QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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SOCIETY OF LLOYD'S |
Applicant |
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And |
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JOHN TREVOR HOWARD HENDERSON and OTHERS |
Respondent |
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Mr. Craig Barlow (instructed) by Messrs Grower Freeman
for the UNO Names.
Mrs. Heather Adams, Mr. Alexander Burns, Mr. S M Butler, Mr. R H Carter, Mr. J.P. Johnstone and Mrs. Elizabeth Reisz – in person:
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr. Justice Andrew Smith:
The Henderson applications
Misfeasance in public office
"Reading the recent cases, one has the sense that all the judges that have wrestled with this problem [of defining the tort] have felt that they know what they are trying to describe-and do so seeking analogies from their own areas of the law-but recognise the difficulty of formulating propositions which would encapsulate that principle without including other actions by public officers which may cause just as much damage, be just as susceptible to judicial review, but do not (in the present state of the law) give rise to a claim for damages. What in my view they are trying to describe is the exercise of power by a public official, not for the purpose for which it was given, but for some ulterior or impermissible purpose, knowing or being reckless as to whether it will damage the plaintiff".
i) The defendant is a public officer.ii) Power as a public officer is exercised either by the defendant himself or by someone for whom he is vicariously liable.
iii) Either (i) the defendant, or officer for whom the defendant is vicariously liable, acts out of targeted malice, in the sense of a specific intention to injure a person or persons, or (ii) the "public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff" (loc cit at p.191E/F). The latter alternative (which is an ingredient of what I shall call the "second" form of the tort) involves bad faith in as much as the public officer does not have "an honest belief that his act is lawful" (per Lord Steyn at p.191F) and it suffices if "the public officer acted with a state of mind of reckless indifference to the illegality of his act" (at p.193C/D) and about the consequences of his act (at p.196B/C).
iv) The claimant has a sufficient interest to have legal standing to sue.
v) There is damage caused by the wrongful act.
vi) That damage is not too remote to be recoverable.
The Lloyd's litigation
The proposed amendment
i) The structure of Lloyd's and the role of the Council and the Committee are described (paras 16-26).ii) The effect of the Lloyd's Acts 1871-1982 is set out under the headings "Statutory Provisions Governing Lloyd's" (paras 27-32) and "Self-Regulation by Lloyd's" (paras 48-57).
iii) The "Reinsurance to Close" procedure adopted by Lloyd's syndicates is set out (paras 33-39 and 75-86).
iv) There is a description of R&R and the Equitas companies through whom the plan was implemented (paras 40-44).
v) "Obligations imposed on Lloyd's by EC Law" (through Directives and domestic legislation to implement them) are pleaded (paras 45-47).
vi) A long description is given of how knowledge about the perils of insuring asbestos risks built up during the 1970's and 1980's (paras 67-74 and 89-202).
i) The first passage (paras 239-254) complains of failure to implement the requirements of European Directives, and in particular Directive 73/239, and is introduced by this allegation: "[Lloyd's] have evinced a reckless disregard for their regulatory obligations as set out in the Lloyd's Acts and the Insurance Company Acts under [European] Directive 73/239, both in so far as its implementation has been delegated to Lloyd's by Her Majesty's Government, if it has been, but in any event as required by the Directive of all undertakings regulated by the Directive". The Names complain both that the delegation to Lloyd's of government obligations was unlawful and that the steps taken by Lloyd's to fulfil the obligations so delegated were unlawful. With regard to the first complaint they say, for example, that because Audit Instructions approved by Lloyd's provided for auditors in some circumstances to report and obtain instructions from the Committee of Lloyd's before issuing a certificate, that the Instructions unlawfully provided for Lloyd's to determine questions of insurers' solvency and that Lloyd's "took advantage of the Government's unlawful delegation" in decisions that it took in light of the Neville Russell letter. As for the second complaint, they say that Lloyd's permitted the accounting system in the market to be "wholly inadequate to enable [Lloyd's] to fulfil their obligations under the Directive", in support of which allegation they rely upon the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Jaffray case; and again relying upon the Neville Russell letter, that Lloyd's, abusing "their powers and responsibilities with a reckless indifference as to the consequences" allowed reserves to be set at too low a level. I observe that, although the reliance upon the Neville Russell letter might suggest that these allegations are directed to how asbestos liabilities were treated at Lloyd's, the pleading does not so limit this part of the case.ii) The second passage (paras 255 – 288) is headed "Long tail liabilities of an APH [asbestos, pollution and health liabilities] Nature". As is apparent from the heading, this passage too is directed not only to asbestos but also to other long tail liabilities. It includes an allegation that Lloyd's failed to ensure that members' agents observed their obligations to Names and prospective Names to make proper disclosure about "significant exposure of particular syndicates to long tail liabilities" (para 266). Lloyd's is alleged to have "evinced a reckless disregard for complying" with its obligations during the period 1979 to 1996, and to have been "recklessly indifferent as to whether the measures that it had implemented complied with the obligations imposed upon them", and have shown a "reckless disregard for whether Lloyd's Names would suffer harm if the measures were unlawful" (para 287).
iii) The third of these sub-sections (paras 289 to 329) is headed "The provision of information relating to, and the regulation of, LMX business and PA [Personal Accident]". It is alleged that as a result of Lloyd's failures, members' agents and managing agents failed to give proper advice or to make proper disclosure to Names or prospective Names, and that "Lloyd's acted in "bad faith" within the meaning of section 14(3) of the 1982 Act in failing to regulate LMX business and in breach of the requirements of Directive 73/239 as amended over the years because Lloyd's could not have … genuinely have (sic) believed that the regulatory steps that it had taken were properly compliant with the Directive and its obligation to regulate the market. Further, in this regard, Lloyd's evinced a reckless disregard for the economic welfare of the Names" (para 323). With regard to PA business, the pleading refers (at paras 326/7) to the judgment of Thomas J in Sphere Drake v EIU and Stirling Cooke Browne, [2003] EWHC 1636 Comm and the underwriting of Workers Accident Compensation business and the "PA spiral" that are the subject of that judgment. It also refers (at para 328) to "the judgments of Phillip J in the Gooda Walker and Feltrim cases and other Court Judgments, Loss Reviews and Disciplinary Investigations as proof of the inadequacy of Lloyd's regulation of agents and maintenance of underwriting standards"; and it refers (at para 329) to the judgment of Saville J in Boobyer v David Holman (1992) to support an allegation that Lloyd's failed to learn lessons from the LMX spiral and therefore failed to prevent the development of other spirals, allowing "the exposure of Names and the market to risk that was never envisaged or understood by Names, but which individual decision-makers at Lloyd's understood and ignored in bad faith and in abuse of their obligations and powers".
iv) Next, a passage (paras 330 to 354) headed "Failure to supervise and regulate the activities of member's agents, brokers and Managing Agents". Here it is said that Lloyd's failed to prohibit or to restrict the following practices of managing agents: use of Time and Distance Policies (alleged to have been taken out to cover shortfalls in reserves); reliance on the Central Fund; and the creation of "Baby Syndicates".
v) The last of these passages (paras 355 to 366) is headed "The removal of the requirement of Errors and Omissions Cover for Agents". It complains about decisions of Lloyd's Council to reduce and then to remove the requirement upon agents to hold errors and omissions cover. Amongst other allegations it is said that this was contrary to an assurance that Lloyd's gave to Parliament when the Lloyd's Bill was before a Parliamentary Select Committee. It is alleged the Lloyd's acted in bad faith in failing to ensure that agents were covered by adequate and effective errors and omissions insurance.
"a. Failed to prohibit or restrict the use by syndicates of Time and Distance Policies and Roll-Over Policies."
b. Failed to prohibit or restrict the practice by which syndicates wrote and conducted business in reliance upon the existence of the Central Fund.
c. Failed to make clear to Names the extent to which they were assuming the credit risk of other Names and the extent to which their obligations were effectively mutualised by the existence of the Central Fund.
d. Failed to prohibit or restrict the creation of baby syndicates and/or to ensure that members' agents or managing agents informed all Names potentially affected thereby of the existence or former existence of such syndicates.
e. Failed to regulate the amount of reinsurance that could be used to cover the risks being contracted for as required by Article 15 of Directive 73/239.
f. Failed to ensure the maintenance of administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms as required by Article 13 of Directive 73/239.
g. Failed generally to act with any or any proper regard for the interests of those Names affected by the above practices or to ensure compliance with Article 19 of Directive 73/239".
It is then pleaded that in 1986 Mr Peter Miller, the Chairman of Lloyd's, encouraged Names to sign a new General Form of Undertaking for 1987 although he and Members of the Council of Lloyd's had been advised (in an advice written by Mr Robert Alexander QC for PCW names) of potential exposure to claims under American RICO legislation, and it is contended "that the representation by Mr Miller to Names that the signing of the New General Undertaking would not prejudice their legal rights was a further illustration of bad faith on the part of the Council, having regard to their knowledge of the advice being received by PCW Names, and their failure to disclose that to all Names"; and it is said that accordingly Lloyd's acted in bad faith "in relation to its failure to regulate the practice of Reinsurance to Close". Accordingly, it is alleged that "it is properly to be inferred that Lloyd's acted in bad faith within the meaning of section 14(3) of the 1982 Act in relation to its failure to reduce and then remove the requirement for E&O cover".
Civil Procedure Rules Part 17
i) that the amendments should not be permitted because of the provisions of the Limitation Acts and CPR 17.4;ii) that the amendments should not be permitted because the complaint of misfeasance in public office stands no realistic prospect of success;
iii) that the Names should not be allowed to advance the allegation of bad faith, an essential part of the claim for misfeasance in public office, in view of the history of the Lloyd's litigation and the findings of Cresswell J, upheld by the Court of Appeal;
iv) that the applications should not be allowed because it would be an abuse of the court's process for the Names to pursue the proposed claim, or at least they should be refused as a matter of discretion.
Limitation
i) The case about the duties and functions of Lloyd's and its nature as a public office. If it be said that these are to be regarded as questions of law, it should be observed that Names allege that Lloyd's is estopped by its conduct since 1 January 1983 from denying its obligations.ii) Various allegations that Lloyd's failed to provide to Names information that it should have distributed or made available.
iii) Complaints about the treatment of long-tail pollution and health risks other than those related to asbestos.
iv) Complaints about the LMX spiral and the PA spiral.
v) Allegations about agents' involvement with time and distance policies.
vi) Allegations about reliance upon the Central Fund.
vii) Complaints about agents' use of "Baby Syndicates".
viii) Complaints about the implementation of R&R.
ix) The claim by Names for damage caused not by their reliance upon representations for which Lloyd's is responsible, but through underwriting losses themselves, and Lloyd's responsibility for them.
i) That a Name joining Lloyd's could have confidence in Lloyd's as an institution to safeguard the Name's interests.ii) That a Name joining Lloyd's could trust those who regulate the Lloyd's market and manage its affairs.
iii) That a Name joining Lloyd's could, because of the way in which Lloyd's regulated and monitored underwriting accounts year by year, (a) rely on syndicate accounts, (b) in underwriting and/or deciding whether to remain a member of Lloyd's, have confidence in the audited syndicate results for past years, and (c) be sure that Lloyd's as part of its regulatory duties would ensure that, when the prospective liabilities were reinsured by one syndicate year into another, such liabilities were being fairly assessed and quantified as between the two syndicate years.
iv) That the Lloyd's market was in a sound financial condition.
v) That Names could safely join Lloyd's and/or continue their memberships of Lloyd's and/or increase their Premium Income Limit with confidence that known and projected claims had been prudently and adequately reserved to ultimate.
Prospects of success: (1) public officer and the exercise of power as a public officer
"The objectives of Lloyd's are wholly commercial. The nature of Lloyd's is not governmental, even in the broad sense of that expression. If any question arises as to the performance of any obligation on the part of the state to protect investors, it is the [Financial Services Authority] which is the governmental organisation which will be answerable to the Strasbourg Court and not Lloyd's. The sixth of the principles identified by Lord Woolf in the Poplar case (which I have set out above) … is particularly in point. It is the FSA which performs governmental functions in these matters, not Lloyd's. The fact that Lloyd's regulates its members' activities in the way it does as a result, in part, of its desire to avoid a more intrusive governmental regulatory regime cannot possibly convert it into a body exercising public law function within the meaning of the Strasbourg case law".
These considerations, it seems to me, strongly support Mr Foxton's submission that Lloyd's is not a public body answerable for misfeasance in public office.
"Lloyd's is not a public body which regulates the insurance market… Lloyd's operates within one section of the market. Its powers are derived from a private act which does not extend to any persons in the insurance market other than those who wish to operate in the section of the market governed by Lloyd's and who, in order to do so, have to commit themselves by entering into the uniform contract prescribed by Lloyd's. In our judgment, neither the evidence nor the submissions in this case suggest that there is such a public law element about the relationship between Lloyd's and the Names as places it within the public domain and so renders it susceptible to judicial review."
As Slade LJ made it clear in Jones v Swansea City Council, [1990] 1WLR 54, the focus is on the nature of the office: "It is not the judicial nature of the relevant power but the nature of the Council's office which is the important consideration" (at p71).
"It needs to be stressed at the outset that this case is concerned only with the functions performed by the Council of Lloyd's and its committees when they are exercising their regulatory powers in relation to the affairs of the members of Lloyd's and of other people, such as members' agents or managing agents of Lloyd's syndicates, who are involved in different aspects of the transaction of business at Lloyd's. It is not concerned with the exercise of disciplinary functions, nor with the exercise of regulatory functions for the protection of policy holders".
Mr Barlow argues (although this is not reflected in the draft pleading) that most Names, as well as being underwriters at Lloyd's, were also policyholders: they would either have been members of syndicate years which had been reinsured to close, or have had stop loss policies or estate protection plans or other policies.
Prospects of success: (2) bad faith
Abuse of process and discretion
The Stockwell applications
The Lowe applications
i) In 1993 the PA Spiral involved syndicates 103 and 718 and other insurers. In 1994 the PA Spiral included Syndicate 718 and other insurers.ii) In each case, business known to be gross loss-making business was written.
iii) Both spirals were created deliberately, in order to transfer the loss-making business to reinsurers writing cover at higher levels.
iv) Those involved in the fraud deceived their capital providers as to the nature of the business in which they were engaged and did not commit their activities to writing because the activities were dishonest and unauthorised.
i) Lloyd's "exercised power as a public official" and "wielded public law power" under the Lloyd's Acts, because it had statutory power to regulate the Lloyd's Insurance Market; because "the statutory authority to self regulate bestowed on [Lloyd's] is part of system of governmental regulation of the insurance market", relying upon the Insurance Act 1982 and European Directive 73/239; because Lloyd's regulatory authority was and is regarded by the Government as "part and parcel of its compliance with the … directive"; and because Lloyd's "has thereby been woven into the governmental control and regulation of the insurance market such that its statutory power to "regulate" is a public law power".ii) Lloyd's unlawfully abused its public law power in that it failed to appreciate that its regulatory powers created by section 6 of the Lloyd's Act 1982 were public law powers and "having failed to recognise that the said powers were "public law powers" it must as a logical concomitant have failed to appreciate that those powers must be considered and exercised within traditional Administrative Law constraints" (namely, that Lloyd's must consider from time to time their exercise, must direct itself according to law, must reach any decisions with procedural and substantive fairness, must "obey the principle of relevancy", taking account only of relevant factors, and must reach a rational decision within a margin of reasonable appreciation).
iii) That Lloyd's decision "not to exercise its regulatory powers" (presumably so as to prevent spirals) and its decision that "a sufficient regulatory framework was already in place to prevent a recurrence of something akin to the LMX spiral" were unlawful.
iv) Lloyd's failed to "exercise any proper regulatory control over the Lloyd's Insurance Market as described in the Sphere Drake judgment and the subject matter of complaint in The Society of Lloyd's v Henderson". More specific details of this complaint are set out.
v) The abuses of power "occurred whilst [Lloyd's] was being recklessly indifferent as to whether (a) its decision-making was lawful and (b) its decisions were likely to inflict harm on Lloyd's Names". In support of the former allegation it is said that Lloyd's was "recklessly indifferent as to the legality of its actions because at no stage in the process did [Lloyd's] ask itself whether the said decisions were lawful in the public law sense", adopting "the firm and inflexible stance that its control of the market was both (i) adequate and (ii) founded in private law and that no public law considerations applied to its decision making processes". In support of the latter allegation it is said that by failing to implement proper controls Lloyd's was "either i) Grossly incompetent in the discharge of its regulatory functions; or ii) Prepared to turn a "blind eye" to the nature of the problem and the risks that it posed to Lloyd's Names, so as to be recklessly indifferent about the inflection of harm on the Lloyd's names".
vi) The claimants suffered loss and damage by reason of the matters of which they complain.
Conclusion