QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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KONKOLA COPPER MINES PLC |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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U&M MINING ZAMBIA LTD |
Defendant |
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Mr DERRICK DALE QC and Mr RAVI ASWANI (instructed by Clyde & Co) on behalf of the Defendant
Hearing Dates: 20 June 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Eder:
Introduction
Background
First Award
Second Award
"The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, on the application of any party:
…..
(c) to order on a provisional basis, subject to final determination in an award, any relief which the Arbitral Tribunal would have power to grant in an award, including a provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of property between the parties…"
Thereafter, Mr Dale reverted to this topic at p42 lines 17-21 of the transcript suggesting:
"… a procedure going forward that the determination of that being, turning that interim order into a final order, along the lines of giving [KCM] a certain time period in which to respond and ask to respond and for then that to be determined by the tribunal …"
The transcript then continues as follows:
"The CHAIRMAN: Can -- would it be possible to do this by way of effectively a conditional award? An interim award plus directions for responding by the respondent. If [KCM] does not respond in whatever time we direct, that is converted into a final award.
MR DALE: That –
THE CHAIRMAN: And if they do respond, then –
MR DALE: Then we have a right of reply. That sets a very fair mechanism for both sides to deal with any points that arise ..."
A full transcript of the hearing which took place on 9 December 2013 was immediately sent to KCM on that very day.
"Unless KCM shows cause, supported by evidence within 14 days, why the invoices … should not be immediately payable, KCM is ordered to pay those invoices totalling US$40,205,995.31 forthwith. If KCM does file a submission within the time directed U&M shall reply thereto within 14 days after receipt of KCM's submissions."
The "show cause" formula was also adopted by the tribunal in respect of certain of the other claims advanced by U&M.
Third Award
Challenges to the Second Award
i) U&M's claim for a declaration that it is entitled to be reimbursed for its legal costs incurred in connection with certain legal proceedings in Brazil and Zambia;ii) U&M's claim for payment of certain invoices that were not the subject of any Request for Arbitration nor referred to in any Statement of Claim (nor otherwise pleaded by U&M); and/or
iii) The Order that KCM pay U&M the sum of £15,000 in respect of a deposit towards the LCIA's costs and the Tribunal's fees paid by U&M (on behalf of KCM) to the LCIA.
i) The tribunal failed to comply with s33 of the 1996 Act, in that it did not: (a) give KCM a reasonable opportunity to put its case and deal with that of U&M; (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of this case; or (c) provide a fair means of resolving the matters falling to be determined;ii) The tribunal exceeded its powers; and/or
iii) The tribunal failed to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties.
The present applications
U&M's evidence in support of its applications
"(a) KCM has plainly set its mind against honouring either the First Award or the Second Award.
(b) No challenge in this Court was ever made to the First Award dated 9 November 2013 and the Court would almost certainly not grant an extension of time for such a challenge.
(c) In the circumstances, it is to be expected that KCM will seek to resist enforcement of the Awards made against it. In relation to the First Award, on 11 February 2013 KCM obtained ex parte relief in Zambia extending the period of time within which it could seek to apply for a stay of enforcement of the First Award. In relation to the Second Award, KCM has issued its various Challenges which I have described above.
(d) The evidence (both from a respected news source Bloomberg and from the official records of the Zambian parliament) suggests that KCM is embarking on a course of conduct involving failing to pay debts, seeking to pass those debts on to the Zambian Government, and heading towards "to [sic] a situation where bankruptcy is entailed". This is in the context of KCM being 79.4% indirectly owned by Vedanta, a very wealthy company indeed.
(e) There is cogent, independent and recent evidence therefore that KCM is being deliberately run into the ground and that Vedanta may be preparing to abandon KCM along with KCM's various and substantial debts in the region of US$1.5 billion. Even KCM's own documents reveal KCM's inability to pay its current trade creditors.
(f) KCM failed at the appropriate times to engage with U&M and the Tribunal in relation to the substance of the matters which it is now seeking raise by way of challenge to the Second Award. Even now, it is taking technical points and declining to assist in relation to matters of substance before the Tribunal as I have explained in my First Witness Statement."
KCM's evidence in response
i) KCM is one of the two largest mining and metals companies in Zambia and one of the largest integrated copper producers in Africa. KCM is primarily engaged in the exploration, mining, production and sale of copper and copper by-products, which it exports to markets worldwide, and it operates four open pit and underground copper mines in Zambia. It has an annual capacity of approximately 200,000 metric tonnes of copper concentrates.ii) Over a number of years, KCM has been the single largest private sector employer in Zambia, with around 18,000 permanent employees and contractors. KCM also generates a substantial amount of public revenue (having been identified has the largest mining contributor to the Zambian National Treasury in 2009 and the second largest in both 2010 and 2011 and has made a major contribution to economic development in Zambia. KCM has also made a significant contribution to Zambia's local communities and it currently runs two hospitals, eight clinics and two schools.
iii) The mines in the Zambian Copperbelt were nationalized during the 1970s. However, privatization plans were afoot by the 1990s and during the same decade, the country's major mining entities were privatized. As part of this process, in March 2000, the Anglo American Corporation (previously the major shareholder in KCM) acquired a 51% shareholding in the company. In March 2002, the Anglo American Corporation sold its shareholding in KCM and the company was restructured. KCM's major shareholders became government entities: ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc ("ZCCM") and Zambia Copper Investments Limited ("ZCIL").
iv) In November 2004, Vedanta acquired a 51% shareholding in KCM, which stake was increased to 79.4% in 2008. Vedanta is a diversified resources and mining company that is listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE 250) and has operations in countries including India, Australia, Liberia, South Africa, Namibia, Ireland, Sri Lanka and Zambia. Since Vendata took its initial stake in KCM in November 2004, KCM has invested over $2.8 billion in upgrading equipment, building new facilities and expanding capacity. These investments increased mining reserves and extended the life of the mines by over 25 years.
v) The remaining 20.6% interest in KCM is held by ZCCM, which is listed on the Lusaka and Euronext exchanges and is 87.6% owned by the Zambian Government. Given KCM's contribution to Zambia's economy and mining industry, the number of people employed by KCM and the many more who are directly or indirectly reliant upon it, the Zambian Government takes a keen interest in KCM and its activities. It is represented on KCM's Board by 3 out of 8 Directors (1 being a direct nominee of the Government and the other 2 being representatives of ZCCM).
vi) KCM has experienced difficulties in its relationship with the Zambian Government and certain activist groups in Zambia in recent months. However, the reports show that the points made against KCM by these groups do not reflect the reality of the commercial challenges it faces. Moreover, the documents show that the criticisms levelled at KCM by the Government in the light of KCM's proposed redundancy program have now been resolved.
vii) In this respect, a "Business Improvement Plan" ("BIP") was presented to the Minister of Mines in late February 2014, which includes a commitment of funding to improve production and profitability to the Zambian Government and an assurance that there will be no redundancies. This BIP was accepted by the Minister of Mines (on behalf of the Zambian Government) by a letter dated 3 March 2014, which stated:
"We are happy with the discussions and dialogue that the government has had with your team in a bid to resolve the matters at hand.The Government of the Republic of Zambia, through my Ministry greatly value the investment that the company has and continues to make in the Mining Industry of Zambia.We should continue to dialogue as we have done in an transparent manner and look forward to greater success of KCM Plc. …We assure you that the government of Zambia remains committed to KCM Plc and we look forward to greater success as a result of your Business Improvement Plan of 28 February 2014 …"The approval of the BIP and the Zambian Government confirmation of its support for KCM and its activities received wide publicity.viii) KCM's (audited) financial statement to 31 March 2013 and draft accounts for the financial year ended 31 March 2014 confirm that in the financial years ending 31 March 2103 and 31 March 2014, KCM had total assets in excess of US$2.5 billion. In the same years, KCM had net assets (i.e. after all liabilities have been taken into account) of just over US$1 billion and US$930.40 million, respectively, and revenue of US$1.74 billion and US$1.27 billion, respectively.
ix) In 2013, KCM's total liabilities amounted to US$1.54 billion and are expected to be US$1.60 billion in 2014. Liabilities in these sums are not, however, unusual for a mining company the size of KCM. Similarly, KCM's ratio of assets to liabilities is in line with those expected in both the mining industry and in the industrial goods industry. KCM secured US$700 million of funding from Standard Bank and Standard Chartered Bank, two of the largest banks in Africa, in late 2012. It would be reasonable to assume that those banks carried out extensive due diligence before providing the said facilities and satisfied themselves as to all the relevant facts regarding the company. KCM also has other short term facilities with banks. KCM's profitability and cashflow were strong in the year ending 31 March 2012 (when it made a profit after tax of US$119 million) but it then weakened significantly in the year ending 31 March 2013 (when it made a loss of US$6.3 million after tax). KCM's financial results for the year ending 31 March 2014 are projected to be weaker still.
x) There are four primary factors that have affected KCM's profitability and cashflow in 2013 and 2014 viz (i) the weak international copper price; (ii) increased costs of production; (iii) a continuing dispute with the Zambian tax authority (the ZRA), which continues to withhold some US$95 million of KCM's VAT tax credits that should be refunded in due course; (iv) the cessation of production at the COP F & D mine, which was brought about by KCM increasing its mining rates to the point that it would have been uneconomic for KCM to continue mining there.
xi) However, KCM has recently addressed these problems. In particular, KCM restructured its loans, obtained new bank financing and sought an injection of capital from Vedanta. An improvement in production and a stronger set of financial results are expected in the current financial year ending 31 March 2015. KCM was thus able to abandon its planned redundancy program. Moreover, notwithstanding the difficulties that it has experienced in recent years, there is evidence that KCM has not defaulted on the payment of employee salaries, repayments or interest payment of bank loans, or payments to the Zambian Government or utilities. It is inevitable in the circumstances that certain trade creditors are experiencing delays in payment, since KCM has to prioritise its payments in respect of goods critical to production. However, KCM still enjoys amicable relationships with its other creditors and none has made any application to the local courts for relief.
U&M's further evidence
U&M's case as to KCM's financial position
i) The financial information relating to KCM is opaque. KCM has resisted providing financial information to U&M. It has steadfastly resisted U&M's application for security for costs on the basis of witness evidence from Mr Dawar which states that KCM has "solid finances and a promising future". This is plainly disingenuous and presents a deliberately misleading account as to the state of KCM's financial condition.ii) It is clear that KCM is now at the centre of very heated public controversy as to its business practices, what happens to the vast amounts of money it earns from mining in Zambia, and whether it is wrongfully diverting its assets to Vedanta or other third parties. On the one hand, KCM is a very large mining organisation, and on the other hand it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.
iii) KCM's financial position is such that it has been reported in the press that during this year it has even been unable to pay for its basic utilities. In particular, in January 2014 KCM was in a position where its emergency underground telephone lines were cut off for failure to pay its telephone bills; and in May, KCM has had to seek a court order to avoid its electricity supply being disconnected for failing to pay its electricity bills.
iv) These are simply the most graphic examples. There is an article on the website of the Times of Zambia dated 19 March 2014 headed "KCM defies Govt Order". This states that various contractors and suppliers are owed monies by KCM and have not been paid, some from as far back as 2005. KCM has not been making payments to ZCCM and US$100 million or more is outstanding.
v) The Government of Zambia is plainly very concerned about KCM's conduct. In February 2014, the Vice President of Zambia stated in Parliament that "there were some very strange things happening at KCM", that Vedanta was "removing a lot of money" from Zambia, that it was hiding information from the Government and that it wanted the Government to assume its liabilities of US$1.5 billion. This was described by the Vice President as a very big issue of national importance. Various independent sources corroborate this. Even the Mineworkers Union of Zambia President has expressed his concerns.
vi) The GTAC report gives a clear insight into the extraordinary state of affairs at KCM. The GTAC report sets out very clearly that as at that date:
a) KCM has total liabilities of US$1.567 billion as at 30 September 2013, that its current liabilities exceeded its current assets by US$123 million and that it was unable to meet its current obligations as they fell due and that its losses at the end of November were US$35 million compared to a budgeted profit of US$134 million.b) KCM's loans with Standard Bank were secured on all assets, implying that the company had been "effectively mortgaged".c) KCM defaulted in September 2013 on a key covenant with Standard Bank and the Bank had given a waiver up to 31 March 2014.d) Vedanta had not taken any financial risk on KCM since investing and that it had called in prematurely a loan of US$500 million in September 2011. The lack of foreign direct investment from Vedanta was entirely at odds to the impression sought to be conveyed by Vedanta. The alleged US2.8 billion investment which Vedanta claimed it made into KCM was in fact made up of US$2.07 billion of internally generated cash flows and US$739 million through borrowing from banks, mainly Standard Bank. It was clear that Vedanta had not injected any capital into KCM as it was supposed to have done.e) Copper was being sold by KCM (through Standard Bank) to Fujairah Gold, a subsidiary of Vedanta in Dubai in such a way as to result in an under-pricing of metal sold to a related company in a manner which was not at arms' length.f) KCM had no clear strategic survival business plan despite the "current grave financial crisis".g) It was not possible to ascertain the value of the approximately US$1m payment made by KCM to Vedanta for "Annual Management Fees".h) There was ineffective government oversight of KCM's operations.vii) The GTAC report is entirely at odds with the way in which KCM has sought to present its internal affairs, financial condition and relationship with the Government. By contrast, it is entirely consistent with the report produced by Grant Thornton (without reference to the GTAC report) in support of the Security Applications.
viii) Further, on 13 May 2014 an article in the Lusaka Times with an accompanying video of a speech given by Anil Agarwal (the Chairman of Vedanta Resources Plc and Chairman) at a conference in Bangalore in March 2014 was reported to much public consternation. In the video, Mr Agarwal stated that KCM was "giving him $500 million every year in profit, plus an extra $1 billion". He also revealed that he had bought KCM for US$25 million compared to an asking price of US$400 million. This has created nothing short of a storm in Zambia with Government, the press and interested third parties seeking an explanation and investigation as to what is occurring. However, no explanation has been forthcoming from KCM or Vedanta. It is hard to understand how the extraction of such sums could be legitimately warranted and such payments do not appear in KCM's accounts.
ix) There was immediate fall-out from the speech in the Zambian press. In particular:
a) There is a front page headline and subsequent article in the Post, a Zambian newspaper dated 15 May 2014 and entitled "KCM Owner mocks Zambians and Govt". This article contains further comment on Mr Agarwal's conference speech. The first paragraph gives an indication of the tenor of the article: "Konkola Copper Mines owner Anil Agarwal has mocked the Zambian government over the paltry amount of money he paid to buy the mine, which is now giving him hundreds of millions of dollars in profit per year."b) There is an article on the website of the Lusaka Times dated 20 May 2014 entitled "Government will not nationalise KCM-Mines Minister". This reports a statement from the Mines Minister stating that the "Government will not nationalize Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) in view of recent revelations by Vedanta Resources Chairman Anil Argawal that the mine has been giving him profit exceeding $500 million per year."c) There is an article on the website of the Times of Zambia dated 20 May 2014 entitled "Zambia: KCM Will Pay Back, Says Government". Amongst other things, that article stated "Additionally an audit carried out on the operations of KCM revealed that the company was poorly managed and heavily indebted to the tune of US$1.567 billion and threatened with insolvency."
Grant Thornton's report
i) It is unclear why Vedanta has recently carried out the corporate restructuring which has left KCM separated from all other group subsidiaries.ii) KCM has over the last four financial years reported a decreasing trend for operating profit and net profit. KCM's costs appeared historically to be uncompetitive in comparison to other Zambian mining firms, and it is likely that this remains the case. KCM will not be able to trade its way out of its financial difficulties in the short term.
iii) According to the draft accounts for the year ended March 2014:
a) KCM had current liabilities greater than current assets by almost US$500 million, with the major portion of short term assets not readily convertible into cash: the majority of KCM's current assets are relatively illiquid.b) KCM had a 90% debt to equity ratio, higher than larger more diversified companies in the mining sector such as Anglo American (56%).c) KCM had a negative cashflow before increasing borrowings. Indeed, "KCM appears to be using borrowing facilities to their maximum extent already".d) The majority of KCM's assets are fixed assets which appear to be largely or wholly secured to repay bank borrowings. "On the face of it, according to the latest balance sheet seen, the company has greater assets than it does liabilities. However, the balance sheet also shows that the value of its assets is predominantly tied up in fixed assets, which are in use in mining operations, and are already secured to the banks".e) There are numerous indications in the evidence available showing that KCM has not been able to meet liabilities to date and has delayed payments to various creditors. The evidence contradicts Mr Dawar's statement that KCM has never defaulted on various classes of payment. "Based on the balance sheet…there is a strong basis to believe that KCM is not currently in a position to pay unsecured creditors for their debts as they fall due."f) KCM has repaid a loan to Vedanta and replaced it with a bank loan, and has also made certain dividend payments to Vedanta. Whilst there are some indications of Vedanta supporting KCM with some smaller sums, there is no firm commitment of overall financial support from Vedanta to KCM (indeed overall net funds flow for the last few years appears to have been to rather than from Vedanta).g) "There is a real risk in relation to KCM's ability to pay creditors as they fall due, and there is certainly a reasonable basis to conclude that KCM would not in all likelihood be able to pay U&M's costs or the Second Award".h) In 2013 KCM became involved in a dispute with the Zambia Revenue Authority which was withholding some US$95 million of KCM's VAT tax credits, a dispute which remains unresolved. "The achievability and timing of any recovery appear uncertain."i) There may be some reason for concern in relation to related party trading. If the Zambia Revenue Authority considers that the sales were on less than commercial terms, it might take steps to try to recover any tax that should have been payable in Zambia, quite apart from any such transactions also being seen as putting assets beyond the reach of KCM's creditors.j) There is no evidence in the financial statements to show how KCM is giving Vedanta US$500 million in profit every year plus an extra US$1 billion. If these claims are true then it must be happening by unreported means.k) The Business Improvement Plan prepared by KCM at the Government's request fails to provide credible information to support the projections contained in it. "… the BIP is limited in detail to support its forecasted improvements to production and financial performance. In my opinion, it does not appear to offer a credible improvement plan to improve KCM's financial and operational position to the extent that it would be in a position to pay KCM's costs and the Second Award if ordered to do so". "Overall, KCM's outlook shows no immediate signs of improving." "KCM appears to lack a credible plan to restore its financial health."
The position of Vedanta
i) Vedanta has taken steps to restructure its subsidiaries under Sesa Sterlite Ltd, other than KCM. The restructuring and the exclusion of KCM from it are unexplained and the inference is obvious. (The remaining 20.6% of KCM is owned by ZCCM Investment Holdings Inc, which is a Zambia Government owned entity.)ii) Vedanta lending to KCM was repaid in 2011 and replaced by bank lending through Standard Bank. The apparent agreement by Vedanta to inject funding into KCM appears not to have been followed through.
iii) The juxtaposition of KCM's apparently poor position on paper with Mr Agarwal's statement that KCM is giving Vedanta US$500 million profit every year since 2009 is obviously troubling. The accounts for KCM do not make any provision for any such payment. This may be occurring through "transfer mis-pricing", i.e. by the selling of copper to an associated company at an undervalue allowing the seller to declare less profit (or even a loss) and reduce its tax liability. The associated company, usually based in a tax haven or lower tax jurisdiction, then makes a large profit on resale of the copper. In the case of KCM, it appears that this practice is indeed being done through a subsidiary called Fujairah Gold (owned by Vedanta) based in Dubai. These transactions amount to transactions at an undervalue, putting KCM's assets beyond the reach of creditors. The Mineworkers Union of Zambia president Nkole Chishimba is recorded in the Post Newspapers Zambia website as saying "The business of copper is traceable. It is therefore surprising that wealth from Zambia remains a mystery when the process of copper mining is traceable". Neither KCM nor Vedanta has sought to explain any of this, notwithstanding all the information now in the public domain.
i) The figures do not support KCM's assertions. Not only has there been an increase in short term borrowings, losses before tax have increased and the cash balance has reduced. Such assets as there are are in fact predominantly fixed assets used in mining already secured to the banks. The ratio of assets to liabilities is neither appropriate nor sustainable – it cannot properly be said that KCM is not highly leveraged.ii) The documents clearly show that KCM is not able to meet liabilities as they fall due – utility providers and other creditors have not been paid. It is unsustainable for Mr Dawar to suggest that KCM has been "operating normally for several years" or that there has been no default on payments of salaries, repayments or interest payments of bank loans or payments to the Government or for utilities. As described above, there have been issues with KCM's telephone lines and electricity due to failure to pay bills.
iii) There is no merit in any suggestion that ore volumes have fallen with the cessation of mining at the COP F&D. This had nothing to do with rates (the Tribunal found as a fact that U&M continued to use existing rates), COP F&D was always a small part of KCM's production, and even when it was operational production targets were not met.
iv) There is no substance behind Mr Dawar's assertion that things should improve in the current financial year.
v) In light of the recent investigations and discoveries, there plainly is considerably urgency in this case.
vi) Mr Dawar makes various comments on the Vedanta accounts and some other documents, but in context and in the light of the documents now available as a whole, these comments are unconvincing.
vii) Ultimately, Mr Dawar's concluding comments contain assertion but are not backed by substance. The evidence available in fact shows that his assertions are incorrect. KCM plainly does not have "solid finances and a promising future". On the contrary, it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in the circumstances the Court can quite properly reach the view on credible evidence that KCM is engaged in a sustained course of deliberately not paying its debts.
Security for costs: s70(6) of the 1996 Act
i) There is no formal fetter on the Court's discretion, and in particular bearing in mind s1(a) of the 1996 Act, it would be a rare case where security for costs would be ordered if the applicant for relief (i.e. respondent to the security application) had sufficient assets to meet any order for costs and if those assets were available for satisfaction of any such costs order.ii) A s.67 challenge involves a consideration of jurisdiction afresh, though it does not follow that the existence of the award is not relevant. It does have relevance, especially if there is no cogent reason put forward for saying it is wrong. However, in any case this is not nearly as important as the question of whether there are sufficient assets which are available for execution (the award might tip the scale if the court could not be certain on assets).
Security for the amount of the Second Award: s70(7) of the 1996 Act
"The court may order that any money payable under the award shall be brought into court or otherwise secured pending the determination of the application or appeal, and may direct that the application or appeal be dismissed if the order is not complied with."
"[32]… in most cases, there will be a threshold requirement that the party making the section 70(7) application demonstrates that the challenge to the jurisdiction is flimsy or otherwise lacks substance …
[50] Thus, whilst it would not be advisable or appropriate to lay down hard and fast rules as to the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to order security under section 70(7), it seems to me that as a general principle the court should not order security unless the applicant can demonstrate that the challenge to the award (whether under section 67 or, indeed, either of the other sections) will prejudice its ability to enforce the award. Often this will entail the applicant demonstrating some risk of dissipation of assets, although there may be other ways in which enforcement could be prejudiced."
"31. Mr Gruder further submitted that the court should not use the jurisdiction conferred by section 70 to improve the ability of a party to enforce an award as opposed to taking steps designed to put it out of the power of the other party to diminish its own ability to honour the award; see Peterson Farms v C&M Farming Limited [2003] EWHC 2298 (QB) per Tomlinson J. (as he then was) at paragraph 19 …
32. I accept that the jurisdiction conferred on the court by section 70 should not be used [as] a means of assisting a party to enforce an award which has been made in its favour. Ordering payment in by X would certainly assist Y to enforce the fourth award. Such an order can only be justified (following the guidance in the authorities to which I have referred) if the existence of the sections 67 and 68 challenges to the award in some way prejudices the ability of Y to enforce the award or diminishes X's ability to honour the award…
34. The conduct of X in refusing to honour the arbitration awards does not attract sympathy. However, that is not a legitimate reason for ordering that it pay the amount of the fourth award into court…
35. I have therefore come to the conclusion that an order for payment in of the sum adjudged due to Y under the fourth award would be wrong in principle because the challenges to the award do not materially prejudice Y's ability to enforce the award. By contrast the making of an order for payment in would assist Y to enforce the award. Whilst that may be said to be desirable it is not, on the authorities, a good reason for making an order for payment in pursuant to section 70 of the Arbitration Act 1996." (Emphasis supplied)
"… With respect to the learned judge, it is difficult to see how, by merely making a challenge, a party could ever be said to be diminishing its ability to honour an award (nor why that should be the relevant test). As Teare J noted, the challenges would (as any challenge would) involve delay (if dismissed), but would involve no other prejudice. Teare J accepted that X's whole attitude to the arbitration (which, on the facts, smacked of constant attempts to squirm out of its obligations and a failure to honour any of the earlier arbitral awards, which were unchallenged) did not 'attract any sympathy', but yet refrained from making the one order that would have either forced X to pay up or end its challenge, which the court had accepted was flimsy …
We also agree that the bar should not be set too low or too high, so that perhaps the best test is the 'flimsiness' test first propounded by Tomlinson J (as he then was). However, we consider that, if the flimsiness test is met, there should be a presumption that security is ordered, unless the court considers that there is a good reason not to order it. It is for this reason the court should presume that, if the challenge is quite obviously flimsy, it is reasonable to infer that the challenger has an ulterior motive, which is bound to include seeking to avoid meeting the award, even if not openly (or secretly) dissipating assets. Although we are wary of stepping across into the field occupied by the CPR, there is a useful analogy with the power under CPR Part 24 to make a defendant with a dodgy defence pay the amount claimed into court (as discussed above in the context of Tajik Aluminium).
We therefore suggest that too much store has been placed by a fear of being seen to enforce awards by the back door, and to whether the very fact of bringing the challenge is in and of itself likely to impact upon the winner's ability to enforce the award. If this test is not abandoned altogether, it should be relegated to very much a second filter after the first filter of the flimsiness test. As to the back-door enforcement argument, we would suggest (as the cases appear to demonstrate) that, in the majority of cases, the loser avoids paying in security, as it realises the weakness of its case and the risk of losing its money. What that does is admittedly not to get the winner its money, but it saves the winner wasting more time fighting a battle it is bound to win …
In many cases, the victor in the arbitration simply does not have sufficient evidence to know that the loser is using its right to mount an unmeritorious challenge as a cover for alienating assets, yet that is often what happens. If an applicant is serious about its challenge to an award and confident in its success, it ought not to baulk at being asked to 'put up or shut up'. There are far too many examples of unscrupulous losers getting away without honouring awards, making (in some cases) the entire process a waste of time and money, and giving arbitration a bad name in the process. We suggest that the court's role, if it is to be truly supportive of the arbitral process, is to do what it can to stymie the sort of obstructive behaviour that is becoming all too frequent, by making orders that either stop the unscrupulous in their tracks (because flimsy challenges are abandoned), or at least give the victor a better chance of demonstrating that the arbitration was not a futile exercise."
Conclusion