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England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Chanel Ltd v Skeens [2025] EWHC 619 (KB) (14 March 2025)
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Cite as: [2025] EWHC 619 (KB)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 619 (KB)
Case No: KB-2024-002470

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
14 March 2025

B e f o r e :

: MR JUSTICE SWEETING
____________________

Between:
Chanel Limited Claimant/Applicant
- and -
Charlotte Skeens Defendant/Respondent

____________________

Judgment on Application for Interim Injunctive Relief 14 March 2025
____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION FOR INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 14 MARCH 2025
HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    Mr Justice Sweeting:

  1. This is an application by Chanel Limited ("Chanel") for an interim injunction against Charlotte Skeens (Ms Skeens). The application arises from concerns that she has breached undertakings given to the Court in a Consent Order dated 5 March 2025, as well as the terms of a "New Settlement Agreement" of the same date.
  2. Paragraph 1 of the Consent Order stays all other proceedings except for the purpose of enforcing Ms Skeen's undertakings. This application clearly falls within that exception, and I am satisfied that the stay should be lifted to allow this application to proceed.
  3. While the application is being made on short notice, Chanel took steps to notify Ms Skeens and she attended and appeared in person. I am satisfied that she has not been prejudiced by the shorter notice period. She gave a courteous and articulate explanation of her position in court, and I was provided with her witness statements and a skeleton argument.
  4. Chanel is a luxury brand operational holding company. Ms Skeens was formerly employed by Chanel in its Global Reward team. Her employment ended following a First Settlement Agreement dated 29 March 2022, which contained obligations of confidentiality and her agreement not to make derogatory statements about Chanel.
  5. In July 2024, Chanel became aware that Ms Skeens was posting on TikTok about Chanel, its group companies, and the "Chanel" brand under the alias "@Lottie.Liu", allegedly containing confidential and/or derogatory statements. This led to Chanel issuing proceedings and obtaining interim relief in August 2024, which was continued until judgment after trial.
  6. A trial was initially listed for December 2024 but was adjourned. Shortly before the relisted trial in March 2025, the parties reached settlement terms, recorded in a Consent Order and a New Settlement Agreement. In the Consent Order, Ms Skeens gave undertakings to the Court, including not to disclose Confidential Information (as defined in the order) and not to make derogatory statements concerning Chanel, subject to certain exceptions including protected disclosures under section 43A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.The Consent Order also contained a penal notice.
  7. On 7 March 2025, two days after the Consent Order was sealed, Ms Skeens posted a TikTok video (the "March TikTok"). Chanel contends that this post breaches the undertakings in the Consent Order by disclosing Confidential Information and making disparaging comments. Ms Skeens has suggested that she lacked capacity when the settlement terms were agreed, and that the information disclosed in the March TikTok constitutes a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996.
  8. Chanel seeks an interim injunction requiring Ms Skeens to take down the March TikTok and refrain from further publication of its contents or other confidential information concerning Chanel, as well as limited orders protecting confidential information within these proceedings.
  9. Although this case engages section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is nevertheless sensible to begin with the principles set out in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd. The first question is whether there is a serious question to be tried. Based on the evidence before the Court, including the undertakings given in the Consent Order and the content of the March TikTok, there appears to be a serious question as to whether Ms Skeens has breached her obligations to the Court and to Chanel. Ms Skeens's arguments regarding lack of capacity (if pursued) and protected disclosure will need to be fully examined at trial.
  10. The second question is whether damages would be an adequate remedy for Chanel if the injunction were not granted and it subsequently succeeds at trial, and conversely, whether damages would be an adequate remedy for Ms Skeens if the injunction were granted and she subsequently succeeds at trial. Chanel argues that the continued publication of confidential information and derogatory statements will cause irremediable harm to its reputation and brand, which would be very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in damages. Chanel highlights the potential damage in key markets.
  11. Ms Skeens's financial circumstances are unclear, but there is an indication that she may find it difficult to pay a substantial award of damages. Conversely, Chanel has offered a cross-undertaking in damages which it is plainly able to meet if required to do so. The restrictions sought by Chanel are primarily focused on the specific content alleged to be in breach of the Consent Order and the New Settlement Agreement. They would not prevent Ms Skeens from earning a living or posting on social media generally.
  12. The third question is where the balance of convenience lies. The potential harm to Chanel's reputation and business from the continued dissemination of the March TikTok and similar material appears significant and difficult to remedy with damages. While the injunction would restrict Ms Skeens's freedom of expression in this specific area, this must be balanced against her prior agreement to the Consent Order and the need to uphold undertakings given to the Court. The penal notice attached to the Consent Order, indicates the seriousness with which breaches of its terms are viewed.
  13. Ms. Skeens has suggested that the Consent Order was not valid for the following reasons:
  14. a. She claims she was still experiencing a miscarriage when she signed it.
    b. She also cited "a few other reasons" for believing it was not valid, although these are not specified in detail.
    c. She stated she was suffering from severe physical and emotional distress at the time.
    d. She felt she was not in a fit state to properly understand, assess, or consent to the terms of the agreement due to the miscarriage and distress.
    e. In a later communication, she explicitly stated she lacked capacity to make a rational decision due to her severe physical and emotional distress, which she claimed her doctor or Approved Mental Health Professional would confirm.
  15. It is important to note that while Ms. Skeens has raised these points now, the Good Law Project, were representing Ms. Skeens at the time. While the Good Law Project informed Mishcon de Reya about Ms. Skeens' recent miscarriage, they also expressly confirmed that she was of sound mind. Furthermore, at no point did the Good Law Project suggest that Ms. Skeens lacked mental capacity or that anything prevented them from obtaining proper instructions regarding the Consent Order and the New Settlement Agreement. I asked at the hearing whether the new agreement had been signed by Miss Skeens so that there was no issue that she consented to it.
  16. Mr De Silva, on behalf of Chanel, acknowledges that Miss Skeens has a right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Human Rights Act.
  17. However, this right is be balanced against Miss Skeens' contractual obligations under the First Settlement Agreement and the New Settlement Agreement, as well as her obligations to the Court through the undertakings in the Consent Order.
  18. Chanel contends that there is no public interest in the matters Miss Skeens is threatening to post about or otherwise publicise.
  19. While the interim injunction would restrict Ms Skeens's freedom of expression in the specific area of the March TikTok and related confidential information, this must be balanced against her prior agreement to the Consent Order and the need to uphold undertakings given to the Court.
  20. Decision on Protected Disclosure

  21. Miss Skeens has said that the March TikTok contains protected disclosures. She has referred to paragraph 4.a of the Tomlin Order (which she does not accept as valid), stating that it permits her to make a protected disclosure without specifying the channel.
  22. She states she made the TikTok post in good faith, believing all the comments to be protected disclosures relating to Chanel's unlawful conduct, which she felt needed to be exposed due to public interest in her doing so.
  23. For a disclosure to be protected under section 43G of the Employment Rights Act 1996, Ms Skeens must reasonably believe that the information disclosed and any allegation contained in it are substantially true, she must not make the disclosure for personal gain, one of the gateway conditions in section 43G(2) must be met, and it must be reasonable in all the circumstances to make the disclosure.
  24. On the issue of reasonable belief in the substantial truth of the allegations, while Ms Skeens made a complaint about her manager's conduct internally, the broad and systemic allegations made in the March TikTok Video appear to be a significant extrapolation from her earlier complaints. The hearsay evidence of other alleged witnesses coming forward, without further verification, does not at this stage satisfy me that she had a reasonable basis to believe the widespread allegations were substantially true.
  25. There is also evidence suggesting the disclosure may have been made for personal gain, given her previous statements about using publicity from legal action to gain followers and make money from podcasts and a book. The offer of Chanel handbags to those engaging with her posts further supports this inference.
  26. As for the gateway conditions in section 43G (2), Ms Skeens appears to rely on having previously raised the issue internally. However, the internal complaint related to specific comments by her manager, not the systemic issues alleged in the TikTok video. While Ms Skeens claims a fear of a cover-up, an independent investigation was conducted into her initial complaint. Furthermore, the existence of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) as a prescribed person under section 43F of the ERA provided an alternative avenue for disclosure. Ms Skeens told me that she had attempted to use this avenue and had been rebuffed but there was no evidence of this apart from her assertion.
  27. Finally, the reasonableness of making a public disclosure on social media to a potentially vast audience, rather than utilising other channels or prescribed persons, is questionable, especially in light of the confidentiality undertakings given to the Court.
  28. For a disclosure to be protected under section 43H, it must relate to an exceptionally serious failure, and it must be reasonable in all the circumstances to make the disclosure to the person to whom it was made. While the allegations are serious, at this interim stage, I am not persuaded that they meet the threshold of an exceptionally serious failure that would justify immediate public disclosure in this manner, particularly given the existence of other avenues for raising concerns.
  29. Decision on Interim Injunctive Relief

  30. I must consider Section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires me not to restrain publication before trial unless I am satisfied that Chanel is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. The Court of Appeal in ABC v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2329 held that while the general approach is that the applicant must show a probability of success at trial, a lower degree of likelihood may suffice where the adverse consequences of disclosure would be extremely serious.
  31. In this case, Chanel has demonstrated a likelihood of success at trial in establishing that Ms Skeens has breached her undertakings in the Consent Order. The March TikTok Video prima facie contains derogatory statements about Chanel and discloses information relating to alleged discreditable conduct and treatment of employees, which falls within the definition of Confidential Information in the Consent Order.
  32. The public policy reasons in favour of upholding obligations in settlement agreements, especially those embodied in undertakings to the Court made with the benefit of legal advice, carry significant weight. Ms Skeens entered into these undertakings with the benefit of legal representation from Good Law Project.
  33. Balancing Ms Skeens's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 with Chanel's right to protect its reputation and confidential information, and the need to uphold court orders, I am of the view that the potential harm to Chanel's reputation and business from the continued publication of the March TikTok Video is significant. This includes potential damage to relationships with customers, employees, and other stakeholders. Quantifying this damage would be very difficult.
  34. Therefore, I am satisfied that Chanel has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success at trial to warrant the grant of interim prohibitory injunctive relief.
  35. Decision on Mandatory Injunction

  36. I am also persuaded that a mandatory injunction requiring Ms Skeens to take down the March TikTok Video is appropriate at this stage. Given the number of views the video has already received (over 17,300 within a week and now in the order of 146,000 in the last few days) and the potentially damaging nature of its content, leaving it online until a return date hearing would exacerbate the harm to Chanel. The fact that it is her own TikTok account which has received this accelerating number of views suggests that there would be a purpose in the order sought and that it would not be, as she argued, futile at this stage. Taking down the post is not a permanent step, and Ms Skeens can re-upload it if she is successful at a later hearing. On balance, the risk of injustice to Chanel if the video remains public outweighs the potential risk to Ms Skeens from its temporary removal. I therefore have a sufficiently high degree of assurance that Chanel will establish its right to this relief at trial to justify a mandatory order at this interim stage.
  37. Decision on Confidentiality of Hearing Papers

  38. Chanel has requested that confidential information, including screenshots from Ms Skeens's promoter and the transcript of the March TikTok Video, be redacted in the open bundle and witness statements. The unredacted documents have been provided to me for the purposes of this application. Given the nature of the information and the risk that its public disclosure could undermine the very purpose of this application (the protection of confidential information and prevention of derogatory statements), I consider these limited derogations from the principle of open justice to be justified and proportionate in the circumstances.
  39. Service

  40. The usual position concerning the service of an order with injunctions is that personal service is necessary unless the Court permits another method of service or exceptionally dispenses with service. This principle is clearly stated in the recent case of MBR Acres Ltd v Maher [2022] EWHC 1123 (QB).
  41. However, in the present circumstances, I am persuaded that an alternative method of service is appropriate and should be permitted. My reasons are as follows:
  42. a. Ms Skeens, in her email of 10 March 2025 to Chanel's solicitors, Mishcon de Reya LLP, stated that "Email correspondence is fine as I will be going to the Middle East soon for business/ Eid. Therefore, I do not presently require any future service in person". This indicates a clear acceptance of email as a sufficient method of communication and service.
    b. As noted by Ms Tan in her witness statement, Ms Skeens is about to travel abroad, although the precise dates are unknown. Permitting email service would therefore avoid the practical difficulties and potential delays associated with attempting personal service on Ms Skeens, especially given her imminent departure from the jurisdiction.
    c. In light of Ms Skeens's stated preference for email communication and her impending travel, which would likely complicate personal service, I am satisfied that permitting service of the Application Notice and supporting evidence by email to the address provided by Miss Skeens is appropriate and constitutes good service in these specific circumstances.
    d. This permission extends to the service of any order made pursuant to this application, unless the Court directs otherwise in respect of any mandatory injunctions requiring personal action by Ms Skeens, a matter which can be revisited if necessary.

    Conclusion

  43. In all the circumstances I am satisfied that it is just and convenient to grant injunctive relief in the form of the order sought in this case to maintain the status quo pending a speedy trial. This is necessary to protect Chanel from potentially irreparable harm and to uphold the authority of the Court in respect of the undertakings given in the Consent Order.
  44. END

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