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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Clyde & Co LLP & Anor v Kennedy [2025] EWHC 1186 (KB) (19 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/1186.html
Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1186 (KB)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1186 (KB)
Case No: KB-2024-BHM-000154

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Birmingham Civil Justice Centre
19 May 2025

B e f o r e :

HER HONOUR JUDGE CARMEL WALL SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
____________________

Between:
(1) CLYDE & CO LLP
(2) MR JULIAN RICHARD BERRYMAN SMART
Claimants
- and –

MR CHRISTOPHER KENNEDY
Defendant

____________________

Mr J. Sullivan (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for the Claimants
Mr Christopher Kennedy appeared in person

Hearing dates: 11 and 12 March 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    Her Honour Judge Carmel Wall:

    Introduction

  1. The first claimant is an international law firm. Its Birmingham branch is situated at 63 Temple Row, Birmingham City Centre ("the Birmingham office"). The second claimant is a partner and designated member of the first claimant and works from the Birmingham office. He brings this claim on his own behalf and pursuant to CPR 19.8 as a representative of the individuals who work at the Birmingham office. Both claimants are represented by Mr Sullivan of Counsel.
  2. The defendant has represented himself during these proceedings. He is currently subject to an Extended Civil Restraint Order ("ECRO") made by HHJ Emma Kelly sitting as a Judge of the High Court on 14 October 2024.
  3. Both claimants bring this claim for final injunctive relief pursuant to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. They seek to prevent the defendant from attending at the Birmingham office and its immediate vicinity. They seek to limit his communication with the first claimant and its employees to a designated email account which would receive and send emails to the defendant from the first claimant without identification of the particular staff member initiating or receiving the communication. The claimants' case is that these steps are necessary and proportionate to protect its workforce.
  4. The claimants were granted an interim injunction by HHJ Rawlings sitting as a Judge of the High Court on 22 July 2024 in the terms sought. There has been no allegation of breach of the interim order.
  5. The claimants have been willing throughout this trial to compromise the claim. At the start of this hearing they made an open offer to accept undertakings from the defendant in slightly more generous terms than those in the interim injunction. Their offer was on the basis that the claimants would forego their established entitlement to approximately £11,600 in costs already ordered in their favour against the defendant at an interlocutory hearing and there would be no further order for costs between the parties. The defendant has been unwilling to offer undertakings and seeks determination of the issues between the parties.
  6. The claimants' case is that the defendant has caused harassment to its workforce by attending repeatedly at the Birmingham office, despite being banned and having no legitimate business there. He has entered the reception area, sometimes by tailgating others, and remained when asked to leave. He has filmed security and reception staff without their permission. He has uploaded some of the unauthorised footage he has taken onto social media alongside other posts that contain offensive references to the first claimant. The claimants allege that the demeanour of the defendant is intimidating, even if that is not his intention. The first claimant has had to engage additional security staff and involve the police in removing the defendant on occasion. Its staff have avoided the main entrance when accessing the Birmingham office in order to avoid the defendant. The claimants' case is that the defendant's behaviour, despite not involving any violence or direct contact with most of its staff, has caused widespread upset and anxiety amongst its workforce and is oppressive and unacceptable.
  7. The first claimant further alleges that the defendant's actions have an ulterior purpose. It alleges the defendant intends by his actions to pressurise the first claimant into persuading or coercing its clients into making payments to the defendant to settle potential or subsisting claims he has against those clients; or in some other way to procure for the defendant the compensation payments he asserts are due to him but which the first claimant has no obligation to pay.
  8. The defendant accepts that he has visited the Birmingham office on many occasions but claims that his visits have been for a legitimate purpose and have not been as frequent or on the dates alleged. His case is that the first claimant has represented clients with whom he has a genuine grievance; and the first claimant has obstructed his access to the individual lawyers dealing with these claims on behalf of those clients and to the clients themselves. The defendant asserts that the first claimant has either intervened to impede the payment of compensation to the defendant by its client; or has failed to advise its client that the client must, as the defendant argues, pay him. He says that his visits have been only for the purpose of identifying and then speaking to the relevant staff member of the first claimant about monies he says are rightfully due to him.
  9. The defendant further maintains that his behaviour has always been exemplary. He says he has always been welcomed into the Birmingham office but then tricked by the first claimant's staff who have called the police to remove him. He admits taking video footage of the reception staff but he asserts that this filming is legitimate "evidence gathering" and not harassment. He admits posting images he has taken onto social media but says this is legitimate exposure of what he contends to be unlawful behaviour by the first claimant.
  10. The Law

  11. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 creates criminal offences and civil liability. The sections relevant to the latter provide as follows:
  12. 1 Prohibition of harassment.
    (1)A person must not pursue a course of conduct—
    (a)which amounts to harassment of another, and
    (b)which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.
    (1A) A person must not pursue a course of conduct —
    (a)which involves harassment of two or more persons, and
    (b)which he knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons, and
    (c)by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not one of those mentioned above)—
    (i)not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or
    (ii)to do something that he is not under any obligation to do.
    (2)For the purposes of this section or section 2A(2)(c), the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to or involves harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.
    (3)Subsection (1) or (1A) does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows—
    (a)that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime,
    (b)that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or
    (c)that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.
    3. Civil remedy.
    (1) An actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1) may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question.
    (2) On such a claim, damages may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment and any financial loss resulting from the harassment.
    (3) Where—
    (a)in such proceedings the High Court or the county court grants an injunction for the purpose of restraining the defendant from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment, and
    (b)the plaintiff considers that the defendant has done anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction,
    the plaintiff may apply for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant.
    3A Injunctions to protect persons from harassment within section 1(1A)
    (1) This section applies where there is an actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1A) by any person ("the relevant person").
    (2) In such a case—
    (a)any person who is or may be a victim of the course of conduct in question, or
    (b)any person who is or may be a person falling within section 1(1A)(c),
    may apply to the High Court or the county court for an injunction restraining the relevant person from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment in relation to any person or persons mentioned or described in the injunction.
    (3) Section 3(3) to (9) apply in relation to an injunction granted under subsection (2) above as they apply in relation to an injunction granted as mentioned in section 3(3)(a).
    7. Interpretation of this group of sections.
    (1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1 to 5A.
    (2) References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress.
    (3)A "course of conduct" must involve—
    (a)in the case of conduct in relation to a single person (see section 1(1)), conduct on at least two occasions in relation to that person, or
    (b)in the case of conduct in relation to two or more persons (see section 1(1A)), conduct on at least one occasion in relation to each of those persons.
    (3A) A person's conduct on any occasion shall be taken, if aided, abetted, counselled or procured by another—
    (a)to be conduct on that occasion of the other (as well as conduct of the person whose conduct it is); and
    (b)to be conduct in relation to which the other's knowledge and purpose, and what he ought to have known, are the same as they were in relation to what was contemplated or reasonably foreseeable at the time of the aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring.
    (4) "Conduct" includes speech.
    (5) References to a person, in the context of the harassment of a person, are references to a person who is an individual.
  13. The statute provides a non-exhaustive definition of "harassment". Jurisprudence has consistently recognised that conduct which is within the scope of the Act is conduct which is more than simply annoying but must be "oppressive and unacceptable" (see, for example, Ferguson v British Gas Trading [2010] 1 WLR 785).
  14. The conduct need not involve actual or threatened violence. Persistent conduct, if oppressive and unacceptable, is sufficient to found liability. In DPP v Hardy [2008] EWHC 2874 (Admin), for example, the Divisional Court held that persistent telephone calls could fall within the ambit of the statute. At paragraph 21 of his judgment, Pill LJ said:
  15. Conduct which may begin with what is or may be a legitimate inquiry may become harassment within the meaning of Section 1 of the 1997 Act by reason of the manner of its being pursued and its persistence.
  16. When assessing a defendant's conduct an objective standard is applied. The subjective state of mind of the defendant is not the test.
  17. Only a natural person can make a claim pursuant to s1(1) of the Act.
  18. A legal person which is not a natural person can make a claim pursuant to s1(1A) of the Act provided it can demonstrate that it falls within the scope of "any person" in s1(1A)(c). In other words, to succeed in proving liability, the legal (non-natural) person must prove, in addition to the other requirements of the statutory tort, that the conduct relied on was intended by the defendant to persuade the legal person making the claim not to do something that it is entitled or required to do, or to do something that it is not under any obligation to do.
  19. It is for the claimant(s) to prove the elements of the tort in s1(1) and (1A) of the Act. They succeed in doing so if they meet the standard of the balance of probabilities, what is more likely than not.
  20. Section 1(1) and (1A) is disapplied if a defendant satisfies the court that the pursuit of any proven conduct falls within the scope of s1(5). Again, the standard of proof required to discharge that burden is the balance of probabilities.
  21. An injunction is a discretionary remedy. Even if the elements of the tort are proved, I must then consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to grant a final injunction and if so, then consider the appropriate terms.
  22. The issues

  23. The issues I must decide are therefore these:
  24. a. What conduct on the part of the defendant have the claimant(s) proved?
    b. Does that amount to a "course of conduct" as defined by the Act?
    c. Does it involve "harassment" of the requisite number of people?
    d. Have the claimant(s) proved that the defendant knew or ought to have known that his conduct involved harassment, by reference to whether a reasonable person in possession of the information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment?
    e. Has the first claimant additionally proved that the defendant's conduct was intended to persuade the first claimant to act or omit to act as described in s1(1A)(c)?
    f. Has the defendant proved that s1(1) should be disapplied?
    g. Should an injunction be granted and if so, on what terms?

    Procedural issues

  25. During the second day of the trial I had reason to suspect that the defendant was making an audio recording of the proceedings. When challenged he suggested that he was entitled to "gather evidence" which was a comment capable of amounting to an admission. The defendant was unwilling to give up his mobile telephone voluntarily. The consequence of these events was that the proceedings were then delayed so that police officers could attend to take possession of the defendant's mobile telephone consequent upon a Forfeiture Order I made pursuant to the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (although in the event the defendant did not comply with this order). This delay meant that it was then not possible to hear the defendant's closing submissions and I directed that these should be provided in writing.
  26. I have read and considered the material that the defendant has sent to the court following my order. In one document he has requested that my directions are set aside though has not applied for permission to do so as is required by the terms of the ECRO. Within this document he makes a number of complaints. None has merit.
  27. He has complained about disparity of treatment between the parties based on my direction that his submissions should be provided in writing and limited to 20 pages whereas Counsel for the claimant addressed me orally. The evidence in the trial lasted less than 1 ½ days. The length of written submissions I have allowed is proportionate to this. It equates with the period of time Mr Sullivan addressed me (1 hour). The defendant's "Victim Impact Statement" which I treat as his closing submissions is in any event only 15 pages in length and not even as long as was permitted.
  28. The defendant further complains that I have directed a transcript of Mr Sullivan's closing submissions which he suggests is unfair to him. This was done only for the purposes of considering whether contempt proceedings should be commenced in relation to the suspected use in court of the defendant's telephone. It was not for the purposes of the trial. This judgment has in any event been written without sight of the transcript which remains outstanding as at the date of writing.
  29. The defendant complains that his cross-examination of the second claimant was unfairly curtailed. This is dealt with below under the heading of "The oral evidence".
  30. He complains about my decision to refuse to allow the defendant to show video evidence. That decision was based on his own assertion that he had been provided with this evidence by security officers in connection with a claim he was pursuing against them. In a ruling I delivered during the trial I concluded that pursuant to CPR 31.22 this material was, in those circumstances, subject to an implied undertaking that it was to be used only for the purposes for which it was disclosed; and there was no evidence from the third party of their consent to it being used in these proceedings. When the defendant realised that the circumstances he had volunteered were a procedural obstacle to the material being viewed, he sought to retract his explanation. I remained satisfied that his initial account of how the evidence had been obtained reflected the genuine circumstances and his change of heart was for reasons of pragmatism.
  31. In any event I have made no finding in this judgment that the defendant's conduct when he attended at the Birmingham office was aggressive or violent. Assuming the video evidence shows no more than he suggests, namely that when he visited the Birmingham office he requested to speak to someone from the first claimant's workforce about his ongoing disputes and was not aggressive in his demeanour, it would not change my conclusions.
  32. As to the other complaints made by the defendant, I reject any suggestion of bias or that the defendant did not have a proper opportunity to present his evidence and arguments.
  33. I have read the defendant's "Victim Impact Statement" filed after the trial was adjourned. I treat it as his closing submissions. It largely consists of "Amended Particulars of Claim" in which he makes allegations against the first claimant which he sought to pursue in this trial. My conclusions, for the reasons set out later in this judgment, are that these allegations have no merit. Further, the defendant does not have any counterclaim in these proceedings, despite his insistence to the contrary.
  34. Evidence

    The hearsay evidence

    Anonymous source

  35. Much of the evidence on which the claimant(s) rely consists of hearsay evidence in emails from anonymous sources. The second claimant, who gave the only oral evidence relied on by the claimants, concedes that until the hearing of the interim injunction application he had not met the defendant. He cannot give first-hand evidence about the defendant's attendances at the Birmingham office. The defendant argues that the anonymous hearsay reports relied on by the claimant(s) should be excluded or alternatively that little weight should be attached to them.
  36. The second claimant has given direct oral evidence from the witness box that the hearsay evidence relied on has been anonymised because witnesses were afraid to be identified. The second claimant says this is because of the defendant's demeanour. He gives direct evidence in support of this contention of a personal threat made to him following an interlocutory hearing in these proceedings when the defendant threatened to "bury him" and said he would "see him in the ground". Mr Sullivan invites me to draw conclusions about the defendant's general demeanour from his behaviour during this trial and the fact that he has been excluded from hearings because of his behaviour by other judges in interlocutory hearings.
  37. I have had the opportunity to observe the defendant's manner during two days of trial. Throughout he has been argumentative, confrontational and rude. At times he has been abusive and offensive in his remarks. He has persistently tried to intimidate by threatening the second claimant, Counsel and the court that he will make professional complaints and commence legal actions, when he disagrees with what others say. He will not listen to others or let them express any view that is contrary to his. His approach is to talk over the top of them and prevent civilised exchange. Where there are facts that do not suit him, he pretends they do not exist. This was best illustrated in his attitude towards the Orders of DJ Singh ordering him to pay costs and the Order of HHJ Emma Kelly that set a timetable for case management directions. He did not agree with these Orders. He described them as "null and void" or "set aside" when that was not the position. He has no obvious respect for the court or trial process. Whether he intends it or not, his manner is frequently aggressive.
  38. I have no hesitation in accepting the second claimant's evidence of the threat that was made to him by the defendant. It is entirely consistent with the way in which the defendant has conducted himself before me. Of course, I bear in mind that for an unrepresented litigant the process of conducting a trial is stressful and litigants and witnesses can sometimes behave in a way that is out of character. But the persistence of the defendant's wholly unacceptable conduct provides cogent support for the second claimant's explanation of the need for anonymity for this part of the claimants' evidence and I accept it.
  39. I do not exclude the evidence. I do, though, recognise that because this evidence has been anonymised and is hearsay rather than direct evidence, the defendant has had a more limited opportunity to challenge it. I have been very cautious in my approach to it and looked for whether and if so what other independent or objective evidence has supported its truthfulness, accuracy and reliability.
  40. Authenticity

  41. The first question to consider is the authenticity of the evidence in circumstances in which the defendant says at trial, for the first time, that the emails and photographic images in the trial bundle were not created on the dates they bear.
  42. Mr Sullivan's primary submission is applying CPR 32.19 the authenticity of this evidence is taken to be admitted in the absence of formal notice being given. While Mr Sullivan's submission is legally correct, I do not adopt that approach. It is not realistic or fair in the circumstances of this case – where the court has directed the contents of the trial bundle, and the defendant is unrepresented. However, I do accept Mr Sullivan's alternative submissions on the issue of authenticity and conclude that the dates on the emails and images (where those dates are legible) are genuine. My reasons are these.
  43. Firstly, the dates on the emails fit with the substance of the defendant's other evidence. He accepts that he first visited the Birmingham office during the time that the first claimant was instructed by HDI Global Specialty LE. Those instructions came to an end in March 2022. That is incompatible with the defendant first visiting the Birmingham office in connection with the professional negligence claim in 2023 as he now suggests. Secondly, where there is some independent support for the authenticity of the materials, for example, where there is a corresponding police log or recorded incident, the dates of the independent material are wholly consistent with the dates of the emails describing those events. Thirdly, there is no credible reason for the claimants to fabricate the email and photographic evidence or to alter the dates they bear. They have nothing to gain from these proceedings other than preventing the defendant from attending the Birmingham office in person and limiting his email communication to a designated address. They have not sought to prevent him from communicating with them; nor even from pursuing the complaints or claims he threatens. Finally, this is a very late challenge by the defendant to the authenticity of this evidence. The claimants' evidence was served when the claim was made. He did not raise this issue when the interim injunction was being considered. He has not raised this issue in his rebuttal statement. The lateness of the challenge substantially undermines it.
  44. Reliability

  45. When approaching the question of the weight to attach to this evidence, I apply the provisions of s4(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995:
  46. 4. Considerations relevant to weighing of hearsay evidence.
    (1) In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence.
    (2)Regard may be had, in particular, to the following—
    (a)whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness;
    (b)whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated;
    (c)whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;
    (d)whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters;
    (e)whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose;
    (f)whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight.
  47. I now turn to these factors individually.
  48. Some of the makers of the statements are members of the first claimant's staff. I have already dealt above with the reason why those persons have not given evidence. It may, though, have been reasonable and practicable for witnesses who were independent security officers or police officers to have been summoned to give evidence in support of the claimants' case. However, in the cases of those witnesses, there is no obvious motive to conceal or misrepresent matters where they have absolutely no interest in the subject matter of the dispute.
  49. The hearsay evidence I am considering in the form of email correspondence is contemporaneous with the events described. Events were fresh when the emails were written. No litigation was in contemplation. This is a strong factor supporting the reliability of this evidence.
  50. Some of the evidence does involve multiple hearsay.
  51. I cannot identify any motive on the part of any of the makers to conceal or misrepresent matters. As I have already addressed, the independent witnesses have no interest in the subject matter of this dispute; even the claimants have nothing to gain from these proceedings other than to prevent the defendant from attending the Birmingham office in person and limiting his email communication to a designated address. Further, the evidence in the emails is predominantly recording attendances by the defendant and does not suggest bias or prejudice in its approach. It is reported on 11 February 2022, for example, that the defendant was not aggressive and left the building when asked.
  52. There are some redactions to the statements which I bear in mind. Where the redactions have made the correspondence incomprehensible I have ignored it.
  53. I do not find there has been any attempt to prevent proper evaluation of the weight of the evidence. In many instances the evidence is directly supported by photographic images consistent with the narrative description in the email to which it relates, for example, where the defendant is shown outside the Birmingham office and the entrance is barred by a security guard. In other instances, the narrative chimes with the defendant's own evidence about events or admissions he has made, for example, of photographing the first claimant's receptionist and then posting the image online.
  54. Balancing these factors, they weigh in favour of my conclusion that the contents of the email correspondence provide a reliable account of events. For the most part the emails are supported by other contemporaneous evidence (photographs and police logs for example). Other emails (a smaller number) are not so supported but are similar in tone and content. I do not distinguish between those that are supported and those that are not when assessing reliability. That is because I am satisfied that where a large part of the correspondence has been independently or objectively shown to be reliable, it is highly likely that the remainder is similarly reliable. It would be very surprising if this were not the case, particularly when the contents of all the emails are analysed. They consist almost entirely of brief factual observations rather than hyperbolic comment about the defendant. Further, and importantly, the emails are consistent with the defendant's own case that he was persisting in attempts to speak directly and face to face with a member of the first claimant's staff at the Birmingham office and was being prevented from doing so.
  55. The oral evidence

  56. I found the second claimant to be measured and reflective in his evidence. He made fair concessions where they were appropriate. He was clear and careful in his answers to my questions. I accept that his motivation for bringing this claim has been solely to protect the first claimant's workforce and not for any ulterior motive. Where he gave direct evidence, I accept it. Where he relied on the hearsay evidence of others I have set out above my approach.
  57. I terminated the defendant's cross examination of the second claimant after about 2 hours 20 minutes. By this time he had been warned several times that he must not use his questions to make a speech and that he must respect the court's direction as to the relevant issues in the trial. He persisted in asking questions that were accusatory, irrelevant and intimidatory. They went well beyond robust challenge to the claimants' case.
  58. When stopped from pursuing irrelevant matters, the defendant told me that it is for him and not the court to decide what is relevant. His view of relevance is coloured by his belief that it is part of the function of this court to make findings so that the defendant can pursue a complaint about the first claimant to the Solicitors' Regulatory Association ("SRA"). He is wrong about that. My task is to make the factual findings necessary to decide the issues relevant to the claim and not to provide material for any collateral purpose.
  59. At the start of his oral evidence I allowed the defendant an uninterrupted period of 15 minutes to set out any evidence in chief he wanted me to consider, additional to the rebuttal document that is in the trial bundle. This was a dispensation he was given because he is unrepresented and to ensure that I properly understood his defence to the claim. Much of what he said was unfocussed but clearly demonstrated the defendant's subjective and irrational belief that he is the victim of wide-ranging fraudulent and oppressive conduct. He positively asserted that he is the victim of a number of conspiracies, extending beyond the claimant(s) to the court administration, the judiciary and the police. He said, for example, "I could see there was a criminal network in this court" because court staff had told him that the requirements for a judgment in default in another claim he has brought had not been satisfied. In another example he alleged that this court had conspired with the first claimant to pervert the course of justice; and that one of the first claimant's senior partners had "in house connections" with the court. He asserted that he had been unable to comply with rules of court because there was some conspiracy that prevented him from "doing the right thing". At the end of this part of his evidence he said, "At the end of the day you are all liable and you can all pay".
  60. When cross-examined the defendant was evasive, defensive and obstructive. He tried to intimidate Counsel with unjustified threats of professional complaint and by accusing him of lying and of fraud, for example. He refused to answer some clear and simple direct questions. When he was asked if he admitted attending the Birmingham office on specific dates, his reply was, "Have you got any evidence?" rather than responding straightforwardly. He raised factual disputes with some of the claimants' evidence for the first time and when he did so, his evidence became contradictory.
  61. The defendant is entitled to challenge the quality of some of the evidence on which the claimants have placed reliance; but he has used that as a smokescreen to avoid answering proper and relevant questions about his conduct and his motivation.
  62. I did not find him a reliable or persuasive witness when describing events at the Birmingham office where his description is in conflict with other evidence. I do though accept that he was telling me the truth when he told me he saw nothing wrong with repeatedly demanding to see a member of the first claimant's staff, even though he did not have an appointment; and making unauthorised films of the first claimant's reception staff and then publishing them on the internet. It is those views that ultimately have been the foundation for what I have found to be unacceptable and oppressive behaviour.
  63. The Facts

    Contextual background

  64. The defendant has sought to legitimise his attendance at the Birmingham office by reference to instructions received by the first claimant from clients with whom the defendant has a grievance. These relate to two entirely separate and unconnected areas.
  65. The professional negligence claim

  66. The first arises from criminal proceedings in 2012/13 when the defendant was convicted of drug offences and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. For at least some time during these proceedings he was represented by a firm of Birmingham solicitors, Jonas Roy Bloom ("JRB"). The defendant maintains that JRB were negligent in the conduct of his defence and in particular that they failed to obtain and/or advance at trial fingerprint evidence asserted by the defendant to be exculpatory.
  67. When the defendant intimated a claim of professional negligence, the first claimant was instructed by HDI Global Specialty GE who were believed to be the relevant professional indemnity insurers for JRB who denied liability. The first claimant's Manchester office dealt with the matter. The case handler was Harriet Allen who wrote to the defendant about this matter on 2 December 2019 and 4 March 2020. Liability was repudiated. Her correspondence had, in its heading, a named case handler, case reference number, email address and direct telephone line. A later letter dated 2 August 2021 had a case reference number, email address and direct telephone line in its heading. The defendant could have had no doubt about the appropriate line of communication with the first claimant.
  68. The defendant told me that a representative of HDI Global Specialty GE had accepted from him that JRB had been negligent. He said he had been told he had "won the case". There is no other evidence to support this view. But he relies on this to argue that the first claimant was then obliged to facilitate the payment of compensation to him, either by putting pressure on its insurance client to make payment, or alternatively by procuring payment to him directly. That contention is misconceived. It fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the solicitor-client relationship which the second claimant made clear in his evidence.
  69. In March 2022 the first claimant's instructions in this matter were withdrawn. That was because there had been an error in identifying the correct professional indemnity insurers. In fact, the relevant insurers were AXA XL who chose to instruct different solicitors to manage the defendant's potential professional negligence claim. On 17 March 2022 the first claimant informed the defendant of this by email and explained, "This ends the involvement of HDI Global Specialty SE in relation to your claim. As a consequence, BLM [a firm which subsequently merged with the first claimant] are no longer instructed in relation to your claim. You should direct any future correspondence to AXA XL's solicitors, Kennedys Law" and provided an email address and policy reference number.
  70. Since 17 March 2022 the first claimant has had no further involvement in this matter. But even when instructed, at no time was the claim handled by the Birmingham office.
  71. The MIB claims

  72. The second arises from a series of road traffic accidents involving the defendant and in which the Motor Insurers' Bureau ("MIB") has had an interest.
  73. The first accident in time was in 2008 when the defendant alleges he was the victim of an accident involving an uninsured driver. He made a claim to the MIB in July 2021 which was rejected on the grounds it was made too late. The defendant pursued an appeal against the MIB's decision which an independent arbitrator dismissed on 16 October 2023.
  74. The MIB dealt with this claim directly and did not instruct solicitors. The first claimant has never had any involvement with this claim.
  75. The second accident in time was on 30 May 2012. The other driver made a claim to the MIB in 2015 alleging fault on the part of the defendant and that he was uninsured. The defendant was joined as a party to the claim but did not respond to it. The defendant maintains that this was because he was in custody and had no knowledge of the proceedings. His case is that he was an insured driver and disputes any liability.
  76. The MIB settled the claim for £25,000. It accepted sole responsibility for the settlement. It made no claim for indemnity or contribution from the defendant or his insurers. The MIB confirmed in correspondence that it had written off any debt it might otherwise have been owed by the defendant. Despite this, in 2019, the defendant initiated proceedings against the MIB and its solicitors, Weightmans, alleging a breach of his human rights because, he argued, the MIB should not have settled the claim. Those proceedings were struck out and declared to be totally without merit in an Order dated 2 September 2020 made by DJ Singh (as she then was). DJ Singh also made a costs order in favour of the MIB against the defendant in the sum of £14,000.
  77. The defendant is aggrieved by this outcome because the Order was made in his absence. Although the defendant would wish it otherwise, DJ Singh's Order has not been set aside or successfully appealed. It created a debt owed by the defendant to the MIB for £14,000.
  78. The first claimant had been instructed by the MIB in those proceedings. The claim was handled through its Manchester office. No member of staff from the Birmingham office had any involvement with that claim.
  79. The third accident in time occurred in or about October 2021. The defendant was involved in an accident caused by an uninsured driver. He made a claim to the MIB in April 2022 for compensation for serious personal injuries he sustained in this accident. The MIB accepted his claim. The compensation due was assessed at £14,000. The defendant has not challenged this figure.
  80. The MIB instructed the first claimant in this claim. The claim was again handled through the first claimant's Manchester office. No member of staff from the Birmingham office has been involved in this claim.
  81. By the time the compensation had been assessed, the costs order made against the defendant was still outstanding. The MIB chose to offset the sum owed to it against the compensation to which the defendant was entitled. This extinguished the sum due to the defendant from the MIB.
  82. The defendant is aggrieved by this outcome. His characterisation of it is that he has not been compensated for injury he sustained. He blames the first claimant for this outcome and for the MIB deciding to offset the debt he owed against the compensation due to him.
  83. The defendant's view of this is doubly misconceived. Firstly, he ignores the fact that the debt he owed the MIB has been extinguished so he has obtained a benefit. Secondly, the offset decision was made by the MIB and not by the first claimant.
  84. The defendant's visits to the Birmingham office and other conduct

  85. I find that in February 2022 the defendant first attended at the Birmingham office. The focus of his attention was the professional negligence claim which was being handled by the first claimant's Manchester office.
  86. The defendant suggests that these visits were in 2023 and not 2022. I reject his evidence as to timing. Firstly, I rely on the dates on the emails referring to these visits which are consistent with 2022 and not 2023. Secondly, I do not understand the defendant to dispute that the early visits were connected with the professional negligence claim and related to a period when HDI Global Specialty SE was thought to be JRB's professional indemnity insurers. By 2023 the first claimant was no longer instructed in this claim and the insurers were different.
  87. I find the first attendance at the Birmingham office was on 11 February 2022, the day after the defendant had telephoned the first claimant's Manchester office asking to speak to someone about the professional negligence claim. There is no suggestion that the defendant behaved improperly on this occasion. He left when asked.
  88. It is the defendant's case that he attended because he wanted to speak to someone face to face about his claim. He says he was prevented from doing so because he was asked by the receptionist for a reference number or details of the case handler and he did not have these details. He suggests that this was the first claimant obstructing him from progressing his claim.
  89. The second claimant confirmed that the first claimant does not as a rule, see anyone without an appointment. A caller in an ongoing matter would be expected to have a name or reference number so any enquiry could be appropriately directed. I accept that the first claimant's receptionist would not arrange an appointment for the defendant without details of the case handler and reference number. This would be treating him no differently from any other caller; and further, the defendant was not a client of the first claimant.
  90. There is no dispute that the layout of the Birmingham office is that it has a secure entry point which is controlled by receptionists. They will only unlock the glass entrance doors if they are satisfied the caller, who must identify himself through the intercom system, has legitimate business with the first claimant. Once admitted into the building, the visitor will only have access to the first claimant's offices if s/he is permitted to travel in the lift to the appropriate level. Access to the lift will not be given unless the receptionist is satisfied that an appointment has been made.
  91. The defendant did not have an appointment and does not claim that he did. He was not allowed to go past the receptionist's desk because he did not have an appointment. But he already knew the name of the case handler and the case reference number from correspondence he had received from the first claimant's Manchester office. He had no need to obtain these details from the Birmingham office. If he had told the receptionist what the case reference was, she would have known that the defendant's clam was not being dealt with by anyone at the Birmingham office and he would have been re-directed.
  92. It is likely that he wanted a face to face meeting and travelling to Manchester was not convenient for him. But that did not alter the fact that no one in the Birmingham office was dealing with any claim he was making and the defendant must have been well aware of that.
  93. I find that the defendant returned to the Birmingham office on 17 February 2022 and was refused entry. This is consistent with the contemporaneous email and with a photograph which shows the defendant filming on his mobile telephone into the reception area from outside in the street. He could offer no explanation for doing this, other than that he was not permitted to enter the Birmingham office.
  94. During this visit the defendant also took a video of the reception area which included a video of the receptionist taken from close quarters. This finding is supported by the defendant posting a photograph of the receptionist on social media. When giving evidence the defendant did not deny taking these images. Rather, he justified his actions by asserting that she was not doing her job properly because she was not arranging for anyone from the Birmingham office to speak with the defendant as he wanted. It has never been suggested that the receptionist consented to the defendant taking these images of her and publishing them.
  95. It follows that the defendant must have gained access to the reception area. The contemporaneous email dealing with this incident refers to him tailgating. I accept this account. It is consistent with him gaining access without permission which must follow from the request in the same email that the police are informed because the defendant is not allowed into the building.
  96. I find that the defendant returned the following day on 18 February and the police were called to assist in removing him from the Birmingham office. That finding is supported by a photograph showing the defendant in the reception area with the police in attendance. The photograph shows the police's attention on the defendant which is consistent with the contents of the contemporaneous email.
  97. I find that the email accurately records what happened on this visit. The defendant followed a member of staff into the building rather than buzzing through himself and speaking to the receptionist to facilitate entry. Once in the reception area he made a video recording on his mobile telephone. A member of the security staff arrived and asked him to leave. The defendant was told he was banned from the building. He said they were "perverting the course of justice". The police were then called to attend and did so.
  98. I have accepted that hearsay evidence as true because it is not credible that the staff would have called the police if the defendant had not been asked to leave and had failed to cooperate. There is no motive for this statement to have been fabricated. The statement was made well before these proceedings were contemplated. Further, the reference to the defendant accusing others of "perverting the course of justice" adds credibility to the account. It is a phrase I have heard the defendant use frequently, casually and without any justification throughout this trial. It is very likely and I find that he used the same phrase in the Birmingham office when refusing to cooperate with the security staff's request.
  99. I find that on 22 February 2022 the defendant again visited the Birmingham office. The police were again contacted. Support for this finding is in the contemporaneous recording of the incident number and the collar number of the police officer who dealt with this. I am satisfied for the reasons set out above that the defendant knew that he was banned from the Birmingham office and unwelcome there. His evidence that if told to keep away he would have done so is not credible in circumstances in which security staff had previously called the police to persuade him to leave and he had gained entry more than once by tailgating.
  100. The defendant's own evidence about this incident adds further weight to the claimants' evidence. The defendant agreed that PC Francis had spoken to him. He described the officer as "having no jurisdiction" and going "above and beyond" his authority. He suggested that PC Francis had been misled because the first claimant had told him that the defendant had no case with the first claimant.
  101. The only reasonable inference to draw from that evidence is that PC Francis was telling the defendant that the first claimant did not want him coming to the Birmingham office but the defendant would not accept this. In any event, the defendant did agree in his evidence that PC Francis made it clear to him that any further attendance at the Birmingham office would result in an arrest.
  102. I accept the second claimant's direct evidence that on 24 February 2022 the first claimant advised its staff not to wear their badges identifying their connection with the first claimant when outside the building and to be aware of tailgaters. I am satisfied this was a response to concerns about the defendant's unwelcome attendance at the Birmingham office. I accept the second claimant's evidence that staff were anxious and that the receptionist's concerns had spread around the office and become a talking point. The second claimant fairly said, "He may not mean it, but he can be quite intimidating".
  103. The claimants then allege that the defendant made a number of phone calls to staff at its Manchester office and to HDI Global Specialty SE. There is no independent or objective evidence to verify this. The redaction of the email communications makes it impossible to follow to whom the calls are alleged to have been made. When I questioned the second claimant about this he was not able to offer more than an impression based on his reading of the emails themselves. I do not find the claimants' case on this particular issue (the telephone calls) has been proven.
  104. I find the defendant attended the Birmingham office three times on 10 June 2022. The June attendances are supported by a police incident log for 10 June recording a contemporaneous complaint to the police.
  105. I accept that the defendant returned on 15 June. Although this is not independently verified, it is not credible that this incident has been fabricated, particularly when no additional prejudicial allegation about the attendance is made and having regard to the evidence as a whole.
  106. I find that the defendant visited the Birmingham office again on 9 December 2022. He was wanting to serve legal proceedings which had not been issued by any court. My finding is supported by a screenshot from CCTV at the Birmingham office which shows the defendant stepping through the doorway holding a parcel of papers. There is a Christmas tree in the background which supports the accuracy of the dating of this image.
  107. There was then a significant break in the defendant's attendances at the Birmingham office.
  108. They began again in January 2024. I am satisfied this was prompted by an email sent by the first claimant to the defendant on 4 December 2023 to inform him that following the decision of the independent arbitrator, the claim he had made to the MIB which had been rejected was now finally concluded. The first claimant notified the defendant by email sent from its office in Salford that it was instructed to accept service of any future proceedings in that matter. It asked him to communicate to the first claimant by email to the address provided.
  109. In early January 2024 I am satisfied the defendant came to the Birmingham office. This finding is supported by a screenshot attached to an email dated 3 January 2024 where the defendant can be seen engaging with the first claimant's receptionist.
  110. I find that the defendant came to the Birmingham office on 18 March 2024 at 11.45. This is recorded in an email timed at 15.04pm the same day. The email also records that security officers and police were called. The former arrived at 12.42, a police community officer arrived at 13.07 and other officers at 13.54. The defendant left at 14.18 – 2.5 hours after he had arrived.
  111. The email record is highly persuasive, in part because it is balanced in its content. It records, for example, "Mr Kennedy is never aggressive, but gets very intimidating and persistent with his claims that he wants to speak to someone at Clyde & Co., regarding a name and reference number for an ongoing claim. But from what I have been told and has since heard an officer say to him he has no case on going with Clyde & Co". The email records that the defendant did finally leave the building voluntarily after the police threatened to hand cuff him.
  112. This incident was admitted by the defendant from the witness box insofar as he agreed that after the police attended he agreed to leave.
  113. On 20 March 2024 the defendant posted references on social media to the first claimant being "corrupt" and "commit[ting] fraud. Further social media publications with reference to the first claimant appeared on 22 March 2024.
  114. The defendant accepts in his rebuttal document that he made the social media posts. He says they were made as an assertion of his right to freedom of expression and that his use of social media has been part of a "broader effort to raise awareness of the case". He has adopted the same position from the witness box, namely that his actions are to expose what he describes as wrongdoing on the part of the first claimant.
  115. The claimants seek no injunctive relief in relation to the defendant's online activity. However it is relevant to provide context to his visits to the Birmingham office and why staff would reasonably be upset by his attendance there.
  116. I find that on 23 April 2024 the defendant attended the Birmingham office again. I am satisfied he gained access by tailgating. The email recording this visit describes the defendant as handing over to the receptionist a letter stating that he had been awarded £14,000 and would not leave until he was given this money. The visit is shortly after the defendant was informed on 28 March 2024 by the first claimant's Manchester office that the MIB would be offsetting the award against the debt owed to them. There is an obvious correlation between these two events. I accept that the defendant did not leave for over two hours and only after the police were called.
  117. There was some support for this account from the defendant's own evidence when he accepted that he had left the Birmingham office after police attended.
  118. I accept the second claimant's evidence that on 25 April 2024 the local city centre security team notified the first claimant that they would no longer provide support if the defendant visited the Birmingham offices again. This coincides with an email reference to concerns about the vulnerability of staff who are referred to as having to leave through a fire exit to avoid contact with the defendant. The second claimant told me that he was personally aware of the workforce at the Birmingham office being anxious and using a back entrance into a side road to avoid the reception area because of the defendant. All of that evidence is consistent and I accept it. I am fortified in my view that staff would likely feel anxious due to his presence by the way in which the defendant has conducted himself during this trial.
  119. I find the defendant returned to the Birmingham office on 26 April and gained entry by tailgating as the contemporaneous email records. That finding is supported by the heightened concern at that time making it unlikely the receptionist would have allowed the defendant to enter. There are photographic images showing two police officers forcibly removing the defendant from the Birmingham office. He is plainly unwilling to leave.
  120. I accept the second claimant's evidence that on 29 April 2024 the first claimant paid to increase its security presence at a cost of £1,000 per week. I accept that this was a reasonable measure in the circumstances and that it would not have been done unless the first claimant felt that there was a need to provide protection and reassurance to its workforce.
  121. On 31 May 2024 the defendant emailed the first claimant setting out his position in relation to the £14,000 compensation award from the MIB. He wrote, "The mib accepted liability and paid me for my injuries the money was paid to Clyde and co and Clyde and co have failed to pay the money to the claimant." He went on to accuse the first claimant of "tormenting him" and making "bribes and threats that the money will be set off against fraudulently obtained debts". He said he had attended the Birmingham office to attempt to obtain a reference number and case handler details "and also to provide my bank details for the compensation to be paid immediately". He goes on to allege that his compensation is being unlawfully withheld "by an anonymous source at clyde and co solicitors". He sought substantial compensation from the first claimant.
  122. What is clear and is well supported by the defendant's own evidence is that his purpose in attending at the Birmingham office included an intention to obtain the compensation that the MIB had awarded - whether from the MIB or from the first claimant – and despite the fact that the MIB had decided to offset these monies against the debt owed to them by the defendant so that he was no longer entitled to payment.
  123. I find that on 6 June 2024 the defendant attempted to visit the Birmingham office but did not gain entry. A photographic image shows a security officer astride in the entrance of the Birmingham office with his hands on his hips blocking the defendant's way.
  124. On 29 June 2024 the defendant published further posts on social media referring to "corruption" on the part of the first claimant.
  125. On 30 June 2024 the defendant emailed "particulars of claim/affidavit" to the first claimant in which he alleged that the first claimant was responsible for depriving him of compensation from the MIB. He ignored the fact that the MIB had decided to offset this against his debt. He claimed damages from the first claimant of £744,000.
  126. I find that the defendant visited the Birmingham office on 2 July 2024 but did not gain entry. Photographic images show the defendant directly outside the Birmingham office, filming into the reception area and being blocked by a security guard from entering. I accept as reliable the email sent the same day which refers to him attending twice but failing to enter and making a video on the second attempt. The defendant made some qualified admissions in his evidence about this incident, claiming that he had attended the Birmingham office for business and evidence gathering purposes.
  127. The following day further social media posts alleging corruption on the part of the first claimant and West Midlands Police were made by the defendant.
  128. Following the grant of the interim injunction there were no further attendances by the defendant at the Birmingham office. Social media activity continued on 27 September and 21 October 2024.
  129. Summary

  130. The defendant's attendances at the Birmingham office fall into two broad periods – from February 2022 until December 2022 and then from January 2024 until the grant of the interim injunction in July 2024.
  131. The attendances are numerous, at least 16 separate attempts including several on the same day. On some occasions he has remained for two hours or more. He has at times gained access by tailgating other lawful visitors or staff despite being refused entry.
  132. During some visits the defendant has filmed the reception area and reception staff without permission and has posted material obtained in this way on social media.
  133. In some instances he has not left when asked and the intervention of a security officer or police has been needed to persuade him to leave voluntarily or in default to remove him.
  134. I am satisfied the defendant was well aware he was not welcome at the Birmingham office. Many images show security officers blocking his entry. He cannot have thought that the police had been called because he was welcome. I am satisfied he was tailgating because he knew he could not otherwise gain access.
  135. I am also satisfied that there was no legitimate reason for him to attend the Birmingham office. He was not a client of the first claimant. In relation to the professional negligence claim he already had the details of the case handler, reference number, email address and contact telephone number. In relation to the MIB issues he had a designated email address for correspondence. All of the matters in which the first claimant was instructed were, as the defendant knew, being dealt with in its Manchester office. No one in the Birmingham office was involved in any of these matters. I am satisfied and find that he attended the Birmingham office in person because he believed that was the best way to force the first claimant to do what he wanted, even though this was entirely without justification. He wanted the first claimant to facilitate payment to him of compensation, whether by coercing or procuring this from its clients or by the first claimant making direct payment from its own resources to him. It has been a constant theme of his evidence that he is entitled to these monies and that it is the fault of the first claimant that he is not receiving them.
  136. The defendant's attendances were unwelcome. They caused anxiety amongst the first claimant's workforce because of their persistence, the fact that the defendant was making unauthorised videos and because of the tone of his social media posts and correspondence. But I make no finding that the defendant behaved in a way that was objectively aggressive. The perception of behaviour and demeanour is subjective and in any event the email correspondence is mixed in its assessment of his conduct. Without hearing direct evidence from witnesses who were present to describe how he behaved, and despite his behaviour in the courtroom, I make no finding that he was aggressive when he visited the Birmingham office.
  137. Is this a course of conduct?

  138. The claimants have proved that the defendant's uninvited and unwelcome repeated attendances at the Birmingham office were sufficient to amount to a course of conduct.
  139. Does it involve harassment?

  140. The claimants have not called direct evidence from any person who was caused alarm or distress by the defendant's conduct. I have, though, accepted evidence from the second claimant that the workforce at the Birmingham office was aware of the defendant's conduct because it was reported by the reception staff. News had travelled around the office. Further, staff were sufficiently upset by it that they avoided the reception area despite inconvenience and the first claimant employed security staff because of the defendant's presence at considerable cost.
  141. I am further satisfied that the reception staff felt intimidated by the defendant's presence as the second claimant told me. That is hardly surprising. The defendant was attending the Birmingham office repeatedly despite knowing he was not welcome. He had no legitimate reason for his visits. He would sometimes gain access by tailgating when the reception staff would not admit him. He would sometimes return several times on the same day, sometimes staying for protracted periods and would not leave when asked. Sometimes he made unauthorised videos of the premises and staff which, on at least one occasion, was posted on social media. The degree to which the reception staff and indeed the workforce as a whole found the defendant's conduct to be upsetting and causing of anxiety is best demonstrated by the fact that security officers and the police were called on more than one occasion.
  142. In my judgment the defendant's course of conduct falls within the scope of being objectively "oppressive and unacceptable" notwithstanding I have not found the defendant to have been aggressive or violent. The direct impact of his conduct was on the first claimant's two receptionists. I am satisfied there was also impact on the first claimant's other staff. Staff members had to alter their behaviour (by avoiding wearing identification badges in the vicinity of the Birmingham office and avoiding the reception area) because of anxiety caused by the defendant's conduct.
  143. I am satisfied the claimants have proved that at least two persons were caused harassment by the defendant's course of conduct.
  144. Have the claimant(s) proved that the defendant knew or ought to have known that his conduct involved harassment?

  145. The defendant either chooses not to see or has lost objectivity into the impact of his actions on others. That was evident in the way he has conducted himself during this trial without any obvious appreciation of or concern for the impact of his behaviour on others.
  146. I am entirely satisfied that any reasonable person in the position of the defendant would appreciate that his course of conduct amounted to harassment of the first claimant's workforce. It was obvious to the defendant that he was unwelcome at the Birmingham office. He persisted in attempting to enter and entering the reception area, even resorting to the subterfuge of tailgating. He remained in the reception area for long periods when it was obvious he would not be given an appointment. He repeated the same demands over and over again, even when it had been made clear they would not be met. Many times he left the Birmingham office only in response to the threat of police involvement or when police had actually been called to attend. It must have been obvious to him that his continued presence in those circumstances was intimidating and oppressive, even if he was not overtly threatening.
  147. I am further satisfied that no reasonable person would have taken an unauthorised video of the first claimant's receptionist and then uploaded the image to social media as the defendant did. This is an invasion of privacy and completely unacceptable. The defendant's claim that this is "legitimate evidence gathering" is entirely misconceived. Rather, it is intimidation.
  148. Has the first claimant additionally proved that the defendant's conduct was intended to persuade the first claimant to act or omit to act as described in s1(1A)(c)?

  149. I am satisfied that in repeatedly visiting the Birmingham office, the defendant's ultimate aim was to obtain payment which he considered to be financial compensation due to him. Initially this was in relation to the professional negligence claim; later it was the £14,000 award made by the MIB for his personal injuries. The course of conduct was to pressurise the first claimant into meeting with him so that he could exert pressure on them to achieve this aim. I am satisfied he wrongly held the first claimant responsible for the payments not having been made to him. His intention was to persuade the first claimant to apply pressure to its client in each instance to make the payment or for the first claimant to pay him directly. The first claimant was under no obligation to do either of these things.
  150. My reasons for my conclusions as to the defendant's intentions are based on four principal sources of evidence.
  151. Firstly, there is evidence which I have accepted that when the defendant attended at the Birmingham office, he would, at times, demand payment of the £14,000 award. He told the receptionist on at least one occasion that he had brought his bank details and would not leave until he had received the money. He plainly expected the first claimant to pay him. His course of conduct had the ultimate aim of obtaining payment.
  152. Secondly, the defendant's cross-examination of the second claimant was based on the premise that the first claimant was responsible for the decisions of its clients; and that the first claimant was obstructing the outcome that the defendant wanted to achieve. In relation to the professional negligence claim, for example, he referred to himself as having "won" when he alleged that a representative of the insurers had conceded liability to him. He maintained that it was the first claimant that had intervened to prevent compensation being paid to him. It was clear from this line of questioning that the defendant saw the first claimant as the obstacle to payment of compensation. I infer from that evidence, which is plainly misconceived, that the intention behind his repeated attendance at the Birmingham office in 2022 (at least) was to remove that obstacle by pressurising the first claimant into advising or persuading its insurance client to pay him.
  153. He also suggested to the second claimant that the decision to offset the MIB award against the outstanding debt was a decision made by the first claimant and not its client. The second claimant answered, unsurprisingly, "The MIB made its own decision about the set off of £14,000. If they are owed that money, then they don't have to pay." The defendant was clearly unwilling to accept that answer. It was clear from his approach that the defendant saw the first claimant as making decisions independently of its client and their instructions. That fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between the MIB and the first claimant underpinned his intentions in wanting a face-to-face meeting with a representative from the first claimant. His mindset was that the first claimant could be persuaded to force the MIB to pay him or alternatively to pay him itself, without applying any offset. He falsely referred to the costs order as "null and void". The only reasonable inference to draw from this was that he intended by his actions to bring improper pressure to bear on the first claimant so that he could achieve payment of the £14,000 award without offset.
  154. Thirdly, I rely on the evidence given in chief by the defendant from the witness box during his uninterrupted opening statement. In relation to the professional negligence claim he said, "I put the claim into JRB and HDI. They [the first claimant] said they were acting. I sent all the evidence about fingerprinting [the allegedly exculpatory evidence]. Then you [the first claimant] have to advise HDI to pay. You were evasive. You refused SAR. They refused disclosure. There was the fresh evidence they should have obtained. It all points to JRB. They are bang to rights. Then BLM [the first claimant] should be advising their client to pay. Where there is an indefensible case then they must advise their clients to pay. They should settle in the pre-action protocol."
  155. The inference I draw from this evidence is that the defendant wrongfully believed that the first claimant was obliged to force its insurance client to pay compensation for the professional negligence claim (or potential claim). It had not done so. His course of conduct was with a view to persuading the first claimant to make this happen.
  156. As to the MIB matters the defendant said this, "I saw the MIB doctor. I saw the investigator. They agreed and accepted liability but the set off came about because of Clyde & Co. The MIB never once said they would set off. They [the first claimant] are trying to do it fraudulently. They've come unstuck because I know the law. I'm not scared. Today they've committed perjury and contempt of court. Mr Sullivan has a duty to assist the court. He should explain the MIB obligations and the need to pay compensation."
  157. Again, the only reasonable inference to draw from those comments is that the defendant intended to put pressure on the first claimant to facilitate the payment to him of the £14,000 award without deduction.
  158. Finally, his answers to questions in cross-examination demonstrated an intention to pressurise the first claimant to persuade its client to fall in with what the defendant wanted. The exchanges went as follows:
  159. Q: Your aim was to persuade Clyde & Co to procure HDI to pay out in the JRB claim.

    A: The solicitors' firm advised me to plead guilty. Clyde & Co should persuade its client to plead guilty. They have a legal obligation to advise HDI and JRB to pay. They have a duty to make the MIB pay because they owe me a fiduciary duty.

    Q: Clyde & Co was under no obligation to procure or advise HDI to make any payment

    A: They were because once you see the documents there's no fingerprints. They [JRB] are bang to rights.

  160. I am entirely satisfied that the first claimant was under no legal obligation to make any payment to the defendant from its own resources. Further, it was under no obligation to persuade or pressurise its clients to pay the defendant and in the circumstances would have been contrary to its professional duty.
  161. Despite the defendant's assertions, there is no evidence that JRB or HDI Global Specialty SE had accepted any liability to the defendant in relation to his professional negligence claim; or that the first claimant was acting other than on instructions. After 17 March 2022 the first claimant was, in any event, completely removed from any aspect of this claim or potential claim when it ceased to be instructed. The first claimant had no obligation to the defendant in respect of this claim.
  162. Insofar as the MIB matters, it was the MIB that decided to offset the £14,000 award made in favour of the defendant against his outstanding debt owed to the MIB. That was a decision the MIB was entitled to make. The first claimant had no obligation to persuade the MIB to act against its interest. The first claimant had no independent obligation to make payment of the award to the defendant.
  163. I am satisfied the first claimant has discharged the burden of proving that the defendant's intention was, by his course of conduct, to persuade the first claimant to do something it had no obligation to do.
  164. Has the defendant proved that s1(1) of the Act should be disapplied?

  165. The Act contains three separate limbs to consider.
  166. The defendant has not persuaded me that his course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. He chooses to characterise the actions of the first claimant as "criminal" or "fraudulent" because he has not received payment of the MIB award. This is a gross mis-characterisation of the true position and his allegations of criminal conduct are baseless. The defendant's entitlement to the MIB award has been extinguished by the debt he owed to the MIB by reason of an unsatisfied costs order made against him in a claim that he instigated.
  167. The course of conduct was not pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed under any enactment.
  168. I am not satisfied that in the defendant's particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable. The defendant was able to communicate with the first claimant about litigation or potential litigation in which the first claimant was instructed without the need to attend at the Birmingham office at all. He knew that matters were being dealt with in the first claimant's Manchester office. In relation to the professional negligence claim he had the details of a case handler, reference number, direct telephone number and email address. Later, in relation to the MIB matters, he had been given an email address and case reference number to facilitate communication with the first claimant's Manchester office.
  169. In his initial visit to the Birmingham office on 11 February 2022 it was made clear to him that he needed to provide a case reference so that his enquiry could be appropriately directed. Had he done so, he would have been directed to the Manchester office. No one at the Birmingham office was dealing with the claims (or potential claims) in which he was involved. It was also made clear on 11 February that he could not expect to walk into the Birmingham office and be offered an appointment there and then. Despite that, he made repeated visits to the office.
  170. Even if his initial visit was justified on the grounds he may not have appreciated the first claimant's procedures, it was not reasonable for him repeatedly to attempt to enter the Birmingham office when it was clear he was unwelcome and would not be admitted past the reception desk to speak to anyone in the first claimant's workforce. Further, his conduct in entering by tailgating when access was denied, remaining when asked to leave, and making unauthorised videos had no reasonable justification, however frustrated he might have felt. His firmly held belief that posting the unauthorised images he took of the first claimant's receptionist on social media is "in the public interest" is entirely misconceived.
  171. Should an injunction be granted and if so, on what terms?

  172. Having found the elements of the statutory tort are proved, I must now consider whether I should exercise my discretion to grant injunctive relief.
  173. There are cogent factors that support the granting of an injunction to restrain the defendant from attending at or near the Birmingham office and limiting his communication with the first claimant to a designated email address.
  174. Firstly, there is no substantial prejudice to the defendant in granting the injunction sought. He has no reason to attend the Birmingham office and has no right to enter it. The very limited public area around the Birmingham office from which exclusion is sought is small and (as suggested during the second claimant's evidence) does not prevent his access to neighbouring premises or to important public sites such as Birmingham Cathedral or the Cathedral Square in Birmingham City Centre. The defendant has been given a designated email account which the second claimant assures me is monitored by qualified solicitors who can respond appropriately to communications. There is no obstacle to him communicating with the first claimant if he needs to do so. Although the defendant argues that an injunction is a disproportionate remedy and stifles his access to justice, neither is in fact the case.
  175. Secondly, there is a risk of financial and other damage to the first claimant and its workforce if the injunction is not granted. The persistent conduct of the defendant has made the first claimant's workforce at the Birmingham office feel vulnerable and anxious in their place of work. Receptionist staff have had unauthorised photographs posted on social media. The first claimant has, in the past, had to pay for additional security because of the defendant's behaviour. There has been a cost to the public purse when the police have been called to attend because the defendant has not left the Birmingham office when asked.
  176. Had the defendant's conduct been limited to the period ending in December 2022, then the lapse in time would have been a strong factor against granting injunctive relief. But the conduct recurred. It continued up until the grant of interim relief. Material offensive to the first claimant continued to be posted on social media thereafter, indicating that the defendant continues to harbour a grudge towards the first claimant. That state of mind has been amply demonstrated during this trial.
  177. I also bear in mind that the defendant was unwilling to offer undertakings at the start of the trial, despite conceding he had no reason to visit the Birmingham office, and also despite the generous financial terms he was offered. This supports the conclusion that an injunction is necessary to protect the claimants' legitimate interests. I exercise my discretion in favour of granting injunctive relief.
  178. The terms I will order are the minimum I consider necessary to protect the claimants. The defendant will be excluded from the Birmingham office and will be prohibited from entering the area directly in front of the office up to the railings of Birmingham Cathedral Square. This was the area identified by the second claimant. It must be recorded on a street map so it is clear to the defendant the area to which the order applies.
  179. He will also be prohibited from communicating with the claimants other than through the designated email account, the details of which must also be set out in the final order.
  180. The injunction is to last until further order. The defendant's conduct in these proceedings has arisen out of grievances he has harboured for very many years. There is no indication that his view will change in the foreseeable future. He continues to speak of claims against the first claimant. He has referred during these proceedings to his "counterclaim" although there is none. He has threatened to pursue complaints to the first claimant's professional regulator. There is therefore a strong probability that the claimants will require the protection offered by the injunction for the foreseeable future.
  181. I accept Mr Sullivan's submission that it is necessary and proportionate to grant the Order without limit of time.
  182. Outcome

  183. It follows that I find the claim proved and that the claimants are each entitled to injunctive relief in the terms set out above.
  184. I invite Mr Sullivan to prepare a draft order with a map annexed to the order showing the exclusion zone clearly marked.
  185. Finally, I wish to record that Mr Sullivan has behaved with complete professionalism and courtesy towards the defendant throughout this trial, despite being subjected to wholly unacceptable rudeness and intimidation from the defendant. I am very grateful to him for the calm and measured way he has conducted the claimants' case.

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