SUPREME COURT COSTS
OFFICE
London, EC4A 1DQ | ||
B e f o r e :
____________________
RSA Pursuit Test Cases |
____________________
(instructed by
Hextalls) for RSA First Assist
Mr Jeremy Morgan QC (instructed by Charles
Russell) for the Claimants
Mr Andrew Bartlett QC and Mr Alexander Hutton
(instructed by Beachcroft Wansbroughs and Kennedys) for the Defendants in the
cases of Sandiford, Clarke, Anthony Baker, Deborah Baker
Mr Nicholas Bacon
(instructed by Leo Abse & Cohen) for the Defendant in the case of
Farr
Hearing dates : 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 February 2005 and 27 April 2005
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
para | ||
Background |
||
The Issues |
||
The Applicable Law |
||
The Pursuit Policy Wording |
||
The Test Cases |
||
Deborah Baker v Addenbrookes |
||
Anthony Baker v Euromark |
||
Clarke v Tom James |
||
Sandiford v Price's Patent Candles |
||
Farr v Kerslake |
||
The Evidence |
||
Rsa And First Assist's Witnesses |
||
Peter William Smith |
||
Emmanuel Gilbert |
||
The Claimants' Witnesses |
||
Mark Scrivenger |
||
William John Vallance |
||
Amanda Stevens |
||
Kenneth Besfor |
||
Peter Henry Evan Bennett |
||
The Defendants' Witnesses |
||
Christopher Wait |
||
Kate O'Reilly |
||
John Paul Ivory |
||
Adam Richard Burrell |
||
Comments On The Evidence |
||
First Assist Witnesses |
||
The Claimants' Witnesses |
||
The Defendants' Witnesses |
||
General Submissions |
||
First Assist |
||
Test Case Claimants |
||
Defendants 1 - 4 |
||
(i) Section 29 Access to Justice Act 1999 |
||
(ii) The Costs Judge |
||
(iii) The Ultimate Question |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
General Conclusions |
||
Submissions On The Issues |
||
Issue 1: Is the contract of insurance void for uncertainty because at the time the contract is made the amount of the premium is insufficiently certain and is the said contract accordingly unenforceable by RSA against the claimant and if so what is the consequence? |
||
First Assist |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 1 - Conclusions |
||
Issue 2: Is the insurance arrangement between the client, the insurer and/or the solicitors unlawful on the grounds of champerty and if so what is the consequence? |
||
First Assist |
||
Defendants 1 - 4 |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 2 - Conclusions |
||
Issue 3 - Is the method of calculation of the premium inherently flawed and if so what is the consequence? |
||
First Assist |
||
Test Case Claimants |
||
Defendants 1 - 4 |
||
1. Constant Relationship |
||
2. Policy taken out after CFA entered into |
||
3. The relative sizes of the estimates |
||
4. Estimates of success |
||
5. Premium calculated on Claimant's costs as claimed |
||
6. Premium calculated so as to make up a lack of premium income in unsuccessful cases |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 3 - Conclusions |
||
Issue 4 - What commissions, if any, are payable to the Claimants' legal representatives and/or any other agents of the insurers and if there are any, when and in what circumstances are they payable? |
||
Issue 5 - Should the amount of the recoverable premium be reduced on the grounds that an insurance policy ought reasonably to have been taken out at an earlier stage in the proceedings? |
||
First Assist |
||
Test Case Claimants |
||
Sandiford |
||
Clarke |
||
Defendants 1 - 4 |
||
Sandiford |
||
Clarke |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 5 - Conclusions |
||
Issue 6 - Has the claimant acted reasonably in taking out the RSA Pursuit policy, and if not what are the consequences? |
||
First Assist |
||
Test Case Claimants |
||
Deborah Baker |
||
Anthony Baker |
||
Clarke |
||
Sandiford |
||
Farr |
||
Defendants 1 - 4 |
||
Deborah Baker |
||
Anthony Baker |
||
Clarke |
||
Sandiford |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 6 - Conclusions |
||
Deborah Baker |
||
Anthony Baker |
||
Clarke |
||
Sandiford |
||
Farr |
||
Issue 7 - What if anything is the recoverable amount of the premium against the defendant pursuant to Section 29 of the Access to Justice Act 1999? |
||
First Assist |
||
The Claimants |
||
Defendants 1 - 4 |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 7 - Conclusions |
||
Deborah Baker |
||
Anthony Baker |
||
Clarke |
||
Sandiford |
||
Farr |
||
Issue 8 - Has the indemnity principle been breached in the case of Farr? |
||
First Assist |
||
Test Case Claimants |
||
Defendant 5 (Farr) |
||
Issue 8 - Conclusions |
||
Issue 9 - What is the impact of BTE cover in Farr? |
||
Summary |
BACKGROUND
THE ISSUES
THE APPLICABLE LAW
"Where in any proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any party who has taken out an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability in those proceedings, the costs payable to him may, subject in the case of court proceedings to rules of court, include costs in respect of the premium of the policy."
"11. It was common ground, and rightly so, that the court, when considering whether to award an insurance premium by way of costs, has to consider whether the premium is reasonable. It was also common ground that, insofar as the court finds that the premium is not reasonable, it can and should reduce it. There was debate as to the appropriate approach to the application of the test of what is reasonable.
12. It is important in this context to draw a distinction between two separate matters. The first is the nature of the benefits to which the litigant is contractually entitled in exchange for the payment of the premium. This falls to be determined from the terms of the contract under which the premium is paid. Section 29 permits the recovery of a premium where this is payment for insurance against the risk of liability for costs. If payment of a so-called premium buys a contractual entitlement to other benefits it is, to say the least, arguable that the premium cannot, to that extent, be recovered under section 29. Thus the court has to consider the terms of the contract under which the premium is paid to see whether it is simply a contract of insurance against liability for costs or whether it is something other than, or additional to, that.
13. The contractual benefits purchased by the premium must be distinguished from the use made by the insurer of the premium. An insurer will necessarily look to premium income to meet the costs of the business. The primary costs are likely to be those of meeting claims, but the costs will also include matters such as commissions, advertising and, indeed, refurbishing the insurer's premises. The court will not be directly concerned with how, or on what, the insurer spends the premium income. The court will, however, be concerned with the question of whether the premium is a reasonable price to pay for the benefits that it purchases. Ultimately, this should be a question to be considered having regard to experience, or evidence, of the market. If an insurer is conducting his business in a manner which incurs extravagant, extraneous or otherwise unnecessary expenditure, which has to be covered by the premiums, those premiums are likely to be uncompetitive. To pay such a premium where other more reasonable premiums are available may disentitle the litigant from making a full recovery of the costs of the premium.
...
15. It is highly desirable in the interests of justice that an effective and transparent market should develop in ATE insurance. If the litigant is not at risk as to the premium … it is less easy for a competitive market to develop. Nonetheless, we consider that the solicitor advising the client should be in a position to assist him in selecting ATE insurance cover that caters for his needs on reasonable terms. Master O'Hare informed us that there are at present two sources of information as to availability of ATE cover: the magazine "Litigation Funding", published by the Law Society and the web site www.thejudge.co.uk. We would encourage solicitors to take advantage of such sources of information and hope that before long the exercise of choice will result in competition for ATE business which establishes transparent market rates.
16. In the meantime, where an insurance premium is challenged it must be open to the insurer, whose position is akin to a subrogated underwriter, to place evidence before the court in an attempt to demonstrate that the premium is reasonable having regard to the costs that have to be covered. Satellite litigation involving such an exercise is, however, unsatisfactory. The Judge can only be expected to give broad consideration to such evidence, for it is not part of the function of a judge assessing costs to carry out an audit of an insurer's business."
"17. (1) The general objective of this Part is the development of legal services in England and Wales (and in particular the development of advocacy, litigation, conveyancing and probate services) by making provision for new or better ways of providing such services and a wider choice of persons providing them, while maintaining the proper and efficient administration of justice.
(2) In this Act objective is referred to as "the statutory objective"."
31. Champerty is a variety of maintenance. Maintenance and champerty used to be both crimes and torts. A champertous agreement was illegal and void, involving as it did criminal conduct. Ss. 13(1) and 14(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 abolished both the crimes and the torts of maintenance and champerty. S.14(2) provided, however:
"The abolition of criminal and civil liability under the law of England and Wales for maintenance and champerty shall not affect any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal."
Thus, champerty survives as a rule of public policy capable of rendering a contract unenforceable.
"…the law of maintenance depends upon the question of public policy, and public policy …is not a fixed and immutable matter. It is a conception which, if it has any sense at all, must be alterable by the passage of time."
33. In Trendtex Trading v Credit Suisse [1980] 1 QB 629 at p.663 Oliver LJ remarked:
"There is, I think, a clear requirement of public policy that officers of the court should be inhibited from putting themselves in a position where their own interests may conflict with their duties to the court by agreement, for instance, of so called "contingency fees".
34. The introduction of conditional fees shows that even this requirement of public policy is no longer absolute. This case raises the question of whether the requirement extends to expert witnesses or others in a position to influence the conduct of litigation and, if it does, whether on the facts of the present case the agreements concluded by Grant Thornton can be justified.
35. In Trepca Mines Ltd (No.2) [1963] 1 Ch 199 at p.219 Lord Denning MR observed:
"The reason why the common law condemns champerty is because of the abuses to which it may give rise. The common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses. These fears may be exaggerated, but, be that so or not, the law for centuries had declared champerty to be unlawful, and we cannot do otherwise than enforce the law; and I may observe that it has received statutory support, in the case of solicitors, in section 65 of the Solicitors Act 1957."
36. Where the law expressly restricts the circumstances in which agreements in support of litigation are lawful, this provides a powerful indication of the limits of public policy in analogous situations. Where this is not the case, then we believe one must today look at the facts of the particular case and consider whether those facts suggest that the agreement in question might tempt the allegedly champertous maintainer for his personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, to subborn witnesses or otherwise to undermine the ends of justice.
37. In reaching this conclusion we have been particularly influenced by the approach of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Giles v Thompson…
38. In the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal [1993] 3 All ER 321 Steyn LJ at p.328 identified the public policy which renders champertous agreements illegal as resting on the perceived need to protect the integrity of public justice. Later, at p.336, he added that the policy focused on the protection of the party confronted with the maintained litigation, it did not exist to protect the plaintiff. At pp.328-9 he gave a valuable exposition of the history of this area of the law, culminating in the enactment of s.58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, which we shall have to consider in more detail in due course. As to this, he remarked at p.331:
"The relevance of s58 is that Parliament has, subject to the requirements of the section, empowered the Lord Chancellor to validate by order agreements for a percentage uplift in the costs in the event of success. The ability to recover fees beyond what was otherwise reasonable was intended to be ‘an incentive to lawyers to undertake speculative actions'. Such agreements were, and in the absence of an order still are, unlawful as being contrary to public policy. The rationale of the common law rule is that such agreements allowed the duty and interest of solicitors to conflict with a resultant risk of abuse of legal procedure. Section 58 evidences a proposed modification in relation to an important species of champerty. It represents at least a concession to the view that the abuses associated with champerty are not the inevitable result of all variants of contingency fee agreements. And there is, of course, no more cogent evidence of a change of public policy than the expression of the will of Parliament."
Subsequently, he observed at p.332:
"Contingency fee agreements are nowadays perhaps the most important species of champerty. Such agreements are still unlawful. Yet an English solicitor may share in a contingency fee earned in foreign litigation; see r.8 (contingency fees) of the Solicitors' Practice Rules 1990. This reinforces the point that the doctrine of champerty serves to protect only the integrity of English public justice. It is based not on grounds of morality but on a concern to protect the administration of civil justice in this country."
He continued, on the following page:
"Ultimately, it is necessary to consider the questions posed in this case in the light of contemporary public policy. The correct approach is not to ask whether, in accordance with contemporary public policy, the agreement has in fact caused the corruption of public justice. The court must consider the tendency of the agreement. The question is whether the agreement has the tendency to corrupt public justice. And this question requires the closest attention to the nature and surrounding circumstances of a particular agreement. That is illustrated by the well-known decision of the House of Lords in Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1981] 3 AllER 520, [1982] AC 679."
40. In the House of Lords [1994] 1 AC 142 Lord Mustill gave the leading speech, in which the other members of the House concurred…
42. On these facts Lord Mustill held that it was appropriate to consider whether the mischief was established against which the public policy was directed. As to this, he observed at p.161:
"It is sufficient to adopt the description of the policy underlying the former criminal and civil sanctions expressed by Fletcher Moulton LJ in British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v. Lamson Store Service Co. Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006, 1014:
"It is directed against wanton and officious intermeddling with the disputes of others in which the [maintainer] has no interest whatever, and where the assistance he renders to the one or the other party is without justification or excuse."
This was a description of maintenance. For champerty there must be added the notion of a division of the spoils."
43. Lord Mustill held that in neither case was this mischief established. Summarising the position, he said at p.165:
"Returning to the company, is it wantonly or officiously interfering in the litigation; is it doing so in order to share in the profits? I think not. The company makes its profits from the hiring, not from the litigation. It does not divide the spoils, but relies upon the fruits of the litigation as a source from which the motorist can satisfy his or her liability for the provision of a genuine service, external to the litigation. I can see no convincing reason for saying that, as between the parties to the hiring agreement, the whole transaction is so unbalanced, or so fraught with risk, that it ought to be stamped out. The agreement is one which in my opinion the law should recognise and enforce."
44. This decision abundantly supports the proposition that, in any individual case, it is necessary to look at the agreement under attack in order to see whether it tends to conflict with existing public policy that is directed to protecting the due administration of justice with particular regard to the interests of the defendant. This is a question that we have to address. In so doing we revert to the statement of Lord Mustill that ‘the rule, now in the course of attenuation, which forbids a solicitor from accepting payment for professional services calculated as a proportion of the sum recovered from the defendant …survives nowadays, so far as it survives at all, largely as a rule of professional conduct'. With respect, this statement is not correct. The basis of the rule is statutory. It is now necessary to look at the relevant statutory provisions …
62. More generally, however, s.58[of the 1990 Act] evidences a radical shift in the attitude of public policy to the practice of conducting litigation on terms that the obligation to pay fees will be contingent upon success. Whereas before this practice was outlawed, it is now permissible - subject to the requirements imposed by the section. These requirements do not appear designed to mitigate the mischief that had led to the banning of contingency fees - the undesirability of the interests of officers of the court conflicting with their duties to the court. Rather the requirements appear designed to protect the litigants concluding conditional fee agreements who, when the section was first enacted, were required to pay any ‘uplift' out of their recoveries. Conditional fees are now permitted in order to give effect to another facet of public policy - the desirability of access to justice. Conditional fees are designed to ensure that those who do not have the resources to fund advocacy or litigation services should none the less be able to obtain these in support claims which appear to have merit.
76. In Giles v Thompson Lord Mustill applied the test of public policy identified by Fletcher Moulton LJ in the British Cash case. That test is appropriate when considering those who, in one way or another, support litigation in which they are concerned. It is not, however, really in point when considering agreements under which those who are playing a legitimate part in the process of litigation provide their services on a contingency fee basis. A solicitor who charges a contingency fee which does not satisfy the requirements of s.58, can hardly be said to be guilty of ‘wanton and officious intermeddling in the disputes of others …where the assistance he renders to one party or another is without justification of excuse'. The public policy in play in the present case is that which weighs against a person who is in a position to influence the outcome of litigation having an interest in that outcome.
..."
"11.7 Subject to paragraph 17.8(2), when the court is considering the factors to be taken into account in assessing an additional liability, it will have regard to the facts and circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the solicitor or counsel when the funding arrangement was entered into and at the time of any variation of the arrangement.
...
11.10 In deciding whether the cost of insurance cover is reasonable, relevant factors to be taken into account include:
(1) [omitted]
(2) the level and extent of the cover provided;
(3) the availability of any pre-existing insurance cover;
(4) whether any part of the premium would be rebated in the event of early settlement;
(5) the amount of commission payable to the receiving party or his legal representatives or other agents."
"The premium is the consideration required of the insured in return for which the insurer undertakes his obligation under the contract of insurance (Lewis Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Co [1916] AC 509, 519)."
"44. ... The expression "premium" is not defined by the Access to Justice Act 1999. The court has been referred to the Civil Procedure Rules and various authorities. … In my judgment the premium is not necessarily limited to payments paid on inception of cover, but could include any further amounts paid by, or on behalf of the insured, pursuant to terms agreed with the insurer."
"46. ... The court specifically added "Satellite litigation involving such an exercise [i.e. examining evidence of insurance cover] is however unsatisfactory. The Judge can only be expected to give broad consideration to such evidence. It is not part of a function of a Judge assessing costs to carry out an audit of the insurance business" ... The court may wish to check the overall result which it reaches by reference to the alternative method of obtaining access to justice. This might involve looking at alternative rates of cover, or the costs which would be involved if litigation were to be funded in some other way. This has been called the "top down" approach. Nonetheless, in making that comparison it may be necessary to bear in mind that like may not be being compared with like ... Nevertheless in my judgment, the comparison between the cover provided by these appellants and other means of financing litigation, including other insurance cover, is a relevant consideration to which the appellants could properly bring ... the attention of the Senior Costs Judge. I say this, bearing in mind the general purposes of the new methods of funding litigation introduced by the 1999 Act and by the fact that it is obviously highly desirable in the interests of justice that these methods should be competitive. A premium may not be reasonable if there are alternative ways of providing the same funding at significantly less expense."
THE PURSUIT POLICY WORDING
"The Insurer will provide the insurance described in this Policy in consideration of the Insured's promise to pay the Premium."
"INSURED
The term used to denote collectively both the Insured Litigant and Insured Solicitor in their capacity as beneficiaries under this Policy.
...
LIMIT OF INDEMNITY
The Insurer's liability in respect of Normal Fees and Expenses shall not exceed in the aggregate 100% of the amount specified in the proposal for this insurance as the Insured Solicitor's reasonable estimate of the sum likely to be recovered from the Opponent, excluding costs, if the Legal Proceedings are resolved in the Insured Litigant's favour. This amount appears on the Schedule.
...
ADVERSE COSTS
The net costs of the Opponent in the Legal Proceedings to the extent that the Insured Litigant is legally liable to discharge them, after taking account of any costs awarded against the Opponent or agreed to be paid by the Opponent. No cover is provided in respect of any success fee to which the Opponent or Opponent's solicitor or Opponent's barrister may be entitled.
NORMAL FEES
The costs of the Insured's Solicitor acting for the Insured Litigant under the Conditional Fee Agreement and which form the basis of the calculation of the Success Fee.
Where the outcome of the Legal Proceedings is not a Success the Insurer shall have the right to have the Insured's Solicitor's bills taxed or assessed on the standard basis.
EXPENSES
Expenses and other disbursements paid by the Insured's Solicitor to other parties which are reasonably and properly incurred by the Insured's Solicitor
a) in connection with the Legal Proceedings,
b) in appealing or resisting an appeal against the judgment of a court in connection with the Legal Proceedings provided Our prior written consent has been obtained to the appeal.
The Insurer shall not be liable for Counsel's fees where Counsel is retained to act in the Legal Proceedings under a conditional fee agreement.
...
PERIOD OF INSURANCE
Cover commences at the later of the inception date shown on the Schedule and the date of signing of the Conditional Fee Agreement.
Cover ceases when
a) the Legal Proceedings are concluded by a judgment of the Court of first instance or following an appeal to which We have given Our prior written consent, or
b) the Legal Proceeding are discontinued with Our prior written consent, or
c) the Conditional Fee Agreement is terminated whichever is the earliest.
PREMIUM
The amount shown on the Schedule which becomes payable when the outcome of the Legal Proceedings is a Success.
Where the Insured Litigant receives an offer to settle or a payment into Court which equals or exceeds the definition of Success the Insured Litigant may at that time immediately pay the Premium based on the Normal Fees at that date. The Insured Litigant may elect by written notice to Us to continue with the action and defer payment of the Premium to the Conclusion of the Legal Proceedings. The Premium will then be based on the Normal Fees at the Conclusion of the Legal Proceedings. If, having made this election, the Insured Litigant ultimately fails to achieve a Successful outcome to the Legal Proceedings the Premium payable at the date when the Insured Litigant made the election shall remain payable.
SUCCESS FEE
The amount specified in the Conditional Fee Agreement as the percentage uplift to the Insured Solicitor's Normal Fees payable on the successful conclusion of the Legal Proceedings.
SUCCESS/SUCCESSFUL
The Insured Litigant is offered or obtains at any time a net entitlement to money and/or damages and/or costs which, taking into account any counter-or cross-claim in the Legal Proceedings, equals or exceeds the sum shown in the Schedule as the definition of Success. If the Insured Litigant achieves such an outcome at trial and is required by Us to defend an appeal which results in a net entitlement to money, damages and costs which is lower than the definition of Success then the action will be deemed unsuccessful.
Where an offer to settle is received from the Opponent at any time which equals or exceeds the definition of Success then the outcome of the Legal Proceedings is Successful even if the Insured Litigant elects not to accept the offer.
...
COVER
Section A
Where the outcome of the Legal Proceedings is not a Success the Insurer will, subject to the Limit of Indemnity indemnify the Insured Litigant in respect of
a) Adverse Costs
provided that
1. the Court makes an award of Adverse Costs against the Insured Litigant or
2. the Legal Proceedings are settled or otherwise discontinued with the prior written agreement of the Insured Litigant, the Insured Solicitor and Us
3. the Insurer shall not be liable to pay any Adverse Costs until the Legal Proceedings are finally concluded.
(b) Expenses
provided that
1. the Insurer shall only be liable for any Expenses to the extent that the Insured Litigant is not entitled to recover them from the Opponent or any other party
2. the Insurer shall not be liable to pay any Expenses until the Legal Proceedings are finally concluded.
...
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
This insurance does not cover
1. The Insured Solicitor's Contribution
2. Any payment by the Insurer under this Policy which is due as a result of a discontinuance or settlement to which We have not given Our prior written consent.
3. Damages of any kind.
4. Enforcement proceedings.
5. Wasted costs or any increased legal or other costs arising from any unreasonable delay or negligence by the Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor which in Our opinion is prejudicial to the conduct of the Legal Proceedings.
6. Under Section B only, any liability of the Insurer arising from the Insured Solicitor's failure to comply with procedural directions or pre-action protocols.
7. Legal Proceedings made, commenced, brought or transferred outside the Territorial Limits or which are not governed by English law.
8. Any payment by the Insurer arising from Legal Proceedings in respect of which the Insured is or but for the existence of this insurance would be entitled to indemnity under any other insurance policy.
9. Any amount which the Opponent is obliged to pay but fails to pay to the Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor for any reason.
10. Normal Fees, Expenses and Adverse Costs incurred outside the Period of Insurance.
11. Any costs incurred by the Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor in providing Us with any information or documentation under this insurance.
12. Any payment by the Insurer under the Policy where there has been misrepresentation or material non-disclosure by the Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor.
13. Any payment by the Insurer under the Policy if the Legal Proceedings are stayed, discontinued, abandoned or withdrawn by virtue of the bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation of the Opponent.
CONDITIONS
1. Premium
The Premium payable under this Policy and shown on the Schedule is established by reference to the Normal Fees of the Insured Solicitor.
The Premium is payable even if the Opponent delays or defaults in settling any judgment or agreed settlement.
The Premium will not be affected by taxation or assessment or any agreement which reduces the Insured Solicitor's Normal Fees or the level of the Success Fee.
...
3. Termination
The policy will terminate if the Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor terminates the Conditional Fee Agreement.
We may cancel the Policy by giving fourteen days' notice in writing to the Insured Litigant and Insured Solicitor if
a) the Insured Litigant fails to comply with the terms of the Conditional Fee Agreement
b) the Insured Litigant does not follow the Insured Solicitor's recommendations with regard to settlement of the Legal Proceedings
c) the Insured Litigant does not follow Our recommendations with regard to settlement of the Legal Proceedings
d) the Insured Litigant rejects the Insured Solicitor's advice to discontinue the Legal Proceedings.
In the event that the Policy is cancelled, the Insurer shall be under no obligation to make any payment.
4. Minimising Claims or Legal Proceedings
The Insured must take all reasonable measures to minimise the cost of Legal Proceedings.
...
7. Due Observance
The due observance of and compliance with the terms provisions and conditions of the Policy insofar as they relate to anything to be done or complied with by the Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor shall be conditions precedent to any liability of the Insurer to make any payment hereunder. In the event that the Policy is terminated the parties to this Policy shall continue to observe the conditions to the extent that they remain relevant.
8. Provision of information
The Insured Solicitor must
a) provide to Us regular progress reports on the Legal Proceedings and associated costs and when specifically requested by Us.
b) advise Us in writing as soon as an offer to settle the Legal Proceedings or a payment into Court is made by the Opponent. The Insured Solicitor and the Insured Litigant must not enter into any agreement to settle without Our prior written consent.
c) advise Us in writing as soon as either the Insured Solicitor or Insured Litigant wishes to discontinue the Legal Proceedings.
d) provide Us with a copy of the judgment of the Court in the Legal Proceedings.
e) advise Us immediately in writing if the Conditional Fee Agreement for which the Policy has been issued has been terminated or varied.
f) provide Us promptly with any requested information.
g) provide Us immediately with a copy of any Counsel's Opinion.
h) allow Us to inspect the files of the Insured Solicitor at any time, including after the conclusion of the Legal Proceedings.
The Insured Litigant or Insured Solicitor must advise Us of any material changes to the prospects of success in the Legal Proceedings.
..."
THE TEST CASES
Deborah Baker v Addenbrookes
31 July 1999 |
The Claimant was admitted to hospital, the alleged negligence occurred in the next few days (limitation 31 July 2002). |
26 September 2001 |
Solicitors Scrivenger Seabrook instructed and CFA entered into. Success fee 100%. |
8 January 2002 |
Solicitors submit proposal for ATE insurance to LPL. |
18 February 2002 |
Solicitors submit proposal for disbursement funding to First National Bank (no response from First National). |
15 March 2002 |
Solicitors approach The Judge Broker who in turn (19 March 2002) approaches First Assist. |
2 April 2002 |
First Assist correspond with The Judge as to possible cover. |
20 June 2002 |
First Assist quotation: limit of indemnity ?18,500 [own disbursements only] premium 172% of normal fees plus IPT. |
20 September 2002 |
Inception of cover on terms of quote. |
24 April 2003 |
Defendants offer ?100,000. |
16 June 2003 |
Defendants offer ?350,000. |
22 July 2003 |
Settled by Consent Order for ?400,000 plus costs. |
"Definition of success
The case is finally decided in favour of the insured litigant whether by a court decision or an agreement to pay the insured litigant damages."
Anthony Baker v Euromark
19 August 1999 |
Incident occurs. |
1 August 2001 |
Thompsons advise client they will proceed no further. |
14 November 2001 |
Solicitors AMS Law instructed. CFA entered into, 100% success fee. |
26 July 2002 |
After rejection of previous applications for ATE insurance RSA First Assist proposal form submitted. |
12 August 2002 |
Quote from First Assist. |
16 August 2002 |
Claim form issued (limitation period expires 19 August 2002). |
16 October 2002 |
Inception of policy. |
19 August 2003 |
Part 36 payment by Defendants ?850. |
25 September 2003 |
Settled for ?1,250. |
"Definition of success:
The claim for damages is finally decided in favour of the Insured Litigant whether by a court order or an agreement to pay the Insured Litigant damages or acceptance of any offer as advised."
Clarke v Tom James
23 March 2001 |
Claimant instructed solicitors Hart Brown. |
6 February 2002 |
The Defendants having denied liability the Claimant instructed Charles Russell. |
7 March 2002 |
CFA entered into: success fee 67%. |
27 March 2002 |
Proposal submitted to The Judge Broker. Further information requested by First Assist. |
1 May 2002 |
Proceedings issued. Further correspondence between Charles Russell and RSA. |
27 August 2002 |
Quotation to Charles Russell. |
29 August 2002 |
Policy incepted. Limit of indemnity ?7,000 [own disbursements only]. Premium 123% of normal fees. |
10 July 2003 |
Acceptance of Part 36 payment, ?20,000. |
"Definition of success:
The claim for damages is decided in favour of the Insured Litigant whether by a court decision or where an offer is received which the Insured Litigant's Solicitor advises should be accepted or acceptance of any offer."
Sandiford v Price's Patent Candles
August 1998 |
The cause of action accrued. The Claimant's condition was diagnosed as a psychiatric injury. Limitation therefore ran to July 2001. |
23 February 2001 |
The Claimant instructed solicitors Ormerods in connection with an employment dispute. |
31 July 2001 |
Proceedings issued. Subsequent unsuccessful applications for ATE insurance. |
21 August 2002 |
The CFA: 70% recoverable success fee. |
23 August 2002 |
Inception of policy. Limit of indemnity ?10,000, [own disbursements only] premium 160% of normal fees. |
15 July 2003 |
Settled for ?44,000 plus CRU. |
"Definition of success:
The case is finally decided in favour of the Insured Litigant whether by a court decision or an agreement or acceptance of any offer as advised by the Insured Litigant's Solicitor."
Farr v Kerslake
23 August 1999 |
Accident occurred. |
3 October 2000 |
Solicitors (Dolmans) undertake work under the BTE cover. |
18 June 2002 |
Proceedings commenced. |
22 July 2002 |
Solicitors write to First Assist enquiring about possibility of topping up BTE. |
17 December 2002 |
CFA entered into: 80% recoverable success fee. |
18 December 2002 |
Proposal to First Assist. |
16 January 2003 |
First Assist quote (the quote is based on incorrect figures). |
23 January 2003 |
Insurance policy incepts. |
15 August 2003 |
Defendants offer ?100,000 otherwise will proceed to trial on liability and quantum. |
29 September 2003 |
Settled on first day of trial for ?250,000. |
"Definition of success:
The claim for damages is finally settled in favour of the Insured Litigant whether by a court decision or where an offer is received which the Insured Litigants Solicitor advises should be accepted or any other offer accepted."
THE EVIDENCE
RSA AND FIRST ASSIST'S WITNESSES
Peter William Smith
"Without ATE the use of CFAs would be impossible (since a litigant who could not afford to meet his own solicitor's costs could also clearly not afford to meet his opponent's costs if unsuccessful in the action)."
"Firstly it was obvious that the premium for such cases would have to be much larger than in run of the mill personal injury cases … Secondly it was obvious that a losing litigant would not have the means to pay the premium."
"That the premium needed to be deferred and conditional upon success. Those who won their cases would have the means to pay the premium. Those who lost would not need to do so."
"A ground breaking "after the event" conditional fee agreement protection plan."
"One further feature of the product's development was that we were aware that some solicitors were reluctant to use CFAs for fear of the effect of losing cases on the firm's financial position. We therefore incorporated a section of cover … under which we would cover a proportion of the solicitors own costs. This facility was not used in any of the Test Cases but does have relevance to the rating mechanism explained below."
"We therefore determined to make the premium deferred and we did this prior to any legislation as to recoverability of the premium from the opponent."
"will always be in a position at any stage in the case to know what their costs are and these will be quantifiable at whatever stage the case is concluded."
"We felt that it was a reasonable assumption … to make in broad terms, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a consistent underwriting procedure that the level of the insured's costs and the opponent's cost would escalate for the duration of the case on a roughly equal basis … We thus arrived at the basic fundamentals of a sliding scale premium calculated by reference to own solicitor's fees. It is important to appreciate that each case is rated on the estimated costs of that case. There is no standard assumption, for example, that the insured liability will always be a fixed proportion of own costs. The only workable assumption is that, as costs for both sides start at zero and proceed to the estimated levels at trial, the relationship between own costs and the insured's liability will remain constant throughout the action."
"In order to do this it was necessary to form a view as to:
(i) the likelihood of the insured's case succeeding in percentage terms; and
(ii) if the policy was called upon, how much would have to be paid out in order to work out the break even position, or "burning cost" for the scheme, where the cost of the claims paid exactly matches the value of risk premium income (excluding expenses and commission) received. Given the product was an entirely new concept, the absence of previous underwriting data, and the considerable volatility in rates in the ATE market, we resolved to apply basic principles to arrive at an appropriate rating model."
"In order to form a view as to the burning cost it was necessary for rating purposes to predict what the policy liability, ie own disbursements and adverse costs and disbursements, might come to in each case. This was done by asking the prospective insured's solicitors in the proposal form to provide us with the best estimate of these costs and disbursements to trial … The insured's solicitors would also be in the best position to know the likely rate of the other side in coming to their estimate which we could then use to calculate the premium."
(a) adding together the opponent's solicitor's estimated fees and disbursements and the claimant's solicitor's own disbursements;
(b) dividing the total by the anticipated basic fees of the claimant's solicitors (producing an exposure multiplier);
(c) arriving at a multiple, which is inversely proportionate to the percentage prospects of success of the case at the time the cover is taken out (producing a risk multiplier);
(d) applying the risk multiplier to the exposure multiplier to reach the relevant burning cost premium rate;
(e) adding an allowance for profit and administration and an allowance for broker's commission (if a broker is appointed). IPT is then due on the resultant premium (paragraph 41).
"It can also be seen that our exposure is on average approximately ?60,000 compared with the solicitors' exposure of ?38,000. If it is reasonable for a solicitor to recover a success fee in a range of 60% - 100% to reflect the risk, it follows that the required premium rate for our exposure is in the range of 100% - 150% to reflect the risk we take."
"The intention was to introduce a policy that was cost effective and also was aimed at solicitors who did bulk PI work and had the demonstrable track record of using CFAs effectively. Such solicitors needed to have high quality systems in place for handling such large scale work, and expertise in it. Watermark was designed as a delegated authority scheme for such solicitors as opposed to one off cases only - they were therefore expected to place all eligible risks with us.
...
14. The cover is similar to Pursuit to the extent that premium is conditional and deferred. However there is a limit of indemnity of ?125,000, and in common with other delegated authority schemes in the market there is a stringent set of acceptance criteria for cases to be eligible to be put on cover by the solicitor."
"It [obviously] depends on the state of proceedings. It depends on whether information has been shared under protocols between the solicitors, and often in our cases, because they are taken on late, there may be reliance on an estimate provided by the other side, but that still suffers from the same propensity for variance as the solicitor's own costs. By the nature of the fact that they are estimates, they are not likely to be absolutely accurate. On the other hand, they may be much more accurate than saying that you want, let us say, ?100,000 cover in every case. I would say there is some difficulty. In the majority of cases those estimates are unlikely to be seriously adrift in terms of their relationship one to the other, which is fundamental to Pursuit rating. In some cases -- in the Gouldens case I mentioned previously, which is such an example -- where because the case had an unexpected turn, all the estimates were similarly affected and were wrong. From my experience there is a tendency for estimates to be inaccurate in individual cases. In most cases, the inaccuracy is not material. In some cases both sides costs will be materially underestimated because the case goes all the way to trial and the trial is more complex than is anticipated, but I have some difficulty with the assertion that there is systematic under - or over - estimating ..."
"… the reason for that is if we charge an up front premium there would be no reduction if solicitor's costs were taxed or assessed down, so why should there be with the benefit of hindsight? We set the premium rate up-front. If we charge an up-front premium amount there would be no adjustment and we think it is inequitable that there should be a retrospective adjustment."
Emmanuel Gilbert
"I set up The Judge in April 2000 as an advisory source and started broking in 2001. The Judge is deliberately not a tied agent. Its business purely comes in from solicitors. The Judge has broked about 2,500 cases since November 2001 on behalf of about 700 firms of solicitors. There has been a 50% increase in cases submitted on an annual basis. We reject about 40% of cases on sight of the proposal forms and these do not go to the insurers at all."
"We would usually send a proposal to the most suitable three or so of them [ATE insurers] on any occasion. I would regard it as a tight market so far as the availability of ATE insurance underwriting capacity is concerned. There are only a limited number of insurers active in the market. In most cases it would be rare to get as many as three quotations back accepted … Outside the mainstream personal injury field the market is a declining one and is far from vibrant. This is particularly the case with clinical negligence where there are only a handful of providers remaining in the market."
"Pursuit is a somewhat different product than some of the alternatives in the market in that it operates on a sliding scale and does not have a specified premium figure at the outset. At the time we supply the quotation to solicitors we take pains to make it clear how Pursuit operates, particularly to any solicitors who may be unfamiliar with the product. When in discussion with solicitors, I seek to tell them that there is a parallel between the premium and their success fee, with the risk for solicitors bearing their own fees being comparable to the risk being borne by the insurers. I also explain that the risk for insurers can in fact be substantially greater than theirs, because the policy covers adverse costs, adverse disbursements and own disbursements. I also tell them that the nature of the policy can also be an incentive for the other side to settle, because the cost of the premium rises the longer the case proceeds."
"We receive a deferred commission of a general rate of 10% from First Assist conditional upon the successful outcome of the case."
"Where insurance cover is provided under a delegated authority scheme, it is a condition of the scheme that the solicitors must insure all their CFA cases using that particular policy and for the policy to be incepted at the same time that the CFA is entered into, usually before any letter of claim is dispatched. Solicitors who are not part of the insurer's panel authorised to work on a delegated basis could not access that type of policy. … The usual period of time for acceptance is 14, 21 or 28 days. Once a claimant has been declined cover by one insurer, that has to be disclosed in any future insurance applications and in my experience if a proposal has been turned down by two insurers it is almost "certain death" to the prospects of sourcing insurance from any other provider."
"Premiums shown here are indicative only and may vary depending on a number of factors which might include the stage the case has reached, whether liability is in dispute, the prospects of success, etc."
There are also other more specific warnings relating to particular policies.
"insurance policies are not that black and white. It's a mechanism to try and spread the risk because you could have had a premium which is charged on the full amount which is payable from day one and then it settles the day after, and that in certain circumstances can end up being more expensive than a policy like this … If you draw a comparison with a case which is insured early on, say for ?100,000 cover, and you might pay a premium of between 20 and ?30,000 for that typically for a non- personal injury case. Pre- proceedings the only liability for the insurer is always going to be disbursements but the premium is still ?20,000 to ?30,000. So the thing you are describing is not unique to First Assist. "
THE CLAIMANTS' WITNESSES
Mark Scrivenger
"We can advise that for a limit of indemnity of ?100,000 the premium payable, for our Clinical Justice Plan will be ?13,230 being ?12,600 together with insurance premium tax at the current rate of 5% of ?630.
We can advise that for a limit of indemnity of ?75,000 the premium payable for our Clinical Justice Plan will be ?9,922.50 being ?9,450 together with insurance premium tax at the current rate of 5% of ?472.50."
"If cover is not taken out in this period it may or may not be available at a later stage depending on the circumstances although the premium required will certainly be higher. If you are unable to accept this quotation within 21 days please advise before the expiration of this period.
You should ensure that the level of indemnity you have sought will provide full cover for the entirety of the proceedings. Because of relevant actuarial evidence most underwriters are reluctant to consider later increases to the indemnity particularly after the issue of proceedings."
"I trust the premium is acceptable to your client and look forward to receiving your cheque in order that we may issue the policy documentation. If your client is obtaining funding for the premium we need confirmation of their application, in writing, within 21 days."
"I therefore approached a lender with a request for a loan by way of a credit agreement under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The loan was to be used to pay the premium. Mrs Baker signed such an agreement with the proposed lender First National Bank Plc (FNB)."
"I requested he investigate possible funding terms on behalf of Mrs Baker, I also pointed out that I had to issue proceedings by the end of July 2002, so time was short.
...
18. Mr Gilbert returned to me with the possibility of a policy with First Assist. There were discussions about the nature and terms of the policy but it was also clear to me that First National were no longer effective or interested, and in fact never replied to the application for a loan by Mrs Baker to pay the premium to LPL. This left the Bakers with an LPL policy which they would have to pay the premium up-front which, financially, they were not in a position to do and which left Mrs Baker in a thoroughly unsatisfactory position with limitation a few months away."
"This letter is written to provide an opportunity for settlement of our client's claim without the additional cost of proceeding to trial including the cost of insurance cover which is available to our client."
"If this offer is not accepted (within 21 days) then our client will exercise the insurance cover available to her … such a settlement would save additional cost particularly for the Trust and we would draw your attention to the savings made in avoiding the insurance premium cover if such a cover is reached."
"You will therefore appreciate that we do not have the luxury of delaying the cost of insurance cover beyond the limit of the Part 36 offer."
"Yes there are different functions. The claimant has to build a case and that takes a lot more time and effort, whereas the defendants try and destroy it and that takes a lot less time."
"My client and I were both astonished about the level of premium but you have to take the product as you find it and it is insurers who run the market not the lawyers. These were observations that I made as a clinical negligence lawyer but of course bear no relation to the rating set by the insurance industry. I might also say that the limit of ?75,000 - ?100,000 I would not be comfortable with these days."
"In the event of the costs and the premium being reduced upon assessment we would be agreeable to taking a commercial view in such a situation and that we would consider either accepting a reduced premium based on the actual assessment of the costs or limiting any sum in respect of the shortfall that we would seek from the claimant from damages depending upon the reason for the reduction in the costs claimed."
William John Vallance
"I am aware of a range of different ATE products available in the market as a significant proportion of my caseload is conducted pursuant to CFAs backed by ATE products. I use a number of different ATE providers and I am not tied to recommending any particular product. I advise my clients on a case by case basis depending on the circumstances. It is not possible to give standardised advice in this regard. I must consider whether the proposed ATE product is suitable for my clients in accordance with my professional responsibility."
"Our client has received an offer of after the event insurance from Royal and Sun Alliance pursuant to their "Pursuit Protection Plan" this offer of insurance remains open until 11 September 2002. The premium for this policy cannot be identified at the outset, as it is based on a percentage of our normal fees (i.e. basic costs under the conditional fee agreement) calculated upon conclusion of the case. It is therefore in the party's interest to conclude a settlement of this case sooner rather than later.
To this end we enclose a claimant's Part 36 offer to settle the issue of liability."
"We see no reason to alter or previous stance in this matter. Both liability and causation are denied and we leave it to your client to take whatever steps he considers appropriate."
"Quantum was considerably lower than had been anticipated at the outset because of difficulties in establishing medical causation. This was one of the risk factors identified in the CFA with my client."
"I generally find costs estimates to be difficult whether it is own or other parties costs. But I arrived at that figure on the basis that at the time I was making the application, the defendants had not instructed solicitors at that point, it was still being dealt with by insurers. So I felt that the defendants solicitors would be involved over a shorter time span so that their costs were likely to be less."
"It no longer seems likely that we will be able to attribute a loss of earnings claim to the accident at work and, in the circumstances, our expectation of a successful outcome would be ?5,000."
Amanda Stevens
"I advised Mr Clarke to use the legal expenses insurance brokerage service provided by The Judge.Co.UK.Ltd (The Judge) whereby he would complete one proposal form which would be sent to a panel of five or six after the event legal expenses insurance providers. I considered this to be a cheaper and more effective way of obtaining several quotes simultaneously than approaching insurers direct. I also advised Mr Clarke that by requesting five quotes he would be well prepared to counter any subsequent arguments by the Defendants that the premium was unreasonable.
...
5. An insurance proposal form was forwarded to The Judge on 27 March 2002 and on 2 April I received a letter from The Judge advising that the application had been submitted to Amicus, Mike Young Legal Associates (MYLA), Litco and First Assist being the only insurance providers on their panel that The Judge considered might offer insurance for this particular case.
...
Emmanuel Gilbert managing director of The Judge advised me on 11 April that two of the insurance providers had responded to date and that they had explained no insurance quotation would be forthcoming until medical evidence had been obtained."
"Mr Clarke also asked me to enquire about the option of a deferred premium as he was already paying out money for disbursements and had concerns about the other expenses he would have to pay in pursuing the litigation. I spoke again with Emmanuel Gilbert on 1 August 2002 and he advised that MYLA were not able to quote on this case for their disbursement funding policy. He mentioned one other disbursement funding policy, which might be available with First National Bank, but explained that Charles Russell would have to register with the bank and show the last two years accounts before being accepted, so it was not going to be easy to get cover up and running in time for this claim. This avenue was therefore not pursued."
"It is not necessary to protect a client from adverse costs before proceedings are served, as there can be no liability for such costs at that time. In this case it took five months for a quotation to be obtained as the insurers were unwilling to provide one without medical evidence. I had applied on Mr Clarke's behalf for insurance as quickly as possible after receiving his instructions to pursue the claim."
"It is my belief that the ATE insurance market for RSI cases was virtually non existent. I have formed this view from discussions with colleagues in the personal injury world outside my own firm whom I meet regularly at training and social events and where we naturally discuss our cases on an anonymous basis."