police about routes and that compassion for those adversely affected is at least a recurring factor for consideration. More than that, I have nothing to say on the topic.

c. Finally for sake of clarity: there is no restraint now imposed by this Court with respect to a permitted procession in terms of noise or route. For its limited purpose and duration a peaceful, lawful procession may enter the exclusion zone.

31. Protected Persons - Publication. The Claimants seek and are obviously entitled to a restraint upon publication of material serving to identify a person protected by the proposed Order. Concern was expressed by the Third Defendants, Mr. Cogswell about a possible ramification. The protest campaigned has prompted a pro-vivisectionist campaign the leaders of which (respectively Protected Persons as identified in the proposed Order) have not only identified themselves but have advanced their views in the media. Mr. Cogswell wishes to be free to make a media response and to report upon the exchange of views to his fellow protesters. He is concerned that as originally drafted the restraint would inhibit him from identifying his media opponent. Whilst his concern is more theoretical than real (I like to think that the Claimants would feel inhibited from initiating contempt proceedings in such circumstances), I have taken his point and I have sought to deal with it by way of a proviso. Essentially once a Protected Person waives anonymity for media purposes I can see no reason to inhibit a media response that refers to that person by name. Of course, this is not a green light for publishing such personal details as will result in that person being targeted for intimidation purposes.
32. Photographs. On the 6^th March 2006 Calvert Smith J. on ex parte application restrained protesters from "using any video camera or camera (including a camera on a mobile phone) within the exclusion zone ...". Before me the Defendants challenged the need for any such Order. They accept the Claimants' understandable concern to inhibit the use of a camera as an aid to identifying Protected Persons and their vehicles (with particular reference to those coming and going to and from the site) but query the width of this Order. They point to the use of camera within the site by the Police and by pro-vivisectionists and contend that they should be able to make their own photographic record of any untoward incident in the course of a protest. With some hesitation I think that the application to set aside is well founded. Whilst the Claimants have reason to seek to restrain the use of a camera as an aide to identification I think that that can be dealt with by an order specific to the problem instead by a wide all embracing order. Manifestly if my Order proves inadequate there is then a good basis to reinstate the Order of 6^th March - the necessary evidence will then be to hand.
33. Undertakings. The First and Third Defendants escaped the impact of the Order of Grigson J. by offering him undertakings which were accepted. They make a similar offer to me. The Claimants have no grounds for objection with respect to the Third Defendant; they do object with respect to the First Defendant in circumstances discussed in my earlier judgment. With some hesitation in the case of the latter Defendant I am content to accept undertakings providing that such adequately reflect the restraints imposed by the Order. It helps nobody to have any major discrepancy. In the event my draft Order sets out the undertakings that I would expect - I remain open to further submissions but room for flexibility is limited.
34. Mr. Gratwick. I was courteously addressed by this supporter of the protest. He is concerned about the legality of any restraint and he urged close attendance to the guidance given in Burns v. Azadani, op. cite. I was grateful for his submissions. I remind myself that I am being asked to provide restraint that is interim not final. I have no doubt (along with Grigson J.) that it is appropriate to make an interim order which, as I agree, threatens to impact upon Mr. Gratwick as a Respondent. It will be for him at trial to address, if he wishes, the basis for this and for any final Order. In the meantime if he wishes to join the First and Third Defendants in offering the Court an undertaking then I expect to be able to accept it.

Generally

35. When Superintendent Shead of the Thames Valley Police helpfully gave oral evidence before me it was put to him by the 2^nd Defendant, Mr. Curtin, that the protest in Oxford had been 'copybook' in character. Not surprisingly, he did not get a positive response, but the question did draw attention to the fact of commendable features that currently characterise the Oxford protest. Thus, overall there has been conscious effort on the part of protesters to understand and heed Court orders. Then those protesters who have appeared before me have been courteous and, so far as their principles allow, helpful and commanding of my respect Again, there is good evidence that co-operation with the Police is growing on the basis of mutual trust and all can pay tribute to the Force's determination to act even-handedly. None of this gainsays the fact of a serious ongoing problem for those identified in my Order as Protected Persons arising out of the activities actual or threatened of the extremists - not least because the scope for curtailment by way of any Order is modest, the area being essentially one for the Police and particularly those concerned with serious organised crime. That said, it is important to accord respect and understanding where such are due so that distinctions can be made where they should be made.
36. The other point finally to be made amounts to a reiteration of an earlier passing observation. An Order that reflects a balancing of competing interests on the basis of current evidence inevitably needs subsequent re-consideration from time to time in the light of experience and future developments. I urge such.
37. I thank all the parties for the help given to me; and I thank Inspector Shepherd and Superintendent Shead for their assistance. I would ask that a copy of this judgment and my Order be forwarded to the Superintendent.