England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
SITTING AT MAIDSTONE

		17th July 2017

HHJ POLDEN:

1. I am going to give an ex tempore judgment in this matter. This comes before me today on the restored application of Medway Council, who seek for the respondent Ms Root. to show cause why she should not be committed to prison for alleged breaches of an injunction order made by me on 13 December 2011, as varied by me on 11 June 2012, and further varied by HHJ Murdoch QC, by his order of 24 April 2014.
2. Medway Council are represented today by Mr Elliot of counsel, Ms Root appears as a litigant in person, assisted by her McKenzie Friend.
3. There are other matters that I have got to deal with tomorrow, but I make it clear that, at this stage, I am dealing solely with the alleged breaches of the injunction order.

The Background and the Chronology

4. The background to the case is set out in the affidavit of the social worker, Ms Hopper, dated 12 April 2016. The local authority commenced care proceedings in respect of Ms Root's children, both of whom are now adults.
5. Care orders were made in 2011 and the children were placed with foster parents. Following the making of the care order, there were concerns by the Local Authority that attempts had been made by the mother to contact and disrupt the children's placements, such as posting notes through their door. There were also envelopes containing confidential papers, relating to the care proceedings, left on windscreens of cars in public car parks.
6. Following this, the Local Authority made an application to the court for an injunction order and an order was made by me on 13 December 2011. That order was made by me sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court and an order was made prohibiting Ms Root, until further order, whether herself or by encouraging others, from making any publication of court papers in the public law proceedings relating to her children and to not allow copies of the papers or details specific to the proceedings, as set out within them, to come into the possession of any unauthorised persons.
7. The order also provided, at paragraph 2, that, in the event that Ms Root discovered in her possession, power or control, other documents relating to the proceedings, she was, within three working days, to deliver those up to the Local Authority social worker, unless those documents comprise communications between Ms Root and her legal professionals or were covered by legal professional privilege. A penal notice was attached to the order.
8. Ms Root then made an application to me on 11 June 2012 to vary the order and I discharged paragraph 2 of my earlier order. Ms Root made a further application to discharge the order which came before HHJ Murdoch QC on 24 April 2014. He made an order, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, that Ms Root's application to discharge the injunction order, made on 13 December 2011 as varied by the order of 11 June 2012 was dismissed. However, he varied the injunction to permit publication by Ms Root of information which is permitted by Rule 12.73(1)(a) and (c) and Rule 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and the Practice Direction 12G supplementing those rules.
9. Ms Root then made an application to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal the order of HHJ Murdoch QC. On 28 July 2016, Macur LJ refused an application for leave to appeal, on the basis that an appeal was totally without merit.
10. The Local Authority had attempted to have meetings with Ms Root to discuss concerns that she had, and she did attend two meetings with the social worker and the previous independent reviewing officer. Ms Root was told that neither of her children wanted to have contact with her and did not want to discuss the subject. Ms Root then issued an application to discharge the care order. This was heard by HHJ Scarratt on 11 September 2014. He refused the application to discharge the care order, and he made orders under Section 34(4) and Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 providing the Local Authority with permission to refuse contact and to restrict Ms Root from making any further application regarding the children without permission to do so from the Designated Family Judge.
11. The Local Authority say that it came to their attention on 5 September 2014 that Ms Root had been posting information on Facebook about the children's involvement with Social Services. Initially referring to them by their initials, but then naming them by their full names and naming professionals, including police officers, the independent review officer, social workers and judges.
12. As a result, the Local Authority consulted with their legal department and a letter was sent to Ms Root from Legal Services, warning her that disclosing confidential information about the care proceedings was not appropriate and advising her that she was in breach of the injunction order. That letter was sent on 13 October 2014. It then came to the Local Authorities attention that there was further information on Facebook on 30 December 2014 and that included information about the foster carers and posted photographs of one of the children's previous social workers, IS, describing him as sick and evil.
13. The Local Authority then sought advice from counsel, and the children's new IRO. They had a conference and decided how to proceed. There was concern that if the children became aware of their mother's actions, it would be extremely distressing and traumatising to them, and so it was agreed that information would not be passed on to the children. The Local Authority say that Ms Root continued to put postings on Facebook in breach of the injunction order, including details about the care history of children, photographs of them and details of professionals involved in the proceedings.
14. The elder child became aware of the what the mother was doing and was angry and concerned about it. It is against that background that, on 14 June 2016, the Local Authority issued an application seeking Ms Root's committal to prison for breaching the terms of the injunction order.
15. The application, unfortunately, has been considerably delayed before it has been finally determined today. The matter came before HHJ Lazarus on 5 September 2016. She allocated the committal application to the High Court, and adjourned it until 20 September 2016, for directions before HHJ Scarratt, the Designated Family Judge for Kent, sitting as a Section 9, Deputy High Court Judge.
16. On 20 September 2016, HHJ Scarratt made an order giving directions, and he listed it for hearing before me, for one day, on 12 December 2016. On 12 December 2016, the hearing before me had to be adjourned, part heard, until 2 March 2017.
17. At the hearing on 12 December 2016 the mother was represented by counsel and she accepted that she had published all of the material complained of on her Facebook page, but it was contended on her behalf that she was entitled to publish the material, for 3 reasons. Firstly, she believed that the injunction had come to an end at the conclusion of the care proceedings. Counsel for her conceded that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of Ms Root as to when the final order was made. In her statement, Ms Root, at Paragraph 8, said that the proceedings concluded with the making of final care orders in May or June 2010. That was wrong, because the final care orders were made on 24 May 2011 and her counsel acknowledged that the paragraphs in the statement did not make a great deal of sense as the injunction order was not made until 13 December 2011, i.e. after the care proceedings had concluded. Her position was amended to argue that the proceedings did not really come to an end until 11 September 2014, when HHJ Scarratt refused her final application for contact pursuant to Section 34 of the Children Act 1989.
18. The second point that Ms Root was relying on was that she was entitled to publish the material because she was pursuing a complaint about the conduct of the Local Authority and that was action permitted by Rule 12.73(1)(a) and (c) and Rule 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and the Practice Direction 12(g).
19. The third point argued on Ms Root's behalf was that, in any event, she was not guilty of contempt because she genuinely considered that she was entitled to publish the material. I directed that skeleton arguments be filed on the issue of mens rea .
20. The matter came back before me on 2 March 2017 when, unfortunately, it had to be adjourned again, part heard. It had only been listed for the morning on that occasion, on the understanding that Ms Root was legally represented and that the issues were going to be fairly narrow. At the hearing on 2 March 2017, Ms Root appeared in person. She confirmed that she wanted to act in person, without the benefit of legal advice, because she felt that she had a better knowledge of the matter and its history than any solicitors or counsel could have.
21. I dealt with a preliminary issue that was raised by Ms Root regarding personal service of the committal application, and I determined that, on the particular facts of this case, personal service should be dispensed with. I gave a short judgment, setting out the reasons for that decision, and that judgment should be considered as incorporated within this judgment.
22. The matter was then adjourned until 10 May 2017. Unfortunately, on that occasion Ms Root was not very well and the Local Authority did not actively oppose her application for an adjournment which I granted. She had been recently admitted to hospital and the order that I made on 10 May 2017 sets out, by way of recital, the reasons why the hearing could not go ahead on that day. The matter was, therefore, adjourned until today.
23. I mention for the sake of completeness, though it is not a matter that I am dealing with at the moment, but will be dealt with subsequently, that, at the hearing that took place in December 2016, the mother gave an undertaking to the court that she would take down the postings that she had made and that she would not make any further postings on Facebook. However, when the matter came back to court on 2 March 2017, it was her position that she had been misled by her counsel and the court into giving that undertaking.

The Evidence Considered

24. I have considered very carefully the written evidence in the trial bundle that is before me and I also, on the previous occasion on 2 March 2017, heard oral evidence from the social worker, KMs Hopper. She gave evidence that one of the children had become aware of the actions that their mother was taking in publishing material on Facebook and, as a result, that child had written a letter, dated 23 September 2016, which is to be found in my bundle, and they set out in that letter the impact that it has had on them as they now know the actions that their mother has been taking.

The Burden and Standard of Proof

25. The burden of proof is on the Local Authority. They have to prove that there have been breaches of the injunction order. The standard of proof is the criminal standard and the Local Authority have to make me sure that these breaches have been proved. That is the same as what used to be known as proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.
26. The Local Authority evidence
27. The evidence of the Local Authority is set out in the affidavits of Ms Hopper, together with the exhibits and there are two affidavits for Ms Hopper, 12 April 2016 and 28 February 2017, and exhibited to those affidavits are the actual postings that are complained of.
28. The evidence of Ms Root
29. Insofar as the evidence of Ms Root is concerned, she has sworn an affidavit on 6 December 2016 and, in that affidavit, she sets out the history of the matter. She states, at paragraph seven:
30. 'I accept that I published the letters, photographs and documents suggested by the Local Authority on the dates mentioned and in the manner suggested'.
31. However, she says that it was her understanding, not having had the benefit of legal advice, that the prohibition in the order that I made came to an end at the point when the proceedings that it related to, namely the Children Act public law proceedings, were concluded, which was with the final care orders in May or June 2010. As I have already pointed out, that is actually an error, it should be 2011.
32. It was her view that the proceedings had concluded, and the order was not in force. Therefore, she was entitled to publish information from that point onwards. It has been suggested, and continues to be suggested by the Local Authority, that she suffers from mental illness. She sets out that she has had health problems but is not suffering from mental health problems at the current time.
33. There was a position statement filed on Ms Root's behalf for the hearing on 12 December 2016 and that can be found at A1 1.2(a) to A1 1.2(d) of my bundle. In that position statement Ms Root accepts the substance of the breaches in their entirety, but her position is that her conduct in relation to the online posts is justified by her on the basis that she was fighting for her children. She accepted that said the court may feel that her behaviour was foolish in the extreme; but argues that the continued posting of confidential information as well as the nature of the post does not show any attempt at secrecy and supports her position that she thought that she was entitled to post this information. It repeats the point that Ms Root's understanding was that the injunction came to an end at the conclusion of the care proceedings and said that the relevant date is 11 September 2014.
34. Ms Root has also written a letter to the court, dated 1 March 2017. In that she makes the point that the injunction order must have ceased to have effect on the youngest child's 18^th birthday. She maintains that she is not in contempt of court because her Facebook campaign commenced in August 2014, when she had permission to do so, and also that she had permission under the Family Procedure Rules 12.73 and 12.75 to disclose information to a journalist if it was necessary to enable her to make a complaint against the person or body concerned in the proceedings.
35. For seven years, she has been grieving whilst Medway Council has destroyed her entire family.
36. The Issues and my determination of them
37. Having heard the submissions of the parties, there are a number of matters that have been raised by Ms Root in relation to her defence that she is not in contempt of court. The first matter that she relies on is in relation to service of the injunction order on her, but, as I have said, that was dealt with by me, at the earlier hearing, and I dispensed with service.
38. The next point that Ms Root raises is that the injunction order has lapsed. She complains that she was not present in court when the order was made and, in addition to saying that the order has lapsed, she says that it is invalid. She says that the order obtained by the Local Authority, made by me on the 13 December 2011, was made without notice to her. I am satisfied, from the recording on the face of the order, that her recollection about this is wrong and that she was present at the hearing on 13 December 2011. The order states that she was present, and the order goes on to recite that Ms Root accepted that she had published documents relating to the proceedings as alleged in the affidavit of Ms Bowcock dated 7 December 2011.
39. In my judgment and to the best of my recollection, the correct position is that the Local Authority did initially apply to me on a without notice basis, but I was not satisfied that it should be dealt with without notice to Ms Root and I listed it on 13 December 2011 for her to be served and to attend. She had notice of that hearing and she did attend.
40. In relation to the variation of the order, made by HHJ Murdoch QC, he varied the order so that the mother could publish documents, and the information contained within them, which is permitted by the Rule 12.73 (1)(a) and (c), Rule 12.75 in the Family Procedure Rules, but otherwise he refused the application to discharge the injunction order made by me on 13 December 2011 and varied on 11 June 2012.
41. Ms Root relies on the decision in the case of Re J (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222 and the judgment of Munby J and, in particular, she relies on paragraph 21, in which he said that: 'The prohibition under Section 97, Children Act 1989, comes to an end once the proceedings have been concluded and Section 12 does not protect the identity of anyone involved in the proceedings not even the child'.
42. She therefore says that there is no power under Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 to make any order in the terms that I did.
43. I have considered that point, on behalf of Ms Root, very carefully but, in my judgment, it has no merit to it. The reason why it has no merit to it is that it is clear, when one goes on to read the rest of the judgment, at paragraphs 22-24, that the court has power, both to relax and add to the automatic restraints and, in exercising this jurisdiction, court must conduct the balancing exercise described in Re S (A Child) (Identification Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UK HL 47.
44. At paragraph 23, the President adds two further points. The court may, by appropriate injunction, extend the anonymity of the child beyond the point at which Section 97 ceases to have effect and then, at paragraph 24:
45. 'The court may, likewise, by appropriate injunction, afford anonymity to other participants in the process, for example an expert or Local Authority social worker'.
46. Such injunctions, however, would not regularly be granted.
47. It is clear that in his judgment, HHJ Murdoch QC, sitting as a High Court Judge, was aware of the decision in Re J and he took it into account. A transcript of the judgment is in my bundle at E6 to E8 and the judge was quite aware of the competing rights and the fact that the courts exercise of discretion must be exercised by balancing the Article 8 rights of affected persons with the Article 10 rights of freedom of expression. At Paragraph 12 of the judgment, HHJ Murdoch QC said:
48. 'In my judgment the welfare interests of [the children] ought, in the circumstances of this case to prevail over the Article 10 right of freedom of expression of the mother'.
49. It is quite clear to me and, again, it is reemphasised at paragraph 14 of the judgment, when the judge said:
50. 'This is not an issue where the welfare of the children is paramount. It is an issue where the Article 8 rights and Article 10 rights have be balanced, but in my judgment the balance came down firmly against granting the discharge which Ms Root seeks'.
51. In my judgment, HHJ Murdoch QC, carefully considered the balancing exercise as he was required to do. The order that I made on 13 December 2011 is clear that the prohibition was to remain in place until further order and, in my judgment, that was an order made under the Section 12, Administration of Justice Act 1960, and was an order that remains in place even after the final cessation of the care proceedings and after the children obtained their 18^th birthdays. However, if I am wrong about the order continuing after the children are 18, as the Local Authority have pointed out, the breaches on which they rely were all alleged to have taken place before the youngest child attained the age of 18. There is no merit to the argument put forward by Ms Root at this hearing that the order is invalid, or it has lapsed.
52. The next matter that I have to consider is the issue of mens rea and is it necessary for the Local Authority to prove that there was guilty intent on the part of Ms Root? The Local Authority filed a skeleton argument dealing with this, to be found beginning at A113 of my bundle. Because Ms Root dispensed with her legal team, there is no skeleton argument filed on her behalf in reply. I find that I accept the arguments put forward by the Local Authority that it is no answer to say that, if there was a breach of the injunction, it was not done with a direct intention to disobey the order. The reason why I have come to that decision is that I accept the position in relation to the relevant case law, as set out in the Local Authority's skeleton argument, beginning with the decision of Warrenton J in the case of Stancomb v Trowbridge UDC [1910] 2 Ch 190 which set out the traditional approach that, if a person or corporation is restrained by injunction from doing a particular act, that person or corporation commits a breach of the injunction and is liable to process for contempt if he or she in fact does the act, and it is no answer to say that the act was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there was no direct intention to disobey the order.
53. That approach was confirmed by the House of Lords in Heatons Transport v TGWU [1973] AC 15 at 109, and in Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete UK Limited [1995] 1 AC 456 .In those cases, it was held that motive was irrelevant to the question of liability and, followed a quote from Lord Sterndale, Master of the Rolls, in R v Poplar BC [1922] 1 KB 95 225, 'Unless and until the time comes when the law of this country is that a person may disobey an order of the court, or the laws, as much as he likes, if he does it conscientiously, the question of motive is immaterial'.
54. The Local Authority correctly point out that there is one authority that points the other way and that is matter of Irtelli v Squatriti [1993] QB 83, Court of Appeal. In that case the appellants had been restrained from selling, disposing or otherwise dealing with, seeking to dispose or deal with property which they owned freehold and, thereafter, they executed a charge on the property and the judge found them to be in contempt. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, concluding that it was impossible to conclude that the appellants had intentionally breached the injunction and that, accordingly, the committal order should be discharged. It is quite clear, however, that the case of Irtelli has been considered in a number of cases since then and that they have applied the earlier decision in the Stancomb case and, since the Irtelli ruling, the House of Lords have confirmed that Stancomb was still the law in Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete UK Limited 1995 1AC 456. Lord Nolan said, specifically that, 'In my judgment the decision in Stancombe's case is good law and should be followed in the present case'.
55. Therefore, I am satisfied that it is sufficient, if the Local Authority can prove that the mother's action was deliberate rather than accidental, and that no further mens rea needs to be proved by them.
56. The next matter that I have to consider is, was Ms Root pursuing a complaint within the meaning of Rule 12 the Family Procedure Rules 2010? Starting off with Rule 12.73 that deals with communication of information (general) and makes it clear that, for the purposes of the law in relation to contempt, information relating to proceedings held in private may be communicated to a party, their legal representative, a professional advisor, an officer of Cafcass or Director of Legal Aid casework, an expert instructed in the proceedings, a professional and an independent reviewing officer, or where the court gives permission. There is therefore provision under the rules for information to be communicated. None of that in Rule 12.73 applies in the particular circumstances of this case, but it is necessary then to look at the provision of 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 which deals with communication of information for purposes connected within the proceedings, and provides:
57. 'A party or the legal representative of a party may communicate information relating to proceedings to any person, where necessary, to enable that party, by confidential discussion, to obtain support, advice or assistance in the conduct of the proceedings, to attend a mediation, information and assessment meeting, to make or pursue a complaint against a person or body concerned in the proceedings, or to make and pursue a complaint regarding the law, policy or procedure relating to a category of proceedings to which this part applies'.
58. It is Ms Root's case that she has been pursuing a complaint against the Local Authority and that she has published information to a journalist from Christian Voice publication to enable her to make clear how badly she has been treated by the Local Authority. It is her case that she is not guilty of contempt or of any offence because, when the injunction order was varied on 24 April 2014 by HHJ Murdoch QC, it gave her permission to make a complaint.
59. Her children are entitled to know the truth that they should never have been taken away from her in the first place and that she has been denied a relationship with her grandchild as a result. She says there is a public interest since she has been making her posts on Facebook and she has done nothing wrong. These proceedings commenced against her by the local authority are not to protect either of her children, but they are to protect Medway Council themselves and the court. Her case is very simple, and it is perfectly obvious that she has not committed contempt of court.
60. As she was entitled to do so Ms Root has not given evidence to me at this hearing. I warned her that she did not have to take any steps that may lead to self-incrimination and I warned her of her right to say nothing, but to put the Local Authority to proof of their case.
61. The Local Authority submit that this is not Ms Root pursuing a complaint as envisaged by Rule 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules. They remind the court about the circumstances in which the injunction order was made in the first place, the fact that the mother was, at the time, leaving confidential papers on the windscreens of cars in public car parks, she was protesting in a public forum and the court made it clear that this behaviour must stop by the making of the injunction order. The Local Authority says that, in those circumstances, it beggars belief that the mother would consider that putting the material in the public domain amounts to pursuing a complaint within the meaning of the Family Procedure Rules, when that is precisely the behaviour that the injunction was intended to stop.
62. The Local Authority point out that pursuing a complaint is not something that is mentioned in the actual posts that Ms Root made. They also point out that, at the hearing on 12 December 2016, the mother presented as contrite and said that she was prepared to take down the offending material within 48 hours. That is further evidence that she was not making a complaint.
63. I have come to the firm judgment that the publishing of the information on Facebook, on numerous occasions, as the mother has done, does not amount to a complaint within the meaning of 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules. In my judgment, if complaint was given the meaning that the mother seeks to attach to it, then the order would be rendered completely pointless. That was clearly not the intention of HHJ Murdoch QC, and it was not the intention behind the rule-makers of the Family Procedure Rules.
64. I have come to the conclusion that the Local Authority have made me sure that there is no merit in the various arguments that the mother has put forward.
65. The alleged breaches and my findings
66. I turn now to the amended schedule of breaches and that is set out at A111 to A112 of the bundle. It is limited to ten breaches in accordance with the earlier directions that were given but the Local Authority wish to point out to the court that there have been significantly more than ten postings by the mother, on Facebook.
67. The first alleged breach is that in September 2014 when the mother published, on Facebook, information regarding one of her children. That child was only referred to by their initial but that post also shared details of the independent reviewing officer, the doctors involved, the police officers and details about the children's solicitor. The post in itself is at exhibit KH3 to the social worker's affidavit and begins at C24 of my bundle.
68. I have looked at that posting. It does give information about people involved in the care proceedings and, in my judgment, in naming the solicitor, the detectives involved, the independent reviewing officer, the doctors and the psychologist and the history of the children being taken away, I am satisfied that this breach is made out and that it was a breach of the terms of the injunction order.
69. The next alleged breach is on 30 April 2015 and again the details of that posting are exhibit CH4 to Ms Hopper's affidavit and can be found again at C32 of my bundle and also at C39-50. That is a lengthy posting, disclosing the children's full names and the name of the social worker and pictures of the social worker and the children. It also gives the name and address of the foster carers and names other professionals involved in the case. I am satisfied, having looked at those postings that they also are a breach of the terms of the injunction order that was made in this case.
70. The third alleged breach is on 2 April 2015, publishing a picture of the social worker and his partner and giving details of the 2010 to 2011 care proceedings. The full text appears beginning at A37 of my bundle. I find that I am satisfied that this is a further breach.
71. The next alleged breach is on 2 September 2015, and that is a lengthy post to Ms Root's personal Facebook page, disclosing the children's full names, the full name and address of the social worker and also outlines the history of Social Services' intervention from the mother's point of view. It raises a number of serious accusations against many named professionals. That post in itself appears at C14 onwards of my bundle. I find that I am satisfied that this is a breach of the terms of the injunction order.
72. The fifth alleged breach was on 25 September 2015. The earlier post of 14 June 2015 was reposted to the personal Facebook page and the posting can be found at A69 to A90 of the bundle. I have looked through that posting, and I find that I am satisfied that this is a further breach of the terms of the injunction order.
73. The next alleged breach is on 26 September 2015, where the posting on 2 September 2015 was reposted in identical terms to the personal Facebook page again. The actual posting can be found at A91 onwards on the bundle. I should point out that, rather confusingly, the actual documents refer to the allegations by different numbering. That is because they were subsequently restricted in number and that resulted in different numbering and lettering being used. I am satisfied that is a further breach of the injunction order.
74. Further alleged breach is on 23 October 2015, which gives details of the 2010-2011 care proceedings. The actual posting is to be found at A99-106 of the bundle. Again, by giving details of the history of the proceedings, the involvement of the police and Social Services, the fact that the children were removed, naming the psychologist, and setting out the history of the case from the mother's point of view, I am satisfied that this is a breach of the terms of the injunction order.
75. The next alleged breach is on 7 February 2016. Ms Root published a Cafcass report dated 5 February 2014 that contained information about the original care proceedings and deeply personal information about both children. That can be found at C51 and C69 and also at B21 onwards in the bundle. Yet again, I have looked closely at those postings and I am satisfied that it is a breach of the terms of the injunction order and it was not made with the purpose of making any complaint against Cafcass and was not made other than to set out again details of the original care proceedings and information about the children from the mother's perspective, and her interpretation of what the Cafcass report said.
76. The next alleged breach is on 24 February 2016, it is alleged that Ms Root published foster carer's notes from February 2011 on her personal Facebook page and, again, I have looked at that posting carefully, and I am satisfied that this is a breach of the terms of the injunction order.
77. The final breach is on 8 April 2016 where Ms Root published a picture of the Kent Police emergency protection papers on her personal Facebook page and C54 is the posting. Ms Root says that this was information used fraudulently to remove her children and alleges that the Detective Constable perjured herself in the evidence that she had given. Again, I am satisfied that publishing that information is in breach of the terms of the injunction order.
78. In summary, for the reasons that I have given, I find that the Local Authority have established beyond reasonable doubt that there were 10 breaches of the injunction order, and that those breaches took place between the period September 2014 to 8 April 2016 and I am further satisfied that none of the matters that Ms Root has sought to raise, by way of a defence, to show that she is not in contempt of court, have not been made out. I therefore find that these breaches have been proved.
79. I am not dealing with any sentence at the moment, for the breaches of the order, because I have to go on to consider tomorrow the issue of further alleged breaches, namely the alleged breaches by Ms Root of the terms of the undertaking that she gave to the court and then I have to deal with sentencing on both matters, if it is proved, or just on this matter if the further matter is not proved tomorrow.
End of Judgment