QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
sitting with
Captain Ian Gibb and Captain John Burton-Hall
Elder Brethren of Trinity House
as Nautical Assessors
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THE OWNERS AND/OR DEMISE CHARTERERS OF THE SHIP "KAMAL XXVI" AND BARGE "KAMAL XXIV" |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP "ARIELA" |
Defendants |
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Timothy Hill (instructed by Russell, Ridley & Co) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 3rd & 4th July 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr. Justice David Steel:
Introduction
"Shifting of anchors would require at least 30 minutes notice and pilots are requested to advise the dredger well in advance so that movements can be co-ordinated without delay."
Evidence of ARIELA
"2012 While vessel was manoeuvring at Mormugao channel towards berth No.9…passing between buoys 9 and 10, the barge tied up to dredger KAMAL 26 brushed the port side of ownship. The dredger was stationary. Its anchor was on the centre of the channel as marked by 2 white lighted buoys…Own vessel was under the advice of port pilot Capt. P. Singh at the time and was well inside the channel's centre. Pilot notified Goa port control of the dredger's anchor buoys not being in the right position."
i) A photocopy of her working chart recording two positions in mid-channel, the first at 2006 on an extension of a line from the harbour breakwater and the second at 2010 just short of a line joining buoys 10 and 9 and in close proximity to the position pictured for KAMAL XXVI.
ii) An engine bell book noting that the engines of ARIELA were put dead slow ahead at 1942.
iii) A letter of protest dated 30 April 2004 which contained an account similar to that contained in the deck log (and official log).
iv) A sketch of the collision on the original working chart repeating the account that at collision ARIELA was in about mid-channel (and with the anchors of KAMAL XXVI buoy well inside the channel).
i) Two statements of the master of ARIELA the first dated June 2004 and the second dated February 2007.
ii) A statement of the Pilot dated January 2005.
iii) A statement of the helmsman dated June 2004.
iv) A statement of the third officer (OOW) dated June 2004.
v) A statement of the Chief Officer (who had been at forward station) dated June 2004.
The Defendants were unable to call the Pilot to give oral evidence but did call the Master.
Evidence of KAMAL XXVI
"1955 Stopped dredging, shifted the dredger up to boundary of channel, in accord with DGPS coordinates 1704943.3m. North, 371257.6m. East, port side and stern wires slackened, bucket ladder fixed downward (depth 14.9m CD) to avoid drifting of the dredger. Keep alongside portside, dump barge KAMAL XXIV.
(It is common ground that this position if accurate is in the immediate vicinity of Buoy 10.)
2015 MV ARIELA (Singapore) moving with slow speed to berth No. 9. collided with dumb barge KAMAL XXIV….."
i) A statement of facts prepared by the master dated 1 May 2004 and a report to owners by the master (already referred to above) dated 2 May.
ii) Attached to the report two sketches of the master purporting to show the position of KAMAL XXVI in relation to the channel and the position of the dredger's anchors.
i) A statement of the second officer dated November 2006.
ii) A statement from the Contractors Managing Director confirming the datum for operation of the vessel's positioning (DGPS) equipment.
The Claimants called no witnesses of fact to give oral evidence.
Issues
i) At what stage did ARIELA commence altering to starboard to come round into the next leg of the channel and what degree of helm was applied?
ii) Did ARIELA put her helm further to starboard at any stage and, if so, when?
iii) Where were the port anchor buoys of KAMAL XXVI?
iv) Was the barge KAMAL XXIV lit?
v) When was the barge first seen by those on ARIELA?
Initial alternative to starboard
i) The position contemporaneously recorded on the working chart at C-6 is still in mid-channel.
ii) The master in his statement stated that the alteration to starboard began "just before light on the breakwater was abeam to starboard."
"The manoeuvring data of ARIELA suggests that she is quite responsive to her helm even at slow speed. (Indeed at half-speed/7.7 knots, a hard -a-starboard order would achieve a 90° alteration within about 4 minutes with a transfer of 0.22 miles and an advance of less than 0.4 mile. Notably, there is a note to the effect that "at slow speed transfer and advance about the same … but speeds proportionally lesser and times proportionally greater. In our assessment, if the turn had started at C-9, the vessel would already have altered to starboard very substantially, perhaps approaching 90°, and reached a position on the South side of the channel before reaching buoy 9."
"It is clear from the manoeuvring characteristics sheet that the trial for half speed was conducted at 7.7 knots – i.e. half full sea speed. This was not materially different from "slow ahead". It follows that the reference to transfer and advance at slow speed must incorporate the equivalent of something in the range of "dead slow ahead" or 4 knots. In any event it is not our experience that a vessel, in terms of its turning circle, acts "quite differently" at dead slow ahead. There is no reason to treat the minimum steering speed as giving rise to unusual steering effects."
"In our opinion, the influence of a West North Westerly wind (force 4) on a vessel turning from 080° to 140° would have been minimal. Indeed this seems to be supported by the latest plot produced by the Defendants. As regards the influence of tide, a current of 0.2 knots would only result in a transfer of 100 feet from C-5. The effect is so slight as to be discounted. "
Hard-a-starboard
i) The pilot refers in his statement to an increase in the rudder angle to 20° "as we started the turn" and "saw that we would approach close to dredger and barge." It was accepted that this was probably a reference to the hard-a-starboard order but it could hardly have been earlier than about C-4.
ii) The Master's statements are not entirely clear but suggest that following the initial starboard order there came a stage when the Chief Officer began reporting the distance of the dredger. The first report was said to have been 200 metres (C-1 ½ ). It was only later that hard-a-starboard was ordered.
iii) As already explained, given the manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel, I would have expected the vessel to have come well to starboard of 120° by the time of collision if the hard-a-starboard order was given as early as suggested by the Claimant.
Looking at the matter in the round, it would seem likely that the hard-a-starboard order was given no earlier than C-2.
C-9 | 15° Starboard rudder |
C-7 ½ | Hard-a-starboard |
C-3 ½ | Amidships |
C- ½ | Hard-a-port |
As already indicated, I am not persuaded that these assumptions (and in particular the hard-a-starboard and amidships orders) reflect the helm orders actually given.
Port anchor buoys
i) The dredger maintained its position by use of the anchors, moving by hauling on/paying out her port, starboard and stern anchors. Moving the anchors was a time consuming business. The Master's sketch shows precisely the configuration that would be expected. Since the position of anchors would be only too conspicuous, it is improbable that she would lay any of them in the channel leading to valid complaint by the pilots and requiring the intervention of the harbour master. Moreover, a substantial length of chain paid out to the port anchors would enable the dredger to move significantly to starboard by merely slackening on those chains to keep out of the way of traffic.
ii) Confidence in the sketch is enhanced by the fact that the stern anchor is shown in the vicinity of MD No. 1 Buoy (in stark contrast with the reconstruction on ARIELA's working chart). The sketch is thus entirely consistent with the request of the harbour master at 1740 recorded in the VHF log for KAMAL XXVI to shift the anchor buoy "which is between MD1 and 2" so as to move it closer to MD1. Furthermore, if at that stage the port anchors also presented a hazard it is inevitable that the Port Trust would have required them to be moved.
iii) Although the earlier pilot complained about the position of the anchors, his complaint was primarily directed at the buoy MD No. 1 off the berths. Indeed, as already noted, the master of KAMAL XXVI seems to have insisted that his anchors were outside the channel and this does not appear to have been challenged.
iv) Although the pilot of ARIELA mentioned the port anchor buoys on his way out, he himself does not mention them on the return journey let alone make any complaint. This accordingly does not support the expressions of the pilot's concern reported by the Master who in any event reported the anchors being in the vicinity of Buoy 9. (Indeed the master's protest refers to anchor buoys off berths 8 and 9 not in the way of Buoy 9 at all.)
Was KAMAL XXIV lit?
i) The barge was alongside the dredger. I have asked the Elder Brethren if it would have been appropriate for the barge to exhibit lights. In their opinion, it would have been inappropriate to exhibit navigation lights and, as regards working lights, it was acceptable for the lights on the dredger to provide illumination. I accept that view.
ii) The only evidence in support of the allegation that the barge was lit is in the Second Officer's statement taken some 2 ½ years after the collision.
iii) In contrast the Chief Officer, the Third Officer, the Master and the Pilot of ARIELA saw no lights.
When was the barge first seen by those on board ARIELA?
The position of KAMAL XXVI
i) Although there is no record of when the reading was taken (or indeed who by) it is clear that it is a genuine reading from the machine (rather a reconstruction which would have to be in coordinates of longitude and latitude).
ii) The appropriate adjustment and conversion is confirmed by the evidence of the Chairman of Jaisu Shipping and the calculation of Messrs. LOC retained by the Claimants.
iii) The Master's report sets out the initial position at 1320 on 30 April as being 50 metres south west of Buoy 10. At 1950 the position is recorded 12 metres from the boundary of the channel. Thereafter the port anchor cables were slackened off.
iv) In any event, it strikes me as wholly improbable that the dredger could be manoeuvred 100 metres across the channel with the layout of the anchors set out above, let alone as depicted by the Defendants. Furthermore such could not in any event be achieved in a few minutes.
v) It would appear that the dredger did not resume dredging until 1735 on 1 May by which time the initial report of the Master had been made containing the DGPS coordinates.
vi) The Master presented a detailed sketch of the dredger's position astride the boundary with the barge outside of it. As he put it in his report:-
"Width of channel at this point is 295 metres out of which 7.5 metres was occupied by KAMAL XXVI and 10 metres by KAMAL XXIV leaving 277.5 metres clearance."
vii) It is very striking that the Deck log of the ARIELA and the Master's protest being the most contemporary documents make no complaint about the position of the dredger (only her port anchors). Indeed the dredger is described as "positioned on the side of the channel".
Master's Evidence
Expert Evidence
i) The LOC model appears to demonstrate that ARIELA can only reach a position in mid channel on heading of 148° if the starboard alteration was made when abeam the breakwater but not if the alteration is left until the vessel is on a projection of a line of the breakwater (let alone the waypoint).
ii) The TMC model appears to demonstrate that, accepting the influence of the wind at the beginning of the turn, to reach a position in mid channel on a heading of about 135° the helm of ARIELA needed to be put hard-a-starboard when abeam the breakwater but also by a significant period of amidships.
Summary
i) KAMAL XXVI was anchored in the vicinity of Buoy No. 10 on a heading of about 260°.
ii) At the time ARIELA approached, she was dredging in a position approximately 12 metres south of the channel edge (depicted in pecked lines on Admiralty Chart 492 between buoys 10 and 8).
iii) Her port anchors were laid outside the channel to the south of the line between buoys 9 and 7.
iv) With the approach of ARIELA, she ceased dredging and slackened her port anchor chain thereby moving Northward so that her centre line was approximately on the channel edge.
v) With KAMAL XXIV moored on her port side, the channel side of the barge extended approximately 20 metres into the channel leaving approximately 280 metres of navigable channel North of buoy 9.
vi) The barge was unlit save by reason of the deck lights of KAMAL XXVI.
vii) ARIELA proceeded up the middle of the channel on a course of 080° towards buoys 9 and 10: her engines were working at dead slow ahead giving her a speed of 4 knots.
viii) When in a position on the line of extension of the breakwater as marked on the working chart, her helm was put 15° to 20° to starboard.
ix) Her helm was put hard-a-starboard when she closed on the dredger and barge to a range of about 200 metres.
x) Having reached a heading of about 130°, the port side of ARIELA struck the portside of the barge.
Fault
i) Although the barge was unlit, she was seen by the pilot at a range of 1 ½ miles when inward bound. In any event, the Elder Brethren advise me (and I accept the advice) that a passing distance of 12 metres from the dredger was obviously dangerous and unseamanlike. In my judgment, the absence of lighting was of no causative significance.
ii) Although the port side of the barge abutted some 20 metres into the channel, it is the Elder Brethren's advice, which I accept, that such was a safe position. Given the width of the channel, any inward bound vessel was not embarrassed.