FAMILY DIVISION
The Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Applicant |
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-and- |
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DC |
Respondent |
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Ms Cliona Papazian (instructed by Sam Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 19th to 20th December 2022
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Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE MOOR:-
The relevant history
The law I have to apply
Settlement
"The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment."
"[53]… A broad and purposive construction of what amounts to 'settled in its new environment' will properly reflect the facts of each case, including the very important factor of concealment or subterfuge that has caused or contributed to the asserted delay…
[61] I would unhesitatingly uphold the well-recognised construction of the concept of settlement in Article 12(2): it is not enough to regard only the physical characteristics of settlement. Equal regard must be paid to the emotional and psychological elements. In cases of concealment and subterfuge the burden of demonstrating the necessary elements of emotional and psychological settlement is much increased.
"(1) The proceedings must be commenced within one year of the abduction. The making of a complaint to police or an application to a Central Authority does not suffice.
(2) The focus must be on the child. Settlement must be considered from the child's perspective, not the adult's. The date for the assessment is the date of the commencement of proceedings not the date of the hearing. This is aimed at preventing settlement being achieved by delay in the process.
(3) Settlement involves both physical and emotional or psychological components. Physically, it involves being established or integrated into an environment compromising a home and school, a social and family network, activities and opportunities. Emotional or psychological settlement connotes security and stability within that environment. It is more than mere adjustment to present surroundings.
(4) Concealment and delay may be relevant to establishing settlement. Concealment is likely to undermine settlement. Living openly is likely to permit greater settlement. The absence of a relationship with a left behind parent will be an important consideration in determining whether a child is settled.
(5) A broad and purposive construction will properly reflect the facts of each case – it does not require a 2 stage approach but must, to use a probably over-used expression, involve a holistic assessment of whether the child is settled in its new environment. It has to be kept in mind that the settlement exception is intended to reflect welfare. The Article 12 settlement exception of all the exceptions is most welfare focused. The underlying purpose of the exception is to enable the court in furtherance of the welfare of the child to decline a summary return because imposing a summary return (i.e. without a more detailed consideration of welfare) might compound the harm caused by the original abduction by uprooting a child summarily from his by now familiar environment."
"As I have said earlier, there is clearly a degree of overlap between the concepts of settlement and habitual residence. Settlement does not require a complete settlement, any more than habitual residence requires full integration. Settlement is plainly an evaluation which is, to some degree, subjective. There will be a spectrum ranging from the obviously and completely settled to the very unsettled. In between, there are many possibilities."
Child's objections
"The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views."
"(1) The gateway stage should be confined to a straightforward and fairly robust examination of whether the simple terms of the Convention are satisfied in that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views.
(2) Whether a child objects is a question of fact. The child's views have to amount to an objection before Art 13 will be satisfied. An objection in this context is to be contrasted with a preference or wish.
(3) The objections of the child are not determinative of the outcome but rather give rise to a discretion. Once that discretion arises, the discretion is at large. The child's views are one factor to take into account at the discretion stage.
(4) There is a relatively low threshold requirement in relation to the objections defence, the obligation on the court is to 'take account' of the child's views, nothing more.
(5) At the discretion stage there is no exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The court should have regard to welfare considerations, in so far as it is possible to take a view about them on the limited evidence available. The court must give weight to Convention considerations and at all times bear in mind that the Convention only works if, in general, children who have been wrongfully retained or removed from their country of habitual residence are returned, and returned promptly.
(6) Once the discretion comes into play, the court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child's objections, the extent to which they are authentically the child's own or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or at odds with other considerations which are relevant to the child's welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations (Re M [2007] 1 AC 619).
Article 13(b)
"(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation".
"(1) The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words "grave" and "intolerable".
(2) The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return.
(3) The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk.
(4) When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk.
(5) In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination.
(6) That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do.
(7) If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk.
(8) In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there.
(9) In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance.
(10) As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on "Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings" issued by the President of the Family Division on 13 March 2018, the question of specific protective measures must be addressed at the earliest opportunity, including by obtaining information as to the protective measures that are available, or could be put in place, to meet the alleged identified risks."
Discretion
"To sum up, the exercise of the discretion under the Convention is acutely case-specific within a framework of policy and welfare considerations. In reaching a decision, the court will consider the weight to be attached to all relevant factors, including: the desirability of a swift restorative return of abducted children; the benefits of decisions about children being made in their home country; comity between member states; deterrence of abduction generally; the reasons why the court has a discretion in the individual case; and considerations relating to the child's welfare.
In a consent case, the better view is that the weight to be given to the policy considerations of counteracting wrongful removal and deterring abduction may be relatively slight, while the weight to be attached to home-based decision-making and comity will depend critically on the facts of the case and the view that the court takes of the effect of a summary return on the child's welfare."
The evidence that I heard
My conclusions
Mr Justice Moor
20 December 2022