QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD DATED 3 FEBRUARY 2012
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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MRI Trading AG |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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Erdenet Mining Corporation LLC |
Respondent |
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(instructed by Watson, Farley & Williams ) for the Claimants
Stephen Moriarty QC and Clare Ambrose
(instructed by Clyde & Co.) for the Respondents
Hearing date: 29 June 2012
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Eder :
Introduction
The Original Contract
The Settlement Agreement
"Deliveries of Erdenet Copper Concentrates and Molybdenum Concentrates – EMC shall sell MRI Trading 40,000 WMT of EMC Copper Concentrates in each of 2009 and 2010 and 200 WMT of EMC Molybdenum Concentrates in 2009, all pursuant to new, separate contracts between EMC and MRI Trading in the forms agreed at Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of this Settlement Agreement."
The 2010 Contract
"WHEREAS [MRI] agrees to buy and [EMC] agrees to sell a copper flotation concentrate production of Erdenet Mining Corporation ("Concentrate") on the terms and conditions hereinafter contained:
2. Duration – This Contract shall enter into force from the date of the last signature and shall remain in force until completion of the Parties' obligations herein.
3. Quantity - The quantity of Concentrate to be delivered shall be 40,000 WMT plus or minus 10% at [EMC's] option.
6. Dispatch
6.1 Shipping schedule shall be agreed during the negotiations of terms for 2010.
9. Deductions
9.1 Treatment Charge shall be agreed between [MRI] and [EMC] during the negotiation of terms for 2010.
9.2 Refining charge shall be agreed between [MRI] and [EMC] during the negotiation of terms for 2010.
25. Prior Agreements - This Contract shall constitute the entire agreement between the Parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, whether oral or written, in relation to the subject matter hereof. Except the terms of the Settlement Agreement between Parties dated 30 January 2009."
a. For copper, pursuant to clause 8, there would be a 1.1 unit deduction from the agreed copper content and MRI would pay for the balance at the daily LME US$ Copper Grade A Settlement quotation taken from the London Metal Bulletin, averaged over the quotational period. In addition, pursuant to clause 9, a treatment charge and a refining charge would be deducted.
b. For silver, if the silver content was over 30 grams per DMT, MRI would pay for 90% of the silver content at the daily LME US$ London Spot quotation for Silver taken from the London Metal Bulletin, averaged over the quotational period. In addition, pursuant to clause 9, a specified silver refining charge would be deducted. A further specified deduction would also be made if the arsenic level in the concentrates exceeded a certain level.
The dispute
a. Was there an enforceable obligation on EMC to deliver the copper concentrates ?
b. What is the reasonable price at which the copper concentrates should have been sold?
c. When should the copper concentrates have been delivered?
In the event, the tribunal concluded that the delivery obligation was "non-existent" and that MRI's claim failed. Although all three issues were fully argued at the hearing, having answered the first question in the negative, the tribunal did not consider it necessary to answer the second and third questions and did not do so.
The tribunal's reasons and conclusions
"15. The tribunal has considered whether or not clause 6.1 and 9.1 and 9.2 (shipping schedule and TC/RC) are a matter of detail, or a significant part of the pricing of the goods. While clearly aware that the largest part of the price was purely dependant upon the underlying LME copper price, the Tribunal is also aware, as was confirmed by the experts, that the negotiation of the TC/RC plays a significant role in the conclusion of concentrates contracts. Although the monetary value is considerably smaller than that of the underlying, it is still an amount of around $200,000 - $300,000. The tribunal concludes that the TC/RC is an integral part of the contract negotiation, and is not to be dismissed as a matter of detail. Likewise, the shipping schedule is not a matter of detail, as it needs to conform to the ultimate requirements of the final end-user. It is worth noting the following (Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts) "The effect of uncertainty may be that no contract comes into existence; or it may be that one provision in an otherwise binding contract is unenforceable. Which of these two possibilities is likelier depends on the importance of the term which is uncertain. The more important the term, the more likely it is that the contract as a while is unenforceable.""
"17. Clauses 6.1 and 9.1 and 9.2 constitute an agreement to agree. In Foley vs Classique Coaches, the court found that it could imply a term into the contract; however, in this case there had already been some lengthy period when the contract had been performed. In the case before the tribunal, as noted above, the contract in question is to be construed in the light of its own wording, and it is clear that there had been no part performance. Relevantly, in May and Butcher Ltd vs the King (1943), Viscount Dunedin observed "The simple answer in this case is that the Sale if Goods Act provides for silence on the point and here there is no silence, because there is a provision that the two parties are to agree."
"18. In the light of the above, the tribunal finds that the answer to the question "Was there an enforceable obligation on Erdenet to deliver the copper concentrates?" is no. The contract had left material terms as 'agreements to agree', and the tribunal has no option but to conclude that the delivery obligation was therefore non-existent."
The questions of law
a. Question 1: As a matter of law, should construction/implication in relation to the 2010 Contract be based solely on the wording of that contract without taking any account of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to which it was entered into and the other contracts which were entered into alongside the 2010 Contract?
b. Question 2: In the light of the answer to question 1, was EMC's obligation to deliver under the 2010 Contract unenforceable because it left the TC/RC and shipping schedule to be agreed subsequently or was the 2010 Contract to be performed on the basis of a reasonable TC/RC and reasonable shipping schedule if no express agreement was reached as to those aspects?
The proper approach
a. First, as a matter of general approach, the courts strive to uphold awards. This means that, when looking at an award, it has to be read in a reasonable and commercial way, rather than with a view to picking holes, or finding inconsistencies or faults, in a tribunal's reasoning: see, for example, General Feeds Imc. Panama v. Slobodna Plovidba Yugoslavia [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 688, at 695; Kershaw Mechanical Services Ltd. v. Kendrick Construction Ltd. [2006] 4 All ER 79, at [57]. This is particularly so when the tribunal comprises market men, since one is not entitled to expect from trade arbitrators the accuracy of wording, or cogency of expression, which is required of a judge: General Feeds Imc. Panama v. Slobodna Plovidba Yugoslavia [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 688, at 695.
b. Secondly, where a tribunal's experience assists it in determining a question of law, such as the interpretation of contractual documents, the court will accord some deference to the tribunal's decision on that question. It will reverse the decision only if satisfied that, despite the benefit of that experience, the tribunal has still come to the wrong answer: Kershaw Mechanical Services Ltd. v. Kendrick Construction Ltd. [2006] 4 All ER 79, at [57].
c. Thirdly, it is for the tribunal to make the findings of fact in relation to any dispute and any question of law arising from an Award must be decided on the basis of a full and unqualified acceptance of the findings of fact of the arbitrators: see The "Baleares" [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 215 at 228 which makes clear this is so regardless of whether the court thinks a finding of fact was right or wrong.
d. Fourthly, when a tribunal has reached a conclusion of mixed fact and law, the court cannot interfere with that conclusion just because it would not have reached the same conclusion itself. It can interfere only when convinced that no reasonable person, applying the correct legal test, could have reached the conclusion which the tribunal did: or, to put it another way, it has to be shown that the tribunal's conclusion was necessarily inconsistent with the application of the right test: The "Sylvia" [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep 81 at [54]-[55]. The same extremely circumscribed power of intervention applies when it is complained that a tribunal has incorrectly applied the law to the facts. It is only if the correct application of the law leads inevitably to one answer, and the tribunal has given another, that the court can interfere. Once a court has concluded that a tribunal which correctly understood the law could have arrived at the same answer as the one reached by the arbitrator, the fact that the individual judge himself would have come to a different conclusion is no ground for disturbing the Award: The Chrysalis [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep 503 at 507.
Question 1: As a matter of law, should construction/implication in relation to the 2010 Contract be based solely on the wording of that contract without taking any account of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to which it was entered into and the other contracts which were entered into alongside the 2010 Contract ?
Question 2: In the light of the answer to question 1, was EMC's obligation to deliver under the 2010 Contract unenforceable because it left the Treatment and Refining Charges for copper ("TC/RC") and shipping schedule to be agreed subsequently or was the 2010 Contract to be performed on the basis of a reasonable TC/RC and reasonable shipping schedule if no express agreement was reached as to those aspects?
"69. In my judgment the following principles relevant to the present case can be deduced from these authorities, but this is intended to be in no way an exhaustive list:i) Each case must be decided on its own facts and on the construction of its own agreement. Subject to that,
ii) Where no contract exists, the use of an expression such as "to be agreed" in relation to an essential term is likely to prevent any contract coming into existence, on the ground of uncertainty. This may be summed up by the principle that "you cannot agree to agree".
iii) Similarly, where no contract exists, the absence of agreement on essential terms of the agreement may prevent any contract coming into existence, again on the ground of uncertainty.
iv) However, particularly in commercial dealings between parties who are familiar with the trade in question, and particularly where the parties have acted in the belief that they had a binding contract, the courts are willing to imply terms, where that is possible, to enable the contract to be carried out.
v) Where a contract has once come into existence, even the expression "to be agreed" in relation to future executory obligations is not necessarily fatal to its continued existence.
vi) Particularly in the case of contracts for future performance over a period, where the parties may desire or need to leave matters to be adjusted in the working out of their contract, the courts will assist the parties to do so, so as to preserve rather than destroy bargains, on the basis that what can be made certain is itself certain. Certum est quod certum reddi potest.
vii) This is particularly the case where one party has either already had the advantage of some performance which reflects the parties' agreement on a long term relationship, or has had to make an investment premised on that agreement.
viii) For these purposes, an express stipulation for a reasonable or fair measure or price will be a sufficient criterion for the courts to act on. But even in the absence of express language, the courts are prepared to imply an obligation in terms of what is reasonable.
ix) Such implications are reflected but not exhausted by the statutory provision for the implication of a reasonable price now to be found in section 8(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (and, in the case of services, in section 15(1) of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 ).
x) The presence of an arbitration clause may assist the courts to hold a contract to be sufficiently certain or to be capable of being rendered so, presumably as indicating a commercial and contractual mechanism, which can be operated with the assistance of experts in the field, by which the parties, in the absence of agreement, may resolve their dispute."
As to the latter ie BJ Aviation, the relevant principles were stated by Chadwick LJ as follows:
"19. It is unnecessary, and would be superfluous, to review those authorities again in this judgment. It is I think sufficient to identify five propositions which, as it seems to me, are not capable of dispute.
20. First, each case must be decided on its own facts and on the construction of the words used in the particular agreement. Decisions on other words, in other agreements, construed against the background of other facts, are not determinative and may not be of any real assistance.
21. Second, if on the true construction of the words which they have used in the circumstances in which they have used them, the parties must be taken to have intended to leave some essential matter, such as price or rent, to be agreed between them in the future—on the basis that either will remain free to agree or disagree about that matter—there is no bargain which the courts can enforce.
22. Third, in such a case, there is no obligation on the parties to negotiate in good faith about the matter which remains to be agreed between them—see Walford v. Miles [1992] A.C. 128 , at page 138G.
23. Fourth, where the court is satisfied that the parties intended that their bargain should be enforceable, it will strive to give effect to that intention by construing the words which they have used in a way which does not leave the matter to be agreed in the future incapable of being determined in the absence of future agreement. In order to achieve that result the court may feel able to imply a term in the original bargain that the price or rent, or other matter to be agreed, shall be a "fair" price, or a "market" price, or a "reasonable" price; or by quantifying whatever matter it is that has to be agreed by some equivalent epithet. In a contract for sale of goods such a term may be implied by section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 . But the court cannot imply a term which is inconsistent with what the parties have actually agreed. So if, on the true construction of the words which they have used, the court is driven to the conclusion that they must be taken to have intended that the matter should be left to their future agreement on the basis that either is to remain free to agree or disagree about that matter as his own perceived interest dictates there is no place for an implied term that, in the absence of agreement, the matter shall be determined by some objective criteria of fairness or reasonableness.
24. Fifth, if the court concludes that the true intention of the parties was that the matter to be agreed in the future is capable of being determined, in the absence of future agreement, by some objective criteria of fairness or reasonableness, then the bargain does not fail because the parties have provided no machinery for such determination, or because the machinery which they have provided breaks down. In those circumstances the court will provide its own machinery for determining what needs to be determined—where appropriate by ordering an inquiry (see Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v. Eggleton [1983] A.C. 444)."
a. It is not enough for MRI just to reprise its legal arguments with a view to the court then deciding for itself whether it considers that the 2010 Contract gave rise to an enforceable obligation to deliver. Having identified the correct legal principles, the tribunal has already determined that it did not. For the court to intervene under s. 69 the 1996 Act, on the basis that the tribunal did not correctly apply those principles, the Court has to be satisfied that no reasonable tribunal correctly applying the relevant legal principles could have reached such a conclusion. The tribunal's conclusion has to be necessarily inconsistent with the application of the right test. That is a high hurdle, and one which MRI does not begin to surmount for two main reasons. First, MRI ignores the strict constraints which exist for implying terms into a contract, because it is not for the courts or a tribunal to make the parties' bargain for them. Any question of implying a term into a contract only arises when a contract does not provide for what is to happen on some event, and the default position is that nothing is to be implied: see, e.g., the summary of the relevant principles stated by Lord Hoffman in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988 in Crema v. Cenkos Securities plc [2011] 1 WLR 2066, at [38] and, also, The "Reborn" [2009] 2 Lloyds Rep 639, at [8] – [18]. As can be seen from paragraph 14 of the Award, the principles for implying a term were plainly in the minds of the tribunal in reaching its conclusion. Second, it is impermissible to imply a term into a contract if it is inconsistent with what the parties agreed. Once again, as can be seen from paragraph 16 of the Award, this was also very much a principle which the tribunal had in mind.
b. It is wrong to approach the principles in Mamidoil and BJ Aviation as a set of strict rules to be applied mechanistically to the facts. This is not right. Applying the principles involves a judgmental balance between (on the one hand) trying to give effect to a contract if it was the parties' intention to create enforceable obligations, and (on the other) respecting the parties' intention to leave some important matter for future negotiation and agreement between themselves, even if that renders the contract incomplete and so unenforceable. In this case, the tribunal reached the conclusion – on the basis of its own market experience, as well as the expert evidence – that agreeing a TC and RC plays a significant role in the conclusion of concentrates contracts and is an integral part of the contract negotiation. Given that finding (which is not open to challenge) the tribunal was more than entitled to conclude that, on the facts of this particular case, the parties had contracted on the basis of the TC and RC (as well as the delivery schedule) being negotiated and agreed; and that it was impermissible to imply a term providing for a reasonable TC, RC and delivery schedule, because this would be inconsistent with that agreement.
c. It is not accepted that this is a case which is taken outside principles (ii) and (iii) merely because there were some respects in which the 2010 contract was binding (such as in the case of the arbitration clause). This is nothing like the kind of case where (as in Mamidoil itself) an agreement has already been fully in force, and performed, over a period of time already. Principle (ii) therefore is entirely applicable, so that "the use of an expression such as "to be agreed" in relation to an essential term is likely to prevent any contract coming into existence, on the grounds of uncertainty. This may be summed up by the principle that "you cannot agree to agree".
d. The mere fact that parties may objectively believe that a contract is binding is one factor in favour of implying a term to make it so, but it will not, in itself, justify the implication, especially where the parties have expressly shown an intention to leave some important term to be negotiated and agreed in the future (where the implication of a term would be inconsistent with what they have agreed). In any event, there is no specific finding of fact as to the parties' intentions or objective belief to support MRI's contention.
e. Nor is the fact that a contract is for future performance a reason, in itself, for implying a term of reasonableness; a fortiori if such a term would conflict with what the parties have agreed. It is certainly right that, particularly in the case of long-term contracts where the parties have had to leave something like price to be determined in the future, a court may incline, if it can, to find sufficient certainty by implying a "reasonableness" term. However, as is clear from the passage from Sudbrook quoted by Rix LJ in Mamidoil, at the end of the day "[t]he true distinction is between those cases where the mode of ascertaining the price is an essential term of the contract, and those cases where the mode of ascertainment, though indicated in the contract, is subsidiary and non-essential." If the parties are to be regarded as having intended the matter left over to be resolved by negotiation and agreement, there is no room for an implied term which conflicts with that intention.
f. As regards the suggestion that the case falls within principle (vii) because EMC has already had the advantage of some performance under the 2010 contract, this at best would be only one factor, amongst the others, to go into the mix. However, it is not accepted to be relevant here at all. There had been no performance of the 2010 Contract by either party; and one cannot artificially conjure it up merely because signing the contract (along with the 2 other 2009 contracts) was part of the consideration for MRI and EMC settling its earlier dispute. The Settlement Agreement expressly provided for the parties to sign 3 separate agreements, 2 of which plainly were binding (and have been performed). Moreover, the Court has no way whatsoever of knowing to what extent it was critical to the settlement of the earlier dispute that the 2010 contract should itself also give rise to a binding legal obligation (as opposed to a commercial expectation) that delivery would be made notwithstanding the need for further negotiation and agreement. Either way, however, the settlement of the earlier dispute was plainly not part performance of the 2010 contract itself. It is not right either to say that the tribunal regarded partial performance as a necessary condition for the 2010 contract to be enforceable. It just rejected the argument that there was part performance.
g. As regards principles (viii) and (ix), it is certainly right that a court may, in an appropriate case, imply a "reasonableness" term even in the absence of criteria laying down what the standard is; and it is also right that the power to do so not confined to the specific circumstances contemplated by Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 8(2), or Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s. 15(1). However, once again the fundamental point remains that the default position is that nothing is to be implied into a contract, and the question of implication can only arise when the contract does not itself provide for what is to happen. If the parties have contracted on the basis that certain important matters are subject to further negotiation and agreement, the implication of a term without that agreement flies in the face of what the contract provides.
h. Nor, finally, is it accepted that an arbitration clause is the magic bullet which makes all the difference, and Mamidoil does not say that it is. Unless the arbitration clause is specifically directed at mandating a third party to determine the matter which cannot be agreed, it is not a compelling consideration, and it certainly cannot override the parties' express agreement that the matter is one for them to negotiate and agree.
i. As to the principles summarised by Chadwick LJ in BJ Aviation Ltd., the position is just the same. Indeed, they support the tribunal's conclusion even more strongly. Contrary to the argument advanced by MRI, the absolutely critical distinction drawn by Chadwick LJ is between: (i) the situation where "the parties must be taken to have intended to leave some essential matter, such as price or rent, to be agreed in the future – on the basis that either will remain free to agree or disagree about the matter ..." In this situation there is no obligation which a court can enforce and that is so even if the parties thought it was binding; and (ii) The situation where the parties intend their bargain to be enforceable, and there is nothing in the way of implying a "reasonableness" term because the parties have not left over some essential term to agree themselves. In this situation, a court will strive to give effect to that intention by construction or implication. However – and this is critical – the latter proposition is subject to being satisfied that the true intention of the parties was not that the relevant matter should be left over for further negotiation and agreement between the parties themselves. As Chadwick LJ expressly went on, by way of qualification to his 4th principle:
"But the court cannot imply a term which is inconsistent with what the parties have actually agreed. So, if on the true construction of the words which they have used, the court is driven to the conclusion that they must be taken to have intended that the matter should be left to their future agreement on the basis that either is to remain free to agree or disagree about the matter as his own perceived interest dictates there is no place for an implied term that, in the absence of agreement, the matter should be determined by some objective criteria of fairness or reasonableness."
j. In this case, the tribunal expressly referred to what Chadwick LJ said in the BJ Aviation case, and it quoted in full the passages referred to above. It is to be inferred, therefore, that these passages were considered to be particularly germane to its reasoning. As already noted on a number of occasions, the tribunal also brought to bear its own market experience on the role played by TCs and RCs in the conclusion of concentrates contracts, as well as hearing expert evidence on the matter – and it was in the light of this that the tribunal concluded that the negotiation of a TC and RC plays a significant role in the conclusion of concentrates, and indeed is an integral part of the contract negotiation. The shipping schedule was also regarded as being more than a matter of mere detail.
k. Against that background, it is clear that the tribunal's findings as to the general importance of agreeing a TC and RC as part of the contract negotiation are decisive, because to imply a term into the contract would be inconsistent with the parties remaining free to agree or disagree, as part of the negotiation of terms for 2010. Likewise, too, in relation to delivery. As the tribunal succinctly summed the matter up at the end of its Award "[t]he contract had left material terms as "agreements to agree". That makes perfect sense and, even if expressed briefly, a tribunal is entitled to have its Award read in a reasonable and commercial way, rather than crawled over for faults.
a. This was clearly a situation in which a binding agreement had been intended to be entered into, given the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the other terms of the 2010 Agreement. From an objective standpoint, it can hardly be supposed that the quid pro quo for the settlement of MRI's claim under the Original Contract, in so far as it consisted of the 2010 Contract, was, in effect, illusory because EMC was under no enforceable obligation to make any delivery to MRI; there is every reason why, objectively speaking, the entirety of the settlement package, including the 2010 Contract and all of the delivery and payment obligations described therein, should have been intended to be legally binding.
b. Therefore, principles (ii) and (iii) (as summarised at para. 69 of Mamidoil) do not apply and instead principle (iv) applies i.e. since this was a commercial dealing between parties who were familiar with the trade and who had acted in the manner (as objectively demonstrated by clause 2 of the 2010 Contract) that they had a binding contract, the contract should be construed, where possible, to enable the contract to be carried out.
c. While the parties had used the term "to be agreed", in accordance with principle (vi), since the 2010 Contract (which was signed in early 2009) involved performance in the future with the result that it made sense to leave the TC/RC and shipping schedule to be determined subsequently, the tribunal should have approached the construction of the 2010 Contract so as to preserve rather than destroy the parties' bargain. At the risk of repetition, this was particularly the case (in accordance with principle (vii)) where EMC had already received the benefit of some advantage from entry into the Settlement Agreement and 2010 Contract (which constituted the relevant agreements in relation to the 2010 deliveries).
d. As stated in principle (ix), such a construction or implication is reflected but not exhausted by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and so the observation of Viscount Dunedin from May and Butcher in relation to the Sale of Goods Act (as quoted in paragraph 17 of the Award) does not exclude a term being implied. On the contrary, the normal basis for the implication of terms where a term is "to be agreed" is outside the Sale of Goods Act for just this reason.
e. Pursuant to principle (x), the presence of an arbitration clause should have supported the conclusion that the agreement was sufficiently certain or capable of being rendered so, since it provided a commercial and contractual mechanism, which could be operated with the assistance of experts in the field, by which the parties, in the absence of agreement, could resolve a dispute about a reasonable TC/RC or shipping schedule.
"(6) It is sometimes said that the parties must agree on the essential terms and that it is only matters of detail which can be left over. This may be misleading, since the word "essential" in that context is ambiguous. If by "essential" one means a term without which the contract cannot be enforced then the statement is true: the law cannot enforce an incomplete contract. If by "essential" one means a term which the parties have agreed to be essential for the formation of a binding contract, then the statement is tautologous. If by "essential" one means only a term which the Court regards as important as opposed to a term which the Court regards as less important or a matter of detail, the statement is untrue. It is for the parties to decide whether they wish to be bound and, if so, by what terms, whether important or unimportant. It is the parties who are, in the memorable phrase coined by the Judge, "the masters of their contractual fate". Of course the more important the term is the less likely it is that the parties will have left it for future decision. But there is no legal obstacle which stands in the way of the parties agreeing to be bound now while deferring important matters to be agreed later. It happens every day when parties enter into so-called "heads of agreement". Mr. Rokison submits that that is a special case, but I do not think it is."
"22………..Section 69(7) of the Act forms part of the statutory code providing for appeals on questions of law and as such it sets out the remedies available to the court following the hearing of an appeal. No doubt the court has a measure of discretion when it comes to deciding what order is most appropriate to give effect to its decision. For example, following a successful appeal the court might decide to vary the award itself or remit it to the tribunal for reconsideration. However, s 69(7) must be read in the context of s 69 as a whole. The intention of the legislation is that the powers of the court under this subsection should be exercised in a manner that will best give effect to its conclusions on the issues of law that arise on the appeal, including any issues of law raised by the defendant under para 6.12.(3) of the practice direction seeking to uphold the award. It does not, in my view, give the court a wider discretion or allow it to take into account matters outside the scope of the appeal itself……"
Further, it seems to me that the question whether or not it is "inappropriate" to remit should generally be considered by reference to what is stated in the Award itself including the reasons contained therein and not by reference to matters which are entirely speculative. Such an approach is, in my view, supported by the observations of Hobhouse J in The Tzelepi [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 265 at pp269-270:
"It is said on behalf of the owners that there ought to be a remission to the arbitrator. I have done my best to probe the basis upon which such remission might be granted and what the arbitrator would have to consider if the matter was remitted to him as asked. There is no doubt that I do have a power to remit to the arbitrator and I must therefore consider whether I should exercise my discretion in that regard. But there is no basis for remitting a matter to the arbitrator unless there is something further for the arbitrator to consider and upon which he should exercise his own judgment afresh. The owners have failed to make out any basis of additional material or material upon which the arbitrator ought to reconsider the matter. This arbitration was held, as I have said, long after the material events. The parties, in an admittedly somewhat informal and protracted arbitration hearing placed before him the contentions and the evidence which they wished to rely upon. None of that evidence nor any of those contentions raised a case on behalf of owners that charterers had only paid the premium at a time after the mistake had been discovered. It is a fairly improbable hypothesis on the dates that are given in the award but it appears that no argument to that effect was advanced at the arbitration and that no evidence was placed before the arbitrator which might justify that conclusion of fact. On that basis, unless one is to order a remission purely as a speculation so that one party might seek an opportunity to collect fresh evidence and advance new contentions before the arbitrator, then a remission should not be ordered, and to order a remission on that basis would be improper and it is not something that I am prepared to do."