England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions >> Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Hancock [2001] EWHC 9003 (Costs) (2 March 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Costs/2001/9003.html
Cite as: [2001] EWHC 9003 (Costs)

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This summary of a judgment has been obtained from the Supreme Court Costs Office pages on the HM Courts Service web site. The citation used by BAILII is not an officially approved citation. The full text of the judgment may have an official Neutral Citation issued by the court, and may be available elsewhere on BAILII.

 

 

 No.2 of 2001

Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Dean William Hancock
2 March 2001
Mr Justice Silber sitting with Assessors

The background facts were that the Defendant had been employed by the Claimant council for many years, initially as an advisor on further and higher education, but latterly as an education assistant (Research and Information). On 21 September 1995 the Claimants informed the Defendant that his contract of employment would terminate on grounds of redundancy with effect from 15 December 1995. On that latter date, when the Defendant’s contract of employment terminated, the Claimants paid into his bank account over £24,000, being the redundancy payment due to him calculated in accordance with the Claimants redundancy scheme.

However, on the same day, the Defendant had contacted the Claimants explaining that he had suffered a breakdown in his mental health, and asking if they would consider allowing him to retire on medical grounds, to which the Claimants did agree, provided that he did not in fact receive a larger sum than the redundancy payment that had already been paid. However a second payment was made, and the Claimants therefore obtained a freezing injunction to prevent the Defendant spending that sum, and in July 1996 a Queens Bench Master granted summary judgment to the Claimants for £24,000 odd with over £1,100 interest and costs. The Defendant applied for permission to appeal out of time, and although Ian Kennedy J granted that permission, he nevertheless dismissed the appeal with costs.

The Defendant’s main objection to the assessment which took place before the Costs Judge was that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, as brought into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998, had been infringed. He in particular relied on Article 6.

His primary contention was that because the application for summary judgment was heard in Chambers, by both the Master and the Judge, they were in breach of Article 6, but, after reviewing the authorities, the Judge rejected that contention.

The Judge also rejected a contention by the Defendant that his Human Rights had been breached by the obtaining of the Claimants of their freezing injunction on an ex parte basis.

Next the Defendant contended that the reasoning of the Queens Bench Master could be impugned because he had not produced it in writing. The Judge held that he had no obligation to do so, but, even if he had, any defect was cured, because, on appeal, the Judge had given full and adequate reasons, which had not been the subject of any further appeal.

The final principal ground of objection by the Defendant was that the Costs Judge had not sought to enlist the assistance of the Official Solicitor as a Friend of the Court. The Judge, who of course heard the Defendant in person, said:

"I suspect that there are many competent lawyers who if instructed on behalf of the Defendant would not have been as able to put forward as persuasive a case as the Defendant has. Having reviewed the evidence, I am also satisfied that there were no arguments open to him that he did not pursue."

The Judge accordingly held that this was not a good ground of appeal, but, even if it had been, it would not have allowed the Defendant to impugn the costs order or the order of the Costs Judge.

There was also a cross appeal by the Claimants in respect of the Costs Judge’s decision disallowing the Claimant’s costs of their successful application for the grant of the freezing injunction. The Judge held that the Costs Judge had been wrong in this respect, but as the Claimants only wished to pursue their cross appeal if and to the extent that the Defendant was successful in his own appeal, their cross appeal was formally dismissed.