England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		19 January 2024

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MR JUSTICE RITCHIE:

1. In this case, by an application dated 21 December 2023, the three Claimants apply for a final prohibitory injunction against persons unknown to last for approximately three years, until February 2027. The evidence in support is provided by Mr Wortley in a witness statement dated 21 December 2023 and a later witness statement dated 18 January 2024. The procedure set out in the Notice of Application asked for an on-paper consideration of a temporary further interim injunction pending a hearing. This is the hearing relating to the application for the final injunction.
2. Going to the chronology of these proceedings, the relevant property is Bankside Yards, Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 9UY ("the Site"). The owners are the second and third Claimants and the main contractors on site are the first Claimant, who are entitled to possession.
3. An application for an interim injunction was made on 27 July 2020 and an interim ex parte injunction was made by Soole J on 30 July 2020 until 21 January 2021. Judgment was given by Soole J, which I have read and incorporate into this judgment.
4. The ex parte interim injunction was probably extended by Bourne J in January, but I have not seen the order and this judgment is subject to that order being confirmed as in existence by the Claimants' leading counsel, which I understand will take place this afternoon. The order that was actually put in the bundle was from another case. However, it is clear that there was a return date for the ex parte injunction because a witness statement was filed by Martin Wilshire on 25 January 2021, who is Director of Health and Safety at the first Claimant, that set out two recent incidents, despite the interim injunction. The first was dated before the interim injunction and involved something not particularly relevant. Four males were pointing at a crane on the Site and when the security services on Site made themselves apparent, the four males went away. They never entered the Site. The second is more worrying, because it occurred on 5 January 2021 and an unnamed person climbed a scaffold gantry on the Site but left when security was deployed. This was a direct action which was relevant to and potentially in breach of the injunction ordered by Soole J.
5. Hearsay evidence was given by Mr Wortley about urban exploring and videos of this taking place in London on cranes at various unknown locations, but also in White City. There was in Warsaw, which may not be the most relevant piece of evidence that I have ever read, but it at least showed that urban exploring by climbing buildings and cranes has prevalent in London and Europe.
6. Moving on from the order which was probably made by Bourne J, a further order was made by Stewart J on 4 March 2021, which recited the orders of Soole J (and Bourne J of 26 January 2021), which gives me some succour about the order of Bourne J and was based on the witness statement of Martin Wilshire which I have just recited. This extended the order of Bourne J to 19 May 2021. On 6 May 2021, Eady J extend the order of Stewart J to 26 July 2021. On 20 July 2021, Davis J extended the order of Eady J to January 2022. Master Dagnall, on 26 October 2021, joined the third Claimant to the claim.
7. In a witness statement dated 23 February 2022 in support of extending the interlocutory injunction further, Stuart Wortley informed the Court that a third crane was soon to be erected, updated the Court on urban explorers spotted in Blackfriars (no-one had entered the Site) and referred to evidence from Mr Wilshire and Mr Clydesdale, who believed that, despite the prevalence of urban explorers in London, the Site had not been chosen because of the injunction being plastered all over the Site in accordance with the orders. Mr Wortley sought a final injunction in that witness statement. Exhibited to the witness statement was the judgment of Eyre J in Mace v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 329, which I have read, which gives a useful summary of the general risk in London of urban exploring and climbing on sites and of some attempts to enter the Site itself.
8. By an order of HHJ Shanks, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 3 March 2022, the interim injunction was extended until 31 December 2023. Pursuant to the expiry of that order, Mr Wortley filed his witness statement for this hearing on 21 December 2023; it updated the facts relating to trespasses on Site. There had only been one trespass. Therefore, Mr Wortley suggested the injunctions were having the desired effect. The trespass occurred on 20 December 2023, when two individuals entered the Site. They were intercepted by security and left. The reasons why the Claimants were seeking the injunction were the same as before and, in summary, they were urban exploring (which means climbing on building sites), which is inherently dangerous and puts the perpetrators, security and the public at risk and, of course, it puts the builders on Site at risk. The suggestion was made that the Site is an obvious target because it has cranes and other high structures. It is suggested that the injunctions were being effective as deterrents to urban explorers and it suggested that the balance of convenience, which I describe as the "balance of justice," favoured further restraint. This witness pointed out that the interlocutory injunctions did not restrain lawful activity because they were restricted wholly to the Site and asserted that damages would not be an adequate remedy, only an injunction would. The witness referred also to an injunction granted by Sweeting J at Elephant and Castle on a building site there and I have read the judgment of Sweeting J in that case. The solicitor for the Claimants, Mr Wortley, requested that the injunction be granted until 15 February 2027.
9. By an order made by Jefford J on 21 December 2023, a short, temporary extension of the injunction was granted to the date of this hearing. A further witness statement was filed on 18 January 2024 by Mr Wortley relating to the service of notice of the order made by Jefford J and also updated the Court that there had been no further incidents. I have taken into account the skeleton argument provided by Mr Morshead KC, for which I am very grateful, and in discussion during the hearing the conclusion that I reached was that the proper procedure for granting a final injunction in the light of the recent case law had not been properly followed.
10. It seems to me, following the decision made in Wolverhampton Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47 and [2024] 2 WLR 45, that final injunctions can be granted but that power does not override the necessary notifications to persons unknown to bring a final hearing before the Court. It is not for me to advise on the appropriate methods, but one method that is available is through the summary judgment procedure. Another, of course, is to list the final hearing and to call witnesses or to have permission to rely on written witness statements, if that is granted. Neither of those procedures has been followed and so it seems to me that it would be improper for me to treat this as a final hearing, it being ex parte and no notification having been given through alternative service to any unknown persons. As for the appropriate method for alternative service for bringing a final hearing or for an application for summary judgment, that is a matter for the Claimants to consider and, if necessary, obtain the relevant order upon. Therefore, I refuse to consider a final order, but I do consider it correct to consider a further interim order.
11. The grounds for granting an interim order, since the Wolverhampton case, it seems to me involve not less than 13 factors, which I will run through very briefly.

1 – Substantive requirements

12. There must be a civil cause of action identified in the claim form and particulars of claim. The usual feared or quia timet torts relied upon are trespass, damage to property, private or public nuisance, tortious interference with trade contracts, conspiracy, and consequential damage. In this case it is trespass, but not pure trespass. It is trespass allied specifically in the particulars of claim to urban exploration by way of climbing high on buildings causing a substantial risk as outlined above.

2 – Sufficient evidence to prove the claim

13. There must be sufficient evidence before the Court to justify the Court finding that the claim has a reasonable prospect of success. For the reasons set out in the previous judgment of Soole J and the reasons accepted by the other judges which I have set out above, I do consider that there is sufficient evidence to justify a finding that there is not only a real issue to be tried, but that the Claimant has a realistic prospect of success.

3 – Whether there is a realistic defence

14. Whilst this is not a summary judgment application it is an ex parte application. As the Supreme Court made clear in Wolverhampton, it is incumbent upon the Claimants to put before the Court the potential defences of the persons unknown and for those to be considered. That has been briefly touched upon in the skeleton argument of Mr Morshead, particularly in relation to Human Rights. This is not a case which involves a breach of the Human Rights of the persons unknown by way of freedom of speech or freedom of assembly. Rather, the case only concerns matters which take place on the Claimants' land. For the reasons that are explained in the skeleton argument in paras. 40 through to 47 there is no reason to suppose that anyone's Convention rights are engaged by the relief sought in this claim. I do not consider that s.12(3) of the Human Rights Act is breached by the continuation of the interim injunctions.

4 – The balance of convenience and compelling justification

15. It is necessary for the Court to find, in relation to a final injunction, something higher than the balance of convenience, but because I am not dealing with the final injunction, I am dealing with an interlocutory injunction against PUs, the normal test applies. Even if a higher test applied at this interlocutory stage, I would have found that there is compelling justification for granting the ex parte interlocutory injunction, because of the substantial risk of grave injury or death caused not only to the perpetrators of high climbing on cranes and other high buildings on the Site, but also to the workers, security staff and emergency services who have to deal with people who do that and to the public if explorers fall off the high buildings or cranes.

5 – Whether damages are an adequate remedy

16. It is quite clear to me that damages could not be an adequate remedy for severe personal injury either caused to building site workers, security service staff, emergency workers or members of the public. Compensation may follow but insurance will probably not be in place and in any event money does not cure serious injuries.

6 – The procedural requirements

17. The PUs must be clearly identified and plainly identified by reference to:

a) the tortious conduct to be prohibited and that conduct must mirror the torts claimed in the claim form; and

b) clearly defined geographical boundaries if that is possible.

In this case, I have departed from the practice used by the other High Court judges and deputy High Court judges in this case by requiring the Claimants to add the words "climb or climbing" in the definition of PUs. I was concerned that the scope of the interlocutory injunctions granted to date and sought in future would cover homeless people who sought to enter the Site and sleep under a tarpaulin, or youths who sought to drink alcopops on Site but had no intention of climbing anywhere. If those were the perpetrators which were to be restrained by this injunction, I would not have granted it. in my judgment it is not the purpose of this jurisdiction in the High Court to make PU injunctions against mere vagrants or trespassers, there must be something more and the full requirements must be satisfied. In this case, for those who climb high structures and create real risks of substantial harm to those I have listed above, the factors are satisfied. In the interim order I will make the definition of PUs has been altered to include climbing. I am satisfied that it better mirrors the substance of the claim form and the witness statements in support.

7 – The terms of the injunction

18. The prohibitions must be set out in clear words and should not be framed in legal technical terms (like the word "tortious", for instance). I am afraid I use that word a lot, but it is not to be used in the terms of the injunction. Further, if and insofar as it seeks to prohibit any conduct which is lawful viewed on its own, this must also be made absolutely clear and the Claimant must satisfy the Court that there is no other, more proportionate way, of protecting its rights or those of others. In this case, the behaviour is clearly and plainly stated in the terms of the injunction as "trespass plus climbing" or "staying on the site plus climbing" and I am satisfied that that is sufficiently tight. There is no risk of this breaching the rights of persons unknown on public highways or in public areas because it only relates geographically to the Site.

8 – Prohibitions must match the pleaded claim

19. In this case they do, now that the words "climbing" are added.

9 – The geographical boundaries

20. The boundaries are set out in clear plans which were attached to the previous injunctions and will be attached to the injunction which I grant.

10 – Temporal limits - duration

21. The duration of any final injunction should only be such as is proven to be reasonably necessary to protect the Claimants' legal rights in the light of the evidence of past tortious activity and the future feared or quia timet tortious activity. In this case, I am not granting a final injunction, I am granting a further interim injunction and I consider that a year or approximately a year is an appropriate duration for that to keep costs down and because there is no evidence currently before me that the general public wishes to stop urban exploration or abseiling on building sites.

11 – Service

22. Understanding that PUs are, by their nature, not identified, the proceedings, the evidence, the summary judgment application (if one is made) and any draft order and notice of a hearing must be served by alternative means which have been considered and sanctioned by the Court. In this case, the application is ex parte and I consider that is appropriate in the circumstances. However, if it was a final hearing, then appropriate and authorised alternative service would need to be proven.

12 – The right to set aside or vary

23. PUs must be given the right to apply to set aside or vary the injunction on shortish notice, as set out in the judgment in Wolverhampton. They are given that right in the order that I have made and they were given that right in the previous interlocutory orders. I note that nobody took that right up.

13 – Review

24. At least in relation final orders, they are not final in PU cases, they are quasi final. Final orders in PU cases are clearly not final, they are quasi final in that they need to be reviewed in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. Provision needs to be made for reviewing the injunction in future and the regularity of reviews depends on the circumstances. In this case, I do not need to consider review because it is a further interlocutory injunction that I am granting.

Conclusion

25. Having run through the 13 factors I do consider, on the balance of convenience, that it is appropriate to grant a further interim injunction and I do so. I will consider the terms of the injunction as discussed with leading counsel when they are sent through to my clerk. I understand that no costs are required and, hence, the order will say "no costs on the application".
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