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England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions >> CIBC Mellon Trust Co v Mora Hotel Corporation NV [2003] EWHC 9037 (Costs) (19 February 2003)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Costs/2003/9037.html
Cite as: [2003] EWHC 9037 (Costs)
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This summary of a judgment has been obtained from the Supreme Court Costs Office pages on the HM Courts Service web site. The citation used by BAILII is not an officially approved citation. The full text of the judgment may have an official Neutral Citation issued by the court, and may be available elsewhere on BAILII.
No.17 of 2003
CIBC Mellon Trust Co v Mora Hotel Corporation NV
19 February 2003
Mr Justice Davies (Sitting Without Assessors)
In this case the Judge on appeal from the Senior Costs Judge was asked to reconsider an order made by the latter awarding the receiving party an interim certificate in the sum of £525,000. The receiving party sought a much higher sum on the basis that they would be entitled to recover from the paying parties who had been joined to the proceedings at a later stage than their inception a substantial proportion of their costs incurred prior to the joinder of those parties.
Counsel for the appellant sought to rely on the judgment of Lord Justice Fry in Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529. Although that was a two Judge Court of Appeal it is generally accepted that Lord Justice Fry’s is the dissenting judgment and that the main decision going the other way of Lord Esher MR should be followed.
Mr Justice Davies carefully analysed the judgments, and concluded that the decision of Lord Esher was to be preferred, but that in any event the Costs Judge had very carefully exercised his discretion in arriving at the figure of £525,000 and there was certainly no material upon which he, the Judge, could hold that such a discretion had been wrongly exercised and accordingly the appeal was dismissed.