No. 4 of 2000
Flynn v Robin Thompson & Anor
25 February 2000
Mr Justice Buckley Sitting with Assessors
The Claimant is known to Masters as the principal of The
Solicitors' and Barristers' watchdog. He sought help from the Bar Pro Bono
Unit having represented to them that, being eligible for Legal Aid, he had
been unable to find a solicitor. The Pro Bono Unit informed him that they had
been able to locate a solicitor, namely Mr D. K of M. J. Darby Co, whose
address in West Midlands was given. In fact Mr K was not a solicitor but a
legal executive. Legal Aid was obtained and proceedings commenced. Evidence
was considered (including video evidence) and Mr K concluded it did not
support the Claimant's case. The Legal Aid Board was notified. The Claimant
made serious allegations against the firm of solicitors. Mr Darby issued an
application to come off the record. He served affidavit evidence in support.
Shortly before the hearing in London before the Master, the Legal Aid
Certificate was discharged but written confirmation was not received prior to
the hearing. The Claimant did not attend the hearing , but wrote to the
Master. Mr Darby and the legal executive both attended before the Master in
case questions were raised about the serious allegation being made by the
Claimant. The Master was informed that Legal Aid had been discharged. The
Master made the order sought and ordered that the costs of and occasioned by
the application be paid by the Claimant in any event. On the same day the
Claimant sent to the CAB Notice of Appeal against the discharge of Legal
Aid.
The detailed assessment was conducted by a Taxing Officer. He
disallowed the costs of the Legal Executive on the basis that he had been held
out as a solicitor (Pearless de Rougemont v Pilbrow) (1999) 2 Costs LR 109. He allowed the costs of Mr Darby attending before the Queen's Bench
Master. The Claimant brought in Objections to these determinations. The Master
held that the objections to the disallowance of the costs of the Legal
Executive had already been dealt with by the Taxing Officer, so these
objections were dismissed. The Master upheld the allowance of Mr Darby at the
hearing before the Queen's Bench Master.
The Claimant raised a subsidiary point to the effect that he
did not consider he had any liability for the costs because his Legal Aid
Certificate had been discharged in advance of the hearing before the Queen's
Bench Master. Accordingly, the solicitors "had no authority to go to court to
come off the court record". He relied upon Order 50, r. 5 of the County Court
Rules and RSC Order 67, r.6(4) and contended that as the solicitors, prior to
making their application to be removed from the record, were in fact already
removed from the record and as such, the solicitors were in effect attempting
to extort monies from the Claimant. The point was not part of the objections.
The Master drew the case of Cope v United Dairies [1963] 2 QB 33 to the
attention of the Claimant. The costs must be taxed by reference to the
order.
The Claimant sought a review, basing his evidence on "Order
67, r.6(4)". On the morning of the review, a telephone call was received from
the Claimant's wife to say he had been taken ill and the doctor had been
called to see him later that day. She sent a faxed message to confirm the
position. A Mr Joseph, who I understand is also associated with the
Solicitors' and Barristers' Watchdog, attended the hearing. A transcript of a
Judgment on Costs in a case brought by him against Darby & Co had been
included in the appeal bundle. In that case, he had been advised by Mr
Flynn.
At the hearing Mr Darby was able to explain that the Claimant had appealed the decision of the Queen's Bench Master to the Judge in Chambers and to the Court of Appeal without success. The Judge and the assessors had formed the preliminary view that the review process was not the procedure by which the Claimant should seek a remedy. Once it became clear that the order of the Queen's Bench Master had been the subject of two unsuccessful appeals, the Judge was able to dismiss the application notwithstanding the absence of the Claimant. The costs were summarily assessed. A request for a transcript of the Judgment at public expense was refused. The Judge briefly reiterated the reason for dismissing the appeal.