QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Marian Davis (Widow and Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Davis deceased) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Stena Line Limited |
Defendant |
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Michael Tillett Q.C. and Derek O'Sullivan (instructed by Eversheds LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 29th and 30th November and 3rd December 2004
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Forbes:
""carriage" covers the following periods
(a) with regard to the passenger and his cabin luggage, the period during which the passenger and/or his cabin luggage are on board the ship or in the course of embarkation or disembarkation "
"1. The carrier shall be liable for the damage suffered as a result of the death of or personal injury to a passenger if the incident which caused the damage so suffered occurred in the course of the carriage and was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier or of his servants or agents acting within the scope of their employment.
2. The burden of proving that the incident which caused the loss or damage occurred in the course of carriage, and the extent of the loss or damage, shall lie with the claimant.
3. Fault or neglect of the carrier shall be presumed [in circumstances that do not apply in this case]. In all other cases the burden of proving fault or neglect shall lie with the claimant."
"We have reviewed the applicability of the Athens Convention. We have instructions to confirm that our client admits and agrees the contention in paragraph 10 of your Defence, that notwithstanding that Mr Davis died in the sea, it was still the case that his death occurred during the course of carriage within the meaning of the Convention.
In the premises we confirm that our client's claim is pursued under article 3 of the Convention, and is subject to the provisions of the Convention, and that, accordingly, your client will be entitled to limit its liability pursuant to Article 7."
"If the carrier proves that the death or personal injury to a passenger was caused or contributed to by the fault or neglect of the passenger, the court seized of the case may exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability in accordance with the provisions of the law of that court."
" I must tell you what in law we mean by "negligence." In the ordinary case which does not involve any special skill, negligence in law means a failure to do some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances would do, or the doing of some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances would not do; and if that failure or the doing of that act results in injury, then there is a cause of action. How do you test whether this act or failure is negligent? In an ordinary case it is generally said you judge it by the action of the man in the street. He is the ordinary man. In one case it has been said you judge it by the conduct of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus. He is the ordinary man. But where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been some negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art".
"In his opening submissions, Mr Eder advanced the following principles which he contended applied in the present case:
(1) The standard of skill and care to be exercised by a member of a professional calling is the degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by reasonably competent members of that profession or calling.
(2) The existence of a common practice over an extended period of time by persons habitually engaged in particular business is strong evidence of what constitutes the exercise of reasonable skill and care.
(3) In situations which call for the exercise of judgment, the fact that, in retrospect, the choice actually made can be shown to have turned out badly is not of itself proof of a failure to meet the necessary standard of care.
(4) The plaintiffs cannot show a failure to meet the required standard of skill and care unless the error on the part of the underwriter was such that (no) reasonably well informed and competent member of the profession or calling could have made it.
I accept each of these propositions. They merit, however a degree of elaboration. The first proposition does not remove from the Judge the determination of the standard of skill and care that ought properly to be demonstrated. As the authors of Jackson and Powell on Professional Negligence point out at p. 39:
It is for the Court to decide what is meant by "reasonably competent" members of the profession. They may or may not be equated with practitioners of average competence Suppose a profession collectively adopts extremely lax standards in some aspect of its work. The Court does not regard itself as bound by those standards and will not acquit practitioners of negligence simply because they have complied with those standards.
The fourth proposition is based on a passage of the speech of Lord Diplock in Saif Ali ~v~ Sidney Mitchell (1980) AC 198 at p. 220:
No matter what profession it may be, the common law does not impose on those who practice it any liability for damage resulting from what in the result turn out to have been errors of judgment, unless the error was such as no reasonably well informed and competent member of that profession could have made. So too the common law makes allowance for the difficulties in the circumstances in which professional judgments have to be made and acted upon.
This passage was dealing essentially with the question of judgment. The plaintiffs' case is not that errors of judgment were made, but that judgment was not exercised at all in that the underwriters never acquired the data on which that judgment might have been based."
"Merely to describe something as an error of judgment tells us nothing about whether it is negligent or not. The true position is that an error of judgment may, or may not, be negligent; it depends on the nature of the error. If it is one that would not have been made by a reasonably competent professional man professing to have the standard and type of skill that the defendant held himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care, then it is negligent. If on the other hand, it is an error that such a man, acting with ordinary care, might have made, then it is not negligent."
As Mr Kverndal observed, not every error of judgment will constitute negligence, but many errors of judgment will and for a defendant to rely on a "mere error of judgment" type of defence, he must show that he actually did exercise some judgment: see Gooda Walker (supra).
"Experts overriding duty to the court
(1) It is the duty of an expert to help the court on the matters within his expertise.
(2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid."
"(9) Payments contingent upon the outcome of a case, must not be offered or accepted. To do so would contravene the expert's overriding duty to the court."
"4. The court has disapproved of arrangements whereby expert witnesses are instructed to provide a report on a contingency basis. It is possible (subject to prior agreement ) to delay paying an expert until the case has concluded, but the fee must not be calculated dependent upon the outcome."
"70. Expert evidence comes in many forms and in relation to many different types of issue. It is always desirable that an expert should have no actual or apparent interest in the outcome of the proceedings in which he gives evidence, but such disinterest is not automatically a precondition to the admissibility of his evidence. Where an expert has an interest of one kind or another in the outcome of the case, this fact should be made known to the court as soon as possible. The question of whether the proposed expert should be permitted to give evidence should then be determined in the course of case management. In considering that question the judge will have to weigh the alternative choices open if the expert's evidence is excluded, having regard to the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules.
72. Clearly, [in his judgment in Hamilton ~v~ Al Fayed (No 2)] Chadwick LJ did not contemplate any legal bar to experts providing their services on a conditional fee basis and it is correct that such a course can assist access to justice. But the expert will often be in a position to influence the course of the litigation in a manner in which the funder, or even the lawyer conducting the litigation, will not.
73. To give evidence on a contingency fee basis gives an expert, who would otherwise be independent, a significant financial interest in the outcome of the case. As a general proposition, such an interest is highly undesirable. In many cases the expert will be giving an authoritative opinion on issues that are critical to the outcome of the case. In such a situation the threat to his objectivity posed by a contingency fee agreement may carry greater dangers to the administration of justice than would the interest of an advocate or solicitor acting under a similar agreement. Accordingly, we consider that it will be in a very rare case indeed that the court will be prepared to consent to an expert being instructed under a contingency fee agreement."
"I would be obliged if you could advise me on a matter that came up while dining with an acquaintance last evening? He does quite a lot of medico-legal work, in the psychiatric area, and is certainly much more experienced than I am, or ever likely to be. On asking him whether he had ever been involved in a "no-win, no-fee" type of case, he informed me that it is not possible to be "expert witness" on such a basis. It would be contrary to the principles of the Practice Direction for expert witnesses to provide evidence in a case which one's fees for work undertaken were dependent on winning a case. Doing so would nullify one's neutrality so to speak.
While I have given my opinion on the KB case honestly and without favour or bias, it could be construed that I had a vested interest in the outcome and hence not a witness to the court but to the claimant. I can foresee Counsel for the defence making this point and nullifying my evidence.
Is there any precedence for this? Can you advise?"
"12. I can only apologise to the court for the fact that I had not been alive to this point earlier. As indicated above, and in my letter to Eversheds of 12 November 2004, it was simply due to ignorance on my part as to the rules relating to CFAs. I accept that I should have looked into this at an earlier stage, but I did not do so. That I did not was, I suppose, in large part because it never occurred to me that respected experts such as Dr Golden and LOC would do anything other than provide evidence, fully in accordance with their duty to the court, in a fully independent way.
13. When Dr Golden raised the issue, I then looked into the issue. It seemed to me, following discussions with leading counsel, that the best way to deal with the matter was for the experts to enter into deferred fee agreements with Mrs Davies (sic).
14. By so doing, Mrs Davies (sic) would be liable for their fees in full, but the liability to pay would not crystallise until after the conclusion of the case.
15. I spoke to Mrs Davies (sic) and she confirmed that she was happy for me to enter into such agreements
16. I went back to LOC and Dr Golden, and they both agreed that they were content to enter into such agreements.
17. Copies of the letters recording the agreements are (exhibited hereto).
18. The Defendant has interpreted those 12 June 2004 (sic) letters as meaning that there was a confirmation of an agreement to act on a no win no fee basis. That is simply incorrect. The agreement was and is to act on a deferred fee payment basis liability to pay is not conditional on the result.
19. In relation to dates, the agreement with LOC pre-dates Capt Jubb's report. The agreement with Dr Golden post-dates his first report, but he indicated to James Cradick on 18 May 2004 that he was happy to enter into a deferred fee agreement. So, by the date of both reports the previous discussions about "no win no fee" agreements had been superseded and both experts had agreed to work pursuant to a deferred fee agreement.
20. The effect of the deferred fee agreement is that Mrs Davies (sic) will be liable in full for the experts' fees whatever the outcome of the case, and the quantum of those fees does not depend in any way on the outcome of the case."
"Further to the instructions hitherto given to you in this matter, we should like to confirm in writing the basis on which you have been instructed and have agreed to be paid your fees.
Whilst your instructions have come from this firm and although we are happy for you to render your fee notes to this firm as agent for the Claimant, our client remains responsible for the payment of your fees. In view of the financial position of our client we understand that you would be prepared to work on this matter without submitting interim invoices and instead any fee note will be submitted at the conclusion of the case.
In order that we may formalise this arrangement we would be grateful if you would sign and date this letter confirming your agreement."
"Three passengers had been dining in the cafι located on the aft part of deck 7 and decided to go outside for a smoke. After about 5 minutes, one of them noticed an object in the water outboard and to port of the wake astern of the vessel. He looked closer and realised that it was a man. He pointed him out to his friends and they could clearly see the man spinning around in the water drawing further astern. The passenger then went back into the cafι on deck 7 and told the nearest crew member he could find, who was working on the till. The crew member went to the outside deck with the passenger; however, he was unable to see the man in the water because he was, by then, well astern of the vessel. The other two passengers verified to the crew member that they had seen someone in the water. The crew member returned to the cafι and told his supervisor what had been reported. His supervisor told him to inform the bridge. The crew member telephoned the bridge and told the second officer that a passenger had reported seeing someone in the water. The time was 1145."
"Chapter 3: Sea Operations
3.9 MAN OVERBOARD
3.9.1 The procedure for man overboard differs depending on whether the man was observed to fall over or if he is missed and after a subsequent search is not found and assumed to have gone overboard.
3.9.2 If the man has been observed to fall over the following procedure should be followed:-
3.9.2.1 Action by the Officer of the Watch:-
(1) Rudder hard over to swing the stern away from the person
(2) Release bridge wing lifebuoy on the side the person has fallen over. NB make sure the buoy actually goes in the water and does not hang from the light/smoke float which might not have released from its bracket.
(3) Press "Auto WP/"Event" on GPS unit. Note WP number,
(4) Sound Man Overboard signal (Accident Boat signal THREE LONG BLASTS on the whistle and alarm. Announce on PA "Accident Boat Crew close up".
(5) Commence "Williamson Turn"
(6) Put the main engines at Stand By and inform the machinery control room. Reduce pitch on combinators to "Full Manoeuvring".
(7) Post two lookouts with binoculars.
(8) Plot position of ship relative to person overboard. (Auto WP/Event position).
(9) Hoist Interco flag "O" if near shipping traffic. Display NUC lights at night.
3.9.2.2 Action by the Ship's Company
(1) Muster at Accident Boat stations, Accident Boat crew wearing protective clothing, lifejackets
(2) Accident boat party prepare accident boat.
(3) Machinery party to Machinery Control Room.
(4) First Aid Party to provide stretcher.
(5) The Master will take charge when he arrives on the bridge and manoeuvre the ship as required.
(6) Nearby shipping alerted by VHF.
(7) "PAN" message sent if required.
(8) When the Accident Boat is prepared for launching 120 fathoms gantline attached to a lifebuoy with a spare smoke float can be towed astern. In rough weather or darkness the ship can be manoeuvred such that the trailing line will form an arc in which the man overboard can be gathered and on to which he can hold until recovered by boat or winched into the ship.
(9) If possible a pilot ladder and gangway net should be placed over the lee side with manropes. If necessary the person overboard can be recovered up the ship's side using the pilot ladder and gangway net. Men wearing lifejackets and on lifelines must be prepared to go over the side on the ladder and net to assist the person in the water."
"Mr Kverndal. I think we know from Captain Williams' evidence that no plan was devised or thought out as to the retrieval until the man overboard was seen by the bridge team. Do you recall that?
Captain Beetham. Correct, yes
Q. If you find him alive, you want to be prepared for that eventuality?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Some advanced thinking as to how you might be able to rescue him.
A. Yes.
Q. There was not, was there?
A. No. There was not anything planned for it at that point.
Q. That really was not satisfactory, was it?
A. It could have been done better, yes.
Q. One would expect a reasonable and prudent master mariner to have made some preparations as to how you might rescue in the event of finding.
A. Yes."
"40. After we had actually spotted Mr Davis the discussions on the bridge turned to how we were going to actually rescue Mr Davis. Bob Weale and I quickly discounted the possibility of launching a rescue boat we thought that it was just far too dangerous to launch a boat from the side of the vessel in the prevailing weather conditions.
42. We therefore considered what other options there were. We considered the only viable option was to attempt to recover Mr Davis through the bunker door. This meant getting a line to Mr Davis and guiding him along the side of the vessel to the bunker door where we hoped to be able to manhandle him up into the vessel using a rope ladder. We did not consider that there was any other viable alternative (such as opening the bow doors or one of the stern doors)."
"Mr Kverndal: And I suggest to you that there was quite a high risk of a real catastrophe if crewmen tried to effect a retrieval through bunker doors in the sort of circumstances that prevailed on 29th October 2000.
Captain Beetham: There could have been.Mr Justice Forbes: Do you agree?
Captain Beetham: There could have been, yes.
Mr Kverndal: There could have been a catastrophe.
A. Yes.
Q. And if Captain Halanen had carried out a risk assessment of rescuing a man overboard through the only means available to the ferry, namely through the bunker door, he should have come to the same conclusion as you, should he not, that there was a potential catastrophe if this method were tried?
A. Yes.
Q. And he should have warned his masters that they should under no circumstances attempt such a retrieval method?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And he should have told them the reason why they should under no circumstances attempt such a retrieval method: because it could be catastrophic?
A. I think they would know that, but I think an explanation is always helpful.
Q. And he should have given proper instructions, training and procedures which would warn the masters of his ships about this?
A. Yes. I think you are duplicating the bit with instructions and procedures.
Q. One way or another, he should have made it very clear to the masters of his ships that this was a potentially catastrophic retrieval method?
A. Could be, yes.
Q. But in the circumstances of this case, no reasonable and prudent master should ever have attempted to retrieve through the bunker door, should he?
A. No.
Q. Thank you.
Q. I was just going to suggest that the thrust of Captain Halanen's evidence is that he left all these matters to the discretion of the master.
A. Yes.
Q. You will remember that. In the light of what you have just been telling the court, that was wrong, was it not?
A. He should have been given guidance.
Q. And the failure to give guidance meant that Stena failed to meet the standards, which one would expect of a reasonable and prudent ship owner?
A. No. At that time, they were doing what all the ship owners did."
"As this Inquiry has proceeded, I have become more and more convinced of the importance of risk assessment as the correct approach to questions of maritime safety, both generally and in the context of the Thames. The purpose of risk assessment is to try to assess relevant risks in advance so that appropriate steps can be taken to put measures in place to eliminate or minimise them. It contrasts starkly with the historical approach which involved waiting until a casualty occurred before trying to learn lessons from it and improving, say methods of design, construction, equipment or operation of ships Such an approach is surely no longer acceptable. That lesson has been learned much more quickly in the non-maritime field. The evidence which I have seen suggests that it is gradually being learned in the maritime field, albeit somewhat slowly."
"3.9.2.2 Action by the Ship's Company
(1) The Master will take charge when he arrives on the bridge and manoeuvre the ship as required.
(2) Working Party muster on the bridge.
(12) If for any reason the rescue boat cannot be launched the Master should consider other means of recovery. The most efficacious means may be by helicopter or RNLI lifeboat. It is essential that the Coastguard is advised of this at an early stage of the operation.
(13) Where possible a lifebuoy, lifejacket, rocket line with flotation device or any other means to assist flotation should be thrown to the person in the water to enable him to remain afloat pending the arrival of the helicopter or lifeboat."
"The pilot's door was opened. The scale of our task was immediately apparent because the door was approximately 10 feet above the waterline, there was belting around the ship (which would prove an obstacle to manhandling anyone on board) and the sea was very rough. Furthermore, the doorway was only wide enough for one man to stand in the doorway at once and there was generally little room for manoeuvre because of the design of the ship. There was clearly no time to rig a block and tackle to winch the casualty on board. The only way we could get the casualty on board would have been for a member of the crew to don an immersion suit, climb down the pilot ladder and attempt to pull the casualty back on board."
"13. Crossing the bow.
In the prevailing conditions the manoeuvring of the vessel without any fixed reference would be extremely difficult.
We agree that the man overboard came too close to the starboard bow, necessitating the shut down of the bow thrusters. The vessel was probably moving astern and took an uncontrollable swing to starboard, bringing the man overboard across to the port bow.
MJJ and EHB agree that the likelihood of contact with the bow is remote."
(1) Mr Davis was first spotted from the Koningin Beatrix at about 1229 at a distance of about 350 to 400 metres from the ship. Shortly afterwards, at about 1232, the Koningin Beatrix started to turn 90... to starboard.
(2) Mr Davis was about 4 or 5 points (perhaps even more) off the starboard bow both before and in the very early stages of the vessel's 90... turn to starboard. He was in good condition, treading water, riding the waves and, from time to time, waving either one or both arms.
(3) The effect of the Koningin Beatrix's 90... turn to starboard was to bring Mr Davis much finer on to the starboard bow.
(4) The Koningin Beatrix still had considerable way on and Mr Davis passed down the starboard side going aft of the beam, close enough for a crew-member (Emyr Williams) to shout encouragement down to him. A report reached the bridge that the man overboard was "astern" or "by the stern". Mr Lewis wrote this down on a scrap of paper and it was eventually recorded in the log.
(5) By this stage the Koningin Beatrix had been put astern, with the result that Mr Davis moved back up the starboard side until he disappeared from view under the flare of the bow. He was then off the starboard bow and very close to it. He was still in good condition when he passed out of view.
(6) At 1234 the Koningin Beatrix signalled, "We are preparing to open pilot door to try and assist Celtic King preparing to launch lifeboat".
(7) As Mr Davis disappeared from view under the flare of and because of his extreme proximity to the bow, Captain Williams "zeroed" the bow thrusters. Unfortunately, this resulted in an uncontrollable swing of the bow to starboard as the wind took full effect on it. At 1238 the Koningin Beatrix signalled, "Have lost sight of casualty right underneath our bow Trying to get line to him now".
(8) As a result of the bow swinging over and past him, Mr Davis appeared to have moved from the starboard to the port side. When he did come into view on the port side, Mr Davis was face down in the water and apparently lifeless.
(9) Once it became apparent that Mr Davis was lifeless, Captain Ganderton decided that he was no longer prepared to risk his crew by launching the Celtic King's fast rescue boat and, at 1242, the Celtic King signalled "Not prepared to risk my men".
"SECTION 4 RECOMMENDATIONS
Stena Line is recommended to:
2. Amend its company standing orders and operational procedures manual, sections 3.9.2.1 and 3.9.2.2 to include more detailed procedures to be taken in the event of a man overboard in conditions which do not allow the lowering of a rescue boat.
7. Undertake a written risk assessment regarding the use of the fast rescue boat and rescue boats in adverse weather conditions."