England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions

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Cite as: [2014] EWHC 1467 (Fam)

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		Neutral Citation Number: [2014] EWHC 1467 (Fam)
		No. IL12C00766

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

29th April 2014

B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE HOLMAN
(sitting throughout in public)
____________________

	LONDON BOROUGH OF EALING
	v
	JM SA MK

____________________

THE APPLICANT grandmother appeared in person, kindly assisted by Mrs J. Haines as McKenzie friend.
MR KIERAN PUGH (instructed by the Local Authority) appeared on behalf of the respondent.
MS CAITLIN FERRIS appeared on behalf of the children's former guardian.

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

MR JUSTICE HOLMAN:

This is a continuation of the application for permission to appeal which was first considered by me at a hearing in public on 3 April 2014. I am again sitting in public and give this judgment in public.

The judgment which I gave on 3 April 2014 has been transcribed and has been publicly available for about three weeks on the Bailii website under the neutral citation number [2014] EWHC 1084 [Fam] under the name London Borough of Ealing v JM, SA and MK.

This judgment should be read as a continuation of that judgment and I do not propose to repeat anything at all which is already contained in that judgment. The present judgment is purely to record the outcome in relation to the three proposed grounds of appeal which I referred to in paragraphs 20 to 27 of my previous judgment and left over for further consideration today.

The essence of the first two of those grounds related to some uncertainty on the part of myself and others present in the courtroom on 3 April 2014 as to whether the London Borough of Ealing might, in any conceivable circumstances, separate these two children; and specifically as to whether they might place them for adoption with different adoptive families or perhaps place one but not the other.

The London Borough of Ealing were sent a copy of my previous judgment and also of the order made at the last hearing. As a result, they have kindly attended today in some force. I have present the social worker for the children, Mr Joel Carvalho, and a legal assistant in the legal department of the London Borough of Ealing, Miss Stephanie Clark. In the presence of those two officers of the London Borough of Ealing who have social work and legal responsibility for this case, their counsel, Mr Kieran Pugh, has produced a detailed position statement dated today. More particularly, he has told me, publicly and in the presence of the grandmother, Mrs. Marion Kelly, and her McKenzie Friend, Mrs. Julie Haines, absolutely categorically what the firm position of the local authority is with regard to not, in any realistically foreseeable circumstances, separating these children.

Further, he has said that, far from the elder child being "unadoptable", it remains the belief of the local authority that both these two children are indeed "adoptable". Further, the local authority are currently actively investigating two approved adoptive families who have expressed an interest in adopting both these children together.

To create a permanent, crystal clear record of that position of the local authority, my formal order today will recite that in the presence of those two officials, their counsel, Mr Pugh, has categorically stated and assured the court and the grandmother that: (i) the local authority will not, in any realistically foreseeable circumstances, separate the two children; (ii) the local authority consider that the imperative of keeping the two children together overrides the advantages of adoption of both or either of them; (iii) they will not place either child for adoption except by placing them together in the confident belief that a single adoptive placement will endure; (iv) if the children cannot be adopted together, they will remain together in a single foster placement (whether or not their current one); (v) accordingly, no issue of inter-sibling contact can arise; (vi) the local authority currently continue to consider that both children are "adoptable" and that a suitable placement for their adoption together can be found; (vii) the local authority will formally invite the grandmother to all looked after children reviews; (viii) the local authority will (without revealing identity or whereabouts) promptly notify the grandmother (a) when any meetings take place between the children and any prospective adopter or adopters; (b) when the children are actually placed with any prospective adopter or adopters; and (c) if the local authority reach a decision that the children cannot be so placed.

On the basis of those categorical assurances, upon which I absolutely rely, it is clear that there is now no substance in either proposed grounds of appeal 3 or 4. These children are simply not going to be separated in any realistically foreseeable circumstances. Further, if either of them cannot be placed for adoption together in a single adoptive placement, then adoption will simply be removed altogether from the agenda.

So far as the potential ground of appeal 5 is concerned, that related to some question as to the "adoptability" of the elder child in particular. As can be seen from their categorical assurances, the local authority currently believe in good faith that both these children are "adoptable". They will in any event keep the grandmother fully informed as to progress towards placement for adoption. If a time comes when the local authority reach a decision that the children cannot be placed for adoption, then the grandmother will be informed. Clearly at that time she, or more technically accurately, one or both of the parents of the children, would of course be able to apply for the existing placement orders to be revoked.

In those circumstances, it is now quite clear that there is in fact no substance in any of the prospective grounds of appeal 3, 4 and 5. I have already refused permission to appeal on prospective grounds 1, 2 and 6 and it accordingly follows that I must now finally refuse permission to appeal on all grounds from the decision and order of District Judge Bowman of 7 January 2014.