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FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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A LOCAL AUTHORITY | Applicant | |
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THE MOTHER | First Respondent | |
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THE FATHER | Second Respondent | |
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(By his Children's Guardian) | Third Respondent |
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Ms Sam King QC and Mr Julian Hayes (instructed by Berris Law) for the First Respondent
Mr John Tughan QC and Mr Greg Davies (instructed by HarrisTemperley LLP) for the Second Respondent
Mr Alex Verdan QC and Ms Sally Bradley (instructed by Eskinazi & Co) for the Third Respondent
Hearing dates: 15 April – 15 May 2020
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Judgment Approved
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Lieven :
The factual background
"…trying to give her her bottle but she's not having it I've changed her pooey bum she's been up 5 or 10 minutes um obviously I am going to persist with the bottle anyway you know what I mean so today I'm going to persist with the bottle or (inaudible due to distressed baby) and then just like if she ain't going to take it then we just keep putting her back in the cot in her room and letting her cry it out so then eventually she'll get so hungry to the point where she'll just take the bottle and that seems like (baby makes high pitched cry) the most reasonable thing to do even though it sounds harsh it will get her on the bottle again".
There is then a WhatsApp from the Father to the Mother at 15.25;
"Good news. She took some of the bottle so she's getting the message that she can't have the boob and she can cry all she wants but she'll just keep getting put in the cot. It's frustrating and hard but if we stay consistent (Except at night so we can sleep.) Then she'll understand boob is only at night. Xxx"
General principles of law
"45. First, the burden of proof lies at all times with the local authority.
46. Secondly, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
47. Third, findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation. I have borne this principle in mind throughout this hearing.
48. Fourthly, when considering cases of suspected child abuse the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. The court invariably surveys a wide canvas. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.
49. Fifthly, amongst the evidence received in this case, as is invariably the case in proceedings involving allegations of nonaccidental head injury, is expert medical evidence from a variety of specialists. Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of medical experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. It is important to remember that the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. It is the judge who makes the final decision.
50. Sixth, cases involving an allegation of non-accidental injury often involve a multi-disciplinary analysis of the medical information conducted by a group of specialists, each bringing their own expertise to bear on the problem. The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others.
51. Seventh, the evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability.
52. Eighth, it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720).
53. Ninth, as observed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P in an earlier case "The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today's medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research would throw a light into corners that are at present dark."
54. This principle, inter alia, was drawn from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the criminal case of R v Cannings [2004] EWCA 1 Crim. In that case a mother had been convicted of the murder of her two children who had simply stopped breathing. The mother's two other children had experienced apparent life-threatening events taking a similar form. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division quashed the convictions. There was no evidence other than repeated incidents of breathing having ceased. There was serious disagreement between experts as to the cause of death. There was fresh evidence as to hereditary factors pointing to a possible genetic cause. In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that it could not be said that a natural cause could be excluded as a reasonable possible explanation. In the course of his judgment, Judge LJ (as he then was) observed: "What may be unexplained today may be perfectly well understood tomorrow. Until then, any tendency to dogmatise should be met with an answering challenge.""
Identifying a perpetrator
"26. In these difficult and worrying cases where the court has, as Lord Nicholls has said, to recognise and have regard to the differing interests of the adults and the child, Parliament has provided a two limb threshold which requires to be satisfied before the court has the right to consider the welfare of the child. The first is met in this appeal since the child was injured and suffered significant harm. In relation to the second limb, the attributable condition, it seems to me that the two most likely outcomes in 'uncertain perpetrator' cases are as follows. The first is that there is sufficient evidence for the court positively to identify the perpetrator or perpetrators. Second, if there is not sufficient evidence to make such a finding, the court has to apply the test set out by Lord Nicholls as to whether there is a real possibility or likelihood that one or more of a number of people with access to the child might have caused the injury to the child. For this purpose, real possibility and likelihood can be treated as the same test. As Lord Nicholls pointed out in re O and N (Minors); re B (Minors) (above) the views and indications that the judge at the first part of a split trial may be able to set out may be of great assistance at the later stage of assessment and the provision of the protection package for the injured child. I would therefore formulate the test set out by Lord Nicholls as, "Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?". There may perhaps also be the third possibility that there is no indicator to help the court decide from whom the risk to the child may come, in which eventuality it would be very difficult for the local authority and for the court to assess where the child might be at most risk."
"46. Drawing matters together, it can be seen that the concept of a pool of perpetrators seeks to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual, including those of the child, and the importance of child protection. It is a means of satisfying the attributable threshold condition that only arises where the court is satisfied that there has been significant harm arising from (in shorthand) ill-treatment and where the only 'unknown' is which of a number of persons is responsible. So, to state the obvious, the concept of the pool does not arise at all in the normal run of cases where the relevant allegation can be proved to the civil standard against an individual or individuals in the normal way. Nor does it arise where only one person could possibly be responsible. In that event, the allegation is either proved or it is not. There is no room for a finding of fact on the basis of 'real possibility', still less on the basis of suspicion. There is no such thing as a pool of one.
47. It should also be emphasised that a decision to place a person within the pool of perpetrators is not a finding of fact in the conventional sense. As is made clear in Lancashire at [19], O and N at [27-28] and S-B at [43], the person is not a proven perpetrator but a possible perpetrator. That conclusion is then carried forward to the welfare stage, when the court will, as was said in S-B, "consider the strength of the possibility" that the person was involved as part of the overall circumstances of the case. At the same time it will, as Lord Nicholls put it in Lancashire, "keep firmly in mind that the parents have not been shown to be responsible for the child's injuries." In saying this, he recognised that a conclusion of this kind presents the court with a particularly difficult problem. Experience bears this out, particularly where a child has suffered very grave harm from someone within a pool of perpetrators.
48. The concept of the pool of perpetrators should therefore, as was said in Lancashire, encroach only to the minimum extent necessary upon the general principles underpinning s.31(2). Centrally, it does not alter the general rule on the burden of proof. Where there are a number of people who might have caused the harm, it is for the local authority to show that in relation to each of them there is a real possibility that they did. No one can be placed into the pool unless that has been shown. This is why it is always misleading to refer to 'exclusion from the pool': see Re S-B at [43]. Approaching matters in that way risks, as Baroness Hale said, reversing the burden of proof.
49. To guard against that risk, I would suggest that a change of language may be helpful. The court should first consider whether there is a 'list' of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury. It should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability and should seek, but not strain, to do so: Re D (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 472 at [12]. Only if it cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it go on to ask in respect of those on the list: "Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?" Only if there is should A or B or C be placed into the 'pool'".
Lies
"Within that list of factors, although the judge does not expressly prioritise them, the finding that Mr C lied about the quietness in his flat that night is given the greatest prominence in this section of the judge's analysis. A family court, in common with a criminal court, can rely upon a finding that a witness has lied as evidence in support of a primary positive allegation. The well-known authority is the case of R v Lucas (R) [1981] QB 720 in which the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, after stressing that people sometimes tell lies for reasons other than a belief that the lie is necessary to conceal guilt, held that four conditions must be satisfied before a defendant's lie could be seen as supporting the prosecution case as explained in the judgment of the court given by Lord Lane CJ:
"To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness."
The decision in R v Lucas has been the subject of a number of further decisions of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division over the years, however the core conditions set out by Lord Lane remain authoritative. The approach in R v Lucas is not confined, as it was on the facts of Lucas itself, to a statement made out of court and can apply to a "lie" made in the course of the court proceedings and the approach is not limited solely to evidence concerning accomplices.
In the Family Court in an appropriate case a judge will not infrequently directly refer to the authority of R v Lucas in giving a judicial self-direction as to the approach to be taken to an apparent lie. Where the "lie" has a prominent or central relevance to the case such a self-direction is plainly sensible and good practice.
One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the "lie" is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251.
In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt."
Medical evidence
Professor Mangham
Professor Al-Sarraj
"2. Recent intradural haemorrhage in the infratentorial part of dura but there is no evidence of recent subdural or extradural haemorrhage."
Dr Oates
Dr Marnerides
Dr Fitzpatrick-Swallow
Dr McPartland
Dr Cartlidge
Lay evidence other than the parents
Ms Z
The paternal grandmother
Ms B
The maternal grandfather and Ms C
The Parents' evidence
The Mother
Assessment of the Mother's evidence
The Father
Assessment of the Father's evidence
The parties' submissions
Conclusions
The context of the abuse
The Father
The Mother