QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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PJSC Tatneft |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Gennady Bogolyubov & Ors |
Defendant |
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Mark Howard QC, Ruth Den Besten (instructed by Fieldfisher LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 9th May, 10th May
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Crown Copyright ©
[NOTE: As the hearing of this matter was in private some parts of the judgment have been edited to maintain confidentiality]
Mrs Justice Cockerill :
"The purpose of a freezing order is to stop the injunctive defendant from dissipating or disposing of property which could be the subject of enforcement if the claimant goes on to win the case it has brought, and not to give security for his claim."
"So far as judicial precedent is concerned, we can say with some confidence that the jurisdiction to make a freezing order also carries with it the power to make whatever ancillary orders are necessary to make the freezing order effective."
"When rarely and in exceptional cases a worldwide Mareva is granted, a disclosure order will usually follow. On the other hand, I would emphasise that a disclosure order should only be made for a purpose for which the power exists, namely to police the Mareva injunction."
"... being ancillary to the Mareva injunction should not go beyond the ambit of the injunction."
"... whether in all the circumstances it is both just and convenient to make the order. There are no hard and fast rules and certainly no rule which precludes an order for cross-examination."
"The claimant seeks disclosure under CPR rule 25.1(1)(g) in relation to the value and location of D1 to D4's assets, up to the value of $380 million. Such an order is now commonplace to ensure that a freezing order is effective ..."
"The purpose of disclosure is to make the freezing order effective. In the ordinary way, a defendant is required to disclose all his assets above a certain value. This is because if he can choose which assets to disclose, he is likely to choose those which are the least available or accessible to the claimant for the purposes of execution."
"So that the claimant can know whether there will be assets (and if so what assets) available to meet a judgment."
"It is perfectly rational and understandable that the orders are unlimited in amount because in order to police it, you may need to see the totality of the assets and know where they are."
i) the conclusion I have reached as to the issue of principle and therefore the fairly high hurdle which applies to the exercise of the discretionary test;
ii) the conclusion I have reached on the evidence before me as to the discretionary issue, in particular in relation to the other factors which go into the mix; and;
iii) the fact that I am imposing a safeguard by way of confidentiality club;
I do not think that this is the case and therefore, again, this is an indication that I am currently strong minded to make an order with the same dates as regards non-Russian and Russian assets.