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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Grijns v Grijns & Ors [2025] EWHC 1413 (Ch) (12 June 2025)
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Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1413 (Ch)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1413 (Ch)
Case No: PT-2023-000476

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COUYRTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PROPERTY TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)

Royal Courts of Justice
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1NL
12/06/2025

B e f o r e :

MASTER BOWLES (SITTING IN RETIREMENT)
____________________

Between:
Andrew Grijns
Claimant
- and -

(1) Janice Grijns
(2) Julian Grijns
(3) David Grijns
(4) Derek Grijns
Defendants

____________________

Stephen Boyd (instructed by way of direct access) for the Claimant
Sarah Haren KC (instructed by Withers LLP) for the Defendants

Hearing dates: 27 November 2024 to 6 December 2024

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
    .............................
    MASTER BOWLES (SITTING IN RETIREMENT)

    Master Bowles (sitting in retirement) :

  1. The Claimant, Andrew Grijns (Andrew), has occupied a part, or parts, of a freehold property at 31 Bury Walk, Chelsea, London SW3 6 QD (the Property) since 1999. The Property is a four bedroomed, Georgian terraced house, which includes (31A) a self-contained flat on the lower ground floor. It was purchased in 1994 by Andrew's parents, the First Defendant (Janice) and her husband, Leendert Cornelis Grijns (Mr Grijns), in 1994. Mr Grijns died in 2019 and since that date, Janice has been the sole owner of the Property. The Property is unencumbered and, as at July 2024, it had a value of circa £3.85M.
  2. In this litigation, commenced in June 2023, in circumstances set out, in more detail, later in this judgment, Andrew advances a claim, by way of proprietary estoppel, to be entitled, in satisfaction, he says, of an equity which has arisen in his favour by reason of assurances, or promises, made to him by his mother and by reason of his detrimental reliance upon those promises, or assurances, to the, or a, proprietary interest in the Property, or, at the least, an irrevocable licence to occupy the Property.
  3. Additionally, he advances a claim in trespass, in respect of the circumstances and events of June 2023, leading to this litigation, in which, he says, his mother and his brothers, who are the Second, Third and fourth Defendants, forcibly entered the Property, with a view to his removal from the Property and the sale of the Property.
  4. By way of a late amendment in the course of the trial, which took place over eight days, in November and December 2024, Andrew also contends that the conduct of his mother and brothers, in respect of their forcible entry, constituted a breach of Janice's equitable obligations, owed to him, by reason of and arising out of his equity; those obligations being to recognise and satisfy his equity and not, therefore, to take steps to terminate, or interfere with, his occupation of the Property, in contradiction of the rights arising out of his equity and such as to preclude, or interfere with, the satisfaction of those rights. By reason of that breach and in addition to his rights at common law, Andrew asserts an entitlement to equitable compensation.
  5. Janice and, as they relate to the alleged forcible entry, the other Defendants deny Andrew's claims. Janice contends that, as from about 2016, Andrew has occupied the Property as a bare licensee, that his licence has been lawfully terminated and that he currently occupies the Property as a trespasser. Alternatively and if and in so far as Andrew might be found to be entitled to a beneficial interest in the Property, pursuant to his alleged equity, Janice seeks an order for sale, pursuant to section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996
  6. In regard to monetary relief, Janice seeks mesne profits, or damages for use and occupation, from the termination of Andrew's licence, together with an account of profits, arising Janice contends, from the fact that Andrew has, from time to time, since 2020, rented out 31A without her express approval and has not accounted to her for the profits of those rental transactions.
  7. Although there is a weight of, sometimes confusing, email and text correspondence in this case, reflecting shifting circumstances and the shifting relationships between the parties, principally Janice and Andrew, the core background facts underlying these claims and counterclaims, while extensive, are, in essence, relatively simple and not, in large part, in any significant dispute. In setting out these underlying facts, I have relied heavily, but not exclusively on the contemporaneous documentary exchanges between the relevant parties.
  8. Mr Grijns was a successful Dutch-American banker. Janice, now eighty years of age had her own successful career in real estate and, also, as an academic. They had four sons; Andrew, now fifty years of age, his twin brother Julian, the Second Defendant, and Andrew's two other elder siblings, David, the Third Defendant, and Derek, the Fourth Defendant. They were a well to do family and for many years their family home was a substantial 8 or 9 bedroom property, in Greenwich, Connecticut. Janice, Derek, Julian and David all live in America.
  9. Mr Grijn's banking career led him to spend a considerable time in London and that was the context, or a part of it, for the purchase of the Property. The Property was purchased, in 1994, in part to provide a base for Mr Grijns, when working in London and in part as a holiday home, from which they, perhaps specifically Janice, could enjoy London's theatres, opera and restaurants and from which Janice could explore and purchase antiques.
  10. In her written evidence, Janice explained that, when seeking to purchase a property in London, her husband had become disillusioned with the process, with the result that, when Janice came to view the Property, she did so 'secretly'. As she explained in her oral evidence, all that meant was that she viewed the Property in the absence of her husband. No other secrecy was involved. Nor, contrary to a suggestion advanced by Andrew, in his oral evidence, was it the case that, by reason of the circumstances of the purchase, Janice was the decision maker in respect of the Property, such that any input by her husband was, or could be, overridden.
  11. While, on any view of the evidence, it is plain that the Property was of real importance, one might say, 'dear', to Janice, I have seen nothing in the materials before me to indicate that, while in good health, Mr Grijns was not an equal partner with Janice in the running and management of the Property, or that any input, by him, in respect of the Property was, at any stage overridden by his wife. Accordingly, on this question and in so far as relevant, I accept Janice's evidence.
  12. In 1999, Andrew, then twenty four and having completed an MBA in Monaco, took up employment in London and it was at that time and in that context that he moved into the Property, under arrangements, which, in broad terms, continued for many years.
  13. The core of the arrangement was that Andrew would occupy the second floor of the Property (bedroom and bathroom), together with the use of the kitchen and living room on the ground floor, leaving the first floor bedrooms for the use of his parents, when they visited. The expectation, on both sides, was that Andrew would, in effect, manage and care for the Property and stand in for his parents, in respect of the Property, in their absence.
  14. Over time and as Andrew's parents got older their use of the Property diminished, particularly so after the death, in 2019, of Mr Grijns. Correspondingly and perhaps inevitably, Andrew's use of the Property has 'spilt over' on to his parents' floor, such that, as I was told at trial, he is now using his mother's bedroom in the Property as a study.
  15. In regard to payment, Andrew's contention is that, from the outset, it was agreed that he should make a monthly payment to his parents of £1,550 per month. That contention is not, however, reflected in email exchanges between Andrew and his father, in the early years of his occupation (emails of 12 January 2005, 22 February 2006, 5 December 2008, 7 December 2008), which seem to suggest that, in those years, Andrew occupied the Property without any payment or contribution, that payment, when made, was sporadic and had to be 'chased' and, accordingly, that payment only settled at £1,550 per month considerably later on.
  16. There is some evidence (Andrew's email to Janice of 9 June 2016) that that figure, or something like it, only crystallised, when, as set out later in this judgment, Andrew became engaged to and subsequently married a Philippe Gamborelli (Philippe), who, from 2012, had held a tenancy of 31A. The rent under the tenancy was £1000 per month and, as set out by Andrew in the 9 June 2016 email, the monies that he and Andrew were then, collectively, paying for the Property, inclusive of 31A, was £1600 (£1000 for 31A and £600 for, as Andrew put it, 'the house').
  17. Andrew's evidence was that at, probably, an early stage, some payments were made in cash, on the occasions of his parents staying at the Property. It is common ground, however, that, in due course and for a significant period payments were made into the joint account held by Mr Grijns and Janice at Handelsbanken. Janice's evidence was that outgoings for the Property were paid out of this joint account. To much the same effect, Andrew's contention was that outgoings were paid out of the 'licence fee'.
  18. In or about 2015/6, the Handelsbanken account was closed. Janice's evidence is that it was closed on Andrew's advice and on the basis that American citizens were not permitted to hold off-shore bank accounts. While US legislation imposes reporting obligations upon banks, outside the United States, in respect of accounts held in those banks by American citizens, that advice, reiterated by Andrew, in an email of 9 June 2016, was incorrect. What underlay this error is not at all clear. Andrew and his parents seem to have been in considerable anxiety as to the possibility, or prospect, of an IRS investigation into monies accrued overseas and not accounted for and it is possible that Andrew's erroneous advice was a reflection of that anxiety.
  19. Be that as it may, after the closure of the Handelsbanken account, Andrew opened an account, in his own name, at Metrobank into which the monthly payment was made and from which the outgoings in respect of the Property were paid. Janice was provided with a debit card in respect of that account, which enabled her to access that account, primarily when she was staying in London. It appears that this practice may, however, have ceased in about 2017, when, on a visit to London, Janice told Andrew that she intended to use the account and was informed by Andrew that the account was empty. Based on that information, it appears that Janice destroyed her card and that it was never replaced.
  20. No later than 2020, all payments, whether into the Metrobank account, or otherwise, in respect of Andrew's occupation ceased. Andrew asserts that this was by arrangement with Janice and was agreed by her, on the basis that he would take over the entire responsibility for repairs and maintenance at the Property and on the basis, further, that, to that end, he would be authorised and entitled to rent out 31A and retain the rental received. The latter part of that assertion is in contest. Andrew has let 31A, via an agency called City Relay, from time to time, since June 2020 and his obligation to account for rents received forms, as already outlined, an aspect of Janice's Counterclaim.
  21. Putting the Counterclaim to one side, I am satisfied that Andrew's core occupancy was, as Andrew asserts, an informal family arrangement and was not intended to give rise to a contractual relationship, That, as I see it, is entirely consistent with Janice's own written evidence, in which she makes a comparison with the family arrangements to which she was accustomed as a child and, also, to the sporadic and irregular basis upon which payments appear to have been made. Subject to any equity arising in Andrew's favour by the application of principles of proprietary estoppel and to any rights arising out of such an equity, Andrew was never more than a bare licensee at the Property.
  22. Reverting to the background facts, although currently unemployed, Andrew's career has always been in the finance industry. For many years, as he acknowledged at trial, he was successful in his work and extremely well paid. Information before the court shows a starting salary in 2012, at a company called Pictet, of £315,000 per annum and his tax return for the tax year ending April 2021 shows earned income of £357,000. At trial, he referred to earnings in the order of £400,000 per annum. In 2013, when, as set out in the next following paragraphs, Andrew purchased an apartment in Monaco, his 2011 tax return showed income, presumably partly unearned, of £646,000 per annum.
  23. While Andrew has, in more recent times, been subject to redundancy and ill-health, there is no suggestion that, as discussed later in this judgment, at the dates central to his estoppel claim, he was anything other than gainfully and successfully employed. Correspondingly, his level of earnings over the years, all, as I understand it, undeclared to the United States tax authorities, explains, as set out later in this judgment, his considerable sensitivity at being named in his parents' United States wills, with the risk, at least as he saw it, of that exposure leading to an investigation.
  24. In December 2013 and as already stated, Andrew purchased an apartment, La Rousse, in Monaco, where he had been a student and where he had, from time to time, considered taking up employment. The purchase was funded, in large part, by monies (circa €850,000) provided by his parents, with the balance (some €300,000) being advanced to Andrew by way of mortgage.
  25. The funds from Janice and Mr Grijns were monies that they had previously held in a family investment vehicle, Birchwood Securities (Birchwood). The monies in question had not been declared to the United States tax authorities and there was a concern that, if, as apparently originally contemplated, the funds were to be invested in America that might lead to a tax investigation and significant tax liabilities. There was some suggestion by Janice, at trial and in her written evidence, that her understanding had been, not that Andrew hold the Monaco property beneficially, but rather as trustee for Birchwood. That understanding, however genuine, does not accord with the reality that Andrew borrowed significant monies, in order to fund the purchase and, probably, reflects, more than anything, Janice's own written evidence that she had not been involved in the structuring of the transaction.
  26. What is clear, however, is that, at least until 2020, Andrew made payments to Janice out of and in respect of the rental receipts from the Monaco property, acknowledging, therefore, as it seems to me, their contribution towards its purchase and, at least potentially, their informal interest in the property.
  27. The current position, in respect of the Monaco property is that it is retained by Andrew and that he has been enabled to repay the mortgage on the property from his earnings, such that the property is now unencumbered.
  28. In 2015, Janice and Mr Grijns gave instructions to London solicitors, Volks Hedleys, in respect of the preparation of their UK wills. It appears, from a 10 April 2015 email, that the solicitors were suggested by Andrew, following what must have been a discussion with his mother in respect of the wills. It seems likely, given the overall testamentary arrangements set out in paragraphs 29 and 30 of this judgment, that it was at this stage that Andrew either informed, or confirmed to, his mother, arising from his concern as to the possibility of an IRS investigation of his affairs, should he be seen to benefit under his parents' United States will, that he would rather not be named, or benefit, in that will and would, therefore, prefer that any disposition in his favour arise under his parents' UK wills.
  29. On 12 April 2015, Janice emailed Andrew, stating that, as she put it, ' after a largely sleepless night' she had decided that Andrew would inherit two thirds of the Property and that the other third would be shared between David and Derek. Andrew's response, by email the same day, was to say ' I agree and very kind of you Mom'. The email went on to make reference to the monies used to acquire the Monaco property, in respect of which Andrew, reflecting, I think, his continuing anxiety as to the intervention of the IRS, asserted that his use of those monies had put him in danger. The email concluded, however, with Andrew describing himself as 'lucky and grateful'.
  30. On 13 April 2015, following up on the 12 April email, Janice also wrote to her American lawyer, Matthew Smith, at Day Pitney, copied to Andrew, setting out, in somewhat more detail and after 'three years of soul-searching' her and her husband's decisions as to the devolution of their assets. The email confirmed the proposed 2015 testamentary gift to Andrew, two thirds of the Property and its contents, with the balance of the Property going to David and Derek.
  31. In regard to their American assets, it explained that David and Derek would inherit Janice's house and its contents, in New Orleans, that David and Derek would each inherit one third of the value of Janice and Mr Grijn's primary residence in Connecticut, together with their investments in Field Point Private Bank and that the other third of those assets would devolve on Julian's children, rather than Julian. Julian, as confirmed at trial, was, largely estranged from Janice, due, it appears, to his refusal to allow her contact with his children; a decision, in turn, which Janice attributed to the influence of Julian's wife. More materially, the email explained that Andrew's absence from their American will was because he had been provided for in the United Kingdom.
  32. In the succeeding weeks, there followed some email discussion between Andrew and Janice, as to Andrew's sight of the proposed draft wills and his embarrassment at being, as he saw it, excluded from sight of the documents. The exchange ended, somewhat testily, on 22 and 23 April 2015, with Janice, then in London and at the Property, telling Andrew that she had decided to sell the Property as she spent so little time there.
  33. Despite this exchange, the wills, produced in the course of trial, were executed on 1 May 2015. The wills, as drawn, expressly related only to Mr Grijns and Janice's UK estate. They did not, directly, gift the Property, as such, nor, contrary to the email, set out at paragraph 30 of this judgment, did they, separately, devise the contents of the Property to Andrew. Rather, they provided that, subject to the prior death, respectively of Janice and Mr Grijns, the UK estate, being, at that date, the Property and its contents, should be devised as to one hundred and thirty four two hundredths to Andrew (67%) and thirty three two hundredths (16.5%) to each of David and Derek. These provisions remained, as I understand it, unchanged until 2021.
  34. On 3 September 2016, Andrew got married. His husband, Philippe, from whom Andrew is now divorced, had, as already stated, been the tenant of 31A from 2012 and it would appear that, while engaged, they had chosen to live together in 31A, rather than in what Janice, in her 8 June 2016 email, set out in the next paragraph, referred to as the 'top bedroom floor'.
  35. By 2016, Mr Grijn's Parkinson's disease was worsening and Janice took over their financial affairs, which, as emerges from an email of 8 June 2016, she found in some disarray. In consequence and by that email, she contacted Andrew to enquire as to whether, following their marriage, Andrew and his husband would continue to use 31A, because, if not, she would look into its market value, with a view to its sale.
  36. Andrew's response, by email of 9 June 2016, to which reference has already been made, was to state that it did not 'make economic sense' for him to pay more 'rent', but that Janice could 'get a lot renting the house'. In that context, he asked Janice to give him as much notice as possible so that he could 'buy a place in London and have time to arrange a mortgage ..'
  37. Shortly after the wedding and following on Janice's return to America, she exchanged emails with Philippe. While recording her happiness that Philippe and Andrew were enjoying the Property, she reiterated the possibility that, in extreme circumstances, the Property would have to be rented out to provide care for Mr Grijns. In Philippe's response, he informed Janice that Andrew was looking to buy a flat, taking advantage of low interest rates, 'as an investment and for the future' to be rented out until needed.
  38. Janice's financial concerns, particularly as they related to the cost of Mr Grijns' care, continued into and through 2017. In an important exchange of text messages, in December 2017, in which Janice was canvassing ways and means of raising funds to place Mr Grijns in a nursing home, Andrew informed Janice of his intention to buy a flat in 2018 so that Janice could then rent out the Property. Janice, in what was, plainly, an emotional state, reacted against this. She did not want to rent out the house. She was lonely and wanted to be able to spend time in London with Andrew and Philippe. Andrew pointed out that he needed to own his own home so that he had some security, to which Janice replied that he, Andrew, had 'total security', that having Andrew at the Property gave her pleasure and that the Property would 'likely' be his one day.
  39. Andrew and Philippe's marriage proved short lived. In early 2018, they separated and by the Autumn of 2018 divorce proceedings were on foot. In his Form E, in those proceedings, Andrew described the Property as being owned by his parents. He asserted no beneficial interest and indicated that because of his parents' poor health the Property might have to be sold and he would have to find alternative accommodation. In respect of his future needs, he identified £1.75M as the prospective price of a suitable flat. No mention was made of any inheritance prospects. In November 2018, in response to enquiries made by Philippe as to the use that might be made of the proceeds of the Property, were it to be sold. Andrew, in apparent contradiction of his Form E, stated that so far as he was aware his parents had no intention of selling the Property ('the house or the flat').
  40. A Financial Dispute Resolution hearing took place, in the divorce proceedings, on 30 November 2018. There was some discussion, in the course of submissions, as to Andrew's status at the Property. His counsel described that status as being that of a licensee and accepted that because he was living in a family home he was making less payment than would otherwise have been the case. The judge recognised that, de facto and unless he upset his parents, he had security in the Property. The judge recognised, also, the value to his parents of Andrew living in the Property, in order that it was kept warm and secure. When analysing Philippe's case for a financial order and reaching her non-binding assessment of that case, she determined Philippe's potential entitlement upon a .needs basis and not upon the basis of any shared proprietary rights.
  41. By a consent order, dated 18 June 2019, Andrew agreed to make a series of lump sum payments to Philippe totalling £420,000; the last such payment to be made by April 2020.
  42. In March 2019, 31A was let to a Mr Ramscar. The letting was arranged by Andrew on what seems to have been a preferential basis. The relationship between Andrew and Mr Ramscar was not explored at trial but it would appear that Mr Ramscar was, at that stage. close to Andrew; sufficiently so as to have been appointed by Andrew as his executor, in Andrew's 4 October 2018 will. It would appear, further, that the relationship became abusive, leading to possession proceedings against Mr Ramscar, in 2019, eventually settled in May 2020, to criminal allegations against Mr Ramscar, described by Andrew as being of blackmail and stalking, and, coupled, I think, with the emotional strain arising from his divorce, to understandable and adverse effects upon Andrew's mental health.
  43. The litigation and settlement with Mr Ramscar gave rise to serious disagreement between Janice and Andrew. Andrew was, I think, upset because the compromise agreed was a 'drop hands' settlement, whereby each party walked away and whereby neither arrears of rent, accruing on 31A, nor the costs that he had seemingly incurred in respect of the litigation with Mr Ramscar could be recovered. He was also anxious and upset, as appears from an email of 16 January 2020, that, following his father's death, on 4 November 2019, and contrary to his long expressed wishes, his potential interest in the Property, under the 2015 wills, might have become known to the authorities.
  44. On 9 May 2020, Janice wrote to Andrew, primarily to explain her decision to settle the Ramscar litigation. Her letter was produced by Andrew very late in the proceedings and concerns were raised by those representing Janice as to its authenticity. Having seen and read the letter, I am satisfied that it is an authentic document. I am completely unpersuaded, given both the content and tone of the letter, that it is a fabrication. In fairness, the matter was not unduly pressed
  45. In addition to explaining the rationale and circumstances of the settlement, Janice set out, in the letter, her parlous state of health, the efforts that she had made for Andrew throughout her life, the fact that he was the 'majority heir' to the Property, as well as the owner of the Monaco apartment and the fact that, at seventy six and having just lost her husband, she was now exhausted. The letter, also, confirmed that Janice was no longer seeking payment from Andrew for his occupancy of the Property, or a share in the Monaco rent, or any residual funds in the Metrobank account. In essence, Janice, by her letter, was trying to make her peace with Andrew and prevent the tensions over Mr Ramscar from destroying what she described as their 'close relationship'.
  46. Unfortunately, Janice's efforts were not successful, In June 2020, she had knee surgery, On 15 June, she emailed Andrew, expressing her love for him and her hope that they could restore their relationship. She wanted to know, also, what his plans were and whether, as he seems to have told her, he was intending to leave the United Kingdom. If so, she could come and arrange a sale.
  47. Andrew's response was to make a series of complaints against his mother, accusing her of vilifying and bullying him and turning against him. This seems to have brought matters, at least temporarily. to a head, because, on the next day. 16 June 2020, Janice emailed Andrew, accusing him of wanting her dead, so that he could have the Property and telling him to 'get out of my house as soon as possible', that he could not live there hating and maligning her, that she was afraid to come to her own property and that 'this has to end now'.
  48. Later in June 2020, Andrew was made redundant from his job at Pictet Asset Management and this change of circumstances seems to have given rise to a rapprochement between mother and son. Email exchanges took place, in which Andrew catalogued what he was and had been doing in respect of the repair, maintenance and management of the Property; the context of which, according to Andrew's evidence, being that it was at this stage and in consideration of his no longer making any payment for his occupation that he took over the full responsibility for the repair and maintenance of the Property.
  49. It was, also, at this time and in this context, that, as set out in paragraph 20 of this judgment, Andrew instructed a letting agency, City Relay, to procure short term lettings in respect of 31A. Janice was informed of this by email of 10 August 2020, in which Andrew contemplated that he would incur a substantial tax liability on any letting income, that he hoped to recoup the losses arising out of Mr Ramscar's tenancy, but that he felt that 'we', meaning himself and Janice, would be lucky to come out with a profit. The email was acknowledged by Janice on the same day.
  50. In September 2020, the question of the sale, or at least the valuation, of the Property arose again. Following what seems likely to have been a telephone conversation between Andrew and Janice, Andrew agreed to contact valuers, John D Wood, to arrange a valuation of the Property on 28, or 29 September 2020. At that stage, as appears in a 4 September 2020 email, Andrew was considering moving from the United Kingdom and had been disappointed to discover that this country of choice (Cyprus) did not allow right hand drive vehicles.
  51. On 30 September 2020, Andrew reported to Janice, as to the appraisal of the Property. Robert Green, of John D Wood had estimated an asking price of £4.5M, in respect of the entire Property, including 31A. Andrew felt that it might fetch more. Janice, on 2 October 2020, reflecting her own experience in real estate, deplored the valuation by square footage which had been applied, because it disregarded charm, or the special value she placed on the garden.
  52. The question of sale, or of Andrew 'moving on', was raised again in an email exchange on 15 October 2020. Andrew's position was that he could not move permanently as nothing had been agreed about the Property. What was left to be agreed was not stated, but, in the light of his evidence at trial, the likelihood is that what, from his perspective, remained to be agreed was what amount he would be given from the proceeds of sale, were the Property to be sold.
  53. Further email exchanges took place between 20 and 23 October 2020. On 20 October, Janice was suggesting that a surveyor of her acquaintance would evaluate the improvements and renovations at the Property. Andrew's response, as I read his emails, was to query whether, in that context, the time he had spent with John D Wood, in respect of the valuation, had been wasted. In regard to sale, itself, he was not yet ready to do anything. In an email that, at trial, he characterised as 'flippant', he asked Janice to give him 'until next year' before he was 'kicked out' and asked what he had done to be 'disinherited' despite everything having been agreed between his parents.
  54. The reference to everything having been agreed between his parents was, as I read it, a reference to the provision made in his favour under the 2015 will, which would, necessarily, have been vitiated by a sale of the Property. The reference to disinheritance, reflected, as became clear during the trial, his concern that, should the Property be sold, there would no longer be a United Kingdom inheritance and, since, for his own tax reasons, he did not wish to be named in, or benefit from, Janice's United States will, that would leave him without any inheritance from his mother.
  55. Janice's response to these emails and these concerns was categoric. She had never threatened to disinherit Andrew. She had never wanted to sell the Property and would be thrilled if Andrew lived there forever. She considered the Property his home to be relaxed in and enjoyed.
  56. In parallel to these emails, Janice, over the same period of days, was in touch with an old friend, living in France, Marlene Robbins (Marlene). It is evident, from Marlene's email of 20 October 2020, that Janice had confided in her both as to the sale of the Property and as to her relationship with Andrew, who she described as being depressed and estranged from his mother. In regard to the sale of the Property, Marlene, echoing, I think, what Janice must have said to her, agreed that the sale was a necessary but difficult decision. Janice, herself, responding to that email, explained that matters were currently postponed because Andrew had nowhere to go, but that, when the time came to sell, she would have the assistance of a chartered surveyor, who had previously worked with her as a property manager.
  57. There is an obvious inconsistency between what Janice was saying to Marlene and what, within the same time compass, she was saying to Andrew, as set out in paragraph 55 of this judgment, as well as the inconsistency between what Janice was then saying to Andrew, when contrasted with the way that matters had, seemingly, been progressing prior to the email exchanges of 20 to 23 October 2020.
  58. In November 2020, by email of 9 November 2020, Andrew wrote to a Mr Rimmer of Volks Hedleys, the firm which had prepared the 2015 wills, stating that Janice would like to change her will and, also, to 'change the title' to the Property, by registering it in his name. Janice's evidence is that the idea, both of a change in her will (to leave the Property exclusively to Andrew) and of an inter vivos transfer of the Property to Andrew, emanated from Andrew. I did not understand this to be seriously in contest. Certainly, it is not in doubt but that Janice's letter of instruction to Volks Hedleys, dated 29 January 2021 had been drafted for Janice by Andrew and then sent by Janice, as her own. The letter, itself, however, did not contemplate a transfer of the Property, simply that Janice wished to change her will, in order to make Andrew the sole beneficiary of the Property.
  59. In due course and following email correspondence and the production of several drafts, passing between Volks Hedleys, Andrew and Janice, including an email from Janice to Volks Hedleys, dated 26 February 2021, confirming Janice's intention to leave 31 and 31A to Andrew, a new will was executed by Janice, on 1 March 2021 under which the entirety of her United Kingdom estate (the Property, including 31A, and its contents) was bequeathed to Andrew.
  60. Subject to what appears in paragraph 62 of this judgment, Janice's reasoning, in respect of this enhanced testamentary gift to Andrew is not at all clear, either from the contemporaneous documentation, or from the evidence given at trial. What is clear, however, is that by 29 April 2021, Janice had had a change of heart. By an earlier email of 19 April 2021, Janice had informed Mr Rimmer that she did not wish to destroy her 2015 will and that she did not wish to transfer the Property to Andrew. She followed that up by an email, of 29 April 2021, in which she asked Mr Rimmer whether she could revert to the 2015 will. She wanted to do this as soon as possible and Andrew was not to be involved.
  61. Janice's written evidence, in respect of this, was simply that to bequeath the entirety of this valuable property to Andrew was, or might have been, unfair to his three brothers. A more comprehensive picture, however, of Janice's thinking and concerns, in respect of the Property, emerges from emails that she sent to Marlene and to Marlene's husband, Alan, between 20 and 24 April 2021.
  62. In those emails, in which Janice was primarily seeking tax advice as to the best way of dealing with the Property. Janice explained that, as reflected in the 9 November email from Andrew to Mr Rimmer, Andrew had asked for the Property to be passed to him outright because this would give rise to a saving in taxes on Janice's death. This, Janice said, she had refused. Instead, she had been prepared to change her will, in his favour, and make him the sole beneficiary of the Property, but this had resulted in Andrew complaining bitterly about the taxes that might become payable.
  63. Janice explained that her reason for refusing to transfer the Property to Andrew outright was twofold. Firstly, because, the Property being a major asset, Andrew's brothers would have regarded the transaction as unfair; secondly, because of her concerns that, given Andrew's volatility and given that an argument was always imminent, she might find herself denied the use of what had been her own property. Another concern, she said, was that Andrew had expressed an intention to sell the Property in two or three years and this was something that Janice did not want.
  64. The issues as to the disposition, sale, or transfer of the Property surfaced again, in a series of confusing and sometimes incoherent texts and emails on 7 and 8 July 2021.
  65. At that time, Janice was taking steps to sell the family home in Greenwich, Connecticut and was doing so, at least partially, to be able to give some financial assistance to Derek, who was living in Florida, in a modest apartment and bringing up his children as a single parent. On 7 July she was emailed by Andrew asking her to consider selling the Property in the event of his being unable to secure a job, in London, or elsewhere. Although not explicitly stated in this, or the other emails in this sequence, as was made clear in his evidence at trial, Andrew's contemplation, as foreshadowed earlier in this judgment, was that, on such a sale, he would be given an unspecified part of the proceeds. Janice's immediate response, although unhappy at not being able to see the Property again, was to agree to help Andrew and to ask him to instruct John D Wood to market the Property.
  66. In the course of this exchange, however, Janice disclosed to Andrew that she had reverted to the 2015 will, She explained, also, referring, I think, to Andrew's suggestion that the Property be transferred to him, that she had not been able to go through with it, because of Andrew's expressed intention of selling the Property in two, or three, years. There ensued an animated email discussion, in which Andrew sought to explain, or reiterate, the adverse tax consequences to him, as beneficiary of the Property, as compared with his siblings, benefitting under the United States will, and, adverting, I think, to their earlier discussions as to transfer, to the desirability of avoiding United Kingdom inheritance tax. Janice sought to explain that she was only trying to be 'fair to everyone'. The exchange ended, unpleasantly, with Andrew accusing his mother of being 'evil and destructive'.
  67. The result of all this was that Janice, that same day and in the midst of these exchanges, emailed Volks Hedleys a purported new will, said by her to be dated 7 July 2021, ostensibly reinstating Andrew as sole beneficiary of the Property. Reverting back to a letter she had apparently written in November 2020, she, also, informed Volks Hedley and Andrew that she was gifting him the Property. The exchange ended, on 8 July 2021, with Janice apologising to Andrew if she had made a mistake and with Andrew explaining that these changes could not be made by email and that a gift of the Property to him, by will, gave him no rights over the Property in her lifetime.
  68. Despite the April emails to Volks Hedley and despite the email and text activity of 7 and 8 July 2021, it is not at all clear either that the March 2021 will was destroyed, or the 2015 will reinstated. What is clear is that, despite a text from Janice to Andrew, on 16 July 2021, stating that he had been restored as sole heir, nothing was, in fact, done following the 7 and 8 July exchanges to implement, or give effect to, the instructions that Janice had purported to give to Volks Hedleys on 7 July 2021. What is, also, clear is that, despite Andrew's original, 7 July 2021, request, the Property was not placed on the market. It may be that this was because Andrew was able, at about that time, to secure employment with a new employer, Federated Homes, such that, from his perspective, the need for a sale had abated.
  69. In October 2021, Janice was planning a visit to the Property and in the run up to that trip, the question of Janice's arrangements as to the Property, again, resurfaced.
  70. By an email of 7 October 2021, Andrew, referring to Janice's email instructions of 7 July, to Volks Hedleys as a 'convoluted mess', told her that those instructions had to be 'confirmed as fixed', that she should not send 'emotive messages' to her solicitors and, reverting to the tax position, that there was a legal means of avoiding 40% of the value of the Property going to the United Kingdom tax authorities; a reference to the potential inter vivos transfer of the Property. Janice, evidently, picked up this reference. Her response was ''Must I sign over the Property before I die?' At this point, as appears from her response to Andrew, both the Connecticut property, Fox Run, and an old family home of Janice's, in New Orleans, Louisville Street, had been put on the market and David and Derek were urging her to move to live with Derek in Florida. In her words, she felt that she was 'being stripped of everything'. She wanted to resolve the issues over the Property as 'loving mother and son'.
  71. The email conversation about the Property continued on 8 October 2021. Janice sent two emails to Andrew, the gravamen of which was that she might be prepared to gift the Property to Andrew one day, but that she would only do so if there was some limitation, or mitigation, of his right to sell the Property. She reiterated that she was feeling bullied into moving to Florida and told Andrew that if, when she came to London, she would be greeted with animosity and a lack of respect or affection, then she would change her visiting arrangements. Andrew's response was to ask his mother not to send emotional and counterproductive emails and to stop changing her mind. She was not being dispossessed and , if the Property was put in his name, he would not sell it if she did not want him to.
  72. Unfortunately, matters were not left to lie. By email of 18 October 2021, Andrew chose to resurrect his concerns as to the Volks Hedleys emails, accusing his mother of undermining him. Janice's response was robust. She explained that the Property was the largest asset in the family and that it was not fair to Andrew's brothers if 'he got the whole pie'. She reminded Andrew that he already had an 'inheritance', referring to the Monaco apartment, and she reminded him, also, that she had the right to dispose of her assets as she wished.
  73. In a reply that, as in the October 2020 exchanges, Andrew, at trial, characterised as 'flippant', he described the money that his parents had provided for the purchase of the Monaco apartment as 'black money', accused his mother of being 'very wicked and pushing us all away' and stated, referring to himself and his brothers, that 'we all know you will just give everything to a donkey sanctuary'. The exchange degenerated into a 'spat', in which each party threatened the other with an IRS investigation, ending with Andrew telling his mother that he wished he had never been born.
  74. After October 2021, the question of either the sale, or the transfer to Andrew, of the Property appears to have been sidelined. Andrew secured a job at Federated Homes that autumn and, consequently, his need for a sale and for a share of the proceeds to rehouse receded. Sadly, the job did not last and on 22 February 2022 he resigned. He has not had employment since that date.
  75. The focus of attention throughout the bulk of 2022 was upon Janice's United States' properties and upon concerns, shared by all her children, including Andrew, arising out of her dealings with those properties and, generally, as to her management of her financial affairs.
  76. As already set out, in the autumn of 2021, Janice was being encouraged by David and Derek to sell both her Connecticut and New Orleans' properties. Janice, herself, I think, recognised her need to downsize, although, as appears from some of the emails to which mention has already been made, there seems little doubt that she felt that her children were imposing pressure.
  77. The Connecticut property, Fox Run, was finally sold, in April 2022, for $5M. At about the same time, Janice's old family property, in Louisville Street, New Orleans, what she referred to as a 'shotgun' property, was sold for $440,000. Both those figures were, however, I was told, subject to various taxes, commissions and costs, substantially reducing, therefore, the gross figures.
  78. Almost immediately, on the sale of Fox Run, Janice chose to purchase a substantial property in New Orleans, St Charles Avenue, for approximately $2.85M. She accepted, in her evidence, that this was a mistake and that it was not a sensible purchase. Rightly, or wrongly, she puts her error down to a concussion that she experienced shortly before completion of the purchase.
  79. Be that as it may, St Charles Avenue was, almost immediately on purchase, returned to the market and eventually sold, in April 2024, for $1.925M, resulting, according to David's evidence, in an overall loss, inclusive of commissions and taxes, in excess of $1M.
  80. The balance of the funds, arising from these transactions, after all costs, taxes and commissions were paid, have been re-invested in Janice's asset portfolio, held in the Royal Bank of Canada. That portfolio is largely stocks and shares and, subject to the usual volatility of such a portfolio, has a value of circa $4M. I am told, again by David, who holds a power of attorney from his mother, that, subject to a pension from Mr Grijns' bank and a small social security payment, Janet's share portfolio is her main source of income.
  81. Despite the purchase of St Charles Avenue, Janice did not remain in New Orleans. She had expected to find friends and family in the area, but that turned out not to be the case. In July 2022, she returned to Connecticut and rented an apartment in Greenwich at a monthly rent of $11,500. At the date of trial, Janice remained in this apartment, She is not happy there, Her possessions and pictures are in store and she wishes to buy a property in Greenwich where she can have her possessions around her.
  82. It is her case that it is to this end and to achieve the funds to make such a purchase, without, as it was put, 'cashing out' her investments, that she now seeks to sell the Property. Her expected budget for the size and type of, still substantial, property that she wishes to buy was put, by David, in his evidence as being in the region of $3.2M to $3.9M
  83. As foreshadowed in paragraph 75 of this judgment, Janice's property dealings in the first part of 2022, specifically the rushed and, as it was seen, whimsical purchase of St Charles Avenue, followed, almost immediately, by the return of that property to the market, and coupled, as appears from email and text correspondence, between her children, commencing in about June 2022, with what was seen as her high levels and rate of expenditure, catalysed her children's concern as to her ability to manage her financial affairs.
  84. By the summer of 2022. Janice was seventy eight years of age. She was not in good health. She suffered a stage 4 heart failure in 2018, coupled with a kidney failure. At that stage, she was told that her life expectancy was in the order of five years. In 2020 and again in 2022, she had knee surgery. She has hearing problems and, as I understand it, difficulties in writing and typing. In the summer of 2022, she had recently sold her home of 42 years, had moved to New Orleans and moved back to Connecticut. Her life had become unstable and insecure and it would not be unfair, I think, based primarily upon the email and text exchanges between her children, to describe her as being both fragile and needy. Janice, herself, would agree that she is volatile, dramatic and emotional and all those qualities will have fed into her behaviour at this time.
  85. The result, sadly, was a period in which her relationships with her children, including Andrew, became very poor. Andrew describes himself as not being on speaking terms with her, because of her 'abuse'. Other exchanges about her by her children were ugly and derogatory. Words like 'narcissism' were bandied about. That said, their concern was , I think real. Her expenditure is said to have been running at $50 to $75,000 per month and she was drawing down heavily on her resources at the Royal Bank of Canada. There was a real concern that, as it was put by Andrew and Julian, they had to 'protect Dad's legacy'.
  86. Things reached the stage when serious consideration was given to seeking a conservatorship, either voluntary, or involuntary, to the extent, even, of securing evidence by installing a camera in her apartment. That, however, did not proceed and, although Andrew's pleaded case, in respect of his trespass claim, leans heavily upon Janice's alleged reduced capacity, no such allegation was pursued at trial and no question of incapacity has ever been raised in respect of Janice's ability to conduct this litigation.
  87. David's evidence to me, which I accept, is that, although a conservatorship was considered, it was, in the end, recognised, by himself, Derek and Julian, that their mother had not lost capacity but was suffering from severe emotional depression, that she had been isolated, lonely and grieving and that resolution as to her affairs could best be achieved by way of a power of attorney; in respect of which he, David, and Derek are the attorneys.
  88. Although, as already indicated, Andrew joined with his brothers in sharing their concerns about their mother, there is no doubt, from the email correspondence, in June 2022, that the Property was, at that stage, causing tensions between the brothers and that there was a feeling that Janice and Andrew had acted behind the back of the rest of the family in respect of the Property. It was part of Andrew's case, at this trial, that it was his brothers who were behind Janice's conduct in seeking possession of the Property, with a view to its sale, and that at least a part of their motivation was that they were envious of what was perceived as the preferential treatment that he had received in respect of the Property.
  89. The question of the Property re-emerged, as a matter of discussion and, subsequently, contention, at the end of August 2022.
  90. In late August and early September, Janice was in touch with a property consultant Robert Rejnin, who was instructed by her to carry out an appraisal of the Property. David was copied into this instruction. The consultant was told that Andrew would be furious if there was any thought of selling and, therefore, that he must not be told.
  91. Notwithstanding that instruction and before, I think, any appraisal took place, Janice, in fact, seems to have discussed sale with Andrew. By an email of 8 September 2022, she suggested, as I read her email, that, on a sale, the tax treatment of the proceeds, under what she termed the 'GB US tax treaty', would be favourable and very fair. By text to Andrew, on the next day, 9 September 2022, apparently envisaging a sale, she indicated that she had bought the Property and that she deserved a large part of the profits.
  92. By 22 September 2022, however, things had again become fraught. On 21 September, Janice having approached John D Wood, via its website, was contacted by Robert Green, who had valued the Property for her in 2020. It would appear that Janice made an appointment and informed Andrew. Andrew's response was to insist that the appointment be cancelled and that Janice not interfere with matters concerning the Property. In a text from Janice to David, on 22 September 2022, Janice recounted a telephone call from Andrew, in which, apparently, Andrew had told her that he had had her declared legally incompetent in Great Britain and, therefore, that she could not see an agent or try to sell the Property. Consistently with that text, on 20 September 2022, Andrew had emailed Julian, asking him how they could get Janice 'signed off' as not having capacity and on 23 September 2022, Andrew emailed John D Wood, saying, in terms, that the Property could not be sold, that Janice had limited capacity and that they had legal advice that the Property could not be sold, for legal and other reasons. None of that was true.
  93. In further texts between Janice and Andrew, on 23 September 2022, Janice, who was in process of planning a visit to the Property, informed Andrew that she was cancelling the appointment, but that she would not accept insults, or disrespect, during her visit and that, if that occurred, Andrew would have to stay in an hotel during her stay.
  94. In parallel with the foregoing, in September 2022, an issue arose as to Andrew's entitlement to rent out 31A, through City Relay. The issue appears to have emerged as a result of an internet search, or similar, carried out by David. What is clear is that David and Julian prepared an email letter for Janice to send to City Relay, denying Andrew's authority to let 31A and requiring City Relay to cease to market it. Janice's email response, on sight of the draft, was that, if it was sent, then she 'could not arrive in London'. Although the contemplation had been that Janice would send the letter herself, in the end, it was sent by Julian, under Janice's purported authority.
  95. It is not at all clear whether, in fact, Janice authorised the email, or whether Julian, perhaps endorsed by David went behind his mother's back. Janice, as set out in paragraph 106 of this judgment, eventually came to explain what she stated to be her ignorance of the City Relay arrangement on the basis that she had never read the 10 August 2020 email referred to in paragraph 49 of this judgment. Having read all the text and email exchanges relating to this matter, I think that the greater likelihood is that Janice, still in a very fragile state, had forgotten that she had been informed of the letting arrangements and the involvement of City Relay and, on that basis, allowed the email to be sent.
  96. Janice's visit, in early to mid-October 2022, was not a success. Prior to the visit, Janice had consulted Julian as to whether she should go at all. David had advised her not to. Julian said that she should go, but refrain from any discussion on the topic of the Property. While in London and at the Property, she texted Derek, on 10 October 2022, describing herself as being 'all alone', having had no meal for two days, Andrew being locked in his bedroom and refusing to get out of bed and with no heat in the Property. That text reflected, very clearly, Janice's evidence at trial that she had found herself shunned by Andrew, during this visit. I have had no doubt but that that evidence was true.
  97. What did, however, emerge at trial was that Andrew had surreptitiously recorded a number of conversations with his mother, during her visit. Janice, unsurprisingly, complained, when giving her evidence, as to use being made of this material. I ruled the material, in so far as relevant, as being admissible.
  98. In those recorded conversations, on 8 October 2022, Janice told Andrew that she just wanted to be sure that her extant will was the 1 March 2021 will, under which Andrew was to 'get everything' in the United Kingdom.
  99. Whether, in fact, the March 2021 will remained in force, in October 2022, or whether following Janice's 2021 instructions to Volks Hedleys, as set out in paragraphs 60 of this judgment, the March 2021 will had been destroyed remains, as set out in paragraph 68 of this judgment, entirely unclear, as is the effect, on the 1 March 2021 will, of a further will apparently executed by Janice on 29 September 2022, as set out later in this judgment.
  100. The weight to be given to these recorded conversations, given their self-serving nature and lack of context, has to be a matter for careful consideration; as also, given the date of these conversations, whether, as explained later in this judgment, their content has any material significance in the resolution of the issues for my determination in this case. The fact, however, that Andrew chose to make these recordings, at all, is, as it seems to me, very plainly indicative of his anxiety as to the Property and the potential disposition in his favour of the Property and of his determination to secure such confirmation as he could as to that disposition.
  101. As had been predicted by Janice, the email to City Relay caused a furore. Its existence and City Relay's response to it seems to have emerged very shortly after Janice's return to America. Text exchanges between Andrew and Janice, at that time, show Andrew's anger and unhappiness as to what had occurred and as to the cancellation of the City Relay contract; accusing Janice of malicious lies and vilification. The situation was compounded by the fact that, allegedly at Janice's request. Julian had been looking into the instruction of Mishcon De Raya to bring eviction proceedings against Andrew and by the fact that Julian had, seemingly, told Andrew of the prospect of such proceedings. Andrew's reaction, as disclosed in a text of 18 October 2022, when, as Andrew put it, he was 'recovering ' from Janice's visit, was to indicate that he had to decide whether to cut off contact with his family and move away.
  102. Janice's response to Andrew's complaints, as to the City Relay email letter, was, essentially, to deny all knowledge and responsibility for the letter and to blame Julian. On 18 October 2022, she emailed to her 'beloved Andrew' that she had contacted City Relay, as she had, to require his reinstatement, in respect of the management of the Property, to emphasise his management skills and to explain his position as 'an heir' to the Property.
  103. On the same day, Janice appears to have contacted Julian, asking him to retract the City Relay email letter and, inferentially, complaining as to his conduct. Julian's response was to remind Janice that, both in respect of eviction and as regards City Relay, what he had done was what she had asked him to do, attaching, by way of reminder, Janice's own message, asking him to 'find an eviction specialist'.
  104. On 19 October 2022, the next day, Janice replied to Julian, calling him a 'vicious liar', denying that she had ever authorised him to write to City Relay, described as Airbnb, and telling him that he should send several months rent to Andrew in 'reparation' To Andrew, by text of 19 October, she accused Julian of using her name without authority and being guilty of a 'heinous crime'. In so far as it matters, I am satisfied, as set out in paragraph 95 of this judgment, that Janice did authorise the City Relay letter and, also, given Janice's own message to Julian set out in paragraph 103 of this judgment, that she did give Julian an instruction to instruct an 'eviction specialist' Her denials of these facts were either mistaken, or a part of a policy of placating Andrew.
  105. Alongside all the foregoing, Andrew, himself, on 19 October 2019, emailed David and, separately Janice, copied to Julian, and Derek.. He explained, correctly, that Janice had been made well aware of the City Relay arrangement, which had never been a secret, and he explained, further, that the rentals received went to pay for the maintenance and 'upkeep of a 200 year old house'. He complained, again, of his constant bullying and vilification and indicated, again, that, unless things changed, he would have to move away and remove himself from the family. He identified a date for this as June 2023.
  106. The episode terminated, following some further recrimination, with Janice explaining to Andrew, in texts of 27 October and 27 November 2022, that she had never read the 10 August 2020 email, set out in paragraph 49 of this judgment, but that she knew that Andrew would have dealt with things meticulously and was pleased that Andrew had found a way to support himself.
  107. It is apparent from the foregoing, that, as contrasted with the earlier years, by 2022, Andrew's brothers were taking a much larger role, in respect of Janice's affairs and the Property. That role, as already stated, has culminated in Janice granting David and Derek power of attorney. The brothers' intervention extended, also, to the contents of Janice's will.
  108. In September 2022, there were email exchanges between the brothers and Janice in respect of Janice's United States will. The brothers were of the view that the United States will should embrace the Property and that, having regard to the benefits (use of the Property and the Monaco property) that Andrew had already received, he should be excluded as a beneficiary. On 29 September 2022, as appears from an email from Janice to David of that date, Janice executed a new United States will, excluding Andrew. This will was not produced at trial and although it is unclear whether, in fact, it embraced the Property, or whether, as previously, it related only to Janice's United States estate, the tenor of the email suggests that it amounted to a total exclusion of Andrew from his mother's testamentary estate.
  109. Whether or not that be the case, on 10 May 2023, Janice made a further will, in respect of her United Kingdom estate, under which each of her four children were to receive one quarter of the value of the property and under which David and Derek were named as executors. As I understand it, although there may, by now, be a further will in respect of Janice's United Kingdom estate, it was the May 2023 will which was in force when the events, which ultimately generated, or gave rise to, these proceedings, took place.
  110. Reverting to November 2022, on 25 November 2022, just before Thanksgiving, Janice texted Andrew about the Property, suggesting that when the market improved, he should sell the Property and start a new life and reiterating her intention to leave him the Property and its contents. As set out in paragraph 108 of this judgment, it is unclear as to whether that intention was reflected in her then current testamentary dispositions.
  111. Be that as it may, by December 2022, Janice was again explaining to Andrew how she had come to be mistaken about the arrangements with City Relay, that (not entirely correctly, as set out in paragraph 104 of this judgment) she had not tried to evict him and that she had fought tooth and nail for him. The tenor of the message is that she asks to be left in peace, with the suggestion, as it seems, that Andrew was still reproaching her in respect of the matter.
  112. Janice was not left in peace. On 6 February 2023, she was texted by Andrew, accusing her of senility and dementia, as the explanation for her 'incoherent messages', stating that she wanted him 'dead and buried' and accusing her, further, of bullying and gaslighting him and using him as a 'punch bag'. What prompted this outburst is not at all clear. Its effect upon Janice is reflected in an email of 5 March 2023, in which she describes Andrew as calling her demented senile, psychotic and vicious.
  113. What is clear, is that, by 16 February 2023, John D Wood had confirmed her titles to the Property (31 and 31A), that she was enquiring of David what steps she could take if Andrew refused to co-operate in a sale and was confiding in Marlene that she was contemplating going to London to organise the sale. Within a month of the 6 February text, formal steps began to be taken in respect of the sale of the Property.
  114. On 2 March 2023, Janice signed a notice to the effect that for family and financial reasons she was engaging Robert Green, of John D Wood, together with her sons and attorneys, to handle the sale of the Property and that all communications in respect of the Property should be directed to Robert Green and her attorneys. That notice was plainly a professionally prepared document.
  115. By 17 March 2023, solicitors, Grosvenor Law, had been retained on behalf of Janice. As explained by David to his mother's accountant, Sam Gilliland, Janice had decided to sell and Grosvenor Law had been retained to assist in the sale and to take legal steps in order to convince Andrew to move out.
  116. Janice explained this decision in her written evidence on the footing that, as set out in paragraph 82 of this judgment, she needed the proceeds of the Property in order to purchase a home for herself without 'cashing out' her investment portfolio. Although, on behalf of Andrew it was submitted that the character of property, suitable for Janice's needs and circumstances, did not warrant the level of expenditure, or, in particular, the size of property that Janice had in mind, I did not find myself in any doubt but that Janice's written evidence accurately reflected her reasons for wishing the Property sold.
  117. On 29 March 2023, notices to quit were served in respect of the Property. The notices were expressed to expire on 10 May 2023.
  118. Notwithstanding service of notice, Janice continued to communicate with Andrew. On 13 April 2023, she texted Andrew, remembering the good times, telling him that he could 'pile on' whatever insults he wanted but she would never stop loving him, and, in reference, I think, to the notice to quit, telling him, also, that 'what is happening now I didn't initiate'
  119. While that last may be strictly true, in the sense that the process will have been dealt with, on her behalf, by her attorneys and by professionals and in the sense that she will have been unlikely to have been made fully aware of the details of the process, I am not in doubt but that Janice was well aware of and approved what was happening.
  120. On 17 April 2023, there was a lengthy exchange of texts between either David or Derek and Janice. Janice asked whether this was the day when Andrew was supposed to be evicted and was informed, slightly erroneously, that the date that Andrew had to move out was 14 May 2023. She asked about Andrew's stance in respect of the eviction and was told that he was fighting it and raising familiar grievances against 'the family'. She asked whether Andrew had mentioned his 'endless privileges' and remarked how his 'horrible' parents had allowed him live in the Property for 25 or 30 years.
  121. Despite the foregoing, Janice wrote to Andrew on 2 May 2023. Her letter expressed her love, recalled their good times, contemplated living with him, feared not seeing him again, but recognised that he would be leaving the Property.
  122. As appears from correspondence between Grosvenor Law and counsel then instructed by Andrew, in early May 2023, and from text messages at the time, Andrew had, at this point, taken his stand on a TR1 allegedly executed in his favour by Janice, but never registered, pursuant to which he asserted beneficial ownership of the Property. It appears, in context, that Andrew was harking back to the events of 2021. This allegation has never been pursued and does not appear to have any support in the evidence.
  123. The notices to quit expired on 10 May 2023. On that day Janice emailed Andrew, stating that the decision to sell the Property was entirely hers. On 16 May 2023, she was texting her sons, enquiring how matters could be expedited, checking that she had provided all the authority that her lawyers required and, having been told, that the notice had expired, requiring to know how physical possession could be obtained; to which she was told that possession would have to await mediation or a court order.
  124. By 18 May 2023, however, David, Julian and Derek were considering going to London to 'get the House listed'. Apparently fearing violence from Andrew, they talked about employing a security guard and informing the local police, Their apparent concern was to enable John D Wood to have access in order to measure up the Property for sale. This approach had, I think, been initiated by Derek, who, on 10 May 2023, had texted his mother, suggesting that they stop the legal process and negotiate 'something or anything' with Andrew.
  125. I am satisfied, having heard the evidence of the three brothers, that it was no part of their intention to forcibly remove Andrew from the Property. As later texts show, they were, however, anxious as to the logistics of Andrew leaving the Property and also as the availability of access to the Property. Andrew had (and presumably still has) a very bulky bed and concerns were raised by Derek, by text, on 25 May 2023, as to how, if Andrew had made no plans, this could be removed. Envisaging, as I see it, problems as to access, it was contemplated that locks might have to be changed and new keys made available.
  126. It was Derek, also, who suggested, in the same text, that Julian should contact Andrew to tell him what was in the wind and to give him an opportunity to remove his belongings gradually, before, what he termed, 'the circus of Bury Walk'. That use of language plainly envisaged the likelihood, or possibility, of the confrontation which, in the event, occurred and, in retrospect, it is very unfortunate that Derek's suggestion was not taken up.
  127. Janice, herself, did, so it appears, contemplate what, in a text of 20 May 2023, she referred to as Andrew's 'forcible extraction', from the Property. She compounded this, by a further text of 24 May 2023, in which she referred to the need for a truck and two men to get Andrew's clothes and furniture out of the Property and the need to have a locksmith to change the locks.
  128. As foreshadowed in paragraph 126 of this judgment, Andrew was not forewarned of his family's intentions.
  129. On Saturday 10 June 2023, Janice and Andrew's brothers, having flown overnight from America, attended the Property. They had not instructed a locksmith, nor made any other arrangements to force access and, as already stated, I am satisfied that, whatever Janice may earlier have had in mind, their collective purpose was no more than to attempt to come to some arrangement with Andrew, as had been contemplated by Derek, and to get the Property to the market
  130. Matters, however, got completely out of hand. The keys that Janice and her sons had for the Property did not work and, even when Andrew saw who was there from his kitchen window, including, as he stated, in his written evidence, his mother slumped in a chair in the garden looking unwell, he was not prepared to open the door. The situation was heightened by the fact that Janice needed access to use the lavatory facilities and, in the absence of access, had in due course, to find her way to a local public house.
  131. Inevitably, the situation became strained and hostile. A locksmith was called to, unsuccessfully, drill out the locks. Andrew telephoned the police, who, by speakerphone, directed the locksmith to stop his work. Eventually Derek obtained a crow bar from a local ironmonger and, with Janice's authority, broke open the door. Police were called again and attended the Property, by which time Janice and the three brothers were in the house and Andrew had retreated to his bedroom. Some pushing and shoving seems to have taken place on the stairway. The police summoned an ambulance for Janice and Andrew rang 999 to secure the assistance of paramedics in respect of a panic attack. The police allowed Janice to remain in the Property. The three brothers were directed to leave.
  132. Janice remained at the Property until flying back to America with David and Julian on 13 June 2023. Derek returned to America earlier. On 11 and 12 June 2013, the brothers, although staying elsewhere, spent time at the Property. It is plain that the situation remained hostile and, in Andrew's perception, intimidatory. A new front door was installed and, on 12 June 2023, Andrew was given a key. Until then he was, he says, afraid to leave the Property for fear of not being able to regain access. Also on 12 July 2023, a representative and then a photographer, from Beauchamp Estates, who had been instructed to market the Property attended the Property to measure up and to take photographs.
  133. In the afternoon of 12 June, Andrew received, by email, drafts of two agreements, ostensibly signed by Janice and apparently prepared by David; a so-called Co-operation Agreement and an 'Addendum to any current lease agreement'. Under the Co-operation Agreement he was to agree to co-operate in the showing of the Property to prospective buyers and liaising, in that regard, with Beauchamp Estates. Under the Addendum, Andrew was to agree not to make, or allow to be made, any changes to the locks, or locking arrangements, at the Property.
  134. At trial, Janice, but not, I think, Andrew's three brothers, was cross examined about her signature on these documents. Her evidence was that the signatures in question were not hers, in that they appeared to be reduced in size from her normal signature. It seems likely that this was the case and that her signature had been electronically transferred, in a reduced size, from some other document. I am not persuaded, however, that this is a matter of more than incidental significance. As set out in the next paragraph, Andrew declined to enter into these agreements. Additionally, by this stage, as I understand it, Derek and David had power of attorney and consequent authority to act on Janice's behalf and, whatever the format of the documentation, that, as it seems to me, is what they were doing.
  135. Andrew's evidence is that he was told by David, by the email that accompanied the documents, that if he refused to sign these documents then a security guard would be installed in the Property to facilitate showings and that, in the evening of 12 June, David came to the Property and tried to intimidate him into signing. Andrew refused to sign and later that evening security guards came to the Property, one of whom stayed overnight.
  136. On 13 June 2023, this Claim was issued and Andrew applied for and was granted a without notice injunction restraining the Defendants from taking possession of the Property or otherwise interfering with Andrew's possession of the Property. On 5 July 2023, undertakings to the same effect were given by the Defendants, until final judgment in these proceedings, or further order, and that is how matters now stand.
  137. Against and in the context of this extensive background, Andrew asserts the claims outlined in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this judgment.
  138. In regard to proprietary estoppel, his case, as set out in paragraph 11 of his re-re-re-amended particulars of claim, is that Janice and Mr Grijns always encouraged Andrew to remain at the Property, dissuaded him from moving out or looking to buy a flat of his own in London and led him to believe that he would be given the Property either during their lifetime or that it would be left to him in their wills, either entirely, or the majority of its value.
  139. By way of particulars of that broad assertion, Andrew relies upon a number of matters.
  140. He avers that he was the recipient of frequent oral assurances that he could live at the Property indefinitely and that Janice asked him to assure her that he would keep and live at the Property after she passed away.
  141. He relies, further, upon the December 2017 text exchanges set out in paragraph 38 of this judgment, the 9 May 2020 letter, set out in paragraphs 44 and 45 of this judgment, the email of 26.February 2021 and the 1 March 2021 will, set out in paragraph 59 of this judgment, the email and text exchanges set out in paragraph 67 of this judgment, Janice's text of 16 July 2021, set out in paragraph 68 of this the judgment, the audio recordings, in October 2022, referred to in paragraphs 97 and 98 0r this judgment, and Janice's text of 25 November 2022, referred to in paragraph 110 of this judgment.
  142. Andrew's contention is that these texts and emails are consistent with and, therefore support and confirm the earlier oral assurances given to him by his parents.
  143. His further contention, as set out in paragraph 12 of his re-re-re-amended particulars of claim, is that in reliance upon his parents' assurances that the Property would be gifted to him he carried out improvements to the Property and, as he puts it, 'ordered his life in a manner that assumed that that the assurances' he had been given would be honoured
  144. In regard to improvements, he particularises works carried out between 2012 and 2021 to the value of £32,250, but estimates overall expenditure, in respect of repairs, maintenance, renewals and improvements to the Property since 1999, as being in the order of £80.000.
  145. In regard to the ordering, or shaping, of his life, he asserts that, in 2007, he declined a job opportunity in Singapore because he had secure accommodation in London, that, while diligently reviewing the property market in London, including viewing a number of flats, specifically, in 2012, a new development in Battersea, he was always dissuaded by his mother, who always reassured him that he could live in the Property indefinitely, that, consequently, rather than buying a property in London, he felt able to use his substantial earnings to make annual trips to luxury overseas destinations and to purchase luxury cars in 2004, 2007 and 2011 and to take on a mortgage in respect of his purchase of the Monaco apartment.
  146. Andrew further asserts that, despite his marriage, in 2016, he was encouraged to stay at the Property and that, after leaving his job with Federated Homes, in February 2022, he felt able to take a 'career break', in the belief that his accommodation was secure and that he did not need to earn an income.
  147. Reliance, also, appears to be placed upon the contention that Andrew only wished to be included in his parents' United Kingdom wills, because of his belief, encouraged by his parents, that his life would be spent in the United Kingdom and that the Property, or the majority of its value, would be gifted to him and upon the further contention that, at the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing, referred to in paragraph 40 of this judgment, the judge, in giving guidance as to the financial settlement of Andrew's divorce from Philippe, took the view that the fact, that the Property might be gifted to, or inherited by, Andrew, should be taken into account in respect of that settlement, leading, it is said, to a higher divorce settlement with Philippe than would otherwise have been agreed.
  148. The pleaded consequence of the foregoing is said to be that it would be unconscionable for Janice to now resile from that which, knowingly, or unknowingly, she has allowed Andrew to assume to his detriment and that Andrew is, accordingly, entitled to a declaration that, by virtue of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, he is entitled to the, or a, proprietary interest in the Property and, pending adjudication of that interest an irrevocable licence to remain at the Property. In the event and as set out in paragraph 168 of this judgment, the interest sought by Andrew is a two thirds interest in the Property.
  149. In regard to the claims arising out of the events of 10 June 2023, Andrew's original claim was a claim in trespass. As advanced at trial, his case is that the conduct of Janice and his brothers on that day were in breach of the provisions of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, unlawful and a trespass, and further, that the period of notice that he was given, by virtue of the notice to quit referred to in paragraph 117 of this judgment was insufficient and the notice invalid, having regard to his lengthy period of occupation of the Property.
  150. His alternative claim, in respect of those events, raised, as set out in paragraph 4 of this judgment, by way of a late amendment, is that, by 10 June 2023 and by reason of the application of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, he already had an equity properly to be satisfied by the grant of the, or a, proprietary interest in the Property and a corresponding equitable right arising out of that equity, that his occupation, pursuant to that equity, or pursuant to the interest to be granted in satisfaction of that equity, should not be interfered with, other than in accordance with the law and by way of due process.
  151. In regard to the trespass claim, Andrew asserts that the conduct of Janice and his brothers, on 10 June 2023, and its consequences was such as to entitle him to aggravated and/or exemplary damages.
  152. In regard, to the alleged breach of equitable obligation, he claims equitable compensation.
  153. In response to the proprietary estoppel claim, Janice, by her defence, served on behalf of herself and Andrew's three brothers, denies that either she or her husband ever promised, or assured, Andrew that he would be given the Property or any part of its value. She denies, further, that Andrew was encouraged to believe anything other than that he might secure an interest in the Property with his brothers after both his parents had passed away. Looked at in context, she denies that the various text and email exchanges, relied upon by Andrew and identified in paragraph 141 of this judgment, are consistent with, or supportive of, the assurances, or promises, alleged by Andrew. She relies upon the position set out in her email of 18 October 2021, referred to in paragraph 72 of this judgment, to the effect that the Property was the largest family asset, that it would not be fair to Andrew's brothers if he got 'the whole pie' and that she had the right to dispose of her assets as she wished.
  154. Her position in regard to reliance is that she denies that Andrew has relied, detrimentally, or otherwise, upon any promises or assurances (themselves denied) that the Property would be gifted to him, or that he would enjoy any other right or benefit in respect of it.
  155. Janice admits that Andrew has carried out some improvements, but puts him to proof of their extent and value, She asserts that Andrew has been gifted money to carry out improvements, but that, in any event, in the context of the countervailing benefits that Andrew has received in living almost payment-free in the Property for 24 years, any improvements funded by Andrew cannot be relied upon as being detrimental.
  156. Janice further denies that Andrew has ordered his life on the basis that the alleged assurances would be fulfilled.
  157. He is put to proof of the averment that he elected not to pursue career opportunities overseas by reason of his accommodation status in London. She denies that she dissuaded Andrew from moving from the Property, either after his marriage, or at all, or that his remaining in the Property, almost payment-free, can constitute detrimental reliance.. She denies that such matters as his election to indulge in lavish foreign holidays and expensive motor cars is capable of constituting detrimental reliance, or that his purchase of the Monaco apartment largely with funds provided by his parents can be so regarded. She puts him to proof that his 'career break' is properly attributable to any assurances that he may have received in respect of the Property.
  158. In regard to Andrew's wish to be included only in his parents' United Kingdom wills, Janice asserts that this was unrelated to any assurances that he may have been given, but was Andrew's decision for his own tax reasons. In regard to Andrew's divorce settlement, Janice avers, correctly, as I find and as is set out in paragraphs 39 and 40 of this judgment, that the Property was not taken into account in and did not affect the eventual divorce settlement.
  159. Taken overall, Janice denies that it would be unconscionable for her to rely upon her legal and beneficial rights over and in respect of the Property, or, in consequence, that Andrew is entitled to claim an interest in the Property, by way of proprietary estoppel.
  160. In regard to Andrew's claims arising out of the events of 10 June 2023, Janice and Andrew's brothers deny any trespass and any claim for aggravated or exemplary damages. Their primary defence is that, as the legal and beneficial owner of the Property, Janice was entitled to access her own Property and that, as a bare licensee, or, given the expiry of the notice to quit, a trespasser, Andrew had no right to prevent Janice and those with her from accessing her own property, or, if need arose, from exercising force to secure that access. In regard to the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, their contention is that, as a bare licensee, Andrew occupied under an excluded licence, within the meaning of section 3A(7)(b) of that Act and that, in consequence, the provisions of the Act did not preclude, or render unlawful, or a trespass, their conduct in forcing access to the Property.
  161. In respect of the alternative claim, Janice and the three brothers deny that any equity has arisen in favour of Andrew, or, therefore, the existence of any equitable right, arising in support of that equity, such as to preclude them from interfering with his occupation of the Property, pursuant to the equity, or any interest to be granted in satisfaction of the equity, or such as to render them liable to make equitable compensation in the event of any such interference. They assert, also, that, even if Andrew has an equity, to be satisfied by the grant of an interest, entitling him to continued occupation of the Property of such a nature as to entitle him to deny Janice access to the Property, that interest does not take effect retrospectively and, in consequence, did not preclude Janice, as at 10 June 2023, from asserting her then beneficial and legal rights.
  162. To complete the picture and as outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this judgment, Janice counterclaims for possession and, if need be, sale and asserts money claims in respect of mesne profits and, by way of an account, in respect of Andrew's rental receipts from City Relay, from 2020 onward.
  163. As regards possession and mesne profits, Janice contends that the notice that she gave to Andrew was reasonable, that it served to terminate his licence and, therefore, that, since 10 May 2023, he has occupied the Property as a trespasser and is liable , therefore, to give up possession and to pay mesne profits, at the market rate, from 10 May 2023 until possession is delivered up.
  164. As regards sale, that claim only arises in the event that, contrary to her defence, Andrew is found to be entitled to a beneficial interest in the Property, in satisfaction of his claimed equity. In that event, however, Janice asserts that the circumstances that I have set out in this judgment and, in particular, her need to release funds in order to rehouse herself in Connecticut entitle her to seek the exercise of the court's discretion in her favour, pursuant to section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996
  165. As regards the rental account, her case, as foreshadowed in paragraph 6 of this judgment, is that Andrew's lettings of 31A, through City Relay, from 2020, were carried on without her express approval, such that Andrew is accountable for the rents and profits received in respect of those lettings.
  166. Andrew's primary answer to Janice's counterclaim, in regard to possession and mesne profits, is that, by virtue of the equity that he has established and by virtue of the beneficial interest to which he has become entitled in satisfaction of that equity (an interest entitling him to possession of the Property) he is not a trespasser in the Property, cannot be evicted as such and is not, in consequence, liable to pay mesne profits in respect of his occupation..
  167. His further contention, even in the absence of any rights arising by way of proprietary estoppel, is that, having regard to the length and quality of his occupation, the period of notice provided was insufficient and, further, that, at the point in time when the counterclaim for possession was launched, 1 August 2023, reasonable notice had still not expired, such that no cause of action for possession had arisen.
  168. In regard to sale, as appears from counsel's opening written submissions, on behalf of Andrew, Andrew is not seeking, in satisfaction of his equity, a long term occupational interest. What he seeks, in satisfaction of his equity is the grant of the two thirds beneficial interest in the Property, contemplated by the 2015 will; the value of that interest to be released to him on sale. It follows that an order for sale, in the event that Andrew is granted an interest in the Property, is not in issue and is not a matter of dispute.
  169. In regard to what I will call the City Relay account, Andrew's pleaded case is that Janice was well aware of the arrangements with City Relay from the outset, having been made aware of and having approved those arrangements, by way of the email exchange referred to in paragraph 49 of this judgment, that at no stage thereafter, at least until the outset of these proceedings, did Janice assert any claim to the rents received and that Janice, thereby, acquiesced in Andrew's retention of rents received and waived any right she would otherwise have had thereto.
  170. Although, as demonstrated in the foregoing paragraphs, there are other issues of importance in this litigation, it is not in doubt but that the fundamental question for determination, both in its own right and as it bears upon the other issues before the court, is the question as to whether Andrew has established his claim in proprietary estoppel and, if so, whether he is entitled to the relief that he seeks, or some other and different relief.
  171. I will, accordingly, deal, first, with the proprietary estoppel claim and, thereafter and to the extent necessary, the other issues raised between the parties.
  172. The principles applicable to a claim in proprietary estoppel are, by now, well understood and, although I was asked to (and did) consider a considerable body of authority, there was, in essence, very little between the parties as to the law.
  173. In very broad summary, a proprietary estoppel will arise in circumstances where a person is promised that he, or she, will receive property in the future, or is informally assured that the property is already his, or hers, and where in reliance upon that promise, or assurance, that person has acted to his detriment, such that it is unconscionable for the promisor, or assurer, to resile from, or repudiate, his promise, or assurance, In those circumstances an 'equity' will have arisen in favour of the promisee, or person assured, and, in satisfaction of that 'equity' and to protect the promisee, or person assured, from the consequences of the promisor, or assurer's, repudiation of his, or her, promise, or assurance, the court will craft a remedy which seeks to deal with the unconscionability created by the promisor, or assurer's. repudiation of his, or her, promise, or assurance.
  174. Turning to the constituents of such an estoppel, in a little more detail, the necessary and fundamental starting point, in any given case, is that there must be a promise made, or an assurance given, to the person asserting an entitlement by way of proprietary estoppel, that that person is to have, in the future, an interest in, or a right over, or in respect of land. The right assured, or promised, may be no more than a right of occupation, or as much as a freehold interest. It must, however, pertain to land. It is, at the least, questionable, whether, therefore, a promise that a person will receive a share in the proceeds of sale of land, or, say, a share in the profits, arising from the development of land, will fall within the doctrine.
  175. The promise, or assurance, in question must be of such a sufficient quality, or calibre, as to be reasonably understood as having been seriously intended to be relied upon. The fact that the person making the promise, or giving the assurance, did not, subjectively, intend the promise to be taken seriously, or relied upon, does not detract from the ability of the promise, or assurance, in question to ground a proprietary estoppel, if, otherwise, it presents as having the requisite quality. It goes without saying that the recipient of the promise, or assurance, must himself, or herself, subjectively understand the promise as having been seriously intended to be relied upon.
  176. Particularly where an alleged promise, or assurance, bears upon testamentary intentions, the court must be careful to distinguish between statements of present intention and commitments as to future conduct. A statement of present intention, even if repeated and even if relied upon by the recipient to his or her detriment, cannot, in itself, ground a claim in proprietary estoppel. The question for resolution has to be whether the statement, or statements, in question, viewed objectively and in context, went beyond a statement of intention and became something reasonably to be understood as giving rise to a commitment to make the relevant gift, or disposition.
  177. Even where a statement carries with it the requisite quality of commitment, such as to be reasonably understood as giving rise to a promise, or assurance, intended to be relied upon, the context, or circumstances, in which the promise was given may bear upon the way that the promise can be reasonably understood. An apparently absolute promise that the promisor will, in the future, gift land to the promisee, may, in context, only be reasonably understood as taking effect in the circumstances that the promisor and promisee maintain the relationship which gave rise to the promise, or in the circumstances that the promisor's needs and circumstances remain unaltered.
  178. In regard to reliance, the starting point, here, is that the reliance must be reasonable. That said, if a promise, or assurance has been made of such a nature and quality as to be reasonably understood as having been seriously intended to be relied upon (without which there will not have been a relevant assurance, or promise), it can hardly be unreasonable for the recipient of that promise to rely upon it and to act upon it.
  179. In establishing reliance, it is not necessary to show that the relevant promise, or assurance, was the sole cause of the conduct said to have been carried on in reliance upon the promise, or assurance, in question, provided that it can be shown, to the satisfaction of the court, to have been one of the causes of that conduct.
  180. Additionally and unusually, as explained by Neuberger LJ (as he then was), in Steria Limited v Ronald Hutchinson [2006] EWCA Civ. 1351, at paragraphs 138 to 142, there exists, in respect of reliance and limited to cases of proprietary estoppel, what Neuberger LJ termed a 'questionable principle', arising from dicta of Lord Denning MR, in Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1WLR 316, to the effect that ' where the representation was calculated to influence the judgment of a reasonable man', reliance was to be presumed and the burden, accordingly fell upon the representor to displace the presumption.
  181. Such a presumption, as, further, explained by Neuberger LJ, at paragraph 129, runs contrary to the general and usual principle that a party asserting an estoppel by representation should take on the burden of establishing the essential ingredients of such an estoppel; representation, reliance and detriment. Accordingly, as it is put, in paragraph 130, in Steria, the ambit of this 'questionable principle' should be 'limited to as narrow an area ss respectably possible'.
  182. On the footing last set out, it seems to me that the proper approach to this presumption, to the extent that it arises at all, is to limit it to cases where no other evidence is available, or to regard it as a presumption very readily displaced by other evidence.
  183. Reliance, if established, must be detrimental; detriment being determined at the point in time when the representor resiles from the promise, or assurance, upon which the promisee, or person assured, has allegedly detrimentally relied. Detriment must be substantial, must, contrary to dicta of Lord Denning, in Greasley v Cooke, be proved and must take into account countervailing benefits received by the promisee, consequential upon the promisee acting in the way that he said he did, in reliance upon the promises, or assurances received.. That said, the issue of detriment is not to be addressed as a technical, or spread sheet exercise, but, rather, an evaluative one, bringing into play all matters, financial, or otherwise, capable of bearing on the overall question of detriment. A useful check, as explained by Robert Walker LJ, as he then was, in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210, at 232, below E, as to whether the detriment established is sufficiently substantial, is whether, having regard to that detriment, it would, or would nor, be unjust, or inequitable, to allow the assurance, or promise, to be disregarded without remedy.
  184. Entwined in and, as it has been said, permeating the entire doctrine of proprietary estoppel is the overriding factor of unconscionability. If, standing back from the circumstances of the case and, even if, in some form, the ingredients of representation, reliance and detriment are established, the conduct complained of does not shock the conscience of the court, then, as it was put by Lord Walker, in Cobbe v Yeomans Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752 at paragraph 92, the analysis will need to be considered again. Circumstances may, also, arise, as explained by Lord Briggs, in Guest v Guest [2024] AC 833 at paragraph74, where the promisor's repudiation of his promise in respect of a given property arises out of his, or her, falling on hard times and having to sell the property to pay creditors, or where a sale is required to pay for social care, or medical treatment and where, in consequence, the repudiation is not to be regarded as unconscionable, or as giving rise to a proprietary estoppel. As explained by Murray Rosen QC, sitting as a judge of the Chancery Division, in Horsford v Horsford [2020] EWHC 584 Ch, at paragraph 29, unconscionability is not solely concerned with the actions, or conduct, of the promisor. Accordingly, if the promisee has behaved badly towards the promisor, then that conduct can be brought into account, in determining whether, looked at overall, the promisor's repudiation of his, or her, promise is unconscionable. Unconscionability is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, condition before a proprietary estoppel can be established.
  185. Where the proprietary estoppel is established, the court, as recently and extensively explained by the Supreme Court, in Guest, has a flexible and pragmatic discretion as to how best to remedy the unconscionability created by the promisor, or assurer, resiling from his, or her, promise.
  186. The normal and natural starting point and the simplest way of remedying the unconscionability arising from the promisor, or assurer's repudiation of his promise, or assurance, is to hold the promisor to his promise. If, however, specific enforcement of the promise is out of all proportion to the detriment which has been incurred by the promisee, then the court may be constrained to limit the extent of the remedy. The intent, in that situation, will not be to precisely compensate for the detriment incurred but, rather, to put right the disproportionality between detriment and performance, where the disproportionality is so large that specific enforcement of the promise would stand in the way of doing justice between the parties.
  187. In determining whether there has been disproportionality of that nature, the court is not carrying out a mathematical calculation, but must reflect the non-financial element of the alleged detriment. In cases where it is alleged that the promisee has based his, or her, life on the expectation created by the promisor's promise and has, in consequence lived an entirely different life than might otherwise have been the case, then the 'true' value of the detriment is likely to be impossible to assess and disproportionality, therefore, will not be a helpful determinant as to the extent of the relief to be granted, or, put another way, will not enable the court to say that the enforcement of the relevant promise is out of all proportion to the detriment that the promise has incurred.
  188. In those cases, sometimes termed 'almost contractual', where the promise given is specifically linked to and is, in a sense, the quid pro quo for, the detriment incurred by the promisee, in reliance upon the promisor's promise, there will be the strongest equitable reason to require full enforcement. The promisor has, in effect, set his, or her, terms and if the promisee meets those terms, the promisor can have little complaint if he, or she, is required to fulfil his, or her, promise, even if there can be shown a manifest disparity in value between the value of the promise to be enforced and the detriment incurred.
  189. In other cases, where the promise made is not linked to any specific detrimental conduct by the promisee, then there will be greater scope for a consideration of disproportionality. and greater scope, in crafting the appropriate relief, to have regard to other material circumstances. The court's approach is not to be binary, as between full enforcement, on the one hand, and compensation, based upon the value of the detriment, on the other, such that, if the court moves away from full enforcement it automatically turns towards relief based upon an attempted valuation of the detriment. Such an approach would shackle the wide range of remedy available to the court.
  190. In cases of this nature, it would not be unconscionable to reflect, in the remedy, a promisor's need to realise part of the promised property to meet the needs of medical, or nursing care, or, as contemplated by Lord Briggs, in Guest, at paragraph 6, to limit the extent of enforcement where the effect of full enforcement would be to preclude the promisor from giving effect to other powerful moral and equitable claims upon his bounty and where, therefore, full enforcement, rather than remedying unconscionability, would cause it.
  191. In cases where no reason, other than that full enforcement would be out of all proportion to the detriment incurred by the promise, the court will, simply, do the best it can. In all cases, (Guest, paragraph 80) the yardstick, ultimately, is whether the remedy provided by the court does justice to the parties and to any material third party and the test, as to whether justice has been achieved is whether if the promisor were to confer on the promisee the proposed remedy he would, or would not, be acting unconscionably. The court will have provided the promisee with Scarman LJ's 'minimum equity to do justice' (Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 at 186G), if what Lord Briggs called the 'unconscionability question' is answered in the negative.
  192. As is clear from the pleadings the alleged foundation of Andrew's case, in this case, are the oral assurances said to have been made to him by his father and mother, as set out in paragraph 140 of this judgment. The pleadings provide no dates in respect of these allegedly frequent assurances, but, if they are to have been causative of any of the matters relied upon by Andrew, as carried on in reliance of those assurances, they must necessarily have preceded those matters.
  193. They must, therefore, have preceded the works of improvement particularised in paragraph 144 of this judgment. They must also have preceded all of the matters, pleaded by Andrew and set out in paragraphs 145, 146 and 147 of this judgment, in respect of which, in reliance upon those assurances, he has allegedly ordered, or shaped, his life.
  194. Importantly, in this regard, all of those matters, other than certain of the works of improvement, allegedly carried out in 2021, other than Andrew's alleged decision to take a career break after leaving Federated Homes in early 2022 and other than the fact that the judge at the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing, in November 2018 is said to have taken account of the fact that Andrew might be gifted, or might inherit, the Property, in giving her guidance as to the appropriate financial settlement with Philippe, also preceded the first of the various text, email and other communications (commencing December 2017) set out in paragraph 141 of this judgment and, in consequence, those communications cannot, in themselves and other than in respect of the three matters outlined in this paragraph, be said to be assurances upon which Andrew allegedly relied.
  195. In fairness and as set out in paragraph 142 of this judgment, that is not the claim advanced by Andrew. He relies upon those communications not as providing, or affording, un themselves, promises, or assurances, upon which he detrimentally relied, but as being consistent with and, as I have put it, supportive and confirmatory of the earlier oral assurances upon which he says he did detrimentally rely.
  196. It follows that the existence, or otherwise, of those oral assurances is fundamental to Andrew's case and that, in the absence of those assurances, his case fails.
  197. I am not satisfied that those assurances were ever given, or, correspondingly, relied upon; nor that, looked at in the full context of the facts of this case, as set out earlier in this judgment, the communications relied upon by Andrew are consistent with, let alone supportive, or confirmatory, of the oral representations alleged.
  198. Nor am I satisfied, were it to be so alleged, that those communications, or any of them, set in their proper context, were relied upon by Andrew, when he left Federated Homes, as assuring him of his security in the Property, such that he could take a career break, or that the guidance given by the judge at the Financial Dispute Resolution, in any way, reflected that those communications had afforded Andrew an assurance that he would be given, or would be left, the Property, or that any of the alleged works of improvement were carried on in reliance upon those communications.
  199. Andrew's written and oral evidence, as to the key oral assurances, was limited, generic and wholly lacking in detail. It was not until witness statements were finally exchanged on 14 November 2024, just fourteen days, or so, before trial, that any date, at all, was identified in respect of the alleged assurances and then only to state that those assurances commenced around Christmas 2004. In regard to their substance, subject to what is said in paragraph 265 of this judgment, Andrew has never provided any specific evidence as to the words used, in giving the alleged assurances, or as to any specific occasions, or circumstances, in which the supposed assurances were given..
  200. His evidence is simply that he was told, by his mother, either in person, when she was in London, or orally, on the telephone, and sometimes in the presence of his father, that he could live in the Property indefinitely and that he was asked to assure his mother that he would keep and live in the Property after she passed away. He does not assert any overt, or specific promise, or assurance, that he would be left the Property, rather that by, in particular, seeking his assurance that he would live in the Property after her death, he was led, by his mother to believe that the Property was to be left to him.
  201. His only supporting evidence emanated from his best friend, Anthony Bosco, and a near neighbour, at the Property, Ashley Ross-Skinner who told me, in the case of Anthony Bosco, that at Andrew's 2016 wedding, both Andrew's parent had told him of their hope that the Property would remain in the family and, in the case of Ashley Ross-Skinner, that, in February 2020, Janice told her, in casual conversation, while returning from lunch at a restaurant close to the Property, that she hoped that Andrew would continue living at the Property. At the time of both conversations, Andrew was the principal beneficiary under the 2015 will and, apparently, in a good position, if he so chose, to buy out his brothers' shares and retain the property after his parents' death. While I have no reason to doubt either witness, their evidence tells me nothing at all as to what promises, or assurances, might have been made to Andrew many years earlier.
  202. Although Andrew's pleaded contention is that the effect of his parents' statements was to lead him to believe that he would either be gifted the Property, or the majority of its value, there is nothing, at all, in the oral statements allegedly made to found the belief that he was to be left a majority share in the Property and it is manifest that that part of Andrew's formulation rests not upon his mother's, or his parents' alleged oral statements, but upon the content of the very much later communications set out in paragraph 141 of this judgment and, perhaps most particularly, upon Janice 's assertion, in the 9 May 2020 letter, that Andrew was the 'majority heir' to the Property.
  203. The first question, here, taking Andrew's evidence on its own terms, but excluding, for the reasons last set out, the suggestion that the oral assurances led him to the belief that he might receive a majority share in the Property, is whether, realistically, Andrew could have taken these statements, if made, as constituting, or giving rise to, an implied promise that he would be left the Property of such a quality as , as set out in paragraph 175 of this judgment (itself derived from Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776), as being reasonably understood as intended to be taken seriously as an assurances to be relied on, or whether, properly understood and having regard to Janice's dramatic nature and undoubted love for the Property, these statements, if made, reflected no more than something of a romantic fantasy.
  204. If I had had to resolve that question, I would have found that Janice's statements were no more than the expression of a romantic wish as to a much loved Property, rather than statements that she seriously intended to be relied upon, or statements that could reasonably have been understood by Andrew as being so intended.
  205. In the result, I do not have to resolve that question because I am satisfied that the statements, upon which Andrew asserts that he relied upon, in shaping his life, were never made.
  206. Andrew was not a trustworthy, or a reliable witness, or, therefore, a witness upon which the court could rely in determining whether, or not the alleged, statements, promises, or assurances were ever made.
  207. As I have already noted, in paragraph 92 of this judgment, Andrew plainly lied to John D Wood, in September 2022, as to Janice's ability and capacity to sell the Property. It emerged in evidence, also, that, for purposes of the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing on 30 November 2018, Andrew had employed a make up artist in order to make himself look, as he put it in an email to the theatrical agency that he has instructed, 'very tired older and withdrawn', presumably in an attempt to attract the sympathy of the judge at that hearing.
  208. In further regard to that hearing, Andrew's pleaded case, as set out in paragraph 147 of this judgment, is that, to his detriment, the fact that he might be gifted, or left, the Property was taken into account by the judge, at that hearing, in giving guidance as to settlement. That was untrue. The judge, as is set out in paragraph 40 of this judgment, specifically gave guidance on the basis of Philippe's needs and not at all upon the basis of any expectations that Andrew might have in respect of the Property.
  209. Similarly, Andrew's pleaded case, also set out in paragraph 147 of this judgment, asserted that the reason that Andrew did not wish to be included in his parents' United States wills, but only in their United Kingdom wills because of his belief, encouraged by his parents, that his life would be led in the United Kingdom and he would be gifted the Property, or the bulk of its value. That was also untrue. It is perfectly clear, as appears from paragraphs 23, 28, 43, 54 and 73 of this judgment, that Andrew's wish, to avoid his name appearing in his parents' United States wills and his corresponding wish to secure an enhanced provision, relative to his brothers, in his parents' United Kingdom wills, was nor related to any belief, encouraged by his parents, that his life would be led in the United Kingdom, or that the property, or the bulk of it, would come to him from his parents, but, rather, his continuing concern that any reference to him in his parents' United States wills might unleash a tax investigation of his undeclared earnings which, understandably, he wished to avoid.
  210. None of these matters give me any encouragement at all as to the trust, or reliance, that I can place in Andrew's evidence. Nor did I find his evidence, under cross examination, evidence that I could safely believe.
  211. Andrew was cross examined at length. He was a very unsatisfactory witness. At no stage did I feel that he was seeking to assist the court by providing an honest and objective account of his dealings with his mother and father. He was manifestly defensive in his testimony, seeking to deflect, or trivialise, any aspect of the documentary material about which he was asked, wherever, or whenever, he saw, or thought, it to be adverse to his case.
  212. By way of example and as recorded in paragraphs 53 and 73 of this judgment, in email exchanges between Andrew and Janice, in, respectively, October 2020 and October 2021, which were manifestly serious and highly charged, Andrew chose to characterise his responses to his mother as 'flippant'. That was, simply, untrue.
  213. Similarly, when confronted with the evidence (his own email of 23 November 2018 ) of his attempt to procure sympathy at the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing, by having himself made up as very tired older and withdrawn, his response was to say that the whole thing was a joke. It was not.
  214. When, in September 2020, as set out in paragraph 50 of this judgment, Andrew was asked to secure an appraisal of the Property by John D Wood, he sought to explain that request not as manifesting any real intention in Janice to sell the Property, but, as he put it, as a form of social activity upon her part, founded upon her background in real estate and reflecting no more than a desire to indulge her interest in property. At the time of Janice's request she was in America and hardly likely, therefore, to instruct a property agent for social purposes, or a discussion.
  215. Andrew was similarly dismissive of other evidence as to his mother's intentions in respect of sale, presumably seeing those intentions as being inconsistent with his core assertion that she had wished the Property retained. Although, as is clear from the factual narrative set out earlier in this judgment, the question of sale was regularly under discussion from 2015 onwards, Andrew's repeated evidence was that his mother's interest in sale was fleeting, or not serious. While Janice's attitude to and reasons for selling undoubtedly fluctuated, as Andrew and her circumstances changed, the facts tell a different story.
  216. Of even more concern, in evaluating Andrew's evidence was the very clear impression conveyed by his evidence that it was a 'construct'; that is to say that Andrew, having, as it would seem, read and assimilated some of the case law relating to proprietary estoppel, had constructed his case in accordance with his reading. There were, as it seemed to me, clear aspects of his oral testimony which appeared to derive from and even adopt the language of the case law, culminating, until stopped by the court, with his attempt to cite Guest, or language derived from Guest, as part of his testimony.
  217. As part of what seemed to me to be this 'constructive' process, Andrew's evidence, under cross examination, sought to back-date statements made by his mother, at a very much later date in the factual chronology, in order to present them to the court as reflecting the oral assurances upon which he said that he had relied, The most obvious example of this and which became, as it was, rightly, put by Miss Haren KC, on behalf of Janice and Andrew's brothers, something of a mantra was his repeated assertion that Janice had told him that his accommodation at the Property was 'secure'. The source of that assertion, I have little doubt, was Janice's statement, in the circumstances and context set out in paragraph 38 of this judgment, that Andrew had 'total security' at the Property. That statement, however, was made in December 2017 and can have had nothing to do with the way that Andrew shaped, or ordered, his life prior to that date.
  218. I add, parenthetically, that although, on the whole, I took the view that Janice, while, undoubtedly, handicapped by age, fatigue and ill health (the trial was adjourned for the best part of two days, when Janice had a fall at her Connecticut apartment) was, in her evidence, trying to tell me the truth and was, subject to those limitations, largely reliable as a witness, the one aspect of her evidence which was palpably untrue was her attempted explanation of her use of the phrase 'total security'. She sought to tell me that this reference to total security was a reference to Andrew's physical security, in the sense that the Property provided him with accommodation in which he could be physically secure. That, with respect, was nonsense. I will return to other aspects of her evidence later in this judgment.
  219. Coupled with the very poor quality and reliability of Andrew's evidence, the case he advances seems to me to suffer from serious inconsistencies, having regard to other material facts.
  220. The core suggestion advanced by Andrew is that his mother, by seeking his assurance that he would remain at the Property after she died, had implicitly assured him that he would be left the Property. Mr Grijns was allegedly privy to the conversations in which Andrew's assurance was sought and, accordingly, was party to and complicit in this implicit assurance.
  221. Emails from Mr Grijns, both to Andrew and to his friend and personal banker, Robert Wortelboer, on 31 October 2011, do not, in any way, reflect that Mr Grijns had seen himself, or his wife, as having given any such assurance to Andrew, or that their conversations with Andrew had resulted in any understanding, or arrangement that he would be left the Property.
  222. The two emails to Mr Wortelboer, on 31 October 2011, made it plain that Mr Grijn's was of the belief that Andrew would soon be moving out of the Property, to take up a position in Monaco, that the most important aspect of his and Janice's ownership of the Property had been to provide Andrew with a 'launching pad' for his career, but that, now Andrew was leaving the Property his and Janice's intended course of action was to sell. There is nothing there at all to suggest that it was remotely in Mr Grijns' thinking that the Property had been promised to Andrew, or that there was any long term expectation that Andrew would remain there. The converse was the case. Andrew was leaving and the Property was to be sold.
  223. The email of the same date to Andrew reflected the same thinking. Andrew was moving to Monaco and would have no need of the Property. The Property could be sold and the proceeds would enable, or assist in, the purchase of a Property in New Orleans. There is no hint, or suggestion, that Andrew had been promised the Property or given any long term expectation as to his occupation. Nor, given the fact that Mr Grijns was evidently of the understanding that Andrew was about to move to Monaco, which understanding must, realistically, have emanated from Andrew, does this email suggest, in any way at all, that Andrew had, as he now contends, ordered his life on the basis that his life would be lived at the Property and that he would not move elsewhere.
  224. As material as these emails themselves, is Andrew's apparent lack of any response to them. One would have expected, had Andrew been given the assurances for which he now contends and had he determined to shape his life upon those assurances, as he now contends, that his father's emails, resiling, effectively, from those assurances and contemplating a move by Andrew to Monaco which Andrew, seemingly, would have had no intention of making, would have been met with a robust response. There is no suggestion, however, in any of the materials before the court, nor even, in any substantial way, in Andrew's evidence at trial, that Andrew questioned, or challenged the idea of a sale, or denied his father's premise that he was intending to move to Monaco, or raised with his parents the fact that they had given him to believe that he could remain indefinitely at the Property and that the Property was to be his.
  225. The contention that Andrew, consequent upon the assurances that he had received, shaped his career and his life on the basis of his occupation of the Property does not, also, sit well with his dealings in respect of the purchase of the Monaco property. In 2013, when the property was purchased, Andrew approached bankers in Monaco to arrange a mortgage, He informed those bankers, as appears from his email of 4 June 2013, that his plan had always been to move back to Monaco 'at some point in the near future'. This does not suggest, or accord with, an intention, induced by assurances received from his parents, to make a permanent home at the Property. The same point can also be made, in respect of Andrew's attitude towards a sale, in 2016, as set out in paragraph 36 of this judgment, and Andrew's own apparent plans, in respect of the purchase of his own property, as set out in paragraphs 36, 37 and 38 of this judgment.
  226. Andrew's parents' intentions in respect of the Property crystallised very clearly in 2015, as set out in paragraphs 28 , 29, 30 and 31 of this judgment. As they explained both to Andrew and to their United States lawyers, they had decided, after 'three years of soul searching' and a 'largely sleepless night' that they would leave Andrew an effective two-thirds interest in the Property, thereby compensating him for his receiving nothing from their United States estates, while giving effect to his wish not to be mentioned in their United States wills. Andrew's response was to thank his parents for their generosity.
  227. What is plain from the contents of those paragraphs is that they present no indication, whatsoever, that any previous assurances had been made to Andrew in respect of the Property, or that Andrew's parents saw themselves, in any way, as resiling from any earlier implicit promise, or assurance, that Andrew would receive the entire Property. What is equally plain, given Andrew's response, is that he, too, had not seen his parents as having given him any prior assurances. The body of evidence, in this case, shows, overwhelmingly, that Andrew is astute as to his own interests. It is inconceivable that, if what he was told by his parents in 2015, had differed from what he had understood to be the case prior to that date, he would have said, or done, nothing to query what his parents had decided. Yet, nothing was said, or done,
  228. The same point, writ large, applies to the entirety of Andrew's dealings with Janice, in the years encompassed by this case. At no stage in all their lengthy exchanges as to the Property, as to its sale, or as to whether or not it was to be gifted to Andrew, does Andrew make any suggestion at all either that he had, earlier, been promised the Property, or that he had founded his life on that promise.
  229. Andrew contends that the email and text correspondence that he identifies and relies upon, as set out in paragraph 141 of this judgment, are consistent with the earlier implicit assurances upon which he says he relied. I completely disagree. Those communications, when set in the full context of all the other communications about the Property between Andrew and his mother, are wholly inconsistent with the case that Andrew advances.
  230. In none of the exchanges as to sale, even when in October 2020, as set out in paragraph 53 of this judgment, he described himself as being 'kicked out' of the Property, can there be found any objection by Andrew that a sale would be unfair because he had long been promised the Property and had ordered his life on the promise. In none of the exchanges as to an inter vivos transfer of the Property is anything at all said along the lines of 'look this is what you have always promised'. When, in October 2021, as set out in paragraph 72 of this judgment, Janice reminded Andrew of her entitlement to dispose of her property as she wished, there was no protest, or objection, by Andrew to the effect that this was contrary to the promises that had been made to him and upon which he had relied. For someone as desirous as Andrew plainly was to either retain the Property, or, at the least, to extract a substantial part of its value, not to raise with his mother, or remind his mother of, promises which had been made to him about the Property and not to explain to his mother how he had relied upon those promises, as shaping his life, is, I reiterate, inconceivable. Yet, throughout the exchanges catalogued in this judgment, there is no material of this type to be found.
  231. Nor, correspondingly and as expanded upon later in this judgment, is there to be found, in those exchanges, anything at all to suggest either that Janice, when electing, in March 2021, to make a will leaving the Property entirely to Andrew, or, when, during the email exchanges described in paragraphs 66 and 67 of this judgment, Janice purported to gift the Property to Andrew, was acting in implementation of some prior promise, or that, when the sale of the Property came under consideration, she saw herself as anything other than a free agent in respect of her dealings with the Property. Tellingly, in her email exchanges with Marlene and Marlene's husband, Alan, as set out in paragraphs 56, 62 and 63 of this judgment and in which Janet spoke frankly, in seeking their advice in respect of the Property, there is no suggestion at all that Janice's decisions were constrained by any promises, or assurances, that she had made to Andrew in the past, or anything to suggest that she saw herself, in her decision making about the Property, as subject to any limitations upon the way that she could deal with the Property.
  232. Alongside all of the foregoing, it is, I think, also important to stand back and to look at the case advanced by Andrew in the round.
  233. In essence, his case is that from 2004, when he would have been in his late-twenties, he has elected to shape his life around implicit, but not explicit, promises made to him by his parents as to the future of the Property. He has, on that basis, he says, improved the Property and most materially, eschewed other opportunities to make his own life in his own home, such that his mother having resiled from these alleged promises, he is now disadvantaged. He has done all this, as he sets out in his trial witness statement, despite the fact that the Property was far too large for his needs, despite the fact that the décor and arrangements of the Property were old fashioned and not, it would seem, to his taste, despite the fact that the Property was expensive to maintain and keep in repair and despite the fact, as he says, that he would have preferred to buy a place of his own.
  234. I have to say that I find this scenario wholly implausible and, candidly, utterly unrealistic. I am simply unable to believe that a young man, as Andrew was in 2004, would have acted as Andrew says he has and foregone all that Andrew says that he has foregone all on the basis of what were, at best, the indistinct and implicit promises that he would, at some distant future date be left the Property, upon which he contends that he relied. It simply does not ring true.
  235. It particularly does not ring true in respect of someone like Andrew. Andrew, as the documentary trail clearly shows and as emerged, with great clarity, from his evidence at trial is a person who is entirely self-absorbed and whose paramount concern is entirely for himself. The idea, therefore, advanced at this trial, that any part of his conduct can be explained on the basis of his desire to accommodate his mother and her wishes, or dreams, in respect of the Property is, simply, not one capable of belief. The idea, also, that Andrew would shape his life on the basis of implicit assurances, or half promises, is equally inconceivable.
  236. I have no doubt at all that, had Andrew been in receipt of the kind of implicit assurances that he now says that he relied upon, he would, before acting on those assurances, have taken steps to confirm his position. That Andrew is not averse to taking such steps is clear from his conduct, in October 2022, as set out in paragraphs 97 and 98 of this judgment when he chose to secretly record conversations with his mother, in order to secure a record of her apparent willingness, at that date, to leave him the entirety of the Property.
  237. The true reason as to why Andrew remained at the Property, made his life there and, to the extent that he did, carried out improvements to the Property, has nothing to do with promises, or assurances, but everything to do with his own wishes and convenience. Put shortly, it suited him to stay.
  238. Andrew, when cross examined, did not find it in him to acknowledge the considerable advantages that he had been given by his parents in being allowed to make his home at the Property over very many years. That is, I think, an indication of the extent of his self-absorption. The reality, though, is that Andrew has had the opportunity to live in a substantial property in a desirable part of London at very modest cost for the best part of a quarter of a century. That opportunity has also enabled Andrew, throughout most of the period under consideration in this case, to pursue his well-paid career in the finance industry, specifically what he termed his 'dream job' at Pictet. Although, as set out in paragraph 145 of this judgment, Andrew pleaded an election, consequent upon the assurances he had received, not to take up a job opportunity in Singapore and although reference was also made, at trial, to a job offer that he received, in 2011, to work for Lloyds TSB in Monaco, it became clear, at trial, that Andrew pursued his career in London for no other reason than that is what he wanted to do.
  239. While Andrew acknowledged, for example, at the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing that, as set out in paragraph 40 of this judgment, he was paying a reduced 'rent' because of his parents' ownership of the Property, he was not able, before me, to acknowledge the full extent of that advantage.
  240. His position was that the value of his accommodation was to be determined having regard to the agreed expert evidence, before the court, as to the value to be placed upon Andrew's rights as a lodger in the Property, having the use of the top floor bedroom and bathroom with communal use of the kitchen and reception rooms, over the years encompassed by Andrew's occupation.; a value ranging from circa £14,000 to circa £17.000 per year; circa £1160 to £1416 per month. That, however, does not reflect the reality of the arrangement. For the majority of each year, even in the earlier years, when Janice and Mr Grijns were visiting London regularly, Andrew had the entire use of the main house. In later years, commencing, effectively, from the time that Mr Grijns fell into ill health, those visits have been very much more limited and Andrew has, accordingly, for the large bulk of each year had the sole occupation and use of the entire house.
  241. While I acknowledge that it is an inexact tool, because it does not reflect the precise nature of Andrew's occupancy, the limited periods of shared occupation with his parents and such expectations as rested upon him in respect of the care, maintenance and management of the Property, the rental value of the main house from time to time seems to me to be a much better yardstick for the determination, in money terms, of the value of the Property to Andrew over the period of his occupation. That rental value, over the years from 2000, ranges from circa £70,000 per year to circa £87,000 per year. At a mean figure of, say, £75,000 per year over 24 years that equates to £1.8M and even, therefore, if heavily discounted to reflect periods of shared occupation and Andrew's expected obligations, it reflects a value to him well in excess of £1M.
  242. To be set against that figure are the monies paid by Andrew for his occupation, which, at his own valuation, reflect a payment of £1,550 per month (£18,600 per year) from 2000 to 2020; a sum in the order of £375,000. Andrew's figure, however, as noted in paragraphs 15 and 16 of this judgment, does not seem to reflect that for the first four or five years of his occupation he paid nothing at all, not even utilities (Mr Grijns' email of 12 January 2005), that, by 2008, he was supposed, apparently, to be paying £500 per month (Mr Grijns' email of 5 December 2008) and that, according to his own email, of 9 June 2016, the monthly payment for the house, as late as 2012, may only have been set at £600 per month. Correcting Andrew's figures, to reflect even some of the foregoing, would reduce the sums actually paid by Anrew to have the occupancy of the Property, more specifically the main house, over some 24 years, to a figure in the order of £250,000.
  243. Analysed in this way, it is easy to see why Andrew remained at the Property and how he was enabled to live what, in vernacular terms, might be described as the 'good life', with expensive foreign holidays, luxury cars and with the capacity to pay off his Monaco mortgage, leaving him with the Monaco apartment, without mortgage and with a value, given the purchase price, which must, as it seems to me, now well exceed €1.1M.
  244. Set in that context, such expenditure as Andrew made on improvements, as itemized in paragraph 12(a) of his re-re-re-amended particulars of claim, reflect nothing more than works carried out in order to make his life at the Property more comfortable. There can, in my view, be no serious suggestion that these were works that he would only have carried out, or have caused to be carried out, other than on the basis of some promise, or assurance. In the context of this case, they were no more than an adjunct of Andrew's way of life.
  245. I add that, in assessing the value of the Property to Andrew, I have taken no account of the rental receipts that he has received in respect of 31A since 2020 and which I will deal with separately later in this judgment. The discount, however, that I have applied does, as already stated, take account of any obligations in respect of repair, maintenance and management of the Property and, consequently, all such monies incurred by Andrew in respect of those matters, as estimated by him in paragraph 12(a) of the re-re-re-amended particulars of claim. There was a dispute, at trial, as to the level of this expenditure, but even taking it at the full value advanced by Andrew, it is quite plain that, when set against the benefits that Andrew has received in respect of the Property, the arrangements under which Andrew has occupied the Property are overwhelmingly in his favour.
  246. The testamentary arrangements, under the 2015 will, were also designed for Andrew's benefit.
  247. As explained in paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 208 and 225 of this judgment, the provision made to Andrew under the 2015 will was tailored, at his request, so that his potential share in his parents' estate was carved out of their United Kingdom estate, in order to assist him in his concerns as to any investigation by the United States Inland Revenue Service and it is, as I see it, Andrew's desire to preserve, or enhance, that provision, or, in the alternative and if the Property had to be sold, to secure equivalent benefits on such a sale, that has been central to Andrew's dealings with his mother since he became aware of the potential disposition in his favour under the 2015 wills and, particularly, when once he became alive to the real prospect that Janice might wish to sell the Property. None of this, as it seems to me, has anything at all to do with promises, or assurances, but, rather and simply, Andrew's understandable concern to protect what he will have seen as his legitimate expectations by way of inheritance.
  248. At the heart of these dealings, as first articulated in October 2020 (paragraph 53 of this judgment), has been Andrew's concern, echoed repeatedly at trial, that he not be 'disinherited'. Disinheritance, in this context, as I have explained in paragraph 54 of his judgment, did not mean his removal from a will, but the removal of the asset that he hoped, or expected, to inherit from his mother's testamentary estate. His concern was that, given his extreme unwillingness to appear in his mother's United States will, for fear of a tax investigation, that, if the Property was sold and if the proceeds were, as it were, migrated to America, to form part of the asset in his mother's United States estate , then that would preclude him from any inheritance from her; she having no other offshore, or United Kingdom, assets.
  249. It is that concern, as I see it, coupled, of course, with the fact that he was comfortably living in the Property, with the obvious inertia as to sale, arising from that fact, that has, as it seems to me, from time to time, over the years, led him to be obstructive as to sale. The extreme example of this was in September 2022, when Janice, by now needing to sell the Property, for the reasons explained in paragraph 82 of this judgment, sought to organise John D Wood to appraise and market the Property and when Andrew, as set out in paragraphs 89 to 93 of this judgment, first required Janice to cancel John D Wood's appointment to view and then lied to John D Wood as to Janice's capacity to instruct them as to sale. An earlier example is that set out at paragraphs 46 and 47 of this judgment, when, in June 2020, Janice offered to come to London to organise a sale if, as she seems to have understood to be the case, Andrew intended to leave the United Kingdom and was met with accusations of bullying and vilification and of turning against him.
  250. Even, however, where Andrew, himself, was contemplating moving away, as in the episode set out in paragraphs 50 to 53 of this judgment, Andrew, as is plain from those paragraphs, was only prepared to leave the Property on his own terms. Specifically, he was not prepared to leave (or be, as he put it, 'kicked out') until everything had been agreed about the Property. As I indicate in paragraph 52 of this judgment, what that meant was that he would not leave until his mother had agreed what money he would receive out of the proceeds of the Property; effectively in lieu of his inheritance.
  251. In none of the foregoing, as I have already commented, in paragraph 230 of this judgment, was any reference, at all, made as to any prior promises made to Andrew, or any consequential shaping of his life around such promises. The concern was 'disinheritance', in the sense explained in this judgment, or, in the alternative, the achievement of a payment in lieu.
  252. A corollary of the foregoing, reverting to Andrew's contention, set out in paragraph 146 of this judgment, that he was able to take a career break, in 2022, because he believed, because of promises made to him, that he was secure in his accommodation, is that that contention simply does not fit the facts. By 2022, talk of sale had been going on for some time. Andrew had, himself, asked his mother to effect a sale as recently as July 2021, when he had believed that he might not get a job in London, or elsewhere (paragraph 65 of this judgment). Implicit in that request, as I set out in paragraph 65, is that Andrew would have been in receipt of at least some part of the proceeds of sale. Janice had, as is clear from paragraph 65, been prepared to go along with this, even if, as she stated, she would have been sad not to see the Property again. I have little doubt but that, if sale had, then taken place, Andrew would have been given a significant part of the proceeds and would, in consequence have achieved a payment in lieu of his inheritance, or, if put that way, had his inheritance advanced. None of that would have had, anything at all to do with any prior promises made to Andrew and, correspondingly, any belief that Andrew may have had in February 2022 that he could safely resign his employment was not, or would not have been, founded upon any prior promises but upon Andrew's belief, in effect, that his mother, as she was manifestly prepared to do, in 2021, would have looked after him.
  253. An additional part of Andrew's concern, as to his expected inheritance pursuant to the 2015 will, emerges from and explains the complicated series of discussions and consequential arrangements as to the Property, which took place across 2021 and which I have set out in paragraphs 58 to 73 of this judgment; relating, severally, to the extent of the interest that Andrew should have in the Property and whether that interest should come to him by will, or by an inter vivos transfer and which culminated in Janice's declaration, on 18 October 2021, (paragraph 72) that Andrew could not have the 'whole pie' and (paragraph 73) the 'spat' that developed from that.
  254. At the heart of those discussions was Andrew's belief, as set out in paragraph 66 of this judgment, that, because of the different taxation systems, as between the United Kingdom and the United States, he would be disadvantaged, as against David and Derek, who would be inheriting United States assets and who, as compared with Andrew, would benefit from a less rigorous tax regime. One way of resolving this, which was initially acceptable to Janice, was to enhance Andrew's potential interest in the Property, in compensation for the heavier tax burden, arising on that inheritance. The other, favoured by Andrew and reflected in the email exchanges with Marlene, at paragraphs 62 and 63 of this judgment and in the events of the Summer and Autumn of 2021, as set out in paragraphs 64 to 70 of this judgment, was that Andrew should take an immediate transfer of the Property, with the result, as, no doubt, all parties hoped, that Janice outliving the transfer by seven years, would, thereby absolve the Property from Inheritance Tax.
  255. As is clear from paragraphs 58 to 73 of this judgment, this debate with Andrew placed Janice in a quandary. She, manifestly, wished to help Andrew, to the extent of making the March 2021 will in his favour. She was, equally manifestly, reluctant to go further, for all the reasons she explained to Marlene, as set out in paragraph 63 of this judgment. She was concerned, however, as to fairness to her other children, hence her wish, in April 2021, to revert to the 2015 will. Under what would appear to be pressure, however, from Andrew, in July 2021, she went as far as making what she thought to be the gift of the property to Andrew, for which he wished. Ultimately, in October 2021, still under pressure from Andrew, for a transfer, she took her stand upon her right to make her own testamentary and other dispositions. Even as late as October 2022, as set out in paragraph 98 of this judgment, she was ostensibly prepared to revert to the position whereby Andrew would take the entire Property.
  256. What, however, is completely clear, in all of this, as already set out in paragraph 231 of this judgment, is that the question of the extent of Andrew's inheritance of the Property, or his receipt of an inter vivos gift of the Property, had nothing whatsoever to do with the implementation of any past promises and everything to do with Andrew's anxiety not to be disadvantaged by the terms of the 2015 will.
  257. What is also clear, from the entirety of the foregoing, is Janice's continuing desire to accommodate Andrew whenever possible and to the extent possible. She was prepared to change her will in his favour and even to consider an inter vivos gift of the Property. She was prepared to assist him by a sale of the Property, when she thought that would help him, even although, as she stated, for example, in July 2021, she would have been sad not to see the Property again.
  258. Throughout their dealings and discussions, as demonstrated in their exhaustive email and text exchanges, set out in this judgment, Janice attempted to maintain, often against long odds and despite unpleasant behaviour towards her, on Andrew's part, a loving relationship with Andrew, right up to the time when matters came to a head in June 2023. As she explained to me, in evidence which I accept, she was, in part, acting to placate Andrew, by telling him what he wanted to hear; a good example of this being, I think, her response, as set out in paragraph 55 of this judgment, to Andrew's outburst, set out in paragraph 52 of this judgment, that he was being 'kicked out' and 'disinherited'. The much greater part of her dealings with Andrew, I suspect, reflected her genuine and deep felt desire to maintain what had been, as she put it in her 9 May 2020 letter and as is set out in paragraph 45 of this judgment, their 'close relationship'.
  259. Be all this last as it may, I am satisfied for all the reasons set out in this judgment that Andrew was not given the implicit assurances, or promises, for which he contends, that, consequentially, Andrew has not conducted his life, or any part of it, upon the basis of such assurances, that the matters that Andrew has pleaded, as set out in paragraph 141 of this judgment, set in their proper context, do not support his claim, that no equity has arisen, in his favour, requiring satisfaction and that, accordingly, the claim in proprietary estoppel fails.
  260. In the result, there is no need for me to go further and to indicate what relief, if any, might have been appropriate, if my findings had been different and if I had been satisfied that material assurances, that is to say assurances that would reasonably be understood as intended to be relied upon, had been made by Janice, or Mr Grijns, to Andrew and if I had determined that Andrew had wholly, or partially, relied upon those assurances in the way that he contends. That question, however, having been fully argued, I think it right that I should indicate, perhaps in less detail than would otherwise have been the case, whether, in those circumstances, an equity would have arisen requiring satisfaction within the broad ranging, flexible and pragmatic discretion available to the court and, if so, what that satisfaction should have been.
  261. The determination of that question turns upon issues of detriment and unconscionability.
  262. In regard to detriment, I am satisfied that, if the only alleged detriment was the works of improvement that Andrew claims to have carried out, then that would have been insufficient to establish any equity in his favour.
  263. I have no doubt at all that were it the case that Andrew had made his life at the Property, in reliance, or partial reliance, upon his parents' promises and, on that footing, carried out the alleged improvements, then the benefits attaching to his occupation, as set out in paragraphs 241 to 243 of this judgment, would have heavily outweighed any the burden incurred by Andrew in paying for those improvements.
  264. Accordingly, I do not consider that, set in the context of Andrew's countervailing benefits, the cost of those works constituted, or would have constituted, a detriment to Andrew, or that taken in isolation, the fact that Andrew had carried out those works of improvement in reliance upon his parents' promises would have rendered it unconscionable, as offending the conscience of the court, for Janice to resile from those promises.
  265. The position, if, as Andrew alleges, he had, in addition to carrying out improvements, also, shaped, or ordered his life around his parents' promises, in other respects, is rather more complex.
  266. If that had been the case, then the relevant detriment would have arisen out of a counter-factual assessment as to how and with what result Andrew would have lived his life, if he had not elected to rely on his parents' promises. His case, on that, which, as is clear from this judgment, I am unable to accept, is that, absent his parents' promises, he would have made his home elsewhere, would have bought a flat and would now own that flat, together with the value and the security associated with that ownership and would not, now, at fifty years of age, be left in a position where, unemployed and without, therefore, mortgage capacity, he has, somehow, either to rent, or buy a home.
  267. Even if I had, in principle, been able to accept that case, I am not persuaded that, on the evidence available to me, the requisite substantial detriment would have been established. Unsurprisingly, given my findings of fact, Andrew's case was not fleshed out by any evidence as to the position that he says would have arisen, if he had not relied upon his parents' alleged promises, or as to whether that position would, when balanced against the very substantial benefits that Andrew has received, have substantially outweighed those benefits. The court would have been left, on the one hand, with very clear evidence of the benefits and advantages, as set out in paragraphs 241 to 243 of this judgment (including the fact that Andrew's Monaco apartment is now mortgage free), that Andrew had obtained by electing to make his life at the Property; in this scenario, in reliance upon his parents' promises; and, on the other hand, with no evidence at all that Andrew would have been in a better position, if, absent those promises and contrary to my findings, he had acted differently.
  268. In the result and had it been necessary to make the determination, I would have decided that any reliance that Andrew might have placed upon his parents' promises would not have been substantially detrimental and that, consequently, no equity would have arisen in his favour. Standing back, looking at the overall position, including the position that now exists in respect of the Monaco apartment, and applying Robert Walker LJ's test as to the substantiality of any detriment, as set out in paragraph 183 of this judgment, I do not think that, taking account of Andrew's benefits received, it would, in this case, have been unjust, or inequitable, to disregard any promises, or assurances, made by his parents to Andrew and to leave him without remedy
  269. Even were I to have been wrong about this and if, looked at in isolation, sufficient detriment had been established to raise a possible equity, the question of unconscionability would remain and , in regard to that question, a number of factors would have come into play.
  270. The case advanced by Andrew is not an 'almost' contractual' case, where, as explained in paragraph 188 of this judgment, the promise made is linked to a 'quid pro quo' and where, therefore, if the promisee fulfils his, or her, part, there are the strongest equitable grounds for the court enforcing the parties' bargain in full'. Rather, Andrew's case is of the type discussed in paragraphs 189 and 190 of this judgment, where the promisor has not dictated the conduct which, if performed by the promise, will result, in turn, in the promisor's performance of his, or her promise and where, consequently, the court has a greater scope to craft, or determine, a remedy which most fits the overall circumstances.
  271. In this case the factors in play would, as it seems to me have encompassed, over and above the benefits that Andrew has already received, the following: the fact that Janice has a real need to sell the Property in order, in ill health and in old age, to move out of her current rented apartment and to acquire for herself, with her own resources, a home for herself in Connecticut; the fact that, as set out in this judgment, Andrew has, over a considerable period, not treated his mother well, culminating, as I set out in paragraphs 96 and 112 of this judgment, with Janice being shunned by Andrew, when visiting the Property, her own property, in October 2022 and being accused by Andrew, in an email of 6 February 2023, of senility and dementia, of bullying Andrew and of 'gaslighting' him; the fact, going towards a partial enforcement, only, of the alleged assurances, that full enforcement would significantly advantage Andrew, as against his three brothers, notwithstanding the benefits that he has already received.
  272. I am satisfied , having regard to the matters discussed and set in paragraphs 184 and 190 of this judgment, that all of the foregoing are material in considering unconscionability and the remedy, if any, required to negative any unconscionability arising from the non-performance of a promisor's promise.
  273. In regard to Janice's own needs and requirements these are, as it seems to me, closely analogous to the medical and care needs that a promisor might need to satisfy and which are properly to be weighed in the balance in determining whether a failure to honour a promise, because of such needs, is unconscionable. The matter can also be looked at another way; namely as to whether the promise, or assurance, in question was given, as explained in paragraph 177 of this judgment, on the footing that the promisor's needs and circumstances remain unaltered, such that the promise is inoperative when and to the extent that circumstances change.
  274. In regard, to Andrew's conduct towards Janice, I concur, strongly, with Murray Rosen QC, in Horsford, that the conduct of the promisee towards the promisor, at least where that conduct pertains to the property in respect of which the promise seeks enforcement of a promise, is a matter properly to be taken into account in determining whether the promisor, in resiling from a promise has acted unconscionably. This aspect of the matter can also, I think, be viewed through the lens of a possible limitation upon the core promise, as discussed in paragraph 177 of this judgment; namely that the promise is predicated upon the relationship giving rise to the promise remaining unchanged.
  275. In this case, without dwelling at too great length upon the detail, it is clear that across Andrew and his mother's dealings and discussions in respect of the Property and standing alongside Janice's efforts to accommodate her son and to keep the peace between them, all as set out in the narrative element of this judgment, Andrew has, with some regularity insulted and , to use the vernacular, 'bad mouthed' his mother. He has accused her of vilifying and bullying him and of being evil, destructive and wicked. He has accused her, as already stated, of senility and dementia. He has questioned, or denied, her capacity to third parties, such as John D Wood (paragraph 92 of this judgment). He has put her in the position that, when visiting her own property, in 1991, she felt obliged to warn Andrew that, unless she was treated with respect and affection and without animosity (paragraph 71 of this judgment), she would have to change her visiting arrangements. Correspondingly, in 2022, when preparing for her visit, she was sufficiently concerned as to her welcome at her property that she told Andrew (paragraph 93 of this judgment) that she was not prepared to tolerate insults and disrespect. I have already referred, in paragraphs 96 and 271 of this judgment, to the way that, on that visit, Janice was shunned by her son.
  276. While I would not, in the context of tis case, regard these matters, in themselves, as entitling Janice to vitiate any promise she had made, I do think that these are matters of which account can and should be taken in the overall determination as to whether she has acted unconscionably.
  277. The third factor, outlined in paragraph 271 of this judgment, goes, as already stated, towards the question as to whether a partial performance of Janice's alleged promise that Andrew would have the Property would be unconscionable, having regard to the position of Janice's three other children.
  278. As Janice, herself, stated, in her email of 18 October 2021 (paragraph 72 of this judgment), the Property, even then, was the largest of Janice's assets. Since then, as explained in paragraphs 75 to 79 of this judgment, Janice's other properties have been sold with an overall loss of some $1M, leaving her with an investment portfolio of circa $4M. On that footing the Property, valued in the order of £3.85M reflects, in broad terms half, or over half, of her potential estate. In the event of full enforcement of Janice's alleged promise, Andrew, having already had the benefits described in this judgment, would also obtain something in the order of half of Janice's potential estate, leaving her three brothers the other half to be divided between them. The unfair position, as between Janice's four children, with which she was, properly, concerned in 2021, would be perpetuated and, given the diminution in her potential overall estate, enhanced.
  279. It is, at least in part, for this reason, that Mr Boyd, for Andrew, has not asserted a claim to the whole Property, but asserts that there should be enforcement as to two thirds, replicating, also, thereby, the position under the 2015 will. Given, however, that the 2015 will was predicated upon Janice's and Mr Grijns' assets at that date and that the asset pool is now smaller, it seems to me that, if there were to be a partial enforcement of the alleged parental promises, to reflect the danger that Janice's other children would be unconscionably disadvantaged, then partial enforcement would have to be in a lesser amount than two thirds.
  280. In the result, however, had I to make the determination as to unconscionability, I would not have directed a partial enforcement. In my view, taking together the benefits that Andrew has received, Janice's legitimate need to sell the Property in order to fund the purchase of her own home and reflecting, also, how Andrew has treated his mother in respect of the Property it would not have been unconscionable for Janice to have resiled from any promise that she had made in respect of the Property.
  281. In this regard, there was both cross examination and argument going to the nature of the property that might be appropriate to meet Janice's needs and as to whether, given her age and ill health, she has the need to purchase the kind, or type, of substantial property in Connecticut in which she is, apparently, interested; the suggestion being made that a smaller and, it was submitted, more suitable property could be purchased out of the proceeds of the Property, leaving funds available for the partial enforcement of Janice's alleged promise.
  282. I am not persuaded that, in all the circumstances of this case. it would have been right to constrain Janice's use of her property in this way, or to subordinate her wishes to Andrew's. Nor am I persuaded that, in all the circumstances of this case, the refusal of any relief to Andrew would shock the conscience of the court, or, therefore, that that refusal by the court would result in Lord Briggs' 'unconscionability question' being answered other than in the negative.
  283. The consequence of all the foregoing and of the failure of Andrew's proprietary estoppel claim is that, turning to the claims arising from the events of 10 June 2023, the claim for equitable compensation, arising out of those events, inevitably, fails. The equitable claim is parasitic upon the proprietary estoppel claim, such that the failure of one leads to the failure of the other.
  284. It follows that the question of principle, as to the existence of such a claim, does not fall for decision. That said, had it been necessary to determine the question, I would have determined it in favour of Andrew.
  285. The question for consideration arises out of what is often termed the inchoate, or imperfect nature of the equity arising out of conduct entitling a claimant to relief based upon proprietary estoppel and upon the proposition that until that imperfect, or inchoate equity is translated into whatever relief may be granted by the court, the equity affords the claimant no proprietary rights, The corollary of that proposition, if right, is that, in a case like the present and even if, contrary to my findings, the elements establishing a proprietary estoppel had existed as at the 10 June 2023, those rights, because undeclared, would not have given Andrew any right to resist entry to the Property, even if, on subsequent consideration by the court, it were to have been determined that his equitable entitlement was to some proprietary interest that would have entitled him to possession of the Property, and to treat, in consequence, any unpermitted access to the Property as a trespass.
  286. The status of the equity, prior to the relief arising under that equity being declared, has most often arisen for discussion in cases where property potentially subject to a proprietary estoppel has been transferred prior to that estoppel being satisfied and the view, which has, generally, if not always satisfactorily, been adopted, is that the transferee simply takes the property subject to the equity and to whatever right may, in due course, be determined as satisfying the equity. The alternative view, flowing from dicta of Browne-Wilkinson J (as he then was), in Re Sharpe [1980] 1 WLR 219, at 225 and, perhaps, reflecting, in he context of proprietary estoppel, an application of the maxim that equity treats as done what ought to be done, is that the right subsequently declared will have come into existence, at least in equity, at the time when the facts upon which the declaration which was subsequently granted came into existence, even if the right was not known to exist, in that particular form, until it was declared by the court. The right could not have come into existence for the first time when the declaration was made because a declaration does not create rights but merely declares them. On that view, on a transfer of property subject to a proprietary estoppel claim, the transferee takes the property subject to whatever right the court might, at that point in time, determine as satisfying the equity, which, by then, had arisen.
  287. Applying what I will call the Re Sharpe approach to the facts of this case, if, as at 10 June 2023, Andrew had acquired a proprietary estoppel properly to be satisfied by the grant of a proprietary interest entitling him to assert possession as against Janice, then that right, although undeclared, would have subsisted, in equity, on that day, such that Janice and her sons conduct in breaking into the Property would have been in breach of that equitable right.
  288. Had the facts warranted it, I would have been prepared to adopt and apply the Re Sharpe approach in this case. It seems to me to afford a principled basis upon which the court can provide a potentially necessary protection to those occupying property in circumstances where they have a valid proprietary estoppel claim of a quality to be satisfied by the grant of a proprietary interest, or of an interest otherwise protecting their occupation, but where, their rights being undeclared, their occupation of the property in question might otherwise and wrongly be put at risk.
  289. For all the reasons, however, already given, the facts of this case do not warrant the application of the principle last discussed. Andrew has no proprietary estoppel claim and, consequently, no proprietary rights, arising under such an estoppel, such as to justify the protection of the court.
  290. I turn, next, therefore, to his claim in trespass.
  291. The starting point, in respect of that claim, lies in the fact that Andrew has never been more than a bare licensee at the Property and, as such, has never been entitled to exclusive possession of the Property, as against Janice, or his brothers, as invitees of Janice. Correspondingly, as the legal and beneficial owner of the Property, Janice has, as against Andrew, always been entitled to enter and remain in her own Property. Put shortly, at common law, Andrew has never been entitled to exclude Janice, or her invitees, from her Property and, if excluded from her Property, she was always entitled to take necessary measures to obtain access. The position, if, on 10 June 2023, Andrew was, as Janice contends, a trespasser, his licence having been lawfully terminated, would, of course, be a fortiori.
  292. It follows that, at common law, when Janice and Andrew's brothers forced their entry on 10 June 2023, they were acting perfectly lawfully. Trespass is a tort arising out of an interference with possession and, as against Janice, Andrew never had a right to possession. A bare licensee (and, a fortiori, a trespasser) cannot exclude the licensor.
  293. The necessary consequence of the foregoing is that to sustain a case against Janice, or those acting under her, or with her authority, Andrew must point to some statutory intervention, such as to modify the common law position and afford him a right of action in trespass. It is in this context, that Andrew relies upon the provisions of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (the Act) and, in particular sections 3(1) and 3(1)(b) of the Act. Specifically, Andrew places reliance upon the proposition, arising from those sections, that, other than in respect of an 'excluded licence'(as defined, in the context of this case, in accordance with section 3A(7)(b) of the Act), it was unlawful and, he submits, a trespass for Janice to enforce against him Janice's right to recover possession of the Property other than by proceedings in court.
  294. There are two problems with Andrew's submission.
  295. The first is conceptual. I am not persuaded that the fact that the sections in question render a self-help remedy in respect of the enforcement of a right to recover possession unlawful and, potentially, an offence under section 1 of the Act has the result that the exercise of such a remedy is a trespass. In particular, it does not seem to me that the relevant sections are intended to operate to modify the parties' common law rights, or to vest in the relevant licensee a right of possession, as against the licensor, such as to render the unlawful exercise of the self-help remedy a trespass. Rather, it seems to me that the sections recognise the common law rights of the licensor; specifically his right to recover possession from his licensee; but renders unlawful any self-help process of enforcement.
  296. The second and fundamental problem turns upon my findings of fact. It is essential to Andrew's case on trespass that Janice was, when procuring entry to the Property, on 10 June 2023, doing so in order to enforce, or seek to enforce, her right of possession. It is that conduct which would be rendered unlawful by sections 3(1) and 3(2)(b) of the Act and which would, on Andrew's case, give rise to a trespass. That, however, is not what occurred. As set out, at paragraphs 125 and 129 of this judgment, when Janice and Andrew's three brothers went to the Property on 10 June 2023, they had no intention of evicting Andrew. Their unannounced and, for that reason, perhaps, ill-advised visit was in the nature of an 'intervention': to get Andrew to come to some arrangement about leaving the Property and about the marketing of the Property for sale.
  297. The consequence of those findings is that section 3 of the Act has no application to the events of 10 June 2023 and Janice's, otherwise lawful, conduct, in forcing entry to her own Property, was not, under the provisions of the Act unlawful, or, for that reason, a trespass. On that footing and for this purpose (although, as set out later in this judgment, not for other purposes) the question as to whether, or not, Andrew's licence was, or had been, an 'excluded licence' is immaterial.
  298. In the result, Andrew's claim in trespass fails and falls to be dismissed.
  299. That leaves for determination, Janice's claims in respect of possession, sale and mesne profits and her claim for an account of the rents received by Andrew, since 2020, from City Relay, relating to 31A.
  300. In the light of the failure of Andrew's estoppel claim, the claim in respect of sale falls away.
  301. In regard to possession, the primary question raised by Andrew is as to the adequacy of the period of notice that he was given and, in particular, whether, at latest, at the inception of Janice's Counterclaim for possession (1 August 2023), Andrew had been given an appropriate period of time to remove himself and his possessions from the Property, such as to render him a trespasser and to found Janice's claim for possession.
  302. Additionally to the foregoing, as foreshadowed in paragraph 297 of this judgment and although not raised between the parties, it seems to me that a potential jurisdictional question arises as to whether, if Andrew's licence was not an 'excluded licence', the High Court is empowered to order possession.
  303. The starting point, here, is my finding, set out at paragraph 21 of this judgment, that, throughout his occupancy, Andrew has been no more than a bare licensee and that the arrangements under which he occupied were never any more than informal family arrangements.
  304. That finding, however, does not mean, necessarily, that the occupancy could be terminated at will and without giving Andrew any notice that his permission to occupy the Property was to be brought to an end.
  305. The position at common law is set out by the Court of Appeal, in Ministry of Health v Belotti [1944] KB 298 at 305; namely that, 'where a licence is revoked, the licensee has, in spite of the revocation, whatever, in the circumstances is a reasonable time to enable him to remove himself and his possessions from the scene of the licence'. The fact that the notice given to terminate the licence does not afford the licensee a reasonable time to make good his departure does not invalidate the revocation of the licence. The revocation will simply take effect and become actionable when once the appropriate reasonable time has elapsed. If, however, proceedings are brought for possession prior to the expiry of the appropriate reasonable time, then the cause of action for possession will not have accrued and the claim will fail.
  306. Additionally, where the licence is not an 'excluded licence', but where the licence is a periodic licence, section 5 of the Protection from Eviction Act provides that a notice to terminate such a periodic licence will only be valid if it is in prescribed form, containing prescribed information and affords the licensee a period of at least four weeks before the date when the notice takes effect. As explained, in Mehta v Royal Bank of Scotland [2000] HLR 35, that period is a minimum period and, where circumstances so require, the period of reasonable notice before action can be brought will be longer.
  307. Andrew's licence, whether, or not, an 'excluded licence' was not a periodic licence. Accordingly, although the notice actually served by Grosvenor Law was apt to terminate a periodic non-excluded licence, the provisions of section 5 were not applicable to this case. The common law requirements, as to reasonable notice, however, undoubtedly do apply.
  308. I am satisfied that by the date of the inception of Janice's Counterclaim, some four months after notice was served, Andrew, notwithstanding the length of his occupancy, had been provided with a reasonable period to remove himself and his possessions from the scene of the licence and that, accordingly, as at that date, Andrew was a trespasser in the Property and properly susceptible to Janice's claim for possession.
  309. Although Andrew's written evidence makes much of the problems that he might have in securing alternative accommodation, I am not at all persuaded that, if he had, as he should have done (see Goddard LJ in Belotti at 309), begun to take steps to secure alternative accommodation, when served, in March 2023, with notice, and had actively pursued such accommodation, he would not have had, by August 2023, more than adequate time to re-house himself.
  310. It is to be noted that, as set out in paragraph 105 of this judgment, Andrew, himself, had, as early as October 2022, been contemplating leaving the Property by June 2023. The prospect or idea, therefore, of leaving the Property and finding a new home was not, therefore, something which would have been completely new to him, when served with notice and not something to which, therefore, he would have given no thought.
  311. At a practical level, although Andrew has, as he says, some furniture in the Property, principally his Victorian bed, the bulk of the furniture and furnishings in the Property are Janice's and go with the Property. This is not a case of having to undertake a full scale removal of a fully furnished home. Nor, although Andrew's written evidence, makes the point that removing from the Property and renting elsewhere might have been inconvenient, in terms of securing the maximum price for those investments that might have to be sold and in removing assets safeguarded from tax in an ISA, there is no suggestion that Andrew did not have the necessary wherewithal to fund a move. Andrew has, in this litigation been coy as to his finances, but one should, perhaps, also, not overlook the existence of the Monaco apartment, whether as a place where Andrew could live, or as a continuing source of income.
  312. While analogies with other forms of licence have been said, in the authorities, to be unhelpful, the analogy with an ordinary domestic move on the sale of an ordinary residential property is not, I think, inapt. In respect of such a move, a four month period to make arrangements, is quite normal. I see Andrew's position as no different.
  313. Taking all the circumstances, together and while I do question whether, in context the initial six week notice period was sufficient, I am completely satisfied that, by 1 August 2023, had been given a reasonable and a sufficient time to make and give effect to alternative housing arrangements.
  314. On that footing, I am correspondingly, satisfied that, as at I August 2023, Andrew was a trespasser in the Property and that Janice had a well-founded claim for possession.
  315. That, however, leads on to the jurisdictional question adverted to in paragraph 302 of this judgment. The question turns upon the status of Andrew's licence and whether, in the language of section 3A(7)(b) of the Act, Andrew's licence was, at the point of its termination, a licence 'granted otherwise than for money or money's worth' and was, therefore, an 'excluded licence'. If it was not an 'excluded' licence, then, as explained by Briggs J (as he then was), in Polarpark Enterprises Inc. v Allason [2007] EWHC 1088 Ch and subject to any further argument when this judgment is handed down, the effect of section 2 of the Act, read with section 9 of the Act, is that Janice can only prosecute her claim for possession in the County Court.
  316. I do not consider that Andrew's licence was an 'excluded; licence' and, accordingly, I am not satisfied that I have jurisdiction in this case to give Janice a judgment for possession.
  317. I do not think that Andrew's licence was granted 'other than for money or money's worth', even in the period post 2020, when Janice was no longer seeking any payment from Andrew in respect of his occupation,
  318. I do not read those words as limiting non-excluded licences to contractual licences. The language used, as it seems to me, is in deliberately wider form and simply requires the court to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the licence arrangement in question, however otherwise informal, contemplated conduct on the part of the licensee having a monetary value to the licensor. It seems to me that the licence arrangement under which Andrew occupied and under which he was expected to manage and care for the Property did have such a monetary value and that, accordingly, it was not a licence granted 'other than for money or money's worth'.
  319. I add that, while I am not persuaded that the situation in respect of Andrew's licence, post 2020, was as formalised as Andrew contends, or that there was any explicit arrangement that, in lieu of payment, Andrew would take on all responsibility for maintenance and repair, I am satisfied that the general, if inchoate, understanding, as between Janice and Andrew, from about that time, was that he would take on a fuller responsibility in looking after the Property. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that there is no evidence at all of Janice, at least in these later years of the licence, making any input into the costs of maintaining the Property, with the obvious implication that the mutual expectation, as between Janice and Andrew, must have been that Andrew would, in the post 2020 years, bear much of that responsibility.
  320. In taking on that responsibility, pursuant to their informal arrangements, Andrew was providing Janice with something of real monetary value, such that his licence cannot properly categorised as an 'excluded licence' and such that the provisions as to exclusive County Court jurisdiction are not applicable,
  321. The consequence of he foregoing, as already set out, is that I have no jurisdiction to make a possession order in this case, notwithstanding Andrew's status as a trespasser, and that, whether by transfer, or by separate proceedings that adjudication must be remitted to the County Court.
  322. That said and to assist the County Court, I will make a declaration that, since no later than 1 August 2023, Andrew has been a trespasser at the Property and that Janice is, accordingly, entitled to possession. Janice's entitlement to possession will then be res judicata.
  323. The jurisdictional bar in respect of possession does not preclude me from making an order in respect of mesne profits. Based upon the agreed expert evidence and taking the rental value for the entirety of the Property (31 and 31A), I will direct that Andrew pays mesne profits at the rate of £85,000 per annum, as from 1 August 2023, until possession is delivered up.. That figure, for the avoidance of doubt embraces the entirety of the Property, including 31A, but is discounted, to reflect that, while 31A, still let out by Andrew, via City Relay, as recently as October 2024, is palpably in a lettable condition, it seems likely that 31 is not.
  324. The remaining and final issue for consideration relates to City Relay and the extent, if at all, that Andrew should account to Janice for the rental receipts that he has received from the lettings of 31A since he first instructed City Relay in June 2020.
  325. As is clear from the narrative set out in the early part of this judgment, the City Relay lettings have been the source both of acrimony and confusion. Having regard, however, to my earlier findings (paragraphs 49 and 95 of this judgment), I am satisfied that, although, over time and in the fragile state that she found herself in, in 2022, Janice may have forgotten about the City Relay arrangements, she had, at the time when those arrangements were made, both been made aware of those arrangements and approved them. There was nothing secret in Andrew's letting activities.
  326. I am satisfied, further, that when those arrangements commenced and were approved by Janice, she had no expectation that Andrew should account to her for his dealings with City Relay. The City Relay arrangement was set up, as appears from paragraph 49 of this judgment, in order to recoup the losses incurred by the Ramscar episode and at a time, as set out in paragraph 48 of this judgment, when Andrew and Janice were in considerable communication about the work to be carried out at the Property and very shortly after Janice's May 9 2020 letter, in which she had absolved Andrew from making any further payment in respect of his occupancy of the property.
  327. It seems to me that it was all these things, taken together, which resulted in the development of the general and inchoate understanding, that I have set out in paragraph 319 of this judgment, and that as part of and merging into that understanding, albeit never explicitly stated, it was understood that the City Relay income would be used towards the running and maintaining of the Property and would remain in Andrew's hands.
  328. That that was the understanding and, specifically, that the rental receipts from City Relay were intended by Janice to remain with Andrew is confirmed, or, at least, supported, by the various text and email exchanges, in October 2022, as set out in paragraphs 102 to 106 of this judgment. Those exchanges, in which Janice reinstated the City Relay arrangement, in which she suggested that Julian make 'reparation' to Andrew for his lost income from 31A, in which Janice records her pleasure that the rental receipts from City Relay have provided Andrew with a source of income and in which Andrew explains to David how the rental receipts have been put toward the maintenance of the Property, are all entirely consistent with the broad understanding that, as it seems to me, was reached between Janice and Andrew in the Summer of 2020.
  329. Ms Haren KC takes the point that the right to the rental receipts received from City Relay was a chose in action, transferable only by written assignment. I would accept that Andrew was never given the right to receive future rents, as they fell due. That, however, did not preclude his mother from consenting, pursuant to her informal understanding with Andrew, to Andrew's retention of rents received.
  330. In the result, I am not disposed to order an account in respect of Andrew's rental dealings, prior to the date, 10 May 2023, when the notices to quit served upon him purportedly expired. After that date, Andrew was not intended by his mother to be in occupation of the Property and, consequently, all arrangements. in respect of the Property, will have come to an end. Up to that date, however, those arrangements subsisted and, with them, Janice's consent to Andrew's retention of rents received.
  331. An account is an equitable and discretionary remedy and, where and to the extent that the court is satisfied that Janice did not merely acquiesce in Andrew's retention of rent but consented to and agreed that retention, there seems to me to be no proper basis for that remedy to be granted.
  332. I will, however, subject to any question of double recovery, in respect of the period in which Andrew is liable to pay mesne profits, direct that Andrew account for the net rents received by him after 10 May 2023.
  333. The consequence of all of the foregoing is that Andrew's claims are to be dismissed, that I will declare that he has been a trespasser at the Property since 1 August 2023, that he is liable for mesne profits from that date and until possession is delivered up at the rate of £85,000 per annum and, subject to double recovery, he must, also, account for the net rents that he has received from City Relay since 10 May 2023. Provision will also need to be made in respect of interest.

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