FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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LA |
Applicant |
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ML |
1st Respondent |
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MQ |
2nd Respondent |
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SP |
3rd Respondent |
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MP (Through his Children's Guardian) |
4th Respondent |
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The Centre for the International Protection of Children and Youth |
Intervenor |
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Mr Michael Hosford-Tanner (instructed by Pritchard Joyce and Hinds) for the 1st Respondent
Mr David Williams Q.C. & Ms Deborah Piccos (instructed by Hopkin Murray Beskine) for 3rd Respondent
MQ - In Person
Hearing dates: 9, 10 and 12 July 2013
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Theis DBE:
(1) Ms Irvine, on behalf of the LA, submits the court can find to the required standard that both the mother and step-father caused the injuries, they both failed to protect the Child's health needs and failed to protect the Child from harm. They support the application made by the mother for the proceedings to be transferred to Slovakia pursuant to Article 15, although they share the Guardian's concerns about delay.
(2) Mr Hosford-Tanner on behalf of the mother, supported by the step father who acts in person, submits the evidence does not meet the required standard and consequently that is the end of the proceedings. If he is wrong about that he submits he applies for the proceedings to be transferred to Slovakia pursuant to Article 15.
(3) Mr Williams Q.C. and Ms Piccos, on behalf of the Guardian, agree with the LA that the evidence does support findings being made against both parents, the step father using an implement of some kind and the mother of inappropriate physical chastisement and failing to protect the Child from the step father. They see the force of the application to transfer under Article 15, but are anxious to avoid delay in making decisions about the Child.
Background
(i) The Child is a Slovak citizen
(ii) Most of the Child's relatives live in Slovakia
(iii) The Slovak Republic is able to provide adequate social as well as medical care for the Child
(iv) The Child has a particular connection with Slovakia
(v) The Child would be under the constant supervisions of the competent authorities
(vi) It is in the Child's best interests
Legal framework
"1. In a free society, it is a serious thing indeed for the state compulsorily to remove a child from his family of birth. Interference with the right to respect for family life, protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, can only be justified by a pressing social need. Yet it is also a serious thing for the state to fail to safeguard its children from the neglect and ill-treatment which they may suffer in their own homes. This may even amount to a violation of their right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, protected by article 3 of the Convention. How then is the law to protect the family from unwarranted intrusion while at the same time protecting children from harm?
2. In England and Wales, the Children Act 1989 tries to balance these two objectives by setting a threshold which must be crossed before a court can consider what order, if any, should be made to enable the authorities to protect a child. The threshold is designed to restrict compulsory intervention to cases which genuinely warrant it, while enabling the court to make the order which will best promote the child's welfare once the threshold has been crossed. That threshold is defined by section 31(2) of the Act as follows:"A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied –
(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to –(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or
(ii) the child's being beyond parental control."3. Once that threshold is crossed, section 1(1) of the Act requires the court to treat the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration, having regard to the checklist of factors listed in section 1(3). These include "any harm which [the child] has suffered or is at risk of suffering" (section 1 (3)(e)). There are therefore three questions to be answered in any care case: first, is there harm or a likelihood of harm; second, to what is that harm or likelihood of harm attributable; and third, what will be best for the child?"
(a) Firstly, the court must determine whether the child has a 'particular connection' with the other Member state. This is a simple question of fact.
(b) Secondly, it must determine whether the court of that other Member State would be better placed to hear the case or a specific part of it. This is an evaluation in all the circumstances of the case.
(c) Thirdly, it must determine if a transfer to the other court 'is in the best interests of the child.' This again involves an evaluation undertaken in the light of all the circumstances of the particular child.
(i) Article 15 applies to public law as well as private law proceedings.
(ii) The burden is upon the person applying to establish that a stay of the proceedings is appropriate;
(iii) The applicant must show not only that England is not the natural or appropriate forum but also that the other jurisdiction is clearly the more appropriate forum;
(iv) In assessing the appropriateness of each forum, the court must discern the forum with which the case has the more real and substantial connection in terms of convenience, expense and availability of witnesses;
(v) If the court were to conclude that the other forum was clearly more appropriate, it should grant a stay unless other more potent factors were to drive the opposite result; and
(vi) in the exercise to be conducted at (d), the welfare of the child is an important, but not a paramount, consideration.
(vii) In making the best interests analysis at (vi) the court will not embark on a profound investigation of the child's situation and upbringing but will dwell in an attenuated inquiry upon the sort of considerations which come into play when deciding upon the most appropriate forum.
Evidence
Submissions
Decision
(1) It is clear from the medical evidence the Child did have various bruises on his body, in particular on his back. The doctors opinion was in view of the number and distribution of bruises they are 'less likely' to be accidental. This evidence needs to be considered together with the other evidence, in particular what is said by the mother, the step father and the Child.(2) The parents, in my judgment, were not impressive witnesses and their accounts cannot be relied upon unless supported by corroborative evidence.
(3) The mother has been inconsistent in her accounts of what she alleged took place in the garden on 28 February 2013. She gave two accounts at the school, a different account in her statement and her oral evidence as to what she did see or not of the incident. I do not accept the mother's explanation that the different explanations were down to her language difficulties. Whilst the mother gave her oral evidence via an interpreter the evidence points to her knowledge and understanding of English being far greater than she suggests. This was demonstrated through very effective cross examination by Mr Williams Q.C. for the Guardian when he established that the mother could only communicate with the step father in English, initially via the internet and following her arrival here in May 2012. That remains their only common language. I pause to note that it is not disputed that she married the step father in a religious ceremony days after her arrival here, which is hardly consistent with someone who can't speak or understand the language the step father speaks. In addition the mother's first statement filed in these proceedings dated 18 March 2013 she accepted did not require an interpreter. She also accepted she completed the application to transfer the Child's school without assistance. I also noted in the questions I asked her during her oral evidence regarding the step father's immigration position she was able to answer before my question was translated to her. Whilst understanding the need to have interpreters to enable her to give her oral evidence with confidence I am satisfied that in fact her understanding of English and her ability to speak it is good and that is it unlikely that she misunderstood what she was being asked about or the explanation she was giving.
(4) In relation to the account of the Child falling in the garden there is an inherent improbability that the mother was hanging washing outside late in the afternoon at the end of February. Additionally it is surprising that the Child when asked the following day at school did not give an account of falling in the garden as the explanation for the injuries on his back.
(5) I also considered the mother was also somewhat defensive of the step father in some of her responses about him (for example, suggesting that he was hardly left alone with the Child and then having to accept that she had a job and the step father had to care for the Child).
(6) I agree with Mr Williams Q.C that a recurring feature of the step father's evidence was it was always the fault of someone else, for example that matters had been mis-recorded in the documents from the social worker and the school with no apparent motive to do so. In addition his somewhat idealised account of the parties relationship and the Child's behaviour as having no difficulties which may be somewhat unrealistic bearing in mind the parties married 10 days after the mother's arrival in this country, they had different languages and backgrounds, they lived in somewhat cramped conditions, and there were some difficulties with the Child at school. It is highly unlikely that there were not stresses in that situation that could lead to the use of inappropriate chastisement of the Child. I also cannot ignore the accounts given by both the school and social worker of the father losing his temper.
(7) The disclosures made by the Child to a number of people (office manager at the school, police at the school, social worker and foster carer) are significant. He states he was physically assaulted by either his step father alone or with the mother together with actions to demonstrate what they did. Both the social worker and foster carer stated they did not have any difficulty in understanding him, which I accept. The significance of the disclosures is they were given to different people in different settings, were often unprompted, twice were accompanied by actions to demonstrate what had happened, were given a context (because he was naughty) and the descriptions of the Child's demeanour as he said them; sad looking with his shoulders hunched. These disclosures corroborate to some extent the injuries to the back, as he said 'Dad did it'. There is no issue that the Child refers to the step father as 'Daddy' or 'Dad'. The consistency in the substance of the disclosures adds weight to their reliability.
(8) I have factored into my assessment of the evidence the positive reports of the contact between the Child and his mother and step father, which on the face of them point away from the findings sought. I have also considered the fact that the Child was not a child kept away from the medical services, there are records showing his attendances at the GP. The mother sought medical advice appropriately and there is no record of injuries.
(9) However, the combination of the physical injuries, the inconsistent accounts from the parents whose evidence I regard as unreliable and the comments made by the Child drive me to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the Child has been physically assaulted by both the mother and step father. In relation to the step father the Child discloses his use of an implement, described by the Child as a green thing or a stick.
(10) The evidence of the dental decay has not been challenged and whilst that would probably not on its own amount to significant harm it adds to the findings I have already made about physical harm. This decay was caused by poor diet and nutrition. The mother accepted that but said she had started to take steps to address this.
(11) It is more likely than not that the mother failed to protect the Child from harm. It is unlikely that the mother was not aware what was going on. For the reasons set out above, I regard the account of the Child falling in the garden as being unlikely to have occurred and it is more likely than not there was an incident when the step father assaulted the Child on or around the 28 February which the mother knew, or ought to have known about.
Article 15
(1) The nationality of the Child's biological parents and the Child is Slovakia;(2) Slovakia is where the Child was formerly habitually resident and where he lived until just before his fourth birthday;
(3) Slovakian is the first language of the Child and his parents;
(4) Both the Child's biological parents are now in Slovakia. The mother, who has been the Child's primary carer, has stated clearly in these proceedings she plans to remain living there long term. This is understood to be irrespective of the step father's immigration position. He said in evidence that he had been brought up in Pakistan and had come here in 2010 on a student visa. That was extended until 30 August 2012. The mother and step father had a religious marriage on 6 June followed by a civil ceremony on 29 August 2012. The step father has applied for a spousal visa, he said he has informed his immigration solicitor that the mother has returned to Slovakia but did not know whether they, in turn, had informed the Home Office. He has been advised that whilst his application for a spousal visa is pending he should not leave this jurisdiction as such a step would be treated as he having withdrawn his application. He said he applied for the spousal visa in January 2013 and thought it should take about six months to process;
(5) The Child's wider family, including his half sibling, all live in Slovakia;
(6) There are clear benefits that any welfare based assessments regarding what arrangements should be put in place for the future care of the Child should take place in the jurisdiction where the Child has spent most of his life and the mother and all the wider family live and intend to remain living for the foreseeable future. The Central Authority has set out the arrangements in the event of the Child returning to Slovakia. They consent to the Child being placed with professional foster carers, and state the competent court is the District Court Trnava. They confirm the social welfare offices will support and control the realisation of contact between the Child and members of his biological family. They also describe the assessments that will be undertaken before any decisions are made about where the Child will live.
"This anticipatory process operates as an exception to the principle that the courts of England and Wales will not generally accept jurisdiction in relation to a child who is neither physically present nor habitually resident here; such a course has been recognised as a legitimate approach by way of an "auxillary" power exercisable in limited circumstances "to provide protective measures to safeguard children in transit from one jurisdiction to another..."[47]: see Re W (Jurisdiction: mirror order)[2011] EWCA(Civ)703. The judgment of Thorpe LJ in Re W drew on the decision of Singer J. in Re P (A child: mirror orders) [2000] 1 FLR 435, in which it was observed that:"… there is the category of case, of which this one is typical, where a foreign court is making provision for contact to take place in another jurisdiction in this case England. In that category of case it is important that there should be the possibility for orders to be made in advance of and against the arrival of the child so that the parties and the foreign court may have confidence that if either of them seeks to take advantage of the presence of the child in the contact jurisdiction, the court there will not lend itself to any such attempt." [Emphasis added]
Singer J. considered that "as a matter of common sense, of comity, and of public policy" the High Court should make orders in these circumstances notwithstanding the absence of the child or the lack of habitual residence of the child in question: see page 441 ibid (and see also Wilson J (as he then was) in A v A (Abduction: Jurisdiction) [1995] 1 FLR 341). The "expedient" route (as he described it) adopted by Singer J is arguably no longer necessary, given the provisions of Article 24 of the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection Of Children 1996 (which entered into force here on 1st November 2012)."