QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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CHRISTOPHER BERNARD UPHAM & ORS |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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HSBC UK BANK PLC |
Defendant |
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- And Between- |
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AYODELE AKINLUYI & ORS |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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HSBC UK BANK PLC |
Defendant |
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Roger Mallalieu QC (instructed by Stewarts Law) for the Claimants in CL-2021-000169
Andrew Green QC, Simon Pritchard and Dominic Howells (instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: Monday 31st January 2022
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Moulder:
Background
Issue
a) an adverse costs order is made against the claimants in favour of HSBC; and
b) the court identifies common issues across both cohorts of claimants, the costs of which the court orders should be borne across the cohorts.
i. insofar as the claimants incur costs in the preparation and management of their own claims, the claimants within a cohort bear their own costs. Those costs consist of primarily common costs, that is costs which arise from the proceedings in relation to the particular cohort, including in relation to sample claimants within that cohort. In addition, claimants will be liable for their own individual costs, being costs which relate to matters which are personal and specific to an individual claimant;
ii. in respect of any adverse costs orders, costs are to be borne severally by claimants; and
iii. a claimant's liability for adverse costs shall be apportioned pro rata to his total investment in the capital of the Eclipse Partnerships and not on a per capita basis.
i. whether, if an adverse costs order is made against the claimants, the share of the common costs should be the pro rata share of all costs incurred by HSBC and which have been incurred "wholly or mainly" in relation to matters which are common to both claims (the approach advanced for the Stewarts Claimants); or
ii. whether the division between the claims should be respected such that a claimant would only be liable for his pro rata share of common costs incurred in relation to his own claim but not costs which, although they relate to common issues across the cohorts, have been incurred by HSBC in relation to the other cohort (the approach advanced for the Edwin Coe Claimants).
1. to enable claimants to evaluate their liability for costs;
2. to enable the quantum of an application for security for costs to be agreed/determined; and
3. to allow/give guidance to HSBC (and their lawyers Norton Rose) as to how they should record time during the life of the proceedings.
Edwin Coe Submissions
i. there should be no order now which provides for costs across cohorts;
ii. unlike the position in Rowe v Ingenious Media Holdings plc [2020] EWHC 235 (Ch), the two proceedings are not akin to a joint venture – there is no sharing by the two cohorts of claimants of common costs incurred by the claimants and there should be no liability to share common costs incurred by HSBC which would oblige Edwin Coe Claimants to pay costs incurred by HSBC as a result of Stewarts' actions;
iii. HSBC are currently allocating costs equally to the two actions except where HSBC take the view that particular costs result from work done in response to particular cohort; this position should be maintained;
iv. it is unnecessary to legislate now for HSBC common costs: even though it may be necessary in future, this is not the right time;
v. any order made at this stage should reflect the fact that the Edwin Coe claim and the Stewarts claim are separate claims – such order should not tie the cases together inappropriately;
vi. the position is distinguishable from Greenwood v RBS [2014] EWHC 227 (Ch), given that case concerned a Group Litigation Order;
vii. the proposed definition of common costs is unworkable and imposes a burden on Norton Rose;
viii. the pragmatic solution reflects the law and is in furtherance of the Overriding Objective – namely, by asking what is the fair and proportionate order; and
ix. once any order is made in this regard, it will set a "bedrock".
"[41]…Given that I have already decided that the liability of the Claimants for the Defendants' costs should be several rather than joint, it seems to me fairer that the risks to a Claimant of participating in the litigation should be proportionate to the reward that he or she might obtain from the litigation. The notion that someone who invested £36,000 (and who, if successful, might recover compensation, whether for loss of investment, penalties or interest, commensurate with that) should contribute to the common venture exactly the same as someone who invested £10.5m (and whose compensation if successful would be very much larger accordingly) seems to me plainly unfair on the most basic principles of equity.
42. It is noticeable that in Davies v Eli Lilly Sir John Donaldson MR said of Hirst J's order at 1141D: "Those who practise in the Commercial Court, of which Hirst J is one of the judges, will recognise the age old respectability of such an order, based as it clearly is upon the Rhodian Law, the Rolls of Oleron and the maritime law of general average." Those who do not practise in the Commercial Court might like to be reminded of the maritime law of general average, set out in Halsbury's Laws (vol 7 (2015), Carriage and Carriers) at §606 as follows:
606. Principle of general average. General average is part of the law of the sea founded on equity. It formed part of the Rhodian law, was based in earlier custom and existed many centuries before the existence of marine insurance. Rhodian law provided that, when cargo was thrown overboard to lighten a vessel, that which had been given for all had to be replaced by the contribution of all. The most often cited legal definition of 'general average' is 'all loss which arises in consequence of extraordinary sacrifices made or expenses incurred for the preservation of the ship and cargo losses within general average, and must be borne proportionately by all who are interested'."
The relevant word here is "proportionately". Those interested in the preservation of the vessel (generally ship, freight and cargo interests) have to make a general average contribution calculated according to the value of their interest (see op cit §608 referring to a "rateable contribution"), and there are rules as to how such interests fall to be valued for this purpose.
[43]. That principle of maritime law (incidentally said to be founded on equity) seems to me to be very similar to the principle I tried to express in my oral judgment that those who embark on a venture together should bear the risks involved in the venture proportionately to their interests in its success. Although the order made by Hirst J in Davies v Eli Lilly was in fact on a per capita basis, it suggests to me that Sir John Donaldson would have been sympathetic to an order providing for a pro rata contribution to the costs had the plaintiffs' claims differed widely in value. In fact the plaintiffs, who were mostly elderly, did not have very large claims (see at 1138E-H). It is perhaps unlikely therefore that their claims showed the same disparity between the values of claims as in the present case." [Emphasis added]
"You have asked us to "please confirm what (if any) First Phase costs have been treated as 'common costs', split between the Edwin Coe Action and the Stewarts Action, and, assuming that there are common costs, on what basis." We can confirm that shortly after service of the Edwin Coe claim at the end of September 2020, we have generally split our time equally between the two claims in respect of workstreams that concerned both. To take a representative example, once Edwin Coe's claim was served we treated security for costs as a common issue to both claims and, in general, sought to evenly allocate our time spent in addressing security for costs through internal analysis and correspondence directed at both of you (i.e. if a given letter took 2 hours, the entry was split (1hrs:1hrs) between the Stewarts and Edwin Coe claims). On the other hand, where responding to one claimant group on security for costs (for example) took longer than responding to the other because of how each group put their position or what questions each raised to us, then the resulting split reflected that difference. As for workstreams that only concerned Stewarts, such as preparing a Rejoinder to the Stewarts' Reply, we only charged time to the Stewarts file on our systems. Likewise with the RFI process, which only engaged Edwin Coe, we only charged time to the Edwin Coe file. [Emphasis added]
Stewarts submissions
i. the order which is sought is both conventional and uncontroversial; the court should decide now how costs should be apportioned; if there are common costs it is fair that the claimants should know how those costs are to be shared;
ii. the court can be satisfied now that HSBC will incur costs which are common across the cohorts as is evident from the List of Issues and the fact that the claims will be tried together;
iii. Norton Rose is prepared to apportion across the cohorts;
iv. the order proposed by Edwin Coe is unsatisfactory as it does not deal with common costs incurred across the cohorts and not to apportion across the cohorts leaves a vacuum; if there are no common costs across the cohorts then the order will make no difference;
v. the issue of cost-sharing of own costs by claimants across the cohorts is a different issue; in any event in Ingenious there was limited sharing of common costs;
vi. if the court makes an adverse costs order against the claimants, the claimants need to know how costs will be apportioned, whilst recognising that the draft order provides that liability for common costs across the cohorts will only extend to those claimants "who are liable in respect of the same costs"; and
vii. if the defendant is incurring costs which are common, it is fair that they should be apportioned: this is clear from Ingenious at [55], [58] and [61]:
"55. I propose at the moment to focus only on the first facet, that is the claimants' liability for costs orders in favour of the defendant. If the defendant succeeds at trial it will expect to obtain a costs order in its favour; and it may also obtain any number of costs orders at interlocutory hearings. The general principle does not seem to me to be difficult to state, which is that all the claimants who were potentially interested in the part of the case on which the costs were incurred should bear an apportioned part of the liability for the defendant's costs insofar as they were common costs.
58. But as I say I do not think that affects the principles. Of the 3 supplementary questions I have identified above, the answers I have already given effectively deal with (iii), the answer being that the apportionment should be on the basis of several liability apportioned pro rata to the relevant Claimants' cash contributions; but I cannot deal in the abstract with the other two. That depends on the circumstances in which each costs order in favour of a Defendant is made. Suppose for example there is an interlocutory hearing at which an application is unsuccessfully made against UBS, and UBS is awarded its costs. Which of the Claimants should contribute to this? The answer is all those interested in the matter that was argued. That is very unlikely (although it is not completely inconceivable) to include any Claimant who does not bring a claim against UBS. But it does not necessarily include all those who do (the 50 Stewarts Claimants and the 1 Peters & Peters Claimant). It might include only the Stewarts Claimants, arising out of a point that they took but that the Peters & Peters Claimant did not. It might not include all of the Stewarts Claimants – it might have concerned only a subset of them, or conceivably only one. None of this can be prescribed for in advance.
61. I am therefore wary at this stage of seeking to do any more than articulate the general principle that I have already set out, that where a costs order is made in favour of any of the Defendants, the relevant Claimants should be severally liable on a pro rata basis for such part of those costs as are common costs." [Emphasis added]
"32. In those circumstances, as I said in my short oral judgment, I have not been persuaded that the change in the legal landscape changes the fundamental equation as to where the risk ought principally to lie; nor does the fact that in this case no GLO has (yet) been made, and may never be (the Claimants are reserving their position on the point), since the case shares very many characteristics with the sort of cases which are suitable for a GLO, and in particular, the characteristic that a very large number of claimants are bringing claims together.
33. That was the basis on which I decided that in principle an order for several liability rather than joint liability should be made."
HSBC submissions
Discussion
i. there are likely to be common issues across the cohorts – this is evident from the List of Issues;
ii. the issues which result in costs being incurred by HSBC may be issues which are common to both cohorts but may not be limited to the agreed List of Issues (e.g. HSBC's application for security for costs);
iii. if HSBC is awarded all or part of its costs at the conclusion of the proceedings, the court has a discretion as to the appropriate order and may not make an issue based order;
iv. if the court does not make an issue based order it will not as a matter of course determine what issues should be treated as "common issues" for the purposes of cost sharing. Should it be the position that common costs are agreed (or ordered) to be shared across the cohorts, the court will therefore need to make a further determination as to what proportion of the costs relate to particular issues, which of those costs relate to common issues where costs are to be shared across the cohorts and which claimants should be liable for those common issues;
v. if the court is to retain its discretion as to costs orders (a principle accepted for the Stewarts Claimants) then it will only determine at the end of the proceedings which claimants should bear the costs of all or part of the proceedings. If the court were to determine that, even though costs were common across the cohorts it was not appropriate in light of other matters such as conduct that the costs should be borne across the cohorts, the provision currently sought as to the allocation of costs would have no application;
vi. since it will only be after trial that the court determines whether an issue is common across cohorts, no benefit would appear to accrue to the claimants now in making an order that such costs should be borne proportionately, as absent a determination as to what is a common issue which should be shared, a claimant will be unable to quantify its likely exposure; and
vii. Norton Rose currently records time to two workstreams reflecting each claim and allocate time equally unless in its opinion one cohort has caused them to expend more time than the other. Norton Rose does not currently therefore merely allocate time on an equal split between cohorts but use their judgement to allocate to the two cohorts based on the work generated by the respective cohorts. An order now that common issues will be borne in pro rata shares across cohorts will not assist Norton Rose in its time recording given that common issues have not been defined (and it is not argued that they can be identified now for this purpose) so remains a matter of judgement and Norton Rose already takes into account the proposition that it is unfair for time to be allocated equally to each cohort when the work has been unevenly caused by one cohort or the other.
"the parties shall take reasonable steps to cooperate, allocate work and/or avoid duplication of costs as appropriate"
"In those circumstances I propose to start by setting out what I understand the general principles to be. In the simple case such as Ward, there are a number of claimants (there 99) bringing actions against a single defendant (there Guinness Mahon) which raise some common issues, and where certain claims are to be tried first. The idea behind the costs sharing order is that all the claimants should contribute to the costs that benefit them all, that is the common costs. That has two facets. One is the claimants' potential liability for the costs of the defendant. The second facet which the costs order may (but so far as I can see need not) deal with is the claimants' liability to contribute to their own solicitors' costs, both if they lose and if they win (as they will be unlikely to recover all their costs from the defendant even if entirely successful), and the recoverability of such costs from the defendant." [Emphasis added]
"I am therefore wary at this stage of seeking to do any more than articulate the general principle that I have already set out, that where a costs order is made in favour of any of the Defendants, the relevant Claimants should be severally liable on a pro rata basis for such part of those costs as are common costs. In any particular instance that needs filling out by identifying both who the relevant Claimants are (namely those who are interested in the particular question which gave rise to the costs), and which costs are to be treated as common costs, or to put it more simply: which costs are common? and common to whom?" [Emphasis added]
i. a statement of general principle will not give useful guidance to Norton Rose since it is recognised that even where there are common issues across cohorts, not all claimants will be liable for costs incurred in respect of those common issues; the issue of what is a common cost is a matter of judgement and ultimately a question for the court; accordingly any allocation by Norton Rose could only operate as a rule of thumb pro tem and could not be binding on the claimants;
ii. it will not resolve the issue of security for costs as any estimate of the likely costs will have to make assumptions about common issues across the cohorts and the amount of costs that will be attributable to such common issues. That exercise is not materially assisted by an order as to the apportionment of common costs as it merely begs the question as to what costs derive from issues which are common across the cohorts and how much should be attributed to those common issues;
iii. it will not assist a claimant to assess its liability for costs as the other elements of the calculation will not be known until a determination is made as to the common issues, the extent of the costs referable to such issues and the claimants who should bear those costs; and
iv. a refusal to make such an order now does not preclude the court from making such an order ordering apportionment across cohorts at the end of the trial but making such an order now may suggest that after trial, if HSBC is successful, the court will make an issue based order or that when an order is made, common issues across the cohorts will be ordered to be borne pro rata when the court may determine that it is not appropriate for costs of issues to be borne across the cohorts even where common. An order now as to apportionment across cohorts of any adverse costs order thus risks operating as a constraint (even if merely indirect) on the future discretion of the court for which no benefit has been demonstrated.
Conclusion