England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS & PROPERTY COURTS
OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION)

		Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
		13/12/2017

The Hon. Mr Justice Popplewell:

1. These proceedings concern the fall-out from a shareholder dispute which came to a head in December 2016. The Claimant ("SMOH") is a company registered in the Cayman Islands which heads the Super-Max group. The group manufactures and distributes razor blades and associated products worldwide, mostly in India, the Middle East and Africa. The group's largest market, in terms of both sales and profit, is India, where the business was started by the Defendant's family and where it operates through a subsidiary, Super-Max Personal Care Pvt. Ltd ("SPCPL"). All its main manufacturing plants are in India. Another group subsidiary is Wesley International Ltd ("Wesley"), which is registered and based in Dubai. The group has offices in Dubai and also at Thane, near Mumbai, which is the largest of its manufacturing plants.
2. The Defendant ("Mr. Malhotra") is commonly known as "Rocky". He is a UK citizen and lives in Dubai, Mumbai and Los Angeles. The Super-Max group is an offshoot of a family business originally founded by his grandfather as Harbhans Lal Malhotra & Sons ("HLM") in 1945. There was a family split in 1986, with Mr Malhotra and his father forming the Super-Max group (initially under a different name) and his uncle retaining the HLM business, with which the Super-Max group competes.
3. Actis LLP is an English registered partnership carrying on business as a private equity investor in growth markets across Africa, Asia and Latin America. In 2011 the Actis group invested US$ 225 million in the Super-Max group through the Additional Defendant which is a Mauritian company created as a special purpose vehicle ("Actis"). At this time the Super-Max business was the second largest manufacturer of razor blades in the world, behind Gillette. Subsequently Actis has invested a further sum of almost US$ 40 million, and Mr Malhotra (indirectly) about $10 million. The investments made Actis a minority shareholder with a current equity interest of 40.17% of the ordinary shares together with additional preference shares. Mr Malhotra and his family retain a majority equity stake. At the material times Mr Malhotra's family interests have been held by a Lichtenstein foundation of which he and his family are beneficiaries, which owns the shares of a Mauritian company, Super-Max Mauritius, which in turn owns 59.83% of the ordinary shares in SMOH. Actis' economic interest in the group is much greater than its 40.17% ordinary share ownership, by reason of the group's debt to it and its preferential shareholding. Its economic interest was put at something in excess of 90%.
4. Actis, Mr Malhotra, SMOH and others entered into a shareholders agreement entitled Subscription and Shareholder Deed ("the SSD"), which was signed on 4 November 2010, amended on 4 March 2011, completed on 24 March 2011 and again amended on 24 July 2015. Mr Malhotra became the Executive Chairman of SMOH and the group, pursuant to the terms of a written agreement with SMOH with effect from 11 April 2011 (the "Service Contract"). Under the SSD there was to be a group chief executive officer who could only be removed with the consent of Actis.
5. The financial performance of the group was disappointing. Mr Malhotra attributed it to the incompetence of the CEO, Mr Anindo Mukherji, and the senior management team he had put in place since his appointment in August 2014. Mr Mukherji and the senior management nevertheless continued to enjoy the support of Actis. On 18 December 2016 Mr Malhotra purported to suspend Mr Mukherji as CEO and take over the role himself, and terminated the employment of some other senior managers. This was contrary to the wishes of Actis and without its consent. Actis sought an injunction, granted ex parte by Picken J on 20 December 2016, restraining Mr Malhotra from implementing the suspension of Mr Mukherji; from implementing the suspension or removal of other employees; and from holding himself out or purporting to act as CEO. In the light of Mr Malhotra's alleged subsequent conduct, a further order was sought, and granted ex parte by Andrew Baker J, on 6 January 2017, restraining Mr Malhotra from doing various things which would or might interfere with the management of the group's business.
6. Actis considered various aspects of Mr Malhotra's conduct, both before and after the Court orders, to be a repudiatory breach of his Service Contract. On 10 February 2017 Actis, purporting to exercise rights under the SSD to take certain actions on behalf of SMOH, caused SMOH to treat Mr Malhotra's behaviour as gross misconduct terminating the Service Contract.
7. The central issue in the case is whether Mr Malhotra's Service Contract was validly terminated. Mr Malhotra challenges the suggestion that he was guilty of gross misconduct or that SMOH had any right to terminate his employment as executive chairman; and in any event disputes that Actis had the right to cause SMOH to take such action. He also advances a claim against Actis for unreasonably refusing its consent to the removal of Mr Mukherji as CEO and for wrongly purporting to act on behalf of SMOH in terminating his Service Contract.
8. Since the time of the purported termination, an interim arrangement has been agreed between the parties, pending the trial in these proceedings, pursuant to which, among other things, SMOH would continue to pay Mr Malhotra's salary and Mr Malhotra would cease to act as executive chairman save for certain functions.

The governing terms

Shareholder agreements: The SSD and articles of association

9. The SSD, which was governed by English law, put in place the following scheme for governance of SMOH and the group. An "Advisory Board" was created, which was to be the "principal governing body of the Group" (clause 17.1.5). The Advisory Board was to have seven members, being (i) Mr Malhotra (who was to act as chairman of the Advisory Board) and three persons nominated by him; (ii) two persons nominated by Actis; and (iii) one independent member, to be appointed by agreement between Mr Malhotra and Actis (clause 17.1.2). The Advisory Board was required to meet at least six times each calendar year at intervals of not more than two months (clause 17.1.4), and would only be quorate if there were three directors present including at least one Actis nominee and one Malhotra nominee (clause 18.4.1). The composition of the boards of directors of SMOH and each group company was to follow the structure of the Advisory Board: (i) Mr Malhotra was entitled to appoint four directors; (ii) Actis was entitled to appoint two non-executive directors; and (iii) there was to be one independent, non-executive director, appointed by agreement between the parties (clauses 17.2.1 to 17.2.3). Mr Malhotra was to be the executive chairman of SMOH and the group under a service contract to be agreed between Actis and Mr Malhotra on the principal terms set out in an already agreed term sheet (clause 17.2.1), provided that if his Service Contract were terminated or expired for any reason he should only be entitled to be non-executive chairman of SMOH and the group.
10. Save for "Reserved Matters", all decisions of the group were to be taken after giving due consideration to the advice and recommendations of the Advisory Board (clause 18.1.2), and the parties agreed to procure each group company – subject to the fiduciary duties of the directors in question – to act consistently in accordance with any resolution of the Advisory Board (clause 18.1.3). "Reserved Matters" were not to be carried out by any group company without Actis' prior written consent (clause 16.1). Such matters include (at para 5.2 of schedule 2):

"The appointment or removal of the CEO (subject to clause 18.6.1), India CEO, the CFO and the India CFO or any variation in the remuneration or other benefits or terms of service of any such person."

11. The SSD empowers Actis' nominated directors to prosecute rights of action on SMOH's behalf, and to instruct SMOH to exercise decisions and/or discretions, in certain circumstances:

Clause 16.3 provides:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Deed, the SMOH Articles of Association…and any other Transaction Document [as widely defined], any right of action which SMOH………may have against the Malhotra Parties [defined to include Mr Malhotra] shall be conducted and prosecuted on behalf of SMOH…solely by the Actis Directors. In such event, the Actis Directors shall have full authority on behalf of SMOH……to negotiate, litigate and settle any claim arising out of such right of action … and each of the parties shall use its best commercial efforts to give effect to the provisions of this clause 16.3."

Clause 16.4 provides:

"The parties agree that all decisions and discretions which may be exercised by any Group Company as against [Mr Malhotra and others] in respect of the Transaction Documents [defined so as to include the SSD and Service Contract] shall be exercised at the instructions of Actis and, the Malhotra Parties [defined to include Mr Malhotra] shall not, and the Malhotra Parties shall procure that each member of the Group shall not, vary, novate, supplement, waive or replace or agree to vary, novate, supplement, waive or replace the terms or conditions of, or give any consent or exercise any such discretion in respect of any of the Transaction Documents … (…whether subject to conditions or not), or do anything which is not contemplated by, or is inconsistent with, any of them, or agree to do any of the foregoing, without the prior consent in writing of Actis. …"

12. The scheme described above was to be replicated across the entire group and incorporated in the articles of association of each group company (clause 35.2). In circumstances of conflict/inconsistency between the provisions of the SSD and the articles of any group company, the parties agreed that the SSD was to prevail (clause 35.2). Article 29 and Schedule 1 of SMOH's articles of association replicated clause 16.1 and Schedule 2 of the SSD in requiring the written consent of Actis for Reserved Matters in terms which are materially identical.
13. In fact at the times material to this dispute the composition of the boards did not entirely reflect the SSD. There were eight, not seven, Advisory Board members because there were two independent appointments. The Advisory Board comprised:

(1) four Malhotra nominees, namely Mr Malhotra himself; Mr Jonathan Ivinson, a personal friend of Mr Malhotra and tax partner at Akin Gump LLP, the English solicitors who advised Mr Malhotra; Mr T.P. Ostwal; and Professor Charles Norchi;

(2) two Actis nominees: Mr Shomik Mukherjee (not to be confused with Mr Anindo Mukherji, the CEO, to whom he is no relation) and Mr Rathinam; and

(3) two independent members: Mr Peter Birch and Mr Akhter Mateen.

14. The SMOH board had only three members: Mr Malhotra and Mr Norchi as the Malhotra nominees and Mr Shomik Mukherjee as the Actis nominee.

Mr Malhotra's Service Contract

15. Mr Malhotra's Service Contract was with SMOH on terms agreed between him and Actis pursuant to the SSD. It was subject to English law and jurisdiction and contained the following express terms:

"Clause 2.1:

"[Mr Malhotra] shall serve as [SMOH's] Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors, and shall have the general powers, duties and responsibilities of management usually vested in that office in a corporation and such other additional powers and duties as may be prescribed from time to time by the Company. The Company may ask the Employee to assume additional positions within the affiliates of the Company."

Clause 2.2:

"The duties of the Executive Chairman of the Board shall include responsibility for determining the Super-Max Group's ("Group") global strategy for manufacturing, distribution, marketing, new product development and the strategic direction. Further, the Executive Chairman will be responsible for leading the development of world class [Environmental, Social and Governance ESG] systems for the Group ensuring that state of the art, best practice technology is implemented at the right cost, that product development meets with the Group's growth plans defining organisation culture, and for the Group's financial health and sustenance."

Clause 2.3:

"During employment with [SMOH], [Mr Malhotra will: …. (ii) comply with all of [SMOH's] rules, regulations and policies;"

Clause 5:

"…It is a condition of employment with [SMOH] that [Mr Malhotra] will comply with rules and policies which are established by [SMOH]"

Clause 7:

"[SMOH] shall pay to or reimburse [Mr Malhotra] for pre-approved reasonable and necessary business, travel promotional and similar expenditures incurred by [Mr Malhotra], including travel as per [SMOH's] travel policy…"

Clause 13:

"13.1 This employment relationship shall last for an indefinite period of time and can be terminated on the grounds and in the manner as provided by applicable law and this Contract"

"13.4 For valid reasons, the Company, as well as the Employee, may at any time terminate the employment relationship without notice. A valid reason is considered to be a gross misconduct within the meaning of applicable law."

16. The rules, regulations and policies of SMOH which fell within clause 2.3(ii) and 7.1 included a Code of Conduct Policy, Travel Policy, Hospitality Policy and an "Authority Matrix". The latter was a document agreed by the Advisory Board at the time of Mr Anindo Mukherji becoming CEO and designed to provide clarity and protection of the senior management's independence from Mr Malhotra. It set out the Reserved Matters in which Mr Malhotra was to have no involvement. It identified those other matters which were ultimately to be decided by either or both of Mr Anindo Mukherji or Mr Malhotra, sometimes in consultation with the other, and also included provisions for the involvement of others in the management hierarchy. A footnote in red provided: "There will not be any direct communication by the shareholders with any employee. All communications will flow through the CEO. A formal communication to this effect will be made to all employees."
17. By December 2016 Mr Malhotra's salary as executive chairman was US$1.45 million per annum.

Mr Anindo Mukherji's contract of employment as CEO

18. Mr Anindo Mukherji was identified by Actis as a candidate for CEO of the group in June 2014 and his appointment made, with the agreement and support of Mr Malhotra, commencing on 8 August 2014. He had successive contracts of employment, first in an appointment letter, then a written contact dated 20 January 2015 with SCPCL and then a written contract dated 1 April 2015 with Wesley. The latter is the operative contractual document under which he was employed as group CEO at the material time. It was governed by UAE law and provided that he was to be supervised by, and report to, the chairman as his line manager. It contained express provisions relating to circumstances in which his employment might be terminated but no express provisions for suspension.

Narrative

19. By the time Mr Anindo Mukherji took over as CEO and was able to shape his own management and strategy, the group had already suffered a serious decline since Actis' investment in 2011. There had been three CEOs, the previous one having lasted only a matter of months before resigning. During two hiatuses between CEOs, Mr Malhotra had acted as temporary CEO, between 30 September 2013 and 2 January 2014; and again between 27 March 2014 and 8 August 2014. This was pursuant to the agreement of the Advisory Board. A few months after Mr Anindo Mukherji started, on 6 November 2014, Mr Birch, one of the independent Advisory Board members, sent an email describing the group as being in a "parlous" position. In his evidence he described it before Mr Anindo Mukherji's arrival as being "shambolic". Mr Anindo Mukherji said that it took him some 6 to 8 months to be in a position to ascertain the problems and start to implement his own strategy for change, including structural and senior management changes, in other words roughly until the financial year end 2014/2015 in March 2015, with Mr Abraham being recruited as CEO India three months later. In the four financial years from 2011/12 to 2014/15 net sales had fallen year on year from about US$231m to about US$141m. EBITDA over that period had been highly volatile: US$27m, minus US$44m, minus US$7 million, and US$16m respectively. The group's financing costs and debt burden meant that it was loss-making throughout. In addition it had serious cashflow difficulties.
20. By the end of the next financial year, 31 March 2016, when Mr Anindo Mukherji had had a full year at the helm after settling in, the results continued to disappoint. Net sales were down further to about US$122m and EBITDA was about US$10m. These compared with forecasts made by Actis, based on management projections, of US$217m sales and US$39m EBITDA.
21. Mr Malhotra and the majority of the group's Advisory Board began to question whether Mr Anindo Mukherji was the right person for the job. Mr Malhotra first expressed his view that Mr Mukherji was not succeeding and should be replaced as CEO at a meeting with Mr Shomik Mukherjee and Mr Rathinam on 8 April 2016. The following month, Mr Peter Birch began to express his concerns in a typically trenchant email of 25 May 2016. A meeting of the Advisory Board took place on 31 May 2016 at which it was apparent that the group had failed to meet the targets management had set. At that meeting, and in the face of critical questioning from the board members, Mr Anindo Mukherji explained that things would be different going forwards because certain legacy issues which had previously affected performance had now been resolved. Mr Mateen informed Mr Anindo Mukherji that the board would be closely monitoring whether he was able to meet his projections.
22. The June and July targets were again missed by a sizeable margin. At the next Advisory Board meeting on 21 July 2016, Mr Anindo Mukherji and senior management explained the figures and their perception of the reasons for the shortfall, together with their revised targets and strategy for the future. After the meeting, Mr Birch emailed the Advisory Board members as follows:

"The first quarter's results were disappointing --- to put it mildly. We did not discuss what steps should be taken if the second quarter and the 2016/17 year's budgeted sales and EBITDA are not achieved. We have no back up. The business is drifting towards closure. The executive management is impressive but NOT performing. We are very good at administration and better than we were @ governance but these are invalid without robust sales. It is not up to the board to come up with solutions --- it is up to management. Should they fail, then the board has no alternative but to step in --- and the way the business is going, that seems more and more likely."

23. In early August 2016 Mr Malhotra sought a further Advisory Board meeting to take place that month, but the Actis nominees did not see the need for another meeting so soon and did not attend. The others went ahead with an inquorate meeting by telephone on 26 August 2016. A number of members of the board, including Mr Birch, were highly critical of Mr Anindo Mukherji. Mr Mateen, the other independent board member recognised that the performance figures were poor but regarded it as unfair to level criticism at the management in the absence of an opportunity for them to discuss and explain the figures.
24. The targets were missed again for August and September 2016. A meeting of the Advisory Board took place on 22 September 2016. All members concluded that no steps should be taken in relation to changing management prior to the next Advisory Board meeting in November. All except the two Actis nominees on the board (i.e. Messrs Birch, Mateen, Malhotra, Ostwal, Norchi and Ivinson) expressed the view that a change in management should be given consideration at the November meeting.
25. The October 2016 targets were again missed, again by a considerable margin. By November 2016 relations between the shareholders had deteriorated further. They were in discussions in relation to a proposal, a variant of which had been mooted a long time before, whereby Mr Malhotra would step down as executive chairman, to be replaced by Mr Mateen as a non-executive chairman, in return for Actis waiving payment of interest on its loans to the group. At this time both sides had in mind that the SSD would enable Actis to begin a process to sell the business in the open market from 1 January 2017, and that if Mr Malhotra did not cooperate or more than 12 months elapsed, Actis had further "drag rights" to compel Mr Malhotra to sell his shares as part of an exit from Actis' investment. Both were aware that because of Actis' preferred rights in relation to its debt and equity shareholding, the result would involve Mr Malhotra receiving nothing unless the fortunes of the group revived considerably.
26. A meeting of the Advisory Board was scheduled to take place on Thursday 24 November 2016. Ahead of that meeting, Mr Malhotra and Mr Ivinson met Mr Shomik Mukherjee and Mr Rathinam at Actis' offices in London on Monday 21 November 2016. This was a shareholder meeting, with Mr Ivinson acting as Mr Malhotra's legal adviser qua shareholder, not in his capacity as an Advisory Board member. Mr Malhotra asked for an offer to buy him out fully, and for Mr Anindo Mukherji to be replaced as CEO. The Actis representatives wanted Mr Malhotra to step down as executive chairman. Neither agreed to the other's requests. They agreed to have further discussions in Dubai on Wednesday 23 November ahead of the Advisory Board meeting scheduled for the following day, and for a draft amended SSD to be drawn up for discussion. Messrs Mukherjee and Rathinam indicated that unless these shareholder issues had been resolved the Advisory Board meeting should not take place on 24 November, a view confirmed in an email from Mr Schmidt, the Actis partner with responsibility for the investment, to Mr Malhotra later that day. Mr Schmidt urged constructive discussion to resolve the issues so that the Advisory Board meeting could be constructive.
27. The discussions in Dubai on 23 November 2016 proved to be anything but constructive. Mr Malhotra commenced proceedings in the Cayman Islands against Actis, Actis LLP, Mr Shomik Mukherjee and three Actis employees/directors, alleging liability for destroying value in the business. When he and Mr Ivinson came to meet Mr Shomik Mukherjee and Mr Rathinam in Dubai on Wednesday 23 November, first at around noon and then over dinner in the evening, Mr Malhotra did not at first reveal this fact. However during the dinner Mr Malhotra then purported to serve the proceedings and, according to Mr Shomik Mukherjee's evidence, which I accept, went on to threaten the Actis representatives.
28. Mr Shomik Mukherjee and Mr Rathinam did not attend the Advisory Board meeting the next day, requesting that it be deferred to another date. It went ahead without them although it was inquorate. Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Desai, the group CFO, attended to speak to the group's performance. The four Malhotra nominees and Mr Birch signed a document condemning the refusal of the Actis nominees to attend.
29. The next day, 25 November 2016, Mr Malhotra sent an email to Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Desai urging them to put in place a drastic remedial plan in almost all areas of the business, copied to Mr Birch. Mr Birch responded supportively, without copying in the Actis nominee board members.
30. Matters deteriorated. Mr Malhotra took a number of aggressive steps towards Mr Anindo Mukherji with a view to undermining and removing him. They met in Dubai on 28 November 2016 and had a follow up call on 3 December 2016. On both occasions Mr Malhotra said that any outcome would result in Mr Anindo Mukherji being dispensed with, and that his reputation would be sullied. He threatened to join Mr Anindo Mukherji as a defendant to the Cayman action and asked him to consider his position, in other words urging him to resign.
31. On 30 November 2016 he sent an email to Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham purporting to set out what was characterised as their "dismal performance" and "lack of action". It was copied to a number of their subordinates. Further aggressive and disparaging emails were sent by Mr Malhotra to Mr Anindo Mukherji and his senior management team over the following weeks, again sometimes copied to subordinates, and in intemperate terms, for example alleging "total chaos", "the disease of non performances", "value destruction created wilfully or by inability" of which the majority of the advisory board were allegedly "in contempt". He prepared an announcement in very critical terms which alleged that Mr Anindo Mukherji "will milk the company as long as the other shareholder and him hatch plot to destroy value". These tirades, and copying some of them to subordinates, can only have been intended to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and the senior management for the purposes of trying to force their resignation.
32. Mr Malhotra sought to further this tactic in late November 2016 through the board of directors of SPCPL. This board was not responsible for strategy, which came from the Advisory Board, but focused largely on statutory compliance matters in its local Indian jurisdiction as well as a few more operational aspects of the Indian business. Mr Abraham was a member of the SPCPL board from 3 August 2015, as would obviously befit the Indian CEO. At Mr Malhotra's behest two more junior employees, Mr Merani and Mr Chakravarthy, each fiercely loyal to Mr Malhotra, were appointed to the board. On 15 December 2016 a detailed agenda for a board meeting on 29 December was circulated which included a review of Mr Abraham's performance as CEO India. The operational strategy of the company in India had not previously been something for its board to consider; that was a matter for the Advisory Board, as was the performance of the CEO India. To have Mr Abraham's juniors being invited to review his performance was clearly calculated to undermine him. This tactic culminated in Mr Malhotra seeking to remove Mr Abraham as a director and replace him with Mr Sameer Khan on 26 December 2016.
33. Meanwhile on 14 December 2016 Mr Malhotra emailed all Advisory Board members criticising Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO for (1) the poor performance of the group and (2) a "serious issue" in relation to "fictitious invoicing". The email sought a written board resolution suspending Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO "pending a decision about his future", and appointing Mr Malhotra himself as interim CEO "pending the appointment of a long term replacement". The four Malhotra nominee members of the Advisory Board and Mr Birch signed a resolution in those terms. The Actis nominees and Mr Mateen did not. Mr Shomik Mukherjee responded pointing out that the SSD did not provide for written resolutions and that business could only be conducted at board meetings; and that the effective removal of the CEO was a "Reserved Matter" requiring Actis' written consent which had not been sought. He went on to outline Actis' substantive objections to the proposed course, including support for Mr Anindo Mukherji and opposition to the idea of Mr Malhotra taking over the role. Mr Mateen also responded stating that the replacement or removal of the CEO was a shareholder reserved matter for the shareholders, not the Advisory Board, and furthermore that he did not agree that Mr Mukherji was responsible for the underperformance of the group. Mr Birch in turn gave his reasons for supporting Mr Malhotra's position that Mr Mukherji was responsible for the poor performance of the business.
34. On 15 December 2016 Actis' position was set out in a letter from its Cayman Islands lawyers to Mr Malhotra's Cayman Islands lawyers reserving the right to take steps for injunctive relief if there were an attempt to suspend Mr Anindo Mukherji. Mr Malhotra's lawyers responded on 16 December 2016 proposing an Advisory Board meeting on Monday 19 December 2016 and confirming that Mr Malhotra would take no further steps pending that meeting. Actis' lawyers responded on 17 December 2016 that the position of the CEO was a matter for the shareholders as a "Reserved Matter" under the SSD, not the Advisory Board, and repeated a request for a shareholder meeting to seek to resolve the position. The letter sought confirmation that no steps would be taken to seek to use the Advisory Board to require the suspension or removal of the CEO without Actis' consent; and threatening to seek urgent injunctive relief from the Cayman Islands court in the absence of such confirmation.
35. Mr Malhotra struck first. Without any further Advisory Board meeting or resolution, and without any forewarning to Mr Anindo Mukherji, on 18 December 2016 Mr Malhotra sent a letter to Mr Mukherji purporting to suspend him from his role as group CEO, instructing him to vacate his office with immediate effect without communicating with anyone, and threatening criminal and civil sanctions under UAE law. The letter listed failings in addition to those identified to the Advisory Board members when seeking the written resolution, including unparticularised allegations against Mr Mukherji of unfair, improper or discriminatory treatment of employees and breaches of the Authority Matrix. The suspension was expressed to be until further notice and whilst the group investigated the matters of complaint.
36. Mr Malhotra also immediately wrote to the entire workforce informing them of Mr Anindo Mukherji's suspension; that he had himself assumed executive responsibility for management of the group as group CEO; and that all employees reporting to that position should now report to him.
37. Mr Malhotra instructed Mr Kishor Wagh, the Group's Global Head of HR, to terminate the employment of four senior management employees on the evening of 18 December or morning of 19 December 2016. The individuals in question were Mr Raghunathachar Sreeram, the group chief supply officer; Mr Milind Khamkar, the group chief information officer; Mr Ashish Balan, the regional head of Middle East; and Mr Ashish Rawat, the regional head of North/Sub-Saharan Africa.
38. At about this time Mr Malhotra also appointed Mr Sameer Khan, the former head of sales for India who had left in November 2015, to start work as National Sales Head, Wholesale, India, reporting directly to him. According to both of them, Mr Khan started work in the field on 19 December 2016. This was unknown to Mr Abraham or Mr Anindo Mukherji, neither of whom were consulted about or told of Mr Khan's appointment. Wholesale sales in India formed a very major part of the business, and in appointing Mr Khan to sit in the hierarchy above the sales force and report directly to himself, Mr Malhotra was sidelining Mr Abraham who was the CEO India with ultimate responsibility for its sales force.
39. On 20 December 2016, Actis and SMOH (acting by the Actis directors alone) applied ex parte for an injunction against Mr Malhotra, which was granted by Picken J. The judge's order ("the Picken Order") was granted at approximately 1400 GMT. It enjoined Mr Malhotra – whether directly or indirectly – from:

"(a) [Taking] any steps to procure or implement the suspension or removal of Anindo Mukherji from his position as Chief Executive Officer of the Super-Max group of companies;

(b) [Taking] any steps to procure or implement the suspension or removal of any [group employee] (save in accordance with Clause 17.2.1 of the [SSD]);

(c) [Holding] himself out as or [purporting] to act as Chief Executive Officer of the Super-Max group of companies."

40. Mr Malhotra learned of the Picken Order in a call with Mr Ivinson at 14.42 GMT that day. He was in India, where it was 19.12 local time. Actis' solicitors, Clifford Chance LLP, emailed a copy of the injunction to Mr Malhotra directly at 18.04 GMT (22.24 in India) and he read it shortly after receipt.
41. Mr Anindo Mukherji returned to work after Christmas. So too did the four senior employees whose contracts had been terminated by Mr Malhotra: Mr Sreeram and Mr Khamkar on 26 December 2016, Mr Rawat on 27 December 2016, and Mr Balan (after leave) on 3 January 2017.
42. However on and from 26 December 2016 Mr Anindo Mukherji, Mr Sreeram and Mr Khamkar, together with the Head of Legal India, Mr Sanjay Jagtap, were prevented from entering the group's Thane premises by security guards acting on the instructions of the labour Union of Thane, Bhiwandi and Aaram, which is known as Maharashtra Rajya Rashtriya Kamgar Sang or MRRKS ("the Union"). They remain locked out to this day.
43. Mr Malhotra continued to behave in a way which Actis alleges disparaged Mr Anindo Mukherji and senior management and undermined their authority with the workforce. I will return to consider the validity of those complaints. On 6 January 2017, Actis and SMOH (again acting by the Actis directors alone) relied upon them to seek and obtain further ex parte injunctive relief from the English Court. By an order of that date ("the Baker Order") Andrew Baker J imposed further restrictions on Mr Malhotra's conduct, including (i) preventing him from entering the Group's headquarters in Dubai when Mr Anindo Mukherji was also present (para 2(a)); (ii) preventing him from communicating with Group employees in terms which were disparaging of Mr Anindo Mukherji and his team, or likely to undermine their authority in their respective positions (para 2(b)); and (iii) preventing him from communicating with Group employees save for the purpose of "discharging the responsibilities allocated to him in the Authority Matrix" or "discharging any of his other duties under his employment contract" (para 2(c)).
44. The Baker Order was continued, by agreement between the parties, by an order of Males J dated 27 January 2017. The operative provisions of that order were substantially the same as the Baker Order, save that Mr Malhotra was additionally prohibited from entering the Group's premises in Thane, India, without Mr Anindo Mukherji's prior written consent (para 3(a)(ii)).
45. On 10 February 2017, Clifford Chance LLP, solicitors for Actis and SMOH, wrote to Akin Gump LLP, solicitors on the record for Mr Malhotra, enclosing draft amended Particulars of Claim and informing them that SMOH (again, acting by Actis alone) had accepted Mr Malhotra's alleged repudiation of his Service Contract with immediate effect, bringing his employment with SMOH to an end.

The issues

46. SMOH alleges that Mr Malhotra was guilty of gross misconduct by reason of the following matters taken individually or collectively:

(1) the suspension of Mr Anindo Mukherji and assumption of position as CEO on 18 December 2016, together with the dismissal of the four senior employees shortly thereafter;

(2) a campaign of abuse and intimidation designed to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and his senior management team in the period between 24 December 2016 and 6 January 2017;

(3) implementing a "parallel management" structure, by dismissing the four senior employees and assigning new functions and responsibilities in their place; and in appointing Mr Sameer Khan, and using him to influence strategy in wholesale sales and undermine the senior management by tasking him to procure evidence of "value destruction" and report solely to Mr Malhotra himself;

(4) procuring or encouraging the Union to exclude Mr Anindo Mukherji and senior management from the plant and offices at Thane;

(5) misleading the Advisory Board in an email on 5 January 2017;

(6) breach of the Picken Order in carrying through the dismissal of the four senior employees in the days following 18 December 2016; and breach of the Picken and/or Baker Orders in the conduct complained of in (2) to (4) above, together with other conduct including implementing salary increases for staff in South Africa, conduct in relation to Mr Sameer Khan, and communicating with other employees;

(7) unjustified expenses claims stretching back to January 2015; SMOH relies on these not only as part of the justification for termination of the Service Contract, but also in support of a claim for relief in the form of an inquiry into damages.

47. Mr Malhotra denies he was guilty of any breaches of contract, or that if he was they amounted to gross misconduct justifying summary dismissal. In particular it was submitted on his behalf that:

(1) he was entitled to suspend Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO and assume temporary responsibility in that role himself; and as such to terminate the employment of the senior employees; alternatively he reasonably believed that he was so entitled;

(2) there was no abuse, intimidation or undermining of the management, alternatively if there were any, it was of such a low grade as not to be gross misconduct;

(3) Mr Sameer Khan was not employed to undermine the senior management or implement a parallel management structure;

(4) Mr Malhotra was not responsible for the actions of the Union which he neither procured nor encouraged; on the contrary he wrote on a number of occasions urging the Union to allow the executives back in;

(5) there was no misleading of the Advisory Board; alternatively, if the 5 January 2017 email was inaccurate it was inadvertently so and/or not such as to amount to gross misconduct;

(6) there was no breach of the Picken or Baker Orders and/or no gross misconduct in the respects alleged;

(7) there were no breaches in relation to expenses; alternatively if there were, they did not amount to gross misconduct.

48. In the alternative Mr Malhotra contends that:

(1) if there were any gross misconduct it had been cured and/or waived and/or SMOH had affirmed the Service Contract prior to purporting to terminate it on 10 February 2017;

(2) alternatively if at that date SMOH was entitled to terminate the Service Contract, Actis had no power to do so on behalf of SMOH or in SMOH's name, and accordingly the purported termination by SMOH is without authority and of no effect.

49. Mr Malhotra also advances a counterclaim for damages against Actis for breach of the SSD in two respects:

(1) If, contrary to his primary case, the SSD granted the power to Actis to terminate the Service Contract on SMOH's behalf or in SMOH's name, Actis was in breach of an implied term that it would not do so unless SMOH was legally entitled so to act.

(2) Mr Malhotra also claims damages against Actis for breach of an implied term that Actis would not exercise its discretion under the SSD whether to consent to the removal of the CEO arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.

The evidence

50. Before turning to these issues it is convenient to say something about the evidence. I heard evidence from the following witnesses:

(1) Mr Anindo Mukherji. He has an impressive c.v. with qualifications and experience which made him eminently suited to performing the role of group CEO. This was recognised by the shareholders when recruiting him in 2015, with Mr Malhotra and Actis eager to woo him and overcome his reluctance to join a business facing so many challenges. Mr Birch, in his evidence, also endorsed the high quality of his qualifications and track record. Before he was excluded from the Thane plant in late December 2016 he would split his time roughly equally between Thane, Dubai, and business travelling. He was an impressive witness who was measured and careful in his answers, and displayed an assured understanding of the business and the events about which he gave evidence. His temperate handling of the difficulties caused by the shareholder dispute does him great credit.

(2) Mr Ketan Desai. He became the chief financial officer for the group, having been approached by Mr Anindo Mukherji, to whom he reported, shortly after the latter's appointment as CEO in August 2014. He spent about two thirds of his time at the Dubai Office and the remainder at Thane prior to his exclusion in April 2017. He was a straightforward witness upon whose evidence I feel able to place reliance.

(3) Mr Kenny Abraham. He joined Super-Max as CEO of SPCPL in July 2015 and was the group CEO for India, reporting to Mr Anindo Mukherji. He was well qualified with a career background which included management in large fast moving consumer goods companies and a knowledge of the dynamics of the Indian market. He too reacted to the shareholder dispute and Mr Malhotra's behaviour towards him with an objective composure which does him credit. He too was an impressive witness with an obvious command of the issues facing the business, whose evidence inspired confidence.

(4) Mr Shomik Mukherjee. He is a partner of Actis LLP and headed its south Asian team. He was the representative of the Actis group with the closest and most day to day responsibility for its investment in the Super-Max group. He was at all material times one of the two Actis nominees on the Advisory Board. On the whole he was seeking to assist the court, although at times he was reluctant to accept what was obvious from the face of the documents and his recollection was influenced by an unconscious self-justificatory bias.

(5) Mr Akhter Mateen. He was at all material times an independent member of the Advisory Board. He was a measured, careful and impressive witness.

(6) Mr Malhotra. He regarded the group as his family business and in his eyes, Mr Anindo Mukherji and Actis have destroyed the value of the group. From the second half of 2016 Mr Malhotra believed, with a genuine and heartfelt passion, that Actis' support for the existing senior management, in particular for Mr Anindo Mukherji, was not in the best interests of the financial health of the group and that he needed to step in to reverse the decline in its fortunes. That passion was apparent throughout his evidence. It clouded his judgment at the time, and infected his evidence, to the extent that he lacked any objectivity or regard for the truth when seeking to portray events in a self justificatory way and in an attempt to put Actis representatives and the senior management in the worst light. He would readily attribute fraud, dishonesty or conspiracy to such individuals without any justification. In significant respects he was not prepared to concede the obvious and maintained aspects of his account of events which were contradicted by the contemporaneous documents. His intemperance and bullying manner is clear from a number of the communications he sent. It was apparent that in a number of respects he was not being frank with the court, and at times his evidence was deliberately evasive. I have been driven to the conclusion that in important respects what he said was untrue and deliberately so.

(7) Mr Peter Birch. He has spent a lifetime in business and was awarded the CBE in 1971. After completing his National Service in 1958, he worked for Nestle and then Gillette becoming chief executive of Gillette UK in 1979 for 5 years. Then he became Chief Executive of the Abbey National Building Society until his retirement in 1998, since when he has held various non executive directorships. He has forthright views and expresses himself in trenchant terms. He was undoubtedly seeking to assist the Court in the evidence he gave. The value of his evidence in support of Mr Malhotra's case was tempered by two matters. First, his experience with Gillette, which was his only experience of direct relevance to the Super-Max business, finished in 1984. There were times when under cross examination his criticisms of some of what Mr Anindo Mukherji and his management team had been doing with the business did not seem to be justified. I attribute this to the fact that his experience in this kind of business was a long time ago. Secondly, and importantly, throughout his time on the Advisory Board, and when he prepared his witness statement, he was unaware of the terms of the SSD or that those terms imposed any restriction on what he regarded as Mr Malhotra's usual authority as an executive chairman to oversee and if necessary replace the CEO and senior management. His views at the time, and in his witness statement, were therefore coloured by the fact that he thought Actis had no right to overrule Mr Malhotra's judgment as to management performance or to prevent him replacing Mr Anindo Mukherji or other senior managers, and were therefore interfering with what he regarded as a central part of a chairman's role.

(8) Mr Jonathan Ivinson. A tax partner of Akin Gump LLP was a close friend of Mr Malhotra, who was his client. He was a straightforward witness who was seeking to assist the court whilst conscious of his duties to his client.

(9) Mr Sameer Khan. He was rehired by Mr Malhotra as head of wholesale sales in India in circumstances addressed more fully below. He was a thoroughly unsatisfactory witness whose answers often lacked credibility and were inconsistent with contemporaneous documents. He was genuinely opposed to the management strategy (which had been approved by the Advisory Board) to rebalance sales more in favour of retail outlets, including barbers, from the predominantly wholesale model previously pursued. This was not, however, his guiding motivation. He was plainly loyal to Mr Malhotra, which was the reason for his engagement in December 2016, and was prepared to say in evidence whatever be believed would support Mr Malhotra's case, even when he knew it to be untrue.

(10) Mr Kishor Wagh. He has been the group Global Head of Human Resources since 2011, working from the Dubai offices. He too was a thoroughly unsatisfactory witness who showed no apparent embarrassment when in cross examination his evidence was repeatedly shown to be inconsistent with contemporaneous documents. These were not errors of recollection. He was at the time of the events in question, and remains, staunchly loyal to Mr Malhotra, and was prepared to lie in his evidence in the belief that it would assist Mr Malhotra's case.

(11) Mr Kumar was the head of human resources in India. His evidence was of less significance, and he was hampered by giving evidence in English without being fluent or having a full command of the language. He too was staunchly supportive of Mr Malhotra which in at least one respect, the backdating of Mr Khan's 5 January 2017 amendment letter, led him to give evidence which the contemporaneous documents show to be untrue.

51. The Court may draw adverse inferences from a party's failure to call a particular witness or witnesses: see Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, 340 and Karis v Lewis [2005] EWCA Civ 1637. I did not hear evidence from Mr Subash Chaudhuri. Mr Chaudhuri had worked at Super-Max until he was dismissed by Mr Anindo Mukherji for expenses fraud. Contrary to Mr Malhotra's assertion, this was not a "stitch up" by Mr Anindo Mukherji. Mr Malhotra engaged Mr Chaudhuri as a consultant to handle all his personal litigation in India and "any assignments/tasks that I may allocate to you from time to time". It is clear from the evidence as a whole and from disclosed telephone records in particular, that Mr Chaudhuri's role as a loyal personal assistant to Mr Malhotra included frequent contacts with Mr Khan, Mr Wagh and others within the group who were loyal to Mr Malhotra, at times when the events in dispute in these proceedings must have been being discussed. Mr Chaudhuri was a go-between, through whom Mr Malhotra communicated with others when he wished to conceal his direct involvement. Mr Chaudhuri's evidence on the course of events which are in issue would have been relevant to the issues in the case. He was not called to give evidence by Mr Malhotra and disclosed no documents. I have little doubt that he would have been prepared to do so out of loyalty to Mr Malhotra had Mr Malhotra wished him to give evidence and/or provide documents within his control, including phone and messaging records. The natural inference is that his evidence would not stand up to cross examination and would undermine Mr Malhotra's case.
52. Ms Bingham QC also asked me to draw adverse inferences from a failure to disclose documents by Mr Malhotra and other individuals whose documents he was in a position to procure if he wanted to. The extent of the non disclosure was set out in detail in Appendix 2 to the Claimant's written closing submissions and I do not need to lengthen this judgment by repeating it. So far as Mr Malhotra's own documents are concerned, there are significant gaps where documents which were either referred to in evidence or in other documents are obviously missing, including SMS and WhatsApp messages. The nature and pattern of the missing material makes it difficult to explain these as the result simply of mistake or incompetence. In some cases Mr Malhotra said the documents had been given to his solicitors, Akin Gump LLP, but since the latter failed to respond to subsequent requests to disclose them the obvious inference is that the evidence was untrue and the documents had not been disclosed to his solicitors. So far as concerns documents of others, the Claimant's solicitors have asked for disclosure of relevant documents from individuals who played a central role in events, including in particular Ms Fernandes and Ms Pereira (personal assistants to Mr Malhotra as Chairman), Ms Gumaste (the Company Secretary), and Mr Merani and Mr Chakravarthy, his nominees on the board of directors of SPCPL, as well as Mr Wagh and Mr Khan. These are all loyal supporters of Mr Malhotra and it is clear he was communicating with them outside the SuperMax communication channels by telephone, SMS, WhatsApp or by email to private email accounts. They have for the most part declined to disclose such communications. Mr Malhotra's open correspondence asking for them to be disclosed was met by refusals and/or reliance on advice not to disclose. However I have little doubt that Mr Malhotra could have procured the disclosure from these loyal supporters of his had he wished the Court to see it, and the obvious inference is that he thought it would undermine his case.
53. I am therefore prepared to draw these adverse inferences, which support the conclusions I have reached. Nevertheless such inferences are not critical to any of my findings, all of which are justified by the evidence which was before me without the need to resort to inferences from what was missing.

Breaches of the Service Contract

(1)Mr Malhotra's suspension of Mr Anindo Mukherji and installing himself as CEO

54. Mr Adkin QC first argued that whatever might be the position under the SSD, Mr Malhotra's powers as executive chairman vis a vis the CEO were governed by the Service Contract, which did not import the terms of the SSD. The latter only applied to Mr Malhotra qua shareholder. The Service Contract authorised Mr Malhotra to exercise the functions of an executive chairman in the wide terms of clauses 2.1 and 2.2. Mr Adkin relied upon the evidence of Mr Birch, that an executive chairman usually has the power to remove a CEO, a proposition which was consistent with Mr Mateen's evidence and not challenged.
55. I cannot accept this submission. The Service Contract must be construed in the light of the SSD, which formed part of its immediate factual matrix. The SSD expressly provided for the entering into of the Service Contract engaging Mr Malhotra as executive chairman. Although only the heads of terms had at that time been agreed (which were not in evidence) it is clear that the SSD intended to circumscribe Mr Malhotra's powers of management in particular in relation to the Reserved Matters which required Actis' written consent. The Service Contract was one of the bundle of contractual documents designed to give effect to that essential bargain. It would render the SSD Reserved Matters otiose if Mr Malhotra were able to remove the CEO in his capacity as executive chairman under his Service Contract. The only sensible reading of his Service Contract is that his powers qua executive chairman were to be no wider than the limitations placed on him qua shareholder in the SSD.
56. This seems to me obvious, but if there were any doubt about it, such doubt is dispelled by the terms of the Service Contract which by clauses 2.3(ii) and 5 require Mr Malhotra to abide by the terms of the Authority Matrix and by clause 2.3(iii) to comply with SMOH's articles of association. The articles identify the Reserved Matters at article 29 in identical terms to the SSD. Article 29.1 in terms requires Mr Malhotra to procure that none of the Reserved Matters are carried out by SMOH or any group company without Actis' written consent. The Authority Matrix listed as its first 35 items the Reserved Matters, including at item 29 the removal of the CEO; in this section there was no role for the executive chairman, in contradistinction to all other functions outside Reserved Matters which formed the subject matter of the remainder of the 100 entries, for which the role of the executive chairman was allocated. The express terms of the Service Contract therefore require Mr Malhotra to procure that none of the Reserved Matters are carried out without Actis' written consent, including in particular the removal of the CEO.
57. To be fair to Mr Malhotra, this does not appear to have been a point which he took at the time, but a lawyers' point, taken on his behalf. It is a bad one. Accordingly if the SSD did not permit Mr Malhotra to suspend Mr Anindo Mukherji in the way he did, then it follows that his conduct was a breach of the Service Agreement.
58. I have reached the conclusion, without any real hesitation, that Mr Malhotra's action in suspending Mr Mukherji as CEO and assuming the CEO role himself, was conduct which he was not entitled to take without Actis' written consent because it was a Reserved Matter within the meaning of paragraph 5.2 of Schedule 2 of the SSD, and Schedule 1 of the SMOH articles of association, and was contrary to the Authority Matrix. For these purposes a suspension (other than perhaps in an emergency for so long as is necessary to seek Actis' written consent) qualifies as a "removal". Clearly what matters for the purposes of the contractual bargain between the parties which was struck in the SSD was Actis' ability to have its approved CEO in place acting as such, performing the important management functions normally ascribed to a CEO, as a counterbalance to the influence on management of the company's business by Mr Malhotra as executive chairman and through his majority nominee powers on the Advisory Board. It would make no commercial sense for the parties to have agreed that Mr Malhotra were able to upset this balance by suspending the CEO from performing the CEO governance functions and assuming them himself for an indefinite period.
59. It is clear from this commercial context that "removal" in paragraph 5.2 of Schedule 2 must include an indefinite suspension which removes the CEO from performance of his service in that capacity. The language is notably wider than "termination" which is the verb used elsewhere in the SSD, in particular in relation to the CEO's service agreement at clause 18.6. As a matter of ordinary language "removal" connotes something being taken away from something and is the antithesis of retention. In an employment context it naturally connotes the employee being taken away from the performance of his duties. A suspended CEO has been removed as CEO, albeit potentially temporarily rather than permanently as would occur with a termination of employment. He does not retain the function of a CEO. Mr Adkin's argument must be that in order for there to be a "removal" of the CEO there must be taken away from him his status of employment as such. But this would be to attribute to the parties a triumph of form over substance. Actis' reserved contractual rights would in substance be neutered by an indefinite suspension which had the same effect as a termination.
60. However, my conclusion on this issue does not depend on whether a distinction can be drawn between a suspension and a termination, because I am satisfied that Mr Malhotra's intention was permanently to remove Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO and that is what would have happened but for the Picken Order. This was in substance a termination dressed up as a purported suspension. I have reached that conclusion for the following reasons:

(1) It is clear from the documents that Mr Wagh and Mr Malhotra were involved in taking advice from UAE lawyers in relation to removing Mr Mukherji. They were regularly communicating on this and other topics via their private personal email addresses and phones, although a complete record is not available. Mr Malhotra and Mr Wagh were thoroughly evasive in their evidence about what advice they had received and from whom. The documents show that Mr Wagh himself identified the UAE law provisions relating to termination and sent them to Mr Malhotra on 13 December 2016, which is some indication that that is what Mr Malhotra had in mind. The email suggests that the legal advice was to be sought soon. The UAE law advice was not disclosed and privilege was claimed by Mr Malhotra in its content (said to have been given orally), presumably on behalf of Wesley who was Mr Anindo Mukherji's employer under the contract governed by UAE law to which the advice was relevant, and on whose behalf Mr Wagh, at least, suggested the advice was sought. There is a text message on Mr Ivinson's Blackberry from him to Professor Norchi on 19 December 2016, the day after the suspension, which says "Andy suspended yesterday. No further updates as yet. I think Actis will get an injunction today but don't think UAE law will allow him back". Mr Ivinson said in cross examination that he could not recall what the reference to UAE law was in that message; but the natural inference is that it referred to the UAE law advice which had been taken in relation to Mr Anindo Mukherji's "suspension" by Mr Malhotra, his client, and that it was to the effect that the course taken would amount to a permanent termination of his services. On any view the text reflects an understanding that the effect of the "suspension" would be permanent exclusion.

(2) The email from Mr Malhotra to the Advisory Board members of 14 December 2016 sought their approval to a resolution not only suspending Mr Anindo Mukherji but approving his own appointment as CEO "pending a long term replacement." This is only consistent with termination rather than suspension. Mr Shomik Mukherjee's response by email of the same day made the point, amongst others, that it was clearly, to all intents and purposes, a dismissal and this accurate characterisation of what was proposed was not contradicted until a letter from Ogier, Mr Malhotra's Cayman Islands lawyers, of 16 December 2016. In the meantime the same wording referring to replacement was included in the resolution signed by Mr Birch and the Malhotra nominees, including Mr Malhotra himself. Mr Malhotra's true intentions are also apparent from the complaints made against Mr Anindo Mukherji. The resolution referred only to financial performance and the so called "fictitious invoicing". Having had the latter explained in the evidence, I have little hesitation in rejecting it as any valid cause for complaint against Mr Anindo Mukherji, and I doubt whether Mr Malhotra believed it to have any validity. But equally if not more significantly, the suspension letter of 18 December 2016 included four additional categories of new and unparticularised complaints about Mr Anindo Mukherji's conduct which had not been raised before and in respect of which he had not been given any opportunity to comment or respond. The suggestion that these also justified suspension cannot have been anything more than window dressing to seek to justify a decision already taken for other reasons. The suggestion that these were to be "investigated" as gross misconduct rings hollow. If they really were a cause for concern and merited investigation, they would have been put to Mr Anindo Mukherji before suspending him. No steps to initiate any investigation appear to have been made in the two days following the "suspension" before receipt of the Picken Order and Mr Anindo Mukherji's reinstatement.

(3) Mr Malhotra's conduct in attacking and undermining Mr Anindo Mukherji and his senior management following the Picken Order, as to which see below, demonstrates a determination to remove him permanently as CEO. If that was his intention then, the natural inference is that it was his intention before the Picken Order when "suspending" him.

(4) When cross examined about the terms of the announcement of Mr Anindo Mukherji's reinstatement as CEO on 24 December 2016 pending the outcome of the litigation, Mr Malhotra explained that it was intended to convey the message to the workforce that he did not want Mr Mukherji to come back.

61. Mr Malhotra knew that he was not entitled to seek to remove Mr Anindo Mukherji permanently under the guise of suspension. Mr Malhotra accepted in cross examination that he knew that Actis had a veto over the removal of the CEO. Accordingly he knew there was no entitlement to do what he purported to do in accordance with the rights of SMOH and Actis under the SSD and Service Contract. For the same reasons Mr Malhotra was not entitled, and knew that he was not entitled, to install himself as CEO without the written consent of Actis.
62. Although it is not necessary for my determination of this issue, I have reached the same conclusions about Mr Malhotra's state of mind in relation to a genuinely temporary suspension (which this was not). At the time Mr Malhotra "suspended" Mr Mukherji, he did not have any genuine belief that a suspension, properly so called, was lawful without Actis' consent. The distinction between suspension and removal was drawn by Mr Malhotra after he had taken legal advice from Akin Gump LLP. Mr Malhotra said in the witness box that the advice was sought on behalf of SMOH. He had claimed privilege in it, but since his evidence meant that the privilege would be that of the Claimant, SMOH, the material was clearly disclosable. When it was requested by SMOH's solicitors, Akin Gump LLP asserted, and Mr Adkin informed me on instructions, that the advice had been given to Mr Malhotra in his personal capacity as shareholder, not to SMOH. Mr Malhotra, through Mr Adkin, then maintained what was now said to be his, rather than SMOH's, claim to privilege, on the basis that his evidence about who had sought and received the advice was untrue. Since what Akin Gump LLP asserted is not evidence, and nor is what Mr Adkin said on instructions from them, strictly speaking the position is that there has been a refusal to disclose what on the evidence is disclosable material. However that may be, on 18 December 2016, shortly before the suspension, Mr Malhotra sent an email to Mr Shomik Mukherjee and the other Advisory Board directors (apart it seems from Mr Birch) which included a passage proposing that the CEO should be suspended. It went on: "There is a material difference between that and removal. One may lead to the other but it may not. Contrary to Shomik's assertion, the company has taken legal advice which [confirms that as Executive Chairman, I may suspend the CEO]." This message was "recalled" by Mr Malhotra because it was obviously in the form drafted for him by Mr Dawkins, a partner of Akin Gump LLP, whose name appeared at the foot of it, or at least was approved by Mr Dawkins. It reveals (a) that the advice was then understood by Mr Dawkins to have been given to "the company", which must mean SMOH, as Mr Malhotra confirmed in evidence; and (b) that no advice had yet been given by Akin Gump LLP that a suspension would be lawful, because the critical passage remained in the draft in square brackets. Mr Shomik Mukherjee promptly emailed making these points. Once Mr Dawkins' draft was "recalled" by Mr Malhotra, no message was sent in equivalent terms, confirming that such advice had been given, at any time prior to the suspension letter being sent to Mr Anindo Mukherji later that day and the announcement made to all employees 11 minutes later (although a version with the brackets removed was subsequently sent on 20 December 2016). Since the advice does not attract privilege, I am entitled to draw inferences from the refusal to disclose it. The obvious inference from (a) the refusal to disclose (b) the square bracketed passage in Mr Dawkins draft, coupled with the absence of any message to the same effect prior to the "suspension" and (c) the true legal position as I have found it to be, is that Mr Malhotra had not received advice from Akin Gump LLP prior to the suspension letter that he was entitled to suspend Mr Anindo Mukherji under the terms of the SSD, but decided to do so anyway.
63. Mr Malhotra also knew that he had no right to appoint himself as a temporary CEO in the event of a suspension of Mr Mukherji, even were the suspension genuinely temporary, which it was not, and even if he were entitled to make that suspension without Actis' consent, which he was not. Appointment of a CEO, as well as removal, is a Reserved Matter under paragraph 5.2 of Schedule 2 to the SSD, and Mr Malhotra's only ground for claiming an entitlement to appoint himself as CEO without Actis' consent was reliance on clause 18.6 of the SSD which requires him to act as temporary CEO only where the CEO's employment has been "terminated". What occurred was not, on Mr Malhotra's case, a termination.
64. Mr Adkin submitted that it was not open to SMOH or Actis to contend for these conclusions as to Mr Malhotra's state of mind, on the grounds that they were not put to him in cross examination. That is a false point:

(1) That Mr Malhotra's true intention was a permanent removal rather than temporary suspension was squarely put to him in cross examination. It was put that he knew that Actis had a veto over removal, which he accepted (Transcript Day 4 page 135 lines 6-8); and it was put to him that he was using private email addresses in his discussions with Mr Wagh because he was preparing to sack Mr Mukherji in breach of the SSD (Day 4 page 142 lines 8-11), and that his intention from at least 12 December 2016 was to get rid of Mr Mukherji (Day 4 p145 line 13 to 146 line 24, p155 line 22-156 line 23), with no intention of his coming back (Day 4 page 170 lines 11-12).

(2) In relation to my finding that Mr Malhotra had no belief that he was entitled temporarily to suspend Mr Mukherji, it was at the heart of Mr Malhotra's own case on this issue, as set out in the written opening skeleton, that he was not in breach, even if wrong on the interpretation of the SSD, because he believed he was entitled to suspend the CEO and that that was what he did. That case was in issue (see for example SMOH/Actis' written opening at paragraphs 43 and 45) so that Mr Malhotra had the opportunity to address it, which is the purpose of requiring an allegation to be "put" in cross-examination. Moreover the question of whether legal advice had been taken from Akin Gump LLP was fully explored with Mr Malhotra in cross examination (eg Day 5 pages 11, 13, 17-20) and the import of the critical words in the Dawkins draft being in square brackets was raised: Day 5 page 7 line 21 to page 8 line 8. Mr Malhotra prevented any further questioning by his (unjustified) claim for privilege. It was put to him that he rushed into the suspension and did not give Mr Mukherji any forewarning because he feared that Actis would get an injunction, as it had threatened (Day 5 page 7 line 6 to page 8 line 11 and page 24 line 24 to page 25 line 1), which carries with it the suggestion that he feared that a suspension would be treated as unlawful. It was also put that he had no honest belief that there were any valid grounds for suspension (Day 5 p37). If the conclusion on this area of the case had depended upon this finding as to Mr Malhotra's lack of belief, which it does not, I would not have regarded it as unfair to make such a finding by reason of the course of Mr Malhotra's evidence: he had every opportunity to say what he wanted on the issue.

(3) In relation to my finding that Mr Malhotra knew he was not entitled to install himself as interim CEO, that case was put at Day 5 page 28 line 12 to page 34 line 24, irrespective of whether the suspension was intended as permanent or temporary.

(2) Campaign of abuse and intimidation designed to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and his senior management

65. On and after 30 November 2016 Mr Malhotra sent a number of communications intended to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and the senior management for the purposes of trying to force their resignation, to some of which I have referred above. Mr Malhotra also ordered Mr Abraham and Mr Sreeram to attend a meeting with him on 19 December 2016 at which about eight members of the Union were present, where Mr Malhotra was highly disparaging of Mr Abraham and Mr Sreeram in front of junior employees. The communications and events which are relied upon as breaches of his Service Contract under the current heading followed the attempted "suspension" of Mr Anindo Mukherji and the Picken Order in the period from 24 December 2016, and in particular the conduct set out in the following paragraphs.
66. On 24 December 2016 Mr Malhotra sent an email to all the employees of the group to announce that Mr Anindo Mukherji was resuming his responsibilities with immediate effect. The email referred to the Picken Order "to protect Andy and his subordinates notwithstanding my concerns and those of the majority of the Advisory Board about the lack of performance by the executive team for the last two years". It stated that the litigation would go on for many years. This brought the boardroom dispute before the entire workforce, and criticised the CEO and senior subordinates for inadequate management for two years. In effect Mr Malhotra was saying that Mr Anindo Mukherji and the senior management were not fit to run the business and he would litigate for years to get them out. Coming from Mr Malhotra, this disparaged and undermined Mr Mukherji and the senior management in the eyes of the workforce and was obviously intended to have that effect. When cross examined about the terms of this announcement Mr Malhotra explained that it was intended to convey the message to the workforce that he did not "agree with the idea of Andy Mukherji coming back" i.e. that it was intended to convey his wish that Mr Mukherji be permanently removed.
67. On 27 December 2016 Mr Anindo Mukherji returned to the Dubai office, having been excluded from the Thane site on 26 December by the Union. Mr Malhotra came into the conference room where Mr Mukherji was working on a number of occasions on that day. As Mr Mukherji put it in his evidence, which I accept, Mr Malhotra appeared to lose any semblance of self-control or professionalism. At about 11.30 am he threatened to sue Mr Mukherji, Mr Desai and Mr Abraham, saying he had decided to include them as defendants in the Cayman Islands proceedings. At around 12.30 pm he came back into the conference room and shouted at Mr Mukherji. Amongst other things, he said "you're either incompetent or colluding with your Actis friends to destroy my value"; "the staff don't like you; the Unions don't like you; what are you doing here?"; "you're not wanted here"; "you have no shame"; "you just watch, I'll make your life miserable." At about 1 pm he came into the conference room and sat down without explanation. When Mr Mukherji enquired whether he could assist him, Mr Malhotra stated he had come to watch how Mr Mukherji "destroy[ed] value", that he was "shameless" and "nothing but a slimy guy" who was "destroying the company" and "only cared for himself". At about 2.30 pm Mr Malhotra returned to the conference room and said he would teach Mr Mukherji a lesson, that he would fight him tooth and nail, and said "you're shameless; you have no integrity, no morals. I'll make life very difficult for you." These tirades were recorded in a contemporaneous note by Mr Mukherji.
68. On the following day Mr Mukherji was in the conference room he was using, with a junior employee, Mr Kishor Nair whom he had asked to accompany him on a market visit he was to make that morning. Mr Malhotra said amongst other things "your market visits are all bullshit; they don't lead to any results" and "your UAE sales are going down for 2 years and you're doing nothing about it; you just go for a joy ride in the market; nothing happens to results." He was shouting at Mr Mukherji throughout the conversation which included these words. Again they are recorded in a contemporaneous note of Mr Mukherji which I accept to be accurate.
69. This abuse on 27 and 28 December 2016 was sustained, aggressive and personal. It went far beyond any frank business discussion which an executive chairman might properly have with his CEO about conduct of the business. The exchanges on 28 December disparaged and undermined Mr Anindo Mukherji in the presence of a junior employee, as Mr Malhotra was well aware.
70. That same day, 28 December 2016, Mr Malhotra sent an email again threatening to add Mr Mukherji, Mr Desai and Mr Abraham as defendants to his Cayman Islands proceedings.
71. On that evening, 28 December, Mr Malhotra sent an extraordinary email first to about 100 employee email addresses and then to all employees. It said: "In light of the failing performance of the CEO and his executive team, if any employee has an issue, they are welcome to directly communicate to me…" It was not merely an attack on the senior management in the eyes of the whole workforce but a specific invitation for insubordination inviting complaint against them. Mr Malhotra's evidence in cross examination was to justify this approach on the grounds that there was "corruption going on between A Mukherji and his people", an allegation without any foundation.
72. On 2 January 2017, Mr Malhotra sent Mr Mukherji a long email in aggressive and intimidatory terms. It was in the context of a dispute over procedure in relation to approval of business travel expenses, which Mr Malhotra had raised as a pretext on which to attack Mr Mukherji, but the email was abusive and disparaging in wider and more general terms, accusing him amongst other things of "value destruction" "incompetence" "a failed track record" "wasting company money" and "a flippant attitude". It was copied to Mr Desai and a more junior member of the finance department.
73. On 3 January 2017, Mr Malhotra sent an email to Mr Abraham in relation to the role of Mr Sameer Khan. I deal below with Mr Khan's position in greater detail, but the significance of the email under the current heading is that it was aggressive and intimidatory towards Mr Abraham, and disparaged him in an email copied to junior employees and, ultimately, the whole workforce. It arose out of Mr Abraham's rebuke to two more junior employees, Mr Kalavitte (known as Datta K) and Mr Kulkarni, for sending emails with confidential information to Mr Khan and cooperating with him behind Mr Abraham's back. Mr Malhotra's email referred to Mr Khan being there to "curb the mess made of the Indian market" by Mr Abraham and Mr Anindo Mukherji. It said that he and Mr Mukherji were being added to the Cayman Islands proceedings as defendants for "value destruction". It went on to criticise Mr Abraham in offensive and personal terms (eg "you sit in your room and pontificate; there is no connect between you neither with the market nor the team"). It ended by saying that the majority of the board had no confidence in him based on his track record and current delivery. These terms went far beyond anything appropriate to a difference of opinion on business matters between an executive chairman and the CEO of its major territory. Mr Malhotra copied the email to Mr Khan, Datta K and Mr Kulkarni who were junior employees who were subordinate to Mr Abraham. It was plainly intended to undermine him. To Mr Abraham's credit he responded calmly and courteously, notwithstanding that Datta K had in his response to Mr Malhotra said "thank you" and copied in many more of Mr Abraham's subordinates. When Mr Malhotra responded to Mr Abraham, he specifically copied in over 20 named subordinates and invited them to "feel free to send your comments here". He copied the same subordinates into a further response to Mr Abraham on 4 January 2017 which said "Through your incompetence and that of Andys You have also messed up the MT [i.e. Modern Trade] business All rights are reserved against you and the value Destruction you are causing the company (sic)". This can only have been intended further to belittle and disparage Mr Abraham and Mr Mukherji in the eyes of the many subordinates to whom it was copied, to undermine their authority, and to impair their ability to exercise effective management of the workforce and the business.
74. On the evening of 3 January 2017 Mr Malhotra instructed Mr Anindo Mukherji to continue to enforce, and not to reverse, any of the organisation structure changes which Mr Malhotra had announced on 20 December 2016 (prior to receipt of the Picken Order) without Mr Malhotra's approval. Mr Mukherji confirmed that he had been given that instruction in an email the following day. Mr Malhotra's responsive email disputed the conversation as "blatantly untrue". However Mr Malhotra's email went on to say that he needed to "sign off your proposals, to mitigate the value destruction you are causing to the business" thereby reiterating the need for his approval for the reversing the changes. I accept Mr Mukherji's evidence that what he recorded in his email is an accurate reflection of what was said in the conversation. It was an attempt to continue to control the structure of senior management which was within the proper sphere of the CEO.
75. On 4 January 2017, Mr Malhotra sent another abusive email to Mr Anindo Mukherji. It referred to his "perpetual failure" and accused him of being "either incompetent or wilfully destroying value to the company." It described most of the people he had hired as incompetent and accused him of being aligned with the minority shareholders for "ulterior motives". It was copied to Mr Wagh, Mr Desai and the latter's subordinate Mr Hada. It concluded; "I recommend that you (a) Stick to the policies (b) Respect authority and stop trying to outsmart your superiors with no foundation (c) Take life seriously and start performing".
76. Another email of 4 January 2017 from Mr Malhotra to Mr Anindo Mukherji described the latter's response as "pathetic", quite unjustifiably, and accused him of not being hands on which was why he was destroying value in the business. It was copied to Mr Chakravarthy, a subordinate who was Head of Modern Trade and Alternate Channels and one of the group's longest serving employees who was very closely aligned with and loyal to Mr Malhotra.
77. SMOH also relied on a number of other communications over this period (up to the Baker Order of 6 January 2017) with similar comments or to similar effect.
78. Taken as a whole, these events can be characterised as a sustained campaign of aggressive abuse and disparagement by Mr Malhotra towards Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham which was intended by Mr Malhotra:

(1) to force Mr Mukherji and Mr Abraham to resign; and

(2) to foment dissent and insubordination from junior employees; and

(3) seriously to disparage and undermine the authority of Mr Mukherji and Mr Abraham in the eyes of the workforce; and

(4) thereby to impede the ability of Mr Mukherji, Mr Abraham and the senior management to exercise effective management of the workforce and the business.

79. In short, Mr Malhotra allowed his sense of grievance as a shareholder to override any respect for the proper corporate governance of the business or the appropriate treatment of senior management.

(3) Implementing a parallel management structure

80. This heading covers essentially two allegations. The first aspect complained of is the dismissal of the four senior employees and giving instructions to circulate announcements that, following their departure, other employees had been assigned new responsibilities and reporting lines. The dismissals and announcements, which were initiated prior to Mr Malhotra receiving notice of the Picken Order, were part and parcel of the taking of control by installing himself as CEO. I am satisfied that the dismissals were not motivated by an objective assessment of the merits of the employees or what they could contribute to the business, but rather that those managers were selected and immediately fired without warning because they were regarded as loyal to the remaining senior management which had reported to Mr Anindo Mukherji. They were in part replaced by employees loyal to Mr Malhotra, Mr Nitin Merani and Mr Sanjay Williams. These appointments and the new reporting lines were intended to cement Mr Malhotra's control as CEO and sideline Mr Abraham.
81. The arguments as to whether this constituted a breach of the Service Contract mirrored those concerned with the "suspension" of Mr Anindo Mukherji. Mr Adkin argued that if Mr Malhotra was not in breach of the Service Contract by suspending Mr Muhkerji as CEO and taking over as acting CEO, he was plainly entitled to exercise the functions of a CEO in restructuring senior management. The conclusion flows from the premise but the premise is false. It was a breach of the Service Contract for Mr Malhotra to "suspend" Mr Anindo Mukherji, and he did not believe he was entitled to do so or to take over as CEO. For the same reasons his termination of the four employees and restructuring was a breach of the Service Agreement, again to Mr Malhotra's knowledge.
82. As a result of the Picken Order, the four employees returned to work after Christmas or in the New Year. I have referred to the exchanges between Mr Malhotra and Mr Anindo Mukherji on 3 and 4 January 2017 in relation to reversing the changes, which rested with Mr Malhotra's assertion that he needed to retain approval of reversing the changes. Nevertheless Mr Anindo Mukherji expressed himself as satisfied thereafter that so far as the four employees were concerned he had no issue with the reversal of their terminations.
83. The second aspect of the complaint under this heading relates to the position of Mr Sameer Khan. He had been National Sales Manager for SPCPL and had therefore at one time occupied a relatively senior position as the line manager to whom the senior regional Indian sales force reported, himself reporting directly to Mr Abraham as CEO India. He was not highly regarded by Mr Abraham, and resigned in November 2015 on grounds of "career advancement". Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Malhotra confirmed at the time that they were pleased to see him go. According to Mr Khan's evidence he remained unemployed until September 2016 when he started to work for a company in competition with Super-Max in the razor blade and personal grooming sector called Super Global Personal Care LLP.
84. Mr Khan was reappointed as National Sales Manager Wholesale by Mr Malhotra, reporting directly to him. The circumstances and timing of that recruitment were disputed. Mr Khan claimed to have been called by Mr Malhotra out of the blue on 13 or 14 December 2016, having resigned from the competitor company a few days earlier. The coincidence would be striking if this was indeed out of the blue, and the documents suggest otherwise. Mr Khan was feeding information he was getting from members of the Super-Max sales force to Mr Malhotra as early as 2 November 2016, when he provided a detailed sales analysis from his private email address to the private email address of Mr Malhotra. The sales analysis included year to date sales figures for the group in India, broken down by zones and regions. It suggests detailed access to Super-Max sales information for the whole of India. Contrary to Mr Khan's suggestion that it came largely from market reports, the nature of the information in the document shows that it was compiled with access to detailed and sensitive information from within Super-Max. Mr Khan clearly retained a close relationship with the sales force of which he previously had been head, and had no scruples about obtaining this information at a time when he says he was working for a competitor. Mr Malhotra's evidence that these were unsolicited is simply not credible given the sensitive and confidential company information they contained, their source, the use of personal email addresses and the fact that they were sent without any covering explanation, which would have been given if they were indeed an out of the blue contact by an employee who had resigned a year earlier. I infer that his recruitment had been discussed and planned rather earlier than either of them was prepared to admit, and that this information was procured from Mr Khan as the first step in what was to follow, namely seeking ammunition with which to attack Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham.
85. Mr Khan and Mr Malhotra both said that he was recruited at a meeting in Mumbai on 18 December 2016, and asked to start work the very next day and report directly to Mr Malhotra; that he started by working in the field on 19 December 2016; and that at the end of the day on 19 December 2016 he reported back to Mr Malhotra in a café in south Mumbai, the location no doubt chosen in order to keep his involvement secret from Mr Abraham who had not been consulted or notified of the appointment.
86. There is a letter of appointment dated 19 December 2016, purportedly countersigned by Mr Khan, but it is doubtful that it was in truth signed then. A contract of employment was drawn up, again dated and purportedly signed on 19 December 2016, but it is clear from the evidence I heard that it was backdated. The first secure dating is an email of 24 December 2016 to Mr Khan enclosing a draft contract. Despite these irregularities in the documentation I shall proceed on the basis of the joint evidence of Mr Malhotra and Mr Khan that he started in the role on 19 December 2016 in the field. He first came to Mr Abraham's attention when he came into the office at Thane on 21 December 2016.
87. In his evidence Mr Malhotra suggested that all that Mr Khan was tasked to do was to find out what the problems in wholesale sales were, and to make a blueprint for Mr Malhotra and the Advisory Board as to what to do about them. But Mr Khan went well beyond this, playing a full part as the man in charge of the sales team, giving them instructions and setting them targets, as I explain below. This can only have been what Mr Malhotra charged him to do, and is consistent with his title and the job description in his backdated contract of employment as well as his actions. The more limited role, which Mr Malhotra suggested, is not consistent with the latter's email of 5 January 2017 to the Advisory Board which credited Mr Khan with having been responsible for the improvement in sales figures in December.
88. Mr Malhotra sought to justify this appointment on the grounds that as acting CEO he was entitled to make it, and that he wanted the information because of his concern over the decline in wholesale sales. In fact if it occurred, as he says, on 18 December 2016, it took place prior to Mr Anindo Mukherji's "suspension" and was a matter for the CEO under the terms of the Authority Matrix. But in any event, even had Mr Malhotra been acting as CEO, there was no justification for deliberately concealing it from Mr Abraham and putting in place a reporting structure which excluded him. Such a course can only have been intended to sideline and undermine Mr Abraham. Moreover after Mr Malhotra had received notice of the Picken Order late on 20 December 2016 restraining him from acting as CEO, he continued to have Mr Khan reporting directly to him as head of wholesale sales in India and continued to support him in that operational role.
89. Mr Khan's twin roles of acting as parallel management in charge of the sales force, sidelining Mr Abraham, and undermining Mr Abraham and Mr Anindo Mukherji by fostering criticism of them, are evident from the following:

(1) Mr Abraham was not notified of or consulted about Mr Khan's appointment, which put him in charge of sales team for the major part of its distribution in the group's major territory, reporting directly to Mr Malhotra, rather than to Mr Abraham who as CEO India was responsible for the sales in that distribution channel.

(2) Mr Abraham first learned of Mr Khan's engagement when he discovered he was back in the office on 21 December 2016. Mr Khan did not report in to Mr Abraham but spoke directly to the senior sales team. Mr Khan told the sales team that he had been appointed by the board to investigate value destruction in the wholesale channel. Mr Abraham twice emailed Mr Malhotra that day to express his concern that this was disruptive for the sales force, but Mr Malhotra ignored him. I reject Mr Malhotra's explanation that he did not respond because he had "stepped back in the light of [the Picken Order]". He was not slow in corresponding with Mr Anindo Mukherji or Mr Abraham when he wanted to. His silence was intended as further support for Mr Khan's role.

(3) Mr Khan sought to fulfil the role of a man in charge of the whole Indian sales force in relation to wholesale channels. He sought to reintroduce a 2% incentive scheme which Mr Abraham had withdrawn for December. This was known to be directly contrary to Mr Abraham's strategy. On 27 December 2016 Mr Khan set detailed revised wholesale targets for all the regional sales managers in India, without any consultation with or notification to Mr Abraham. This again was contrary to the agreed strategy of hybrid retail/wholesale distribution which had been agreed by the advisory board and was the management strategy being implemented by Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham.

(4) Mr Abraham's evidence, which I accept, is that in his discussions with the sales force Mr Khan sneered at retail sales and instructed the sales force to focus on wholesale sales. This was (now) Mr Malhotra's preferred strategy, but contrary to the management strategy previously agreed by the Advisory Board which Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham were seeking to implement. Because Mr Khan was liaising on a day to day basis with the sales workforce, the role given him by Mr Malhotra was an encouragement to foment dissent and insubordination as well as an attempt by Mr Malhotra to impose his own imperatives as to sales strategy on the workforce, bypassing Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham in this central area of the management of the business. Mr Khan's behaviour caused confusion and further undermined Mr Anindo Mukherji's and Mr Abraham's authority.

(5) Mr Khan's continuing operational role is apparent not only from what he did, but also from Mr Malhotra's email to Mr Abraham of 3 January 2017. On 2 January 2017 Mr Abraham had received an email from Datta K enclosing sensitive stocklist target incentive and price list information which he had copied to Mr Khan. Mr Abraham had also learned around this time that Datta K and Mr Kulkarni had been setting up calls for Mr Khan with the field sales team. When he instructed them to stop such actions immediately, instead of following his directive they copied the email to Mr Khan and thence to Mr Malhotra who replied to Mr Abraham on 3 January, copied to Messrs Khan, Datta K and Kulkarni (and later much more widely distributed by them lower down the sales force) that "Sameer Khan is there under my instruction to curb the mess made of the market by Anindo and yourself". I have already referred to the undermining effect of this email and what it went on to say, but its significance in the present context is that it reveals Mr Malhotra's instructions as to the role which Mr Khan was to play, which was an operational one as a counter to the management decisions of Mr Abraham and Mr Anindo Mukherji.

(6) I reject Mr Malhotra's evidence that he changed Mr Khan's role in early January because he did not want it to trespass on either the role of the wholesale sales team or Mr Anindo Mukherji's work and that it was "an audit type function gathering information not interfering with reporting lines." There is a letter dated 5 January 2017 purporting to change Mr Khan's title to VP Special Projects Division. The evidence suggests that it was backdated from 12 January 2017 or thereafter. Whenever the change in title occurred, it did not stop Mr Khan from carrying out his brief to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham. He continued to report directly to Mr Malhotra so that Mr Abraham remained sidelined and undermined. On 5 January 2017 Mr Khan coordinated a series of emails from senior sales managers to Mr Malhotra denigrating current management and/or praising Mr Khan and attributing their success to him. These were procured at Mr Malhotra's instigation for him to forward to the board. Mr Khan continued to occupy his old office at Thane and regularly interacted with Datta K and Mr Kulkarni who told Mr Abraham that they felt that they could not refuse instructions from Mr Malhotra when he instructed them to assist Mr Khan. Mr Khan was responsible for preparing, at Mr Malhotra's behest, four documents entitled "value destruction" reports which purported to show the adverse effect which the senior management had had on sales. These were provided to Mr Malhotra on 9 January 2017 for him to include in the papers for the next Advisory Board meeting, which he did without identifying their author. By the very use of the title "value destruction", both Mr Malhotra and Mr Khan intended them to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham. A further "value destruction" report was sent by Mr Khan to Mr Malhotra on 10 January 2017 and on for Advisory Board consideration. On 1 February 2017 Mr Khan forwarded to Mr Malhotra what purported to be three letters of complaint from wholesalers. These had been procured by Mr Khan as part of the role assigned by Mr Malhotra which was to provide evidence which Mr Malhotra could use against senior management. They had been backdated to early January and were, as Mr Khan knew, spurious. On 6 February 2017, for the same purposes, Mr Khan orchestrated a series of letters from distributors addressed to Mr Malhotra which were critical of Mr Abraham and praised Mr Khan. These were backdated to 19 and 20 December 2016 and sent to Mr Malhotra, at his private email address, by Mr Khan, from his private email address, on 6 February 2017, notwithstanding that they purported to be addressed to Mr Malhotra, not Mr Khan. Again they were spurious. Mr Abraham's evidence, which I accept, is that although Mr Khan's role means that in theory none of the sales force report to him, in practice he sits in the middle of the team who have worked with him in the past, with Mr Abraham and Mr Anindo Mukherji locked out. Many of the sales force have told Mr Abraham that it is difficult to refuse to carry out Mr Khan's instructions because he has the authority of Mr Malhotra, and there have been multiple instances where Mr Abraham was able to track disruptions in the field back to Mr Khan.

90. Mr Malhotra also obstructed the legitimate attempts of senior management to confine Mr Khan's role. On 26 December 2016 Mr Abraham gave instructions for Mr Khan to leave the premises but was stymied by Mr Wagh acting on Mr Malhotra's instructions. On 27 December 2016, Mr Abraham ordered Mr Khan's email to be blocked because he was using it to write to the sales force. Mr Malhotra effectively countermanded Mr Abraham by instructing staff that email blocking required his consent and refusing to give it. In his evidence he sought to justify this on the grounds that he was Mr Khan's line manager and he was entitled to have direct appointees. This was merely confirmation of his use of Mr Khan as part of a parallel management structure.
91. I conclude that Mr Khan's continuing disruption was part of the continuing attempt by Mr Malhotra to impose his own strategy on the business in parallel to the management which Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham have been trying to carry through. It is inconceivable that Mr Khan would continue to behave in this way without Mr Malhotra's approval and authority. It is not necessary to decide whether this is as a result of direct communication between the two, or whether others such as Mr Chaudhuri have been involved, as they clearly were in the past.
92. Mr Adkin relied upon an offer made by Mr Malhotra for Mr Khan to be put on paid leave for the duration of the proceedings with a view to him resuming employment in a role "which fits in to the group structure existing at the time", with Mr Malhotra indemnifying SMOH for the cost. This offer was rejected by Mr Anindo Mukherji for a number of reasons, including his fear that even if on paid leave Mr Khan could influence and disrupt the sales force. Since this offer came on 9 March 2017, after the purported termination of Mr Malhotra's Service Contract, it is not of direct relevance to the issues I have to decide. Nevertheless I have considered whether the fact of the offer casts doubt on my conclusion that in the relevant period Mr Khan was being used by Mr Malhotra to disrupt the workforce, and concluded that it does not. Mr Anindo Mukherji's fear that if Mr Khan retained his status as an employee he would be in a position to disrupt the workforce was a legitimate one, and Mr Malhotra's offer was tied to Mr Khan being a permanent employee in some capacity after conclusion of the proceedings.

(4) Procuring or encouraging the Union to exclude Mr Anindo Mukherji and senior management from the plant and offices at Thane

93. The core facts are not in dispute. Super-Max's Indian headquarters are in Thane, Maharashtra, on the outskirts of Mumbai. Thane is the group's Indian headquarters and flagship factory. Until recently, it is where Mr Abraham and the group's Indian management team had their offices. Mr Anindo Mukherji, Mr Desai and other group managers would visit regularly. It is obviously of prime importance for the group's managers to be able to access the Thane premises.
94. Messrs Anindo Mukherji, Sreeram and Khamkar have been excluded from Thane since their return on Monday 26 December 2016. Sanjay Jagtap, the India General Counsel, has been excluded since Monday 9 January 2017. Messrs Abraham and Desai have each been excluded since 3 April 2017. The exclusion of the latter two is not directly relevant to the issues I have to decide since it occurred after the purported termination of the Service Contract on 10 February 2017.
95. These exclusions have been made by the Union. On the face of the correspondence, the Union asserts that the exclusions are the result of grievances with "Actis-appointed management". SMOH and Actis submit that they have been procured or encouraged by Mr Malhotra. Mr Malhotra denies any such involvement and points to communications from him urging the Union to allow the managers into the plant.
96. The case for SMOH/Actis on this issue is based on a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence. I am satisfied that it is made good to the relevant standard by reason of the following matters in particular:

(1) The identity of the excluded managers and the timing of their exclusion is striking. It would be a remarkable coincidence if the Union had just happened to choose 26 December 2016 as the day to exclude Mr Anindo Mukherji and the two senior employees when (a) they were the three most senior people whom Mr Malhotra had just been thwarted in removing and (b) this was the first day of their return to work following his failed coup. Although there were long running disputes with the Union, there was no reason for them to have been brought to a head or escalated into a lockout at that particular time, nor for the Union to have singled out those three particular individuals. By contrast, neither Mr Malhotra nor any of the employees aligned with Mr Malhotra have been excluded.

(2) Between 15 and 24 December 2016 Mr Chaudhuri had fifteen calls with the secretary of the Union Mr Kader, known as Kaderbhai; on 25 December 2016, the day before the exclusion he had three such calls; and on 26 December 2016 itself, he had fourteen such calls, both before and after the exclusion itself. There was a dispute over the length of these calls, many of which were recorded simply as being one minute long, which may reflect a call lasting anything up to a minute. It is possible that some of the calls were of short duration or involved leaving voicemails, but the frequency is common ground and striking. Mr Malhotra had no coherent or convincing explanation for that contact. Kaderbhai had pledged his allegiance to Mr Malhotra by his idiomatic use of the phrase "eating the salt of the master" at the meeting with the Union a week earlier on 19 December 2016. Over this period Mr Chaudhuri was in constant telephone contact with Mr Malhotra's personal assistants and supporters, including Messrs Khan, Wagh, Chakravarthy and Merani.

(3) When Mr Sreeram was refused entry, he emailed Mr Anindo Mukherji, with a copy to Mr Wagh, explaining that he had been told by the Union that they would not be allowed in unless Mr Malhotra came with them. Mr Wagh forwarded it to Mr Malhotra's private email address, but Mr Malhotra did nothing to intervene to assist.

(4) Mr Kumar gave Mr Malhotra a briefing on the day's events to the latter's private email address. The use of the private email address suggests a desire to conceal that Mr Malhotra was taking a particular interest in the events. There was no coherent alternative explanation from Mr Wagh or Mr Malhotra.

(5) On 29 December 2016 Mr Anindo Mukherji emailed Mr Malhotra advising of the further difficulties in being locked out of the plant and asking for Mr Malhotra to intervene to assist. Mr Malhotra failed to do so. He sought to explain his inaction on this and other occasions on the basis of a concern as to the effect of the Court's injunctions. I do not accept that this was the explanation: there was nothing in the Picken or Baker Orders which would preclude him communicating with the Union, and subsequent orders contained an express proviso to make clear that he was permitted to do so.

(6) It is apparent that Mr Chaudhuri was involved in drafting key correspondence on the Union's behalf. After Mr Jagtap was excluded on 9 January 2017 Mr Malhotra sent an email from his Super-Max email address on 11 January 2017 to Mr Sudhakar Sawant, the Vice-President of the Union, urging him to let all four excluded managers into the factory. Mr Malhotra's Whatsapp records include the following three messages to him from Mr Chaudhuri on the evening of 11 January:

"I am preparing the draft reply from Sawant just now. Already spoken to Sawant and sending him the draft reply shortly."

"Draft reply sent to Sawant"

"Spoken to Sawant. He would be sending the reply today evening."

Then Mr Sawant sent the official Union response to Mr Malhotra's email in a letter dated 12 January 2017 alleging that the excluded managers had been responsible in direct connivance with Mr Shomik Mukherjee and Mr Rathinam of Actis in systematically destroying an otherwise great company. Mr Malhotra's evidence that Mr Chaudhuri was liaising with the Union in relation to an undisclosed "questionnaire" and "presentation" is impossible to reconcile with the language of the messages themselves and was neither coherent nor credible. The absence of evidence or documentary disclosure from Mr Chaudhuri reinforces the conclusion that Mr Malhotra was orchestrating and dictating the terms of the Union response refusing access through Mr Chaudhuri; and that his email requesting access was not genuine, but window dressing concealing his working for the very opposite result.

(7) The phone records suggest that this was not a one-off occurrence. I have already referred to the large number of calls between Mr Chaudhuri and Kaderbhai leading up to and around the time of the exclusion on 26 December 2016. Mr Chaudhuri had some 28 calls with Mr Sawant and Kaderbhai between 1 and 8 January 2017, including late at night. On 9 January 2017, the day when Mr Jagtap was excluded, Mr Chaudhuri spoke to Mr Sawant or Kaderbhai 9 times. Between 10 and 12 January 2107, whilst Mr Malhotra sent open communications to the Union by letter, Mr Chaudhuri spoke to the Union representatives 13 times. I was unpersuaded by Mr Malhotra's evidence that Mr Chaudhuri was not making these calls on his behalf. Mr Malhotra himself accepted in evidence Mr Chaudhuri would act as a 'go-between' with the Union, and that the Union "would try and give messages to me via Mr Chaudhuri". The only sensible inference is that in these calls, Mr Chaudhuri was acting as just such a go-between.

(8) Mr Anindo Mukherji's evidence, which I accept, was that contrary to the paper trail, what he and the other relevant managers were being told at the gate by the Union committee members was that they would be granted entry to Thane with Mr Malhotra's permission.

(9) All this comes against the background of Mr Malhotra having had a long and close history with the Union. He appears to have kept them fully apprised of his attempt to take control in December, specifically sending a copy of the announcement of Mr Anindo Mukherji's removal to Sachin Ahir, the Union President. Mr Chaudhuri was in close telephone contact with Union officials at the time of the December suspension and terminations, often many times a day, and including late into the night. Mr Malhotra's other conduct, considered elsewhere in the judgment, designed to impede the ability of Mr Mukherji and his senior management to conduct the business effectively and to undermine them and force them out, is all of a piece with the effect of the Union behaviour and lends support to the conclusion that Mr Malhotra was behind it.

97. I conclude that Mr Malhotra used Mr Chaudhury to direct or encourage the Union to exclude Messrs Mukherji, Sreeram, Khamkar and Jagtap from the factory. I judge that he was motivated by three objectives. First it was to assist him in his attempts to impose his own strategy on the business through Mr Khan. It was part of a parallel management initiative which not only inserted Mr Khan, but excluded Mr Anindo Mukherji and senior management so as to impede their ability to restrain or control him. Secondly it was to make it more difficult for Mr Anindo Mukherji and his senior management team to carry on the business effectively, and thereby to provide himself with further ammunition with which to attack the Actis appointed management in the context of the litigation and the shareholder dispute. Thirdly it was to assist in maintaining and consolidating his own power base amongst the workforce in India.
98. Mr Adkin pointed to the fact that Mr Malhotra had sent a number of emails and letters to the Union requesting access for the excluded individuals. However since he was, through Mr Chaudhury, directing the responsive refusals, these were no more than deceptive window dressing. Nor is my conclusion undermined by the fact that Mr Malhotra had himself been included amongst the Defendants in an action commenced in November 2016 before the Industrial Court at Thane alleging unfair labour practices. The evidence as a whole established that he maintained a very good relationship with the Union, and the motive for including him as one of many defendants to that action was not explained by, or explored with, any of those responsible.

(5) Misleading the Advisory Board on 5 January 2017

99. On 5 January 2017 Mr Malhotra sent an email to the Advisory Board members which commenced: "Wholesale made a comeback with 41 percent growth Thanks to the efforts of Sameer Khan". The email included figures which made it clear that the 41% being referred to was the increase in revenue for wholesale CSP sales for December 2016 from those for November 2016.
100. It was seriously misleading to attribute this increase to the efforts of Mr Khan. Mr Anindo Mukherji's evidence, which I accept, was that the increase in figures had nothing to do with Mr Khan. Rather they were due to external factors which had a negative impact on the market for all fast moving consumer goods companies in November 2016 in India, primarily issues arising out of the demonetisation of certain notes.
101. Mr Malhotra knew that it was misleading to attribute these increases to Mr Khan's efforts. Mr Khan had only been involved for 7 working days in December 2016; he had not been involved for the majority of the month, only starting on 19 December 2016, as Mr Malhotra was well aware. I reject Mr Malhotra's evidence that he was responsible for the increase because wholesalers had confidence in him and "the minute he came in the money poured in" for that reason. Mr Malhotra was aware of the effects on the market of the demonetisation, which were the subject of newspaper comment at the time. His email came against the background of Mr Anindo Mukherji's detailed email to the board of the previous day complaining of Mr Malhotra's conduct, including the appointment of Mr Khan. Mr Malhotra was anxious to justify Mr Khan's appointment and exaggerate its effect as part of his campaign to persuade the board members that the business needed him to act as CEO in order to rescue it from the incompetent management of Mr Anindo Mukherji.
102. Ms Bingham also relied upon the fact that Mr Malhotra forwarded to the board a series of 10 emails sent to him on 5 January 2017 from senior employees criticising current management and/or praising the efforts and success of Mr Khan. These were sent to Mr Malhotra within the space of a few hours. I reject his evidence that they were unsolicited. His explanation that the employees happened to have been talking amongst themselves because they were "tickled pink at the upbeat of the sales" is improbable. I conclude that he procured these messages, through Mr Khan, as part of the campaign to justify Mr Khan's appointment and exaggerate its effect, with the same motives as the misleading 41% growth email. This is of a piece with his procuring emails from customers and distributors through Mr Khan in February 2017, to which I have referred above. This was not pleaded in the Amended Particulars of Claim as a separate breach comprising an attempt to mislead the advisory board, and I do not treat it as such. Nevertheless it supports my conclusion that such was Mr Malhotra's intention in the 41% email of the same date.

(6) Breach of the Picken Order and/or Baker Orders

103. SMOH/Actis have brought proceedings against Mr Malhotra for committal for contempt of court in relation to these allegations. Those committal proceedings have been ordered to be tried separately from this trial on civil liability and subsequent to it. In any committal proceedings the standard of proof is the criminal one and a party is entitled to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination if so advised. I have reached my conclusions on the issues necessary to determine civil liability on the balance of probabilities bearing in mind the heightened need for scrutiny necessitated by the gravity of the allegations being made and the inherent probabilities involved. I do not find it necessary in determining the outcome of the civil claim to express conclusions as to whether Mr Malhotra was in breach of the orders, and nor is it desirable to do so even to the civil standard, given the pending contempt proceedings. I recognise that if the conduct complained of constituted a knowing breach of court orders, that would be an additional reason for treating them as breaches, indeed grave breaches of the Service Contract because it would be a serious breach for a senior employee deliberately to disobey a court order obtained by his employer against him. But since I can decide the outcome of the case without recourse to such an approach, it is fairer to Mr Malhotra to do so. If the contempt proceedings are pursued they will have to be addressed on the basis of the evidence then before the Court and the criminal standard of proof required.

(7) Expenses claims

104. The complaints made by SMOH in relation to expenses fall into different categories, referenced to Table A and Tables B2-5 annexed to the Amended Particulars of Claim:

(1) Table A particularises a claim that for 18 different stays at hotels between 7 September 2015 and 12 December 2016 the amount claimed by Mr Malhotra was in excess of the maximum daily limits set out in the Business Travel Policy CGP 10 which was, as Mr Desai testified, approved by the Group Audit Committee and endorsed by the full Advisory Board at its meeting on 15 September 2015 ("the travel policy"). The total excess is US$ 31,934. The pleading also alleges that these expenses were not reasonable and/or necessary within clause 7.1 of the Service Contract, but this allegation was not ultimately pursued by Ms Bingham when her case was clarified in final speeches. The claim in respect of the Table A expenses turns solely on the allegation that they were in excess of the amount allowed by the travel policy.

(2) Tables B2-5 are pleaded as expenses for which there was no adequate supporting documentation submitted, so that the Court is asked to infer that they had no business justification and that Mr Malhotra knew he was not entitled to claim them or was reckless as to his entitlement. In fact, as later confirmed in argument, the main allegation is simply that they should have had adequate supporting documentation and it was a breach of the travel policy, or the Gifts and Hospitality Policy CGP 3 ("the hospitality policy") not to provide it. Table B2 contains the summary of these expenses, totalling US$ 516,265 in respect of payments from January 2015 to November 2016. The agreed method of claiming and reimbursement for these expenses had been, for very many years, that Mr Malhotra would use his personal Amex credit card for both business and personal expenses. The credit card bill was paid monthly by Super-Max Corporation USA, a subsidiary of SMOH. Mr Malhotra would mark up and reimburse those expenses which were personal in nature, leaving Super-Max to bear the business expenses. Table B2 is a summary of totals in five categories, namely (1) air ticket purchases, (2) air ticket purchases with points/airmiles, (3) hotels/lodging expenses, (4) meals, and (5) other expenses.

(3) Tables B3 to B5 are what are said to be "examples" of individual expenses in three of the five categories summarised in Table B2. Table B3 identifies four particular examples of purchases in the second category, air ticket purchases made with points/airmiles. Table B4 identifies four particular examples in the fourth category, meals. Table B5 identifies fives examples in the fifth category, "other" expenses.

105. By the conclusion of her final speech, Ms Bingham advanced the case in three ways:

(a) Breaches of the travel and/or hospitality policy justifying termination and/or an inquiry as to damages comprising:

(i) expenses in excess of the travel policy limits (Table A); and

(ii) failure to provide adequate supporting documentation in breach of the travel and hospitality policies (Table B2 of which Tables B3-5 are examples).

(b) False and fraudulent claiming: this was confined to a few examples of flights specifically put in cross examination on the basis that they were to and/or from locations where there was no company business.

(c) The meal in a steak house in Dallas on 12 June 2016 at Table B4 item 4, which was alleged to be unreasonable and unnecessary in amount, but not to amount to a fraudulent expenses claim.

Table A

106. The table of daily rates in Chapter 2 of the travel policy are not expressed as limits. They are categorised as "Budget Guidelines". If the employee's contract only entitles him or her to reimbursement of reasonable and necessary expenses, the policy provides guidance in advance of what will generally be regarded as reasonable and necessary for that grade of employee. The document states its purpose as being to educate employees on incurring expenses whilst on business travel. Mr Desai stated that the amounts were subject to reasonable variation. They are not fixed limits. For an employee to claim expenses in excess of the guidelines is not a breach of the employment agreement. It is for the finance department to vet and allow or disallow such expenses. In Mr Malhotra's case they were allowed: there was nothing clandestine about the amounts being claimed and no challenge was made to them until they were included in these proceedings as an additional ground to support the termination. There was no breach of contract and no entitlement for SMOH to recoup what has been allowed.

Table B2: lack of documentary support for expenses paid for by SMOH on the personal credit card

107. Mr Adkin submitted that it was very unfair to complain of the failure to provide supporting documentation so long after the event when Mr Malhotra's practice in claiming expenses and providing documentary support had been consistent and transparent throughout the periods in question and before. I agree. Neither the travel policy nor the hospitality policy requires any particular form of vouching or supportive documentation. The latter merely requires that there be an accurate record of it. Mr Desai's evidence was that in practice what was required was an invoice or receipt and identification of the names of the person receiving the hospitality. That may have been a legitimate policy to operate as a precondition to being satisfied that the expense should be reimbursed. It is no basis for holding that a claim without such documentation is a breach of contract, and especially so when the expense has been allowed on the basis of the documentation in fact provided.
108. I have not lost sight of the fact that the method by which Mr Malhotra was allowed to incur and claim expenses involved a blanket payment of his personal Amex card with subsequent adjustment for personal expenses. This was an additional line of credit for the company in respect of business expenses, and a system which the company chose to operate. Although Mr Desai says he was unaware of it until February 2017, there was nothing secretive about the arrangement which involved emails between finance department personnel. Mr Malhotra could properly regard any expenses for which he had not volunteered personal reimbursement as having been allowed by the company in the absence of contemporaneous challenge or request for further information. It is too late to be doing so now. If, contrary to my findings, there was any breach in relation to claiming such expenses, SMOH clearly waived it by paying them through its subsidiary Super-Max America.

Table B3: tickets bought on points/airmiles

109. The examples are in respect of four purchases of airmiles with Silverwings Travel which were for redemption on business flights. The complaint is that these were first class flights and that first class flights are not authorised by the travel policy. For reasons I have already given in relation to the travel policy generally there can have been no breach of contract or right to reimbursement. Moreover Mr Malhotra explained that the cost was less than would have been incurred if the points had not been purchased but he had booked business class flights through the Dubai office. There was no evidence to challenge this, which affords a further ground for holding that there was no breach in this respect.

Table B4: meals

110. Of the four meals expenses claims identified in Table B4, only one was explored in cross examination on the basis that it was an unreasonable and excessive expense. In respect of the other three, Ms Bingham suggested that they fell within the category of expenses for which there was inadequate supporting documentation. Mr Malhotra's case was that he had in fact reimbursed SMOH for these three meals as personal expenses and he had provided such supporting documentation as he now had available in respect of the reimbursement. He was not challenged on this in cross examination. I am not therefore persuaded that these are expenses he has claimed as business expenses or that they have been borne by Super-Max. Even on the Claimant's case of inadequate vouching, there would have been no breach of the Service Contract and/or it would have been waived.
111. The steak house meal in Dallas was explored in cross examination, and Mr Malhotra identified the attendees and the business purpose of the meal. The real complaint was the size of the bill for a meal for three people. Mr Malhotra explained that he was entertaining the chairman and senior director of the second largest retailer in Mexico with whom Super-Max had a $3 million relationship going back 12 years. Large though the bill was, I am not persuaded that it was unreasonable for the executive chairman to incur such an expense in that context.

Table B5: "other expenses"

112. Mr Malhotra accepted that these were personal expenses. He said he had reimbursed them and had provided such supporting documentation as he now had available. Again this was not challenged in cross examination. I am not therefore persuaded that these are expenses he has claimed as business expenses or that they have been borne by Super-Max. In the end Ms Bingham did not pursue the case in relation to these payments.

Flights

113. The allegation of fraudulent claiming in respect of some flights was not pleaded, as it should have been (paragraph 47(b) of the Amended Particulars of Claim is insufficient to give proper notice or particulars of such an allegation of fraud). For that reason alone I would reject it, particularly since the generic way in which the Table B2 allegations have been advanced has made them difficult for Mr Malhotra to address. In any event, in the light of his explanations in cross examination that these flights were merely intermediate legs on journeys to or from places where he was conducting company business, I am not satisfied that the allegations of fraudulent claiming are made out.
114. Accordingly the expenses claims allegations afford no grounds for justifying the termination of Mr Malhotra's Service Contract. Nor do they give rise to an entitlement to an inquiry as to damages.

Gross Misconduct?

115. There were the following terms of the Service Contract:

(1) an express term that Mr Malhotra would comply with the articles of association (clause 2(iii)) and the Authority Matrix (clauses 2.3(ii) and 5) ("Term 1");

(2) an express term that Mr Malhotra would comply with the Code of Conduct Policy CGP 1 (clause 2.3(iii) and 5) which required him to treat fellow employees fairly, courteously and respectfully (paragraph 2(a)) and not to harass them (paragraph 2(j)) ("Term 2");

(3) an implied term that Mr Malhotra would serve SMOH with good faith and fidelity ("Term 3"); this includes a duty to refrain from wilful disruption of the functioning of the business: Secretary of State for Employment v Associated Society for Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 455, 491, 498, 508-9;

(4) an implied term that Mr Malhotra would not without reasonable or proper excuse act in such a manner as was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between SMOH and himself ("Term 4"): Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20, 45; Adesokan v Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 22 at paragraph [14].

116. Mr Malhotra's conduct, as I have found it to be, was a breach of these terms. In particular:

(1) He staged a coup whereby he removed Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO, installed himself as CEO and exercised the powers of a CEO to dismiss four senior employees, rearrange reporting lines and responsibilities, and to appoint Mr Khan to a senior position. He knew he was not entitled to do so. This behaviour constituted a breach of Terms 1, 3 and 4.

(2) He conducted a sustained campaign of aggressive abuse and disparagement towards Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham intending thereby (a) to force them to resign (b) to foment dissent and insubordination from junior employees (c) seriously to undermine them in the eyes of the workforce and (d) thereby to impede their ability, and that of senior management, to exercise effective management of the workforce and the business. This behaviour constituted a breach of Terms 2, 3 and 4.

(3) He directed or encouraged the Union to exclude senior management from Thane in order (a) to assist in imposing his own strategy on the business (b) to make it more difficult for Mr Anindo Mukherji and the senior management to exercise effective management of the workforce and the business and (c) to assist in maintaining and consolidating his own power base amongst the workforce in India. This was a breach of Terms 2, 3 and 4.

(4) Even after the reinstatement of Mr Anindo Mukherji and the four senior employees, he sought to maintain a system of parallel management through the Union lockout and the continued employment of Mr Khan, and thereby to continue to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham. This was a breach of Terms 1, 2, 3 and 4.

(5) He sought to deceive the Advisory Board. This was a breach of Terms 3 and 4.

117. Gross misconduct is the epithet which is given to breaches of contract by an employee which are sufficiently serious to amount to a repudiation which the employer can accept by summary dismissal. Whether conduct is sufficiently serious to reach this threshold is a matter of fact and degree. The focus is on the damage to the employment relationship between the parties; deliberate actions which poison the relationship by undermining the mutual trust and confidence which is an essential part of it will amount to gross misconduct: see Adesokan per Elias LJ at paragraph [23]. I have little hesitation in concluding that Mr Malhotra's breaches were sufficiently serious as to amount to gross misconduct.
118. I should record that his conduct also constituted breaches of his fiduciary duties as a director of SMOH. That is not relied on as a separate ground justifying termination, but it may be relevant to the form of relief granted.

Cure/waiver/affirmation

119. Mr Adkin argued that the matters complained of took place on or before 6 January 2017, and that by 10 February 2017 when SMOH terminated the Service Contract:

(1) they had been cured by Mr Malhotra; and/or

(2) SMOH had waived the breaches and affirmed the contract by permitting Mr Malhotra to continue in employment throughout the period as executive chairman, including in particular the following:

(a) seeking and obtaining the further injunctive relief on 6 January 2017 expressly recognising at paragraph 2(c) of the Baker Order his continuing responsibilities as executive chairman;

(b) Mr Shomik Mukherjee's request on 7 January 2017 that he continue to play the role of executive chairman;

(c) payment of his salary on 12 January 2017;

(d) discussing his continuing responsibilities as executive chairman at the Advisory Board meeting on 17 January 2017;

(e) seeking and obtaining the continuation of the further injunctive relief on 27 January 2017 expressly recognising at paragraph 3(c) of the order his continuing responsibilities as executive chairman;

(f) Mr Anindo Mukherji's request to him for approval of the promotion of an employee on the morning of 10 February 2017, before the termination letter later that day.

Cure

120. I am bound by Court of Appeal authority that English law does not permit a party in repudiatory breach unilaterally to cure the breach once it has been committed, so as to affect the innocent party's right to rely upon it to put an end to the contract. The innocent party may terminate unless he has lost the right to do so because of an election to affirm or a deemed affirmation from the passage of time. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Bournemouth University Higher Education Corpn v Buckland [2011] QB 323 specifically in the context of a breach of the duty of mutual trust and confidence in an employment contract: see especially per Sedley LJ at paragraphs [33]-[44] and per Jacobs LJ at paragraphs [52]-[53].
121. Mr Adkin relied on a dictum of Lewison LJ in Ampurius Nu Homes Holdings v Telford Homes (Creekside) [2013] EWCA Civ 577, at paragraph [63], endorsing a passage in the judgment of Rix LJ in Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Company [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 436 at paragraph [87]:

"A breach of contract, although serious, may be capable of remedy. If it is remedied before the injured party purports to exercise a right of termination, then the fact that the breach has been remedied is an important factor to be taken into account. Likewise if there is delay in performance of an ongoing obligation it may well be possible for the delay to be made up by faster performance."

122. Ampurius was concerned with a breach by a developer which consisted of his suspending building works he was obliged to carry out. By the time of the purported termination he had resumed work. The breach in that case was a delay in performance, the extent, and therefore seriousness, of which fell to be judged at the date of purported termination when the works had restarted. Whether the default was repudiatory, as a breach of an innominate term, depended upon the length of the delay in performance. The case was not concerned with cure of an existing breach as such, but with defining the extent of breach of an innominate term. It casts no doubt on the principle that a party who has committed a repudiatory breach cannot cure it, at least where the repudiatory character of the breach is not itself dependent on the passage of time. Mr Malhotra's breaches were complete when committed. Accordingly as a matter of law Mr Malhotra's breaches could not be cured.
123. If I were wrong in this conclusion, I would nevertheless hold that Mr Malhotra's breaches were not cured on the facts of this case for two reasons. First the breaches were continuing breaches in a number of respects which amounted to continuing gross misconduct. In particular between 6 January and 10 February 2017 Mr Malhotra:

(1) continued to direct or encourage the Union to exclude senior management from Thane;

(2) sought to maintain a system of parallel management through the Union lockout and the continued employment of Mr Khan, and thereby to continue to undermine Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham;

(3) continued to threaten to resume his position as CEO in place of Mr Anindo Mukherji if and when he was successful in the litigation. Although Mr Malhotra did not resist the temporary continuation of the injunction on 27 January 2017, it was not until service of the Defence on 24 March 2017 that he indicated that he would not resist final relief restraining him from purporting to act as CEO. At the date of the termination on 10 February 2017 he had given no indication that his stance had changed or that his assumption of the role was constrained by anything other than the existing temporary Picken and Baker Orders.

124. Secondly, even if the gross misconduct had ceased at 6 January 2017, it had not been cured by 10 February 2017. Where an employee's misconduct is sufficiently serious to damage the mutual trust which is essential to the employment relationship, such breach is not remedied merely by cessation of the conduct. What would need to be remedied would be the effect of the breach on the relationship. In this case the effect of Mr Malhotra's gross misconduct was fundamentally to destroy the trust which SMOH could have in the proper exercise of his functions as executive chairman. Even assuming, which I do not decide, that Mr Malhotra abided by the Baker Order, there was nothing that he did in the 5 weeks between 6 January and 10 February 2017 which was sufficient to repair the deleterious effect of his conduct on the parties' relationship or remedy its effects on the business or the parties. Nor did the passage of time have that effect.

Waiver/Affirmation

125. Mr Adkin drew no distinction between waiver and affirmation. A party will be taken to have affirmed a contract if, with knowledge of the breach and of his right to choose, he does some unequivocal act which is consistent only with a decision to affirm, or allows too much time to pass by without indicating a decision.
126. There are four separate reasons why there was no affirmation in this case. First, there was no unequivocal act which was consistent only with a decision to affirm. Throughout the relevant period SMOH was pursuing the litigation against Mr Malhotra in which it was claiming, amongst other things, a declaration that Mr Malhotra's conduct "amounts to gross misconduct within the meaning of Clause 13.4 of [the Service Contract]". Clause 13.4 is the provision conferring an express right to summary dismissal for gross misconduct. Accordingly anything which was happening in relation to Mr Malhotra acting in the meantime as executive chairman was against the background of SMOH's continuing assertion in the proceedings of a right to dismiss him for gross misconduct. It was not unequivocally consistent only with an intention to affirm the contract; on the contrary there was a continuing assertion of a right to terminate the contract. In such circumstances there is no affirmation: see W.E. Cox Toner (International Ltd) Ltd v Crook [1981] ICR 823, 829.
127. Secondly, in the employment context, a party faced with apparent gross misconduct is entitled (and often obliged) to take a reasonable period of time to investigate and form a view about whether to terminate: see for example Cook v Ministry of Sound [2009] EWCA Civ 624 at paragraph [56]. That was what SMOH was doing through the litigation. Accordingly for that reason also, any continued employment and associated conduct in the meantime is not an unequivocal election to affirm.
128. Thirdly, affirmation requires full knowledge of the facts giving rise to the right to affirm and knowledge that it gives rise to such right. SMOH was throughout the relevant period seeking to ascertain the true facts, significant aspects of which only became apparent after 5 January 2017. At no time prior to 10 February 2017 did SMOH have full knowledge of the facts I have held constitute the full extent of the gross misconduct of Mr Malhotra.
129. Fourthly, Mr Malhotra's gross misconduct continued up until 10 February 2017 in the respects I have identified. Accordingly any prior affirmation of earlier breaches would not preclude SMOH from terminating the employment on 10 February 2017 for the continuing and subsequent gross misconduct.

Actis' power to terminate on behalf of SMOH

130. It follows from my conclusions thus far that SMOH was entitled to terminate the Service Contract for gross misconduct on 10 February 2017. The next question is whether Actis had the power under the SSD to exercise that right on behalf of and on the name of SMOH.
131. I reject Actis' reliance on clause 16.3 as conferring the power. Clause 16.3 allows Actis to "conduct" and "prosecute" a "right of action" which SMOH has against Mr Malhotra. It is concerned with pursuing, including by litigation, existing claims which have given rise to a cause of action. It does not confer authority on Actis to create a new cause of action, save to the extent conferred by the authority to "negotiate, litigate and settle any claim arising out of such right of action". When Actis commenced proceedings against Mr Malhotra in SMOH's name it was exercising the power under clause 16.3 to pursue an accrued right of action in respect of prior breaches of the Service Contract in order to recover damages or injunctive relief. That is a different right of action from that which results from the exercise of the right to terminate the Service Contract as a result of those breaches. Exercising a termination right does not amount to conducting or prosecuting the right of action for breach; nor does termination of the contract amount to negotiating, litigating or settling the cause of action for breach or any claim arising out of that cause of action. Termination involves the creation of new rights, and the authority to create those new rights is not to be found in an authority to litigate about them if and when created.
132. However clause 16.4 does confer the necessary authority on Mr Shomik Mukherjee of Actis. There was a decision and discretion to be exercised by SMOH against Mr Malhotra in respect of one of the Transaction Documents, namely the Service Contract, i.e. whether to exercise the accrued right to terminate it. Mr Adkin argued that all that clause 16.4 allowed Actis to do was to direct SMOH to take the relevant action, but that there needed to be a subsequent board decision of both the Advisory Board and the board of directors of SMOH to do so. I see no justification for imposing any requirement of any board decision. Mr Adkin relied on clauses 17.1.5 and 18.1 of the SSD but neither of them prescribe a decision of either board as necessary. Clause 16.4 covers a potentially wide range of discretions and decisions which may be exercised by any Group Company against any Malhotra Party or their affiliates in respect of a range of Transaction Documents and the Tax Structure Paper. Whether such a decision or discretion requires a board meeting is a matter for the internal governance regime of the particular company in question.
133. The articles of association of SMOH include the following:

"26 POWERS OF DIRECTORS

…

26.3 Subject to the provisions of the Law, the Memorandum and these Articles, the business of the Company shall be managed by the Directors who may for that purpose exercise all the powers of the Company.

28 MEETINGS OF DIRECTORS

...

Quorum

28.6 No business shall be transacted at any meeting of the Board unless a quorum is present at the time when the meeting proceeds to business and remains present during the transaction of such business. Until such time as an [Actis nominated] Director is appointed, the quorum for the transaction of business of the Board shall be one Director. At any time following an [Actis nominated] Director having been appointed, the quorum for the transaction of business of the Board shall be three Directors, one of whom must be an [Actis nominated] Director and one of whom must be a [Malhotra nominated] Director, subject in each case to Article 28.7. In the event Article 28.7 applies, then the quorum shall be any one Director who is not prohibited from voting pursuant to Article 28.7, or in the event of a matter referred to in Articles 29.3 or 29.4, the quorum shall be any [Actis nominated] Director.

28.7 The relevant members of the Board shall be required to recuse themselves from voting on any matter which relates to a Group Company, on the one hand, and the Shareholder appointing or nominating them or any of its Affiliates, on the other, and shall not be required to form part of the quorum of any Board meeting or any committee thereof, as regards such matter.

RESERVED MATTERS

…

29.4 All decisions and discretions which may be exercised by any Group Company as against a Malhotra Party or any of their Affiliates in respect of the Transaction Documents or the Tax Structure Paper shall be exercised at the instructions of Actis, and the [Malhotra nominated] Shareholders and the Company shall not, and shall procure that each member of the Group shall not, vary, novate, supplement, waive or replace or agree to vary, novate, supplement, waive or replace the terms or conditions of, or give any consent or exercise any such discretion in respect of any of the Transaction Documents or the Tax Structure Paper (in each case whether subject to conditions or not), or do anything which is not contemplated by, or is inconsistent with, any of them, or agree to do any of the foregoing, without the prior consent in writing of Actis."

134. Article 26.3 confers upon the directors the authority to exercise all the powers of the company. This includes the decision to terminate Mr Malhotra's Service Contract. The three SMOH directors were Mr Malhotra, his nominee Professor Norchi, and Mr Shomik Mukherjee. All three would be bound by article 29.4, which is in the same terms as clause 16.4 of the SSD, to exercise their powers as directors to comply with Actis' instruction. Accordingly upon a true construction of the articles, in circumstances where Actis has given a valid instruction under article 29.4 (and clause 16.4 of the SSD), any one director is empowered to give effect to that instruction because all are bound to do so. Moreover, even if there were to have been a requirement of a board decision, clause 18.4.3 of the SSD and article 28.7 of the SMOH articles of association would have required Mr Malhotra and his nominee, Professor Norchi, to have recused themselves. The last sentence of article 28.6 expressly provides that in those circumstances Mr Mukherjee acting alone would constitute a quorate body, both because the other two were bound to recuse themselves under article 28.7 and because the decision was one in respect of a matter governed by article 29.4. Accordingly Mr Shomik Mukherjee had power to take the decision on behalf of SMOH on his own under the company's articles, and it was he who did so pursuant to Actis' directions. It matters not whether Mr Mukherjee's decision is treated as an executive act of a director or the act of a quorate board comprising only himself. His conduct in procuring the termination of the Service Contract was a duly authorised act of SMOH pursuant to a direction of Actis. This makes obvious business sense. The structure of the SSD was such that Mr Malhotra was to have the majority of nominees on the SMOH board and therefore to have control. Clause 16.4 is concerned with circumstances in which SMOH's rights are adverse to Mr Malhotra's and therefore directed to situations in which Mr Malhotra could not reasonably be expected to exercise his controlling interest in SMOH to make decisions adverse to himself. If Mr Adkin's argument were sound, Mr Malhotra would either be in a position to neutralise the central purpose of clause 16.4 by delaying or blocking any board resolution, which is a construction contrary to its central purpose, or else the requirement of a board meeting would serve no useful purpose, in which case the construction would lead to a triumph of form over substance. Neither construction is dictated by the words used or consistent with business common sense.

The Counterclaim: breach by reason of SMOH's termination of the Service Contract

135. Since I have held that SMOH was entitled to terminate the Service Contract and that Actis validly procured that it did so, this issue does not arise.

The Counterclaim: breach in failing to consent to the removal of Mr Anindo Mukherji

136. Mr Malhotra's case is that there was an implied term of the SSD that Actis would not exercise the discretion conferred on it by clause 16.1 in a manner which was arbitrary, capricious, irrational or unreasonable; or in other words that Actis' written consent under clause 16.1 of the SSD would not be unreasonably withheld. Mr Adkin confirmed in the course of argument that "unreasonable" was here used in its public law sense as Wednesbury unreasonable.
137. Ms Bingham argued that there were no such implied terms: Actis had an unfettered right to decide whether to consent to any of the Reserved Matters; alternatively, if there was any such term, Actis was not in breach of it in relation to Mr Anindo Mukherji's removal because Actis' written consent to such removal was not requested and/or in any event a refusal would not have been capricious, arbitrary, irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable.

Was there an implied term?

138. The principles governing the implication of terms were authoritatively restated in Marks & Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2016] AC 742. A term of the nature contended for has often been implied in contracts containing a contractual discretion vested in one party: see Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co v Product Star Shipping Ltd (The "Product Star") (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 397,404; Paragon Finance Plc v Nash [2002] 1 WLR 685 at paragraphs [39]-[41]; Socimer International Bank (in liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep 558, 575-577; British Telecommunications Plc v Telefonica O2 UK Ltd [2014] 4 All ER 907; Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 1661; and Waaler v Hounslow London Borough Council [2017] 1 WLR 2817. It is likely to be implicit in any commercial contract under which one party is given the right to make a decision on a matter which affects both parties whose interests are not the same: see Braganza per Baroness Hale at paragraph [18]; JML Direct Ltd v Freestat UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ per Moore-Bick LJ at [14]; and Waaler per Lewison LJ at [20]. The rationale is that such a term is necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the power conferred on one party. The discretion conferred on Actis in clause 16.1 in relation to Reserved Matters fall squarely within the rationale for such implication. It contains a power vested in Actis to make decisions which affect the potentially conflicting interests of the other parties in relation to the governance of the group in a wide variety of different ways enumerated in Schedule 2.
139. Ms Bingham argued that the discretion in clause 16.1 is a binary decision which renders it outside the field in which decisions are subject to the implied term; and that it is essentially a veto which is no different in kind from a requirement that unanimity is required in relation to Reserved Matters in a vote in general meeting; and that since shareholders are entitled to vote their shares in accordance with their own wishes and even with malice, the same unfettered discretion should apply to clause 16.1. I am unable to accept this analysis. I agree with Asplin J, as she then was, in Property Alliance Group Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [[2016] EWHC 3342 (Ch) at paragraph [277] that to focus on whether the decision in question is binary is not helpful in resolving whether the term is to be implied. What matters is whether the decision involves an assessment or choosing from a range of options, of which there may only be two. Nor is the position of voting shares in general meeting analogous, which is based on shares being property and having property rights attached to them. This is a commercial contract regulating contractual rights; and the clause 16.1 discretion applies to a wide variety of reserved matters set out in Schedule 2 which fall to be considered in the light of Actis' investment as a private equity house.
140. Accordingly there is to be implied the term for which Mr Malhotra contends.

Was Actis' written consent sought and refused?

141. Clause 16.1 does not require Actis to make a decision in relation to a Reserved Matter unless and until its written consent is sought. There can have been no decision to refuse written consent unless such written consent was requested, and in the absence of such decision there is nothing to which the implied term can attach. In this case there was no request for the written consent of Actis to the removal of Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO. Mr Adkin relied in particular on Mr Malhotra's email to all Advisory Board members seeking a written board resolution suspending Mr Mukherji as CEO "pending a decision about his future", and appointing himself as interim CEO "pending the appointment of a long term replacement". Ms Bingham advanced a threshold submission that since Mr Malhotra's case was that such a suspension was not a Reserved Matter, he should not be allowed to advance a case that this was a written request to exercise a discretion in relation to a Reserved Matter for the purposes of clause 16.1. I do not regard that threshold submission as sound. I have rejected Mr Malhotra's case that suspension is not removal, and it follows that the request for a board resolution on 14 December did involve a Reserved Matter. Mr Malhotra is entitled to argue that the email constitutes the written request for consent which is necessary under clause 16.1, in the alternative to his argument which I rejected that suspension is not removal.
142. The email seeking the board resolution was not, however, a written request to Actis. The written resolution request was made to Mr Shomik Mukherjee and Mr Rathinam in their capacity as members of the Advisory Board. They were nominated as such by Actis, but they were not delegates and they were acting in a personal capacity as members of the board. A request to them did not constitute a request to Actis. By contrast, on previous occasions on which written requests for consent had been made under clause 16.1, they had taken the form of letters to Actis' registered office, including a letter from Mr Malhotra of 6 January 2013 seeking consent to the removal of the CEO then in office.
143. That is sufficient to dispose of the counterclaim. However in case I be wrong on this issue, I will consider whether if Actis' attitude to the retention of Mr Anindo Mukherjee had been a decision under clause 16.1 it would have been in breach of the implied term.

Was Actis' attitude to the retention of Mr Anindo Mukherji unreasonable?

144. It is important to keep in mind two considerations which inform the answer to this question. The first is the scope of the limitation imposed on Actis by the implied term. The Court is not concerned to apply its own views of what would or would not have been reasonable. Reasonableness in the current context is not an objective standard to be applied by the Court, but a criterion applied to the decision making process of the decision maker. Apart from challenges to the procedural manner in which the decision comes to be made, or challenges to the relevance or irrelevance of considerations which were or were not taken into account, neither of which arise in the present case, the test focuses on the outcome of the process; and in order for there to be a breach of the term, the decision maker must have reached a decision which is so outside the range which any decision maker could reasonably have reached that it is properly categorised as irrational or perverse: see Hayes v Willoughby [2013] 1 WLR 935 per Lord Sumption JSC at paragraph [14] approved in Braganza at [23]-[24]. It is a high threshold, as the public law cases make clear.
145. Secondly, it is important to look at the nature of Actis' decision. If, contrary to my conclusion, Mr Shomik Mukherjee is to be equated with Actis for these purposes, his response was not a simple refusal, but an indication that there should not be any removal yet without further discussion. In his email of 14 December 2016, he said:

"… Actis' written consent has not been sought to date. I can inform this Board that Actis is happy to make itself available to discuss the Group's performance and next steps with Mr Malhotra. … At the very least … a much more considered, unemotional and evidence-based assessment is needed of the current issues facing the Group and potential solutions."

146. Mr Malhotra's case on this issue depended entirely on the disappointing financial performance of the group, which he attributed to the incompetence of Mr Anindo Mukherji and his senior management. However it is quite impossible to treat this as sufficient to treat Mr Shomik Mukherjee's approach to the written resolution request as unreasonable for three separate reasons, each of which is sufficient.
147. First, there was clearly room for two views, at the lowest, as to whether Mr Anindo Mukherji was sufficiently at fault or incompetent such that the financial results required his removal. It is fallacious to suggest that disappointing financial results ipso facto prove incompetent management, or that they must be met by a change in management. I need not set out the very considerable body of evidence before the Court as to the problems faced by the group and their causes, in respect of which Mr Anindo Mukherji and Mr Abraham provided cogent and convincing explanations in their evidence. It is enough to record my conclusion that a reasonable decision maker in Actis' position in December 2016 could reasonably have taken the view that the financial performance was substantially due to historic problems and external market conditions; and that turning the business round was a longer term task for which Mr Anindo Mukherji remained well qualified and competent. It is not for the Court to determine whether that was or was not the case, but it was certainly a tenable and rational view to take. Actis could reasonably have taken the view that for the time being, at least, the retention of Mr Anindo Mukherji as CEO was in the best interests of the group. That was the view of one of the independent Advisory Board members Mr Mateen; and the other, Mr Birch, whilst disagreeing, described Mr Mateen's views as "very understandable".
148. Secondly, Actis could reasonably have concluded that there was no viable alternative to Mr Anindo Mukherji at the time. No other CEO was identified to take over from Mr Mukherji, save only that Mr Malhotra would be acting CEO for an indefinite period, which would likely be a substantial one to give sufficient time to identify and recruit a suitable replacement given past experience. Actis was entitled to take the view that Mr Malhotra was not a suitable replacement, both temperamentally and as a matter of operational experience, even on a temporary basis. Such a view would not have been unreasonable, as my findings in relation to his subsequent conduct illustrate. Mr Birch said to Mr Shomik Mukherjee in a telephone conversation a month later, on 17 January 2017 "…..Rocky can't run the business because he's got too many girlfriends, and too many interests elsewhere in the world…….he's got a huge amount of personality and charisma, but he's not a businessman, he's a playboy." Mr Shomik Mukherjee's evidence was that it would not have been possible to attract an alternative CEO of the calibre of Mr Anindo Mukherji if he were to be removed at that time; and that had he been removed, and the senior management to have left with him, as was likely, including experienced and effective zonal sales managers in India, that would not have been in the group's best interests. That was a rational and tenable view, at the lowest.
149. Thirdly, at the time Mr Malhotra provided no evidence to Mr Shomik Mukherjee that advice had been taken in relation to the contractual right to remove Mr Anindo Mukherji, or that such removal was lawful under UAE law. At the very least it would not have been unreasonable to refuse to agree to his immediate and indefinite suspension without such advice.

Conclusion

150. Mr Malhotra was in breach of his Service Contract and it was validly terminated on 10 February 2017. I will hear the parties on the appropriate form of relief on the claim. The counterclaim fails and is dismissed.