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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> G v B [2025] EWHC 1222 (Fam) (16 May 2025)
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Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1222 (Fam)

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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1222 (Fam)
Case No: FD25P00022

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
16 May 2025

B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE PEEL
____________________

Between:
G
Applicant
- and -

B
Respondent

____________________

Charles Hale KC and Charlotte Georges (instructed by Bin Sevan Advocates (Dubai)) for the Applicant
Michael Edwards (instructed by Hunters Law LLP) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 30 April – 2 May 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 16 May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to National Archives.

    Mr Justice Peel :

  1. The father ("F") of three children aged 6, 4 and 2 applied on 16 January 2025 for a summary return order to Dubai pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The children's mother ("M") opposes the application. As explained by Moylan LJ at para 3 of Re A and B (Children: Summary Return: Non-Convention State) [2022] EWCA Civ 1664, "summary return order" is shorthand for a return order made after a summary welfare determination.
  2. I am sure that each party wants the very best for their children. I am sure they are devoted to their children. Sadly, their own relationship has broken down and is beyond repair, but they will have to work together to ensure that these children grow up as securely and happily as possible.
  3. The law

  4. Dubai is not a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention.
  5. The law in cases where a return order is sought to or from a non-Hague Convention jurisdiction is well established.
  6. In Re J (A Child) (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights) [2005] UKHL 40; [2006] 1 AC 80, Baroness Hale held as follows:
  7. a) "… any court which is determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child has had a statutory duty to regard the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration" [18];
    b) "There is no warrant, either in statute or authority, for the principles of The Hague Convention to be extended to countries which are not parties to it" [22];
    c) "…in all non-Convention cases, the courts have consistently held that they must act in accordance with the welfare of the individual child. If they do decide to return the child, that is because it is in his best interests to do so, not because the welfare principle has been superseded by some other consideration." [25];
    d) "… the court does have power, in accordance with the welfare principle, to order the immediate return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction without conducting a full investigation of the merits. In a series of cases during the 1960s, these came to be known as 'kidnapping' cases." [26];
    e) "Summary return should not be the automatic reaction to any and every unauthorised taking or keeping a child from his home country. On the other hand, summary return may very well be in the best interests of the individual child" [28];
    f) "… focus has to be on the individual child in the particular circumstances of the case" [29];
    g) "… the judge may find it convenient to start from the proposition that it is likely to be better for a child to return to his home country for any disputes about his future to be decided there. A case against his doing so has to be made. But the weight to be given to that proposition will vary enormously from case to case. What may be best for him in the long run may be different from what will be best for him in the short run. It should not be assumed, in this or any other case, that allowing a child to remain here while his future is decided here inevitably means that he will remain here for ever" [32];
    h) "One important variable … is the degree of connection of the child with each country. This is not to apply what has become the technical concept of habitual residence, but to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his 'home' country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture, and his education so far will all come into this" [33];
    i) "Another closely related factor will be the length of time he has spent in each country. Uprooting a child from one environment and bringing him to a completely unfamiliar one, especially if this has been done clandestinely, may well not be in his best interests" [34];
    j) "A child may be deeply unhappy about being recruited to one side in a parental battle. But if he is already familiar with this country, has been here for some time without objection, it may be less disruptive for him to remain a little while longer while his medium and longer term future is decide than it would be to return." [34]
    k) "In a case where the choice lies between deciding the question here or deciding it in a foreign country, differences between the legal systems cannot be irrelevant. But their relevance will depend upon the facts of the individual case. If there is a genuine issue between the parents as to whether it is in the best interests of the child to live in this country or elsewhere, it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which he is to be returned" [39];
    l) "The effect of the decision upon the child's primary carer must also be relevant, although again not decisive." [40]
  8. In Re NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49; [2020] AC 665, Lord Wilson set out questions that the first instance judge should have "at least given some consideration to":
  9. "56. First, the court, which was sitting on 18 June 2019, should have considered whether the evidence before it was sufficiently up to date to enable it then to make the summary order. The mother's statement in answer to the claim under the Convention was dated 29 March 2019. In it she had devoted seven out of 67 paragraphs to assertions of the child's habitual residence in England and of particular circumstances said to demonstrate how happy and settled she had become. In his statement in reply dated 11 April the father had joined issue with the mother's assertions. The oral evidence given by the parties to the judge on 15 April had been limited to the issue of consent to the child's removal from Israel and so had not addressed these matters.
    57. Second, the court should have considered whether the judge had made, or whether it could make, findings sufficient to justify the summary order. The only relevant finding made by the judge had been that on 10 January 2019, only seven weeks after her arrival in England, the child had retained habitual residence in Israel. Was that sufficient to justify the making of a summary order five months later? In the light of the policy in favour of the making of substantive welfare determinations by the courts of habitual residence, did there need to be inquiry into the child's habitual residence at the relevant date, which, in the absence of an application, was in this case the date of the proposed order?
    58. Third, the court should have considered whether, in order sufficiently to identify what the child's welfare required for the purposes of a summary order, an inquiry should be conducted into any or all of the aspects of welfare specified in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be: see para 49 above. It might in particular have considered that the third of those aspects, namely "the likely effect on [the child] of any change in [her] circumstances", merited inquiry.
    59. Fourth, the court should have considered whether in the light of Practice Direction 12J, an inquiry should be conducted into the disputed allegations made by the mother of domestic abuse and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be: see para 50 above. The judge had made no findings about them. Instead, in accordance with the E case cited in para 12 above, he had, for the purposes of the claim under the Convention, made a reasonable assumption in relation to the maximum level of risk to the child arising out of any domestic abuse to be perpetrated by the father and had considered that such risk would be contained within acceptable limits by undertakings offered by the father, the enforceability of which in Israel the judge had not explored. Consideration should therefore have been given to whether, in a determination to be governed by the child's welfare, the judge's approach to the mother's allegations remained sufficient.
    60. Fifth, the court should have considered whether, without identification in evidence of any arrangements for the child in Israel, in particular of where she and the mother would live, it would be appropriate to conclude that her welfare required her to return there.
    61. Sixth, the court should have considered whether, in the light of its consideration of the five matters identified above, any oral evidence should be given by the parties and, if so, upon what aspects and to what extent.
    62. Seventh, the court should have considered whether, in the light of its consideration of the same matters, a CAFCASS officer should be directed to prepare a report and, if so, upon what aspects and to what extent. It is noteworthy that in the L case discussed in para 43 above, a CAFCASS report had been prepared. It had been designed to ascertain the boy's wishes and feelings and so was apparently made as if pursuant to section 1(3)(a) of the 1989 Act: see para 14 of Baroness Hale's judgment. In her careful weighing, in paras 34 to 37 of her judgment, of the welfare considerations which militated both in favour of, and against, the boy's return to Texas, Baroness Hale relied to a significant extent upon the content of the CAFCASS report.
    63. Eighth, the court should have considered whether it needed to compare the relative abilities of the Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem and the Family Court in London to reach a swift resolution of the substantive issues between the parents in relation to the child and to satisfy itself that the Rabbinical Court had power to authorise the mother to relocate with the child back to England: see para 34 above.

    Oral evidence

  10. M applied for oral evidence to be given by the parties, and M's mother, in respect of her allegations against F of domestic abuse. Both parties accept that it is a matter for the court to decide whether and to what extent oral evidence should be given. In Re A and B (supra), the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Poole J at first instance not to conduct a fact finding inquiry into allegations of domestic abuse by a mother when determining whether to order a return of the children to the UAE, nor to hear oral evidence. Moylan LJ said at para 72:
  11. "As in all welfare decisions, the extent of the court's inquiry and the court's determination of what order to make will depend on the facts of the particular case".
  12. It is M's case that a fact finding is necessary for the purpose of (i) determining the application for a return order and (ii) future welfare proceedings. She has set out her allegations in writing in comprehensive detail. In summary, she alleges against F a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour towards her throughout the marriage, characterised by:
  13. i) Emotional harm and verbal abuse, including F calling her "mentally unstable", "a bitch" and a "disgusting nightmare" and saying that he would "destroy her".

    ii) Financial control.

    iii) Other matters such as accessing M's private emails when she was seeking legal advice.

    iv) Intimidating behaviour, notably in an incident in August 2022 captured in a short phone video, and a highly charged episode in December 2024.

    v) Threatening to "lose it" with the children".

  14. F denies the allegations, whilst acknowledging that at times during the relationship emotions ran high. It is his case that M displayed erratic and unstable behaviour.
  15. So, says M, the court needs to establish these factual matters in order to assess the level of risk upon return, and to ensure that the essential factual matrix is established before the court (whether here or in Dubai) can embark upon the welfare analysis which will govern child arrangements. She says that, applying PD12J and K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468, it is relevant for the welfare of these children to establish the factual matrix.
  16. I declined to conduct a fact finding, or to hear oral evidence, for the following reasons:
  17. i) This is an application for a summary return order rather than a child arrangements order. Usually, and as with 1980 Hague Convention applications, the purpose of the return order decision is essentially to determine where future welfare child arrangements should be decided, in this case in Dubai or in England. It is for the courts of the seised jurisdiction then to determine whether there is a need for a fact finding hearing/inquiry into domestic abuse, and if so how it should be case managed.

    ii) It is open to me to adopt the approach in Hague Convention cases where the Article 13(b) defence is pleaded, by hypothetically taking M's case at its highest (albeit not making any findings), and assuming the maximum level of risk to the children alleged by her in the event of return. That was how Poole J took account of the allegations in Re A and B, and it seems to me to be a proportionate and pragmatic way to deal with an issue which can be highly contentious, and consuming of a considerable amount of court resources.

    iii) There is a welter of written evidence for me to evaluate and consider when determining whether a return to Dubai should be ordered.

    iv) As it happens, a significant amount of unsupervised contact between F and the children is taking place and M has stated in her evidence that it is "vitally important" for the children to have a relationship with F, and that they should continue to see him on an unsupervised basis in this country, but not in Dubai. Although it will be a matter for another court to decide whether inquiry into domestic abuse is relevant and proportionate for any welfare disputes, on the face of it, there may not be a justifiable need to do so given the apparent acceptance about the benefits to the children of ongoing contact with F.

    v) I note that usually in these cases, to conduct a fact finding hearing will lead to a lengthy delay before the adjudication of the application for a return order. That is contrary to the summary nature of the proceedings. I was told that oral evidence would take two days, which would have inevitably led to adjourning the case part heard for submissions and judgment.

  18. There are usually two distinct stages in these cases; the first is the return order application, and the second is the subsequent determination by the court of the long term child arrangements. The child's welfare is the test in both stages, but the first stage is more susceptible to abbreviated proceedings.
  19. My view is that oral evidence should be expressly justified in these non-Hague return cases, and should not be regarded as the default position, although ultimately it is a matter of judicial discretion in each case.
  20. One can see that if there is an issue about whether consent to removal was given, there may well be a need for oral evidence on that particular issue, but issues about conduct are less likely to require oral evidence. At case management hearings, the focus should be on having the return order application dealt with as promptly as possible in the interests of the children. After all, it is only when the return order application is determined that the court can fully move on to long term welfare decisions.
  21. Having now heard submissions, I am satisfied that I have had ample material to reach a just decision and it was the correct decision not to receive oral evidence on the domestic abuse allegations.
  22. Background

  23. F is a Swiss national, and M is a Britih national. Both are of Christian, not Sharia, faith. F works in tech-finance. M has not worked since the birth of their first child. The children are dual Swiss and British citizens, save for the oldest child) who is Swiss only. M was born in Hong Kong to British parents, returning to the United Kingdom when she was aged 7. In her twenties she appears to have lived between Dubai and London. The parties met in Dubai in 2015 and shortly afterwards started living together there. They had brief separations but reconciled and married in Dubai on 24 August 2018.
  24. The three children are 6, 4 and 2 years old.
  25. There is a dispute between the parties about the extent of their respective parental roles. It is clear that F was a fully involved, hands on father. However, the evidence, albeit untested orally, does not seem to me to establish that he was the primary carer. He was at work during the day, while M did not work. These are young children. It seems likely to me that they both had very involved roles, but M probably took the parental lead.
  26. The family lived in Dubai until June 2020, when they relocated to London for F's work and settled in an area in London. The oldest child, who had been born in Dubai, attended school in London from September 2023. The younger two children were born in England. The family integrated well in England. However, there were some problems in the marriage and the parents attended couples therapy.
  27. In the summer of 2024, F wanted to relocate the family to Dubai for employment and financial reasons. M was reluctant (F accepts that she was unsettled by the idea) but agreed to the move. It was also agreed that M's mother would accompany them. In my assessment, M's mother became an important supportive figure for M and the children.
  28. The family moved to Dubai in August 2024. They purchased one way plane tickets. They secured rented housing, schooling for the oldest child, and medical registration. A car was bought and other logistical arrangements were made. All their belongings were shipped to Dubai. A spousal residence visa for M was obtained. Notice of leaving was given to the oldest child's school in London. F says that the entire process of relocation cost about £150,000. M says she did not see it as a long term move, but the documentary evidence suggests that this was intended as a full move, not a temporary or trial period.
  29. The children lived in Dubai from August 2024 to the beginning of January 2025, a period of some 4 months. Thus, by January 2025:
  30. i) The oldest child had lived in Dubai from March 2019 to June 2020 and from August 2024 to January 2025, and in England from June 2020 to August 2024 which amounts to about 1 ½ years in Dubai and just over 4 years in England.

    ii) The middle child had lived in England for about 3 ½ years, and in Dubai about 4 months.

    iii) The youngest child had lived in England for about 1 ½ years, and in Dubai for 4 months.

  31. The children have, since January 2025, lived in England for a further 4 months.
  32. As Baroness Hale said in Re J, it is not necessary or helpful to consider technical questions of habitual residence, which has a very specific meaning under English and European law. Put simply, in my view, the children lived in England from June 2020 to August 2024, and in Dubai from August 2024 to the start of January 2025.
  33. Unhappily, the parties' relationship swiftly deteriorated in Dubai such that they attended therapy in November 2024. For both of them these months were difficult, and there must have been a tense atmosphere in the family household witnessed and sensed by the children. M believed that F was undermining and controlling her; F became convinced that M was creating a wedge between him and the children, and planning a move back to England with the children.
  34. On 1 December 2024, F left the family home; it may be that he thought this was for an initial temporary period, but he did not in fact return on a full time basis. He visited on a number of occasions to spend time with the children, and the arguments and conflict continued.
  35. On 7 December 2024, F says that he could not find the children's UK passports, which he believed had been hidden by M. Subsequently, he discovered that M had withdrawn large sums of cash. At about this time he was contacted by the Dubai police who told him that M had been enquiring whether there was a travel ban on the children.
  36. On 9 December 2024, M applied for divorce in England. The papers were served on F on 18 December 2024. Subsequently, she issued a financial remedies application 15 January 2025.
  37. On 12 December 2024, F applied in Dubai for a joint custody order. No court order on the application has yet been made
  38. On 24 December 2024, a significant episode of conflict occurred between the parents, witnessed by the children. It seems that the relationship between the parents, already at a low ebb, reached breaking point.
  39. F made various further applications to the Dubai court:
  40. i) For a travel ban in respect of the children, made on 30 December 2024. An order was made without notice, but only registered or activated after their departure.

    ii) An application made on 31 December 2024 for M to facilitate visitation rights in Dubai. An order was made on 2 Jan 2025.

    iii) An application made on 31 December 2024 for M to deliver up the children's passports to F. An order was made on 3 January 2025.

    iv) A divorce application made on 31 Dec 2024. A final divorce order was made on 25 February 2025, which M is appealing on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

  41. It may be that M is in breach of Dubai orders as follows:
  42. i) The order for delivery up of the children's passports.

    ii) The order for her to make the children available for visitation in Dubai.

    I say "may be" because F thinks that the making of the divorce order automatically discharged these two orders. However, that was not made out in the evidence and (taking M's case at its highest) I proceed on the assumption that she remains in breach.

  43. On 2 January 2025, M, the maternal grandmother and the children left Dubai and returned to England without F's knowledge or consent, and just before the travel ban was activated. It seems that M initially told F she had left for a few days to clear her head, but it been since confirmed in correspondence that when she left, it was her intention not to return.
  44. Since arrival in England, M and the children have been living with the maternal grandmother in her flat in another area of London. F has opposed the children entering schools here, such that M has been home schooling the older two children, with the assistance of tutoring.
  45. F remains in Dubai. By agreement, he has visited the children in England several times, including for overnight unsupervised periods of contact, most recently for 3 days between 24 and 27 April 2025.
  46. M's mental health

  47. M has produced a letter dated 1 April 2025 from her UK GP. It refers to anxiety and low mood in 2008 which led to a referral to a private psychiatrist. She was diagnosed with clinical depression and admitted to the Priory for 5 weeks. She continued to see the psychiatrist as an outpatient, and was prescribed mirtazapine until 2014. Thereafter she was reviewed at the GP practice on several occasions with issues relating to her mood.
  48. On 8 January 2025 she was reviewed by the GP. She presented with a history of acute anxiety related to issues with F. A course of medication was prescribed. She has been seen three times since then, continuing to experience anxiety and stress. She reported poor concentration, panic, difficulty sleeping, poor appetite and physical symptoms of stress. She has experienced relationship flashbacks.
  49. F does not dispute (indeed expressly asserts) M's poor mental health history and in a note to their previous therapist dated 8 January 2025 said that "her current behaviour suggests instability that could affect her ability to care for our children".
  50. Evidence of Mr Edge

  51. Pursuant to a case management order, Mr Edge was jointly instructed as to relevant UAE (and specifically Dubai) family law. He gave oral evidence to me. I summarise his written and oral evidence as follows:
  52. i) On 1 February 2023, the UAE brought into force a Federal Law of Civil Status ("FLCS") to apply a civil/secular set of family law principles to non-Muslims in a separate court from cases brought under Federal Personal Status Law ("PSL"), of which the most recent iteration was brought into force on 15 April 2025, which is principally aimed at Muslim families. Where the FLCS has gaps, it will be filled by application of the PSL. For example, the travel ban and the passport order were both obtained under the PSL.

    ii) The FLCS changes, which are designed to move towards a more international legal approach for non-Muslim families, have not yet been fully explored and tested, and so there is a level of uncertainty as to how these provisions will be applied by the courts. The principal changes are to provide for equal treatment of parties, and to evaluate child arrangements according to best interests.

    iii) Divorced parents have joint custody in raising the children. The amount of time spent by the children with each parent may be equal or unequal, subject to what the court considers is in the best interests of the children.

    iv) After divorce under the FLCS, a mother is entitled to (i) a residence to raise the children in accordance with the previous standard of living, and (ii) maintenance which can be paid monthly or by lump sum.

    v) The behaviour/conduct of the parties can be taken into account in determining custody and/or financial arrangements. F could raise the removal of the children by M as behaviour suggesting she is an untrustworthy/unfit mother, but there is no indication yet how the court would approach that suggestion.

    vi) There is a duty contained in many of the provisions about children to consider the best interests of the child, although there is not one overriding requirement to do so.

    vii) Mr Edge does not believe the mother is at material risk of any criminal proceedings in UAE, by reason of the removal of the children.

    viii) M could make an application for relocation in Dubai based upon Article 10(3) of the FLCS (although relocation is not specifically mentioned). It is not clear how that will be interpreted. There is no real case law on such applications.

    ix) The parties may submit an agreement (including one entered into in England) which can be confirmed and enforceable locally as a judgment/order in the court.

    x) A new Domestic Violence Law came into force in 2024. It defines domestic abuse to encompass physical, psychological, sexual and economic harm. Coercive control is not expressly referred to but the identified factors could combine to be interpreted in that way. It makes provision for setting up shelters and safe spaces. Again, it is too soon to know how it will be implemented by the courts. In the past, the courts have required evidence of physical abuse and it remains to be seen whether the recent law change will expand the approach of the courts.

    xi) The courts take account of domestic abuse in children cases, although they tend to deal with all matters on a rolled up basis, rather than a separate fact finding hearing.

    xii) It is possible to obtain a Protection Order either from the Public Prosecutor or from the courts, but Mr Edge said this can be a bureaucratic process and take some time, which he measured in months.

    xiii) It would be straightforward for F to apply to discharge the existing passport order, travel ban, and visitation order.

    xiv) Legal proceedings are likely to be expensive and lengthy.

    xv) Undertakings given to an English court are not enforceable in Dubai, but can be made anew to a Dubai court or before a Notary, although I was not told what sanctions are available in the event of breach.

    Immigration expert

  53. The single joint instruction of an immigration expert was provided for at a case management hearing. He was not required to give oral evidence. His written evidence is that:
  54. i) M's spousal visa can be cancelled by F, her sponsor, at any time by a simple administrative procedure, although "If an amicable agreement is reached between the mother and her ex-husband, the current residence permit arrangements could be maintained until at least the mother is able to find suitable alternatives".

    ii) If M and the children are out of the country for 180 consecutive days, which in this case means up to 1 July 2025, they are at risk of "automatic invalidation" of their residence visas.

    Positions on child arrangements

  55. Although the only application before me is for a return order, I asked both parties during the hearing to set out their proposals in respect of child arrangements should they respectively succeed.
  56. F's case is that if the children are returned to Dubai, they should live with M for 8 days out of 14, and for him with 6 days out of 14, with a division of holiday time.
  57. M's case is that if the children are not returned, F can come to the UK and have the children on alternate weekends, with a division of holiday time.
  58. F's submissions

  59. F says that M uprooted the children from their settled home and surroundings in Dubai and, in the oldest child's case, her school. She did so clandestinely, without his knowledge or agreement. She has caused instability and uncertainty in their lives. They have suffered by being separated from F. He says that Dubai is familiar to M (who lived there for many years) and to the children. The children's welfare is better met by the well-appointed family home in Dubai, surrounded by their belongings, rather than the maternal grandmother's flat in London. He points to the financial benefits of being in Dubai, and the strong health care and educational provision. He says that if returned to Dubai, the children would have the benefit of spending time with each parent.
  60. F submits that the recent law changes in Dubai mean that M will be treated equally and fairly under the system there both in respect of divorce and child arrangements. Issues concerning the children will be determined according to best interests. The relocation jurisdiction is available.
  61. In summary a return to Dubai for the children will restore their routine and stability, and is in their interests.
  62. In order to meet the various concerns raised by M about a return, he offers a series of "protective measures", a phrase lifted from 1980 Hague Convention proceedings but which I will adopt for convenience. I emphasise that this should not be viewed in the context of the 1980 Convention jurisprudence on Article 13(b); rather it is to be seen as a series of measures designed to mitigate any risk of harm to the children, and to enhance their welfare upon return. I attach at Annex A the updated document setting out his proposals.
  63. M's submissions

  64. M headlines six broad submissions.
  65. First the immigration evidence suggests that M is at risk of her visa being invalidated or discharged, with the possible consequence of deportation. It is not practical to expect her to obtain some form of work based visa instead, and a visitor visa would only be for 90 days.
  66. Second, the new family law provisions in Dubai are uncertain. M cannot be confident as to how the principles will be applied. Further, her breaches of existing orders may be held against her in child arrangements proceedings; indeed, F in his submission to the Dubai court for visitation rights dated 31 December 2024 refers to Article 12 which states that a breach by the custodian "shall be considered a breach of the condition of trust and shall be taken into account when requesting the cancellation of custody". M specifically points to Mr Edge's evidence about the uncertainty of relocation proceedings, in circumstances where Baroness Hale at paragraph 39 of Re J (supra) said: "…it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which [the child] is to be returned". She refers also to the difficulties on obtaining a Protection order.
  67. Third, the alleged domestic abuse would be perpetuated by a return to Dubai in that M would be dependent for practical, logistical and financial support on F, whom she accuses of economic abuse. She would be reliant upon F complying with the terms of the protective measures offered. She would be deprived of the support of her wider family, in particular her mother.
  68. Fourth, her mental health issues would be exacerbated by a return to Dubai, and as a result would likely impact on the children.
  69. Fifth, she submits that the protective measures will not meet the various matters raised.
  70. Sixth, she says that the greater connection for the children is with England, not Dubai and the time spent in Dubai was short, fractious and unstable.
  71. Conclusion

  72. I am very grateful to counsel for both parties who have been of very considerable assistance. No more could have been said on their respective clients' behalves.
  73. Having carefully weighed up all the evidence and submissions in the round and as part of an interlocking jigsaw, I have come to the clear conclusion that F's application for a return order should be refused for a number of reasons.
  74. I remind myself that the guiding principle, as explained in Re J, is the welfare of the children.
  75. I do not find the phrase "habitual residence" of much assistance; as Baroness Hale pointed out at para 33 of Re J it has become a technical concept and one which usually is a gateway condition for relief sought. Thus under the 1980 Hague Convention the application for a return order must satisfy the court that the relevant child was habitually resident in the outgoing country in order to be able to apply for a return order. As another example, sometimes a party will apply to the English court for a return order in respect of a child removed overseas, and will ordinarily need to satisfy the court that there is jurisdiction to make such an order by reason of habitual residence (or another appropriate ground) under the Family Law Act 1986. That is not the case here. There is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction to make an order and the issue before me is welfare based. More useful is the "degree of connection" as Baroness Hale put it, which then forms one part of the welfare evaluation, influenced by, and influencing, other parts of the evaluation.
  76. In my judgment the far closer connection of the children is with England rather than Dubai (unlike the facts in Re A and B (supra) where a return order to Dubai was made):
  77. i) As set out above, they have all lived a far greater proportion of their lives in England rather than Dubai.

    ii) Neither parent is Emirati. M is British. None of the children have UAE passports; two have British passports as well as Swiss passports.

    iii) The period from June 2020 to August 2024 was one where the family put down deep roots in England; work, family life (including M's extended family), education, community, social life and so on were the environment in which the children were brought up. It was their home. They spent no time in the UAE.

    iv) From August 2024 to 2 January 2025, I accept that Dubai became their home as a result of the relocation. But as Mr Hale KC rightly acknowledged on behalf of F, the roots developed in that time were shallow. It was only a matter of 4 months. The relationship of the parents was tense, and broke down in acrimony. The atmosphere must have been unsettling for the children. This period was precarious.

    v) In my judgment the degree of connection with England, in terms of time spent, family roots and quality of family life was and remains incomparably greater than the connection with Dubai.

  78. I take the view that M's mother, the children's maternal grandmother, has become an important figure in the children's lives. She is close to M. She seems to have been a regular presence in the June 2020 to August 2024 period in England. She accompanied the family to Dubai. M and the children have lived with her in London since they all came to England in January 2025. She has made it clear in her witness statement that she would not return to Dubai if this court makes a return order. I consider it likely that she is a source of stability and reassurance for the children, and to be parted from her would be a negative consequence of a return order.
  79. I do not accept F's submission that because M and the children are in a different part of London than where they previously lived, that in some way militates in favour of a return order. M's network of friends is in the previous part of London where they lived, which she goes to when she can, but in reality at present she and the children have no real alternative unless and until F makes financial provision for them to move back there (if that can be afforded), either by agreement or in financial remedy proceedings.
  80. The children now appear to be reasonably settled in England after four months since they came here in early January (about the same length of time as they spent in Dubai). A change of circumstances occasioned by a move to Dubai is likely to be a source of instability, particularly without their grandmother and with the post relationship breakdown arrangements not yet resolved.
  81. M's documented mental health issues seem to me to be a significant factor, particularly when coupled with her case on domestic abuse. F agrees that she has a history of mental illness which I have outlined above. He appears to think there is a potential consequence upon her ability to care for the children, as evidenced by his email to the therapist. M's mental health is relevant in two overlapping ways:
  82. i) I accept that there is no psychiatric evidence on M (an application for a report was, in my view rightly, refused at a case management hearing). However, the evidence which I have outlined suggests to me that it is likely her mental health would be negatively impacted by a return to Dubai where (i) she would no longer have her family support network (particularly her mother), (ii) she would be (on her case) forced back to a country where she has been the subject of domestic abuse, (iii) she would be dependent on F in practical and financial terms even though the relationship has ended, (iv) there is some uncertainty about her visa situation and (v) she would be facing prolonged litigation in Dubai and no immediate prospect of a return to England. This constellation of factors is likely to be distressing and detrimental to her wellbeing.

    ii) Linked to (i), a negative impact on M is likely to feed through to the children, potentially affecting her parenting ability (adverted to by F) and at the very least exposing the children to a low, depressed atmosphere.

  83. Although family law in Dubai for non-Muslim families has been since 2023 rather more aligned with the laws of England and Wales, and other Western based legal systems, as Mr Edge says it is new and untested. The principle of comity deserves the highest respect. But there is at least a question mark about whether M will be able realistically to pursue a relocation application with any prospect of success. At the very least, it would be understandable for her general anxiety to be exacerbated by uncertainty as to the remedies available to her. She must face, too, the possibility that her actions in removing the children will work against her. There is uncertainty also about how easy it would be to obtain domestic abuse protection orders. It may be that none of this would present difficulty but as Mr Edge said, it is all rather uncertain.
  84. The protective measures offered by F are comprehensive and in my judgment it does him credit to have thought them through carefully. However, they are not in my judgment of such significance as to outweigh the other matters referred to herein. They address some of the practical consequences on the ground to mitigate risk of harm to the children, but the exercise before me is a welfare evaluation, not just a harm analysis as would be the case under Article 13(b)). I have to look at the wider picture, considering all relevant factors within the framework of the children's interests. There is also a practical problem that they depend on F abiding by them. There is no evidence that he would not, and I have no reason to think he would not. But were he to renege on these commitments after the return of the children, in circumstances when there is no clear evidence of sanctions available in Dubai, M and the children would be placed in a difficult position. Accordingly, even if the risk of breach is low, the effects of breach would be significant. At the very least, it would be a source of anxiety for M to be reliant on continued adherence to the measures by F.
  85. Further, I think it possible that they would not all be implemented before 1 July 2025, whether by way of court order in Dubai or undertaking in that jurisdiction, such that M would risk her visa being automatically invalidated upon return. Were that to occur, the consequences for M and the children (deportation and separation of M from the children) would be very grave indeed.
  86. I am conscious of F's concerns about the impact on his relationship with the children if they remain in England. However, he has been able to see them on, I believe, five occasions since January and he is in the fortunate position of having resources to enable him to travel and have them with him overnight. Moreover, I was assured that M would agree to an order for contact with F to be made along the lines of her proposal. I will require that to be included in the order. It should be regarded as an interim order, but I sincerely hope that it can provide a blueprint for the parties going forward.
  87. I will provide in the order that both parties should attend mediation about finances and the children. In the light of this decision, the picture on the ground should now be clearer for mediation to make progress.
  88. I urge both parties to reflect, at the end of this hard fought litigation, on the viewpoint of the other. F should appreciate M's genuine worries about returning to Dubai where she would feel trapped, helpless and dependent. M should reflect on F's genuine worries about his contact with the children, and his mistrust of M as a result of the circumstances in which she abruptly, and secretively, removed the children from Dubai.
  89. I am satisfied that it is in the children's interests for the application to be dismissed.
  90. Any future child arrangements application shall be made to the local family court.
  91. ANNEXE
    Protective measures offered by F

    In advance of the children's return to Dubai:

    a. Cancel/discharge the travel ban, Orders in respect of passports and arrangements for children as previously ordered in Dubai;
    b. Settle M's legal debts to solicitors in UK and Dubai, including the costs Order made against M within the Dubai divorce proceedings/discharge that order;
    c. Agree reciprocal terms equivalent to a non-molestation/Occupation Order with M;
    d. F will meet the cost of flights for M and the children to return to Dubai.

    Upon landing/return to Dubai:

    Living/Education Arrangements:
    e. M and the children to return to reside at the current family home in Dubai until completion of the financial issues between the parties.
    f. F will vacate the property prior to their arrival and not to return, save for any agreement reached in respect of contact/handovers at the property.
    g. F to continue to meet the costs of the children's education at their current International School/nursery in Dubai.
    h. Agree not to attend the airport upon M and the children's return to Dubai (M to confirm to father that she and the children have landed and when they have re-entered the family home).
    Visas:
    i. F undertakes not to undermine or withdraw his sponsorship for the current valid visas in place for M and the children.
    j. He will provide his assistance/support/sponsorship (as may be necessary) to M in the future, in obtaining any new visas she (and children) may require to remain in Dubai.
    k. F shall meet the reasonable costs of the mother/children obtaining new visas when required.
    Financial:
    l. F will provide M with a lump sum of £20,000 immediately upon her return to Dubai (into her personal bank account), to use as she wishes, the only caveat to such funds is that when necessary, and upon expiration of her current medical insurance, she shall set up and meet the costs of her own personal health insurance going forward; allowing her autonomy/confidentiality in respect of this policy. F confirms he will continue to meet the costs of the children's medical insurance.
    m. F will continue to meet the costs of accommodation until completion of the financial settlement.
    n. F will provide an interim monthly sum of maintenance in the sum of £2,500 (in Dirham to ensure that M is able to meet her reasonable outgoings for herself and the children).
    o. Meet the costs of mediation for a period of up to four months (M can choose location of the mediation - including UK mediator if required by screen). Following such period of mediation, and in circumstances in which court proceedings remain necessary, F shall meet M's costs of such representation by her current Dubai lawyer on a monthly basis up to a cap of 30K.
    Other:
    p. F will undertake not to seek nor support any prosecution or civil punishment of any nature of M in Dubai, England or any other jurisdiction in respect of her unlawful removal of the children to England and Wales.
    q. The children's passports will be deposited with a Dubai based solicitor (independent from both) pending resolution of arrangements for the children in Dubai at F's cost – only to be released by agreement [OR 1 passport with F and 2 with M? – at no costs].
    r. F confirms he remains willing to engage in mediation or other and all forms of non-court dispute resolution to try to resolve the child arrangement issues relating to the children.
    s. Transfer the Car in Dubai to M for her sole use [save by agreement with M for F to use on occasion - F does not have a car].

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