England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions >> Dooley v Parker [2003] EWHC 9029 (Costs) (05 July 2003)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Costs/2003/9029.html
Cite as: [2003] EWHC 9029 (Costs)

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This summary of a judgment has been obtained from the Supreme Court Costs Office pages on the HM Courts Service web site. The citation used by BAILII is not an officially approved citation. The full text of the judgment may have an official Neutral Citation issued by the court, and may be available elsewhere on BAILII.

 

 



No.9 of 2003

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Dooley v Parker
5 July 2002
Court of Appeal, Rix & Dyson LJJ and Wall J

The relevant facts in this costs dispute arising out of a boundary dispute are complex, but the essential and important fact is that from the beginning of proceedings until 1 May 2001 the claimant was seeking a right to park and a right of way over the defendant’s land. The claimant gave notice that she was abandoning the claim to a right to park on 1 May 2001, but continued to press her claim for an unlimited vehicular right of way. The case was ultimately settled on 30 May 2001.

The District Judge had held that following Shirley v Caswell [2001] Costs LR 1 there should be no order as to costs.

The Court of Appeal reversed that finding, saying that the claimant should have her costs from 1 May 2001 but that there should be no order as to costs prior to that date. Lord Justice Rix said this, in the course of his judgment:

"Accordingly, I would say that if the judgment of Lord Justice Chadwick has been interpreted as meaning either that there is no power to make an order and that the party receive only a proportion of his costs, or that if there is such a power it should never be exercised in case the Costs Judge would penalise the paying party twice over, then that is to misunderstand what Lord Justice Chadwick was saying. I have already indicated the extent to which any statement of principle is to be derived from his judgment. It is clear that he was not satisfied on the facts of that case that the Judge was alive to the risk of double penalty."