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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> The Secretary of State for Business and Trade v Greensill [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch) (13 May 2025)
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Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1380 (Ch)
Case No: CR-2024-001426

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
INSOLVENCY AND COMPANIES LIST (ChD)

Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London
EC4A 1NL
Date Of Hearing: 13 May 2025

B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE TROWER
____________________

Between:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
BUSINESS AND TRADE
Claimant

- and –


ALEXANDER DAVID GREENSILL
Defendant

____________________

Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,
2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.
Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDE
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____________________

DAVID MOHYUDDIN KC, CARLY SANDBACH and ISABEL PETRIE (instructed by Howes Percival LLP) for the Claimant
HILARY STONEFROST (instructed by Ellerman Ltd) for the Defendant

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    MR JUSTICE TROWER:

  1. On 7th March 2024 the Secretary of State for Business and Trade commenced Part 8 proceedings against Mr Alexander Greensill seeking his disqualification from acting as a director pursuant to section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 ("CDDA"). The trial is fixed for a six week hearing commencing in a five day window from 8th June 2026.
  2. This judgment is concerned with an application by Mr Greensill for a stay of one of the issues raised by the Secretary of State in these proceedings pending final judgment in certain proceedings pending in the Federal Court of Australia ("the Federal Court"). Initially, Mr Greensill also made an alternative application for an order directing a separate trial of that issue. On the way the case was then put this would have led to a very similar result, but Ms Stonefrost for Mr Greensill made clear that the application was now only for a stay.
  3. The two insolvent English companies in relation to which these disqualification proceedings have been brought are Greensill Capital UK Ltd ("GCUK") and its subsidiary and an SPV called Greensill Ltd ("GL"). GCUK and GL are both part of the same group (the "Greensill group"), of which an Australian company, Greensill Capital Pty Ltd ("GCPty") is the parent. One other Greensill company also features in the evidence, a German company, Greensill Bank AG ("GBAG"). Both GCUK and GBAG are direct subsidiaries of GCPty.
  4. GCUK was the principal Greensill group trading entity and went into administration on 8th March 2021. GL is now in liquidation. GCPty and GBAG are also now in insolvency proceedings in Australia and Germany respectively.
  5. The current application was issued on 30th January 2025, having first been intimated on 7th January 2025, some nine months after the commencement of the proceedings. The Secretary of State draws attention to the fact that Mr Greensill's evidence in the disqualification proceedings is due to be served on 18th July 2025. On the face of it, any stay would have the consequence that Mr Greensill would not have to file his evidence in relation to the relevant issue until the stay is lifted. Indeed, what is said to be the benefit of him withholding his evidence on that issue is one of the reasons for asserting that the relief sought should be granted in the first place.
  6. GCUK was engaged in the business of extending discounted credit to its customers in return for the assignment of receivables payable by the customers' debtors. This was called accounts receivable financing. It also extended credit, again at a discount to face value, pursuant to an alternative structure called supply chain financing. This involved advances to the customer to enable it to pay unpaid invoices from its own suppliers.
  7. GCUK's business was funded in part by advances made by GBAG and in part by debt issues. The structure of the debt issue was a form of securitisation pursuant to which the receivables and their related rights were assigned to a Luxembourg note-issuing securitisation vehicle. The notes were then acquired by a fund which I can call "Virtuoso" for short, managed by Credit Suisse Asset Management (Switzerland) AG whose clients invested by taking shares in Virtuoso.
  8. The notes were what has been described in the evidence as "credit enhanced by insurance". This insurance was underwritten by Insurance Australia Ltd ("IAL") through its authorised representative, BC Trade Credit Pty Ltd ("BCC"). There are two relevant policies with slightly different parties. The first, the Master Policy, was between BCC on one hand and GCUK and GCPty on the other. The second, the Parallel Policy, was between BCC on the one hand and GCPty and GBAG on the other. Both were originally agreed in 2017 and renewed in 2019. They both confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of New South Wales and are both governed by the law of New South Wales.
  9. It is said by Mr Greensill that the Parallel Policy to which GCPty and GBAG were party had more limited disclosure obligations than the Master Policy to which GCPty and GCUK were party. Mr Greensill says that the Parallel Policy may still respond to a claim where the Master Policy would not, because of the breach of the more onerous Master Policy disclosure obligations. It is said that, if that were to happen, any losses sustained by IAL or BCC as a result of any claim by GCPty and GBAG on the Parallel Policy could be recouped from GCPty and GCUK for breach of their more onerous disclosure obligations under the Master Policy.
  10. Virtuoso was known as a loss payee under the Parallel Policy. It also had an indemnity claim against GCUK under the Parallel Policy in the event that it failed to respond to any claim because GCPty or GBAG were in breach of their obligations under that policy.
  11. Many but not all of the notes are in default and ten claims have now been made in New South Wales under the Parallel Policy by GBAG, Virtuoso and one other loss payee which I shall called "White Oak" for short. These claims were issued in the Federal Court on various dates between October 2021 and June 2023. They have an aggregate value of in excess of US$4 billion.
  12. When the claims were initially asserted in or about July 2020 IAL had refused to pay on the basis that BCC and its head of trade credit (Mr Greg Brereton) had acted in excess of their authority. This defence arose out of an investigation into the business which had been written through Mr Brereton, which was carried out after IAL was acquired by Tokio Marine, which itself occurred shortly after the Parallel Policy and Master Policy were renewed in 2019.
  13. Since the issue of proceedings, a number of other defences have been asserted. In summary, they fall into one of two broad categories: (a) coverage defences turning on the wording of the Parallel Policy and its application to the specific facts of each case and, (b) a general defence that the Parallel Policy is invalid in any event.
  14. This general invalidity defence includes allegations that the Greensill group made certain misrepresentations and non-disclosures when it procured cover for a number of counterparties or groups of counterparties. Two of those groups of counterparties included four companies in the same group (the "Catfoss Group"). They were Catfoss Renewables Ltd, Catfoss DBT Ltd, Noviniti Poole Ltd and Noviniti Colchester Ltd. The others were Bluestone Resources and Liberty France Aluminium.
  15. It is said that Mr Greensill was personally responsible for the misrepresentations and that they were made deliberately and dishonestly. It is also said not just that they infected the cover granted under the Parallel Policy to the groups of counterparties I have just mentioned, but more generally the decision to enter into the renewed Parallel Policy in 2019.
  16. The parties to the Australian proceedings comprise GBAG and its insolvency administrator, Virtuoso, another Credit Suisse fund and White Oak as applicants. The respondents, sometimes referred to as simply "the Insurers" are IAL, BCC, two entities associated with Tokio Marine, Mr Brereton and two Marsh companies which were the Greensill group's brokers. GCUK and GCPty are also parties, but Mr Greensill is not.
  17. The ten claims being pursued in the Australian proceedings are currently subject to joint case management and are listed for trial together. As at the time this application was made, the trial in Australia was listed to commence on 1st March 2026. That original start date has now been put back by five months and the trial is now listed to commence before Thawley J on 3rd August 2026 with a time estimate of three to four months. The pleadings are voluminous and the evidence is that disclosure has been completed by all parties except for GBAG, GCUK and GCPty. Extensive oral evidence is anticipated. The present position is that no party has yet approached Mr Greensill to give evidence on their behalf.
  18. On this application Mr Greensill submitted that the allegations of misrepresentation and nondisclosure made by the Insurers in the Australian proceedings overlap to a material extent with one of the three broad areas of misconduct identified in the Secretary of State's statement of matters included in his evidence pursuant to Rule 3(3) of the Insolvent Companies (Disqualification of Unfit Directors) Proceedings Rules 1987 (the "1987 Rules").
  19. The first and third of the issues arising out of these three broad areas of misconduct are not core to this application, although they are of some relevance. They are as follows:
  20. i) Issue One. In the period November and December 2020 Mr Greensill caused GCUK, GL and GCPty to enter into a series of transactions to the detriment of Virtuoso as noteholder of the Katerra notes programme and caused GCUK to apply sums received by it otherwise than for the redemption of the Katerra notes.

    ii) Issue Three. From August 2000 Mr Greensill made a series of misrepresentations and non-disclosures to the boards of GCUK and GCPty in respect of the status of the insurance, including service of notice of non-renewal, such that the boards were unaware of these issues.

  21. Issue Two is at the core of this application and can be summarised as follows. From September 2018 onward Mr Greensill made, or caused GCUK to make, a series of dishonest misrepresentations and non-disclosures to trade credit insurers providing cover in respect of finance provided by GCUK to members of the Catfoss Group. This exposed GCUK and its investors, including the loss payees, to the risk that the existing policies would be avoided and that the Insurers would refuse to provide further cover which would not be replaceable from elsewhere. These risks have eventuated in that the Insurers have refused to pay, declining to accept claims for approximately US$4.6 billion of losses incurred by investors in GCUK's products.
  22. The Secretary of State makes clear that he does not rely on the existence of the Australian proceedings to prove the misrepresentations and non-disclosures on which he relies to establish unfitness, although the Secretary of State said that it is entirely unsurprising that they are one of the planks of the Insurers' defence.
  23. The extent of the overlap is apparent from three tables prepared on behalf of Mr Greensill. They set out:
  24. i) the Catfoss allegations which are common to both the disqualification proceedings and the Australian proceedings;

    ii) the Catfoss allegations which are made in the disqualification proceedings but not in the Australian proceedings; and

    iii) the allegations of dishonesty against Mr Greensill, both in relation to Catfoss and to the other two counterparties I have already mentioned – Bluestone Resources and Liberty France Aluminium - which are made in the Australian proceedings but not in the disqualification proceedings.

  25. Without accepting the accuracy of every point of detail, the Secretary of State accepts that these tables reflect in very broad terms the extent of the current overlap.
  26. It appears that on the present state of the pleadings the Federal Court in the Australian proceedings and this court in the disqualification proceedings are both likely to have to consider a material number of the same Catfoss related issues. The Secretary of State accepts that this is the case. As it was put in the skeleton argument prepared on his behalf,
  27. "It is unhesitatingly admitted that there is some 'common ground' between part of one of the limbs of the Defences of the Insurers in the Australian Proceedings, and one of the allegations – Issue 2 – in these disqualification proceedings".
  28. However, Mr Mohyuddin submitted, and I accept, that there are a significant number of issues, both as they relate to the Catfoss allegations under Issue Two and more generally which are currently relied on in one set of proceedings but do not arise in the other. He also submitted that, if the court asks itself the relevant question, which is whether the extent of the overlap means that the interests of justice require a stay, the answer is most certainly no.
  29. It was also said in the evidence adduced by Mr Greensill that the allegations by the Secretary of State in relation to Issue Two have been piggybacked without proper analysis on what had been said in the Australian proceedings. The facts relied on in support of the Secretary of State's case on Issue Two and the chronology of events makes that a possibility, but a possibility only in the sense that the Australian proceedings contributed to the formulation of the allegations made under Issue Two. However, on the basis of the information currently before me, I am far from satisfied that the Secretary of State has simply recited an uncritical replication of those allegations without proper analysis.
  30. In any event, Mr Greensill's position has now shifted from what was said at one stage in his evidence in the sense that he does not at this stage rely on the piggy backing allegation in support of a submission that the Secretary of State is guilty of unfair conduct. As to that, he now reserves his position for a further application in due course should he see fit to make one. The point made on his behalf is simply that it supports his case that the allegations made in both the disqualification proceedings and the Australian proceedings are closely connected, although I am bound to say that this is not how the allegation read when it was originally made in the evidence in support of the application.
  31. Against this background, Mr Greensill's application notice seeks a stay on the grounds that, since the Australian proceedings raise similar or related issues to those raised by Issue Two, it would better serve the interests of justice for that issue to be tried after final judgment in the Australian proceedings. This was said to be for four interrelated reasons:
  32. i) the outcome of the Australian proceedings may promote a consensual resolution of the issue or reduce the time needed to try it in England;

    ii) the outcome of the Australian proceedings may reduce the time needed to try it in England;

    iii) it is likely that the possibility of conflicting decisions in Australia and England would thereby be reduced; and

    iv) it is in the interests of the creditors of GCUK for such an order to be granted.

  33. There was no substantial disagreement between the parties as to the approach to be taken by the court on this application, although there certainly were differences of nuance. In particular, it was not in dispute that the CPR applied pursuant to Rule 2(2) of the 1987 Rules and that the court was being asked to exercise a case management power governed by CPR 3.1(2). The court must, therefore, consider what is required by the interests of justice, a question which must be answered by reference to the overriding objective.
  34. The applications in the present case fall into the category of cases in which a stay is sought because there are linked or parallel proceedings in another jurisdiction. In the case of Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Ltd [2020] UKSC 36 at paragraph 99, the Supreme Court has given the Supreme Court has given the following guidance in such a case and I quote:
  35. "The English courts have wide case management powers, and they include the power to impose a temporary stay on proceedings where to do so would serve the Overriding Objective; see CPR rr 1.2(a) and 3.1(2)(f). For example, a temporary stay is frequently imposed and even more frequently ordered by consent in order to give the parties breathing space to attempt to settle the proceedings or narrow the issues by mediation or some other form of alternative dispute resolution. A temporary stay may be ordered where there are parallel proceedings in another jurisdiction, raising similar or related issues between the same or related parties, where the earlier resolution of those issues in the foreign proceedings would better serve the interests of justice than by allowing the English proceedings to continue without a temporary stay: see Reichhold Norway ASA v Goldman Sachs International [2000] 1 WLR 173. But this would be justified only in rare or compelling circumstances: see per Lord Bingham MR at pp 185-186, and Klockner Holdings GmbH v Klockner Beteiligungs GmbH [2005] EWHC 1453".
  36. The order sought must, therefore, better serve the interests of justice than would be the case if the proceedings were permitted to continue with no stay of Issue Two. That is the legal test, but where a case management stay is sought on the grounds of parallel proceedings elsewhere, it is to be expected that it will only be in rare and compelling circumstances that, as a matter of fact, the test has been met (see Athena v the Holy See [2022] EWCA Civ 1051 at [56] to [59]).
  37. The four reasons identified in Mr Greensill's application notice as justifying a stay continued to be advanced by Ms Stonefrost in her skeleton argument, albeit expressed in slightly different terms. The reasons are all interrelated and at the end of the day the court must stand back and look at the position in the round. Nonetheless, I can still take them in their turn.
  38. The first ground relates to the importance of avoiding inconsistent judgments. This was the third ground relied on in the application notice. Ms Stonefrost submitted that this consideration is not limited to circumstances in which there is an issue estoppel where the proceedings are between the same parties. So far as it goes, I entirely agree with that submission, but where the parallel proceedings are not dispositive of any issue in the proceedings sought to be stayed this will be a material question for the court in deciding how to exercise its discretion.
  39. Ms Stonefrost submitted that, on those issues which overlap both sets of proceedings, the court will be considering the same conduct of Mr Greensill and the same allegations that his conduct was dishonest. But she said that the evidence was likely to be different, because there will be more disclosure in the Australian proceedings than in the disqualification proceedings and she pointed out that while Mr Greensill will be cross-examined as a witness in the disqualification proceedings as matters stand he will not be giving evidence in the Australian proceedings.
  40. She then submitted that the consequence of this was that there was a very high risk of inconsistent decisions and that the court should bear in mind the reality of what is happening and what is likely to happen on the ground.
  41. Ms Stonefrost also cautioned against placing too much weight on the consideration that the public interest is generally best served by disqualification proceedings being concluded as soon as reasonably practicable. She did not dispute that this was an appropriate starting point, but she submitted that the court needed to guard against jeopardy to public confidence in the disqualification process if this court's decision on Issue Two in the disqualification proceedings turned out to be inconsistent with the decision in the Australian proceedings, more particularly if Mr Greensill were to be found to have been dishonest in one set of proceedings but not in the other.
  42. Mr Mohyuddin's answer to these submissions was that it was frequently a feature of disqualification proceedings that a director's misconduct must also be examined in parallel proceedings. He said that obvious examples included cases in which misfeasance and other analogous claims are made by an officeholder against a director, related criminal proceedings and proceedings by creditors such as a claim under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986. He also said that it was not at all unusual for there to be different evidence in associated or parallel proceedings, but that was not objectionable in and of itself and was in any event unaffected by the relief sought.
  43. In broad terms I accept this is the case. I also consider that one of the reasons why a stay may not be required in order to do justice is that the substantive relief being sought in both sets of proceedings is very different, which means that although the two courts may reach different conclusions on particular facts which are relevant in each set of proceedings, the actual decisions will not conflict. This is reflected by the fact that the Australian proceedings are not in England and Wales, that neither party to the disqualification proceedings is a party to them and that they are not dispositive of any issue in the disqualification proceedings. Conclusions reached in the Australian proceedings are not binding on any party to the disqualification proceedings or on this court.
  44. Put another way, I consider that although there is an overlap in some of the allegations which are made, the two courts are considering two quite different questions. This court is considering whether Mr Greensill is unfit to act as a director of a limited company and, if so, the length of the period for which he should be disqualified. The proceedings are brought in the public interest. The Federal Court is not concerned with the English public interest at all. It is simply determining whether an insurer is entitled to decline cover by reason of what is in part the same misconduct together with claims against others by way of counterclaim. It is concerned with private law commercial proceedings which are ultimately about money, which will be litigated by the parties in their own commercial interests and over the conduct of which the Secretary of State has no influence or control.
  45. In my view, the significance of the distinction in this context is reflected in judicial statements to the effect that it will rarely be in the interests of justice to make a disqualification application wait on other civil proceedings, whether on the grounds of the risk of inconsistent judgments or at all. This is well illustrated by Re Rex Williams Leisure Plc [1994] Ch 1 at paragraph 16 per Sir Donald Nicholls VC at first instance and again in the Court of Appeal at [1994] Ch 350 where Hoffmann LJ said that the Vice Chancellor was entirely right in his conclusions and described as quite absurd the suggestion that the disqualification application should be stayed until a misfeasance action, albeit, and I stress this, one which had been dormant for three years, had been concluded.
  46. More generally Hoffmann LJ gave the following pithy summary of why the interests of justice will rarely justify a stay of disqualification proceedings pending resolution of parallel proceedings of this kind and I quote:
  47. "The Secretary of State has a public duty to apply for the disqualification of unfit directors. He cannot be held up indefinitely by other proceedings over which he has no control".
  48. It seems to me that this is a statement of principle given the special context of disqualification proceedings which is entirely consistent with the general statements of principle laid down in the Unwired case. I also think that there is real force in Mr Mohyuddin's submission that the relief sought does not seek to resolve such conflicts as there may be. It simply reverses the order in which the proceedings are to be determined on the basis that it is appropriate for the disqualification proceedings to play second fiddle to the Australian proceedings in circumstances in which, absent a stay, Issue Two will be determined by this court in any event.
  49. Doubtless that is in part because Mr Greensill is not a party to the Australian proceedings and has no locus to seek case management relief in Australia. But that seems to me to be of limited significance when balanced against the public interest in ensuring that disqualification proceedings are determined in the manner contemplated by the Vice Chancellor in the Court of Appeal in Rex Williams Leisure.
  50. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the Australian proceedings may settle without there being any judicial resolution of any of the matters which are in common with the disqualification proceedings. If that were to happen, the risk of conflicting judgments would fade away altogether and the disqualification proceedings would have been delayed to no purpose at all.
  51. The second of Ms Stonefrost's grounds was that it was not in the interests of justice for court time to be used and for costs to be incurred in relation to Issue Two in circumstances where a decision in the Australian proceedings would clarify the parties' respective position in the disqualification proceedings. She said that, if the determination of Issue Two in the disqualification proceedings were to await resolution of the Australian proceedings a settlement would be facilitated or at least there would be a narrowing of the issues. This part of her submissions reflected the first and second grounds in the application notice.
  52. In particular, Ms Stonefrost pointed out that the insurance policies in issue are governed by Australian law and the likelihood was that expert evidence would be required if the disqualification proceedings on Issue Two were to be pursued before the Australian proceedings had been decided. The costs of experts would be avoided and the court time taken hearing experts would be saved by a temporary stay of Issue Two. In her oral submissions Ms Stonefrost referred me to the significance of the Australian Insurance Contracts Act which bears on the consequences of any misrepresentations Mr Greensill may have made which may, so she submitted, be relevant to the disqualification proceedings even if only to the extent and seriousness of any misconduct of which Mr Greensill may be found to be guilty.
  53. Mr Mohyuddin said that it rather looked as if expert evidence on this point would be of only minor significance. Based on the submissions made today and in writing, I am not satisfied that this is a factor of real weight, not least because it is not clear to me that any Australian law expert evidence required for the purposes of the disqualification proceedings will be either extensive or controversial. Even if it is, it is not clear to me that the Australian proceedings will resolve any controversial matters in a manner which means that expert evidence that would otherwise have been required for the purposes of these proceedings can be avoided.
  54. As to facilitating a settlement, Mr Mohyuddin said that in any event the court will be hearing and determining the disqualification application during the course of 2026 while judgment in the Australian proceedings is unlikely to be delivered before some time in the first half of 2027 with the real possibility of an appeal thereafter. There is no guarantee that the Australian proceedings will not settle before a determination of the questions relating to Issue Two in any event, a point I already made in a slightly different context. He also said that the prospect of compromise of these disqualification proceedings was speculative, because the only way that disqualification proceedings can be settled is by the abandonment of the Secretary of State's claim or by the giving of undertakings by Mr Greensill.
  55. Mr Mohyuddin also submitted that each of the three main areas of alleged misconduct relied on in the disqualification proceedings concern Mr Greensill's personal knowledge and conduct in respect of his dealings on behalf of GCUK and GCPty and that the level of interconnectivity between them made it impractical to carve one allegation out of the disqualification proceedings and treat it separately from the other two. Thus it was said that much of the evidence concerning the structure and dealings with the Greensill group and Mr Greensill's knowledge and understanding of trade credit insurance related to all three issues. This was particularly the case in relation to the connections between Issue Two and Issue Three, where the evidence in support of both of the issues was, he submitted, inseparable.
  56. Ms Stonefrost submitted that Mr Mohyuddin's argument that there was a factual and a contextual overlap between Issue Two and Issue Three, such that any trial on Issue Three would necessarily require a determination of the evidence relating to Issue Two, was significantly exaggerated. In particular she said there was no overlap in relation to the conduct alleged against Mr Greensill in the sense that one category of misrepresentation was to the Insurers and the other was to the boards of GCUK and GCPty. She also said that the time period in which the events complained of took place were different – September 2019 on the one hand and August 2020 on the other.
  57. Ms Stonefrost also submitted that the Secretary of State was wrong to say that, if Issue Two were to be stayed, the period of disqualification could not be determined, as it would not be possible for the court to take all relevant factors into account, because on that basis the undetermined Issue Two factors would not have been included. She submitted that the reason the Secretary of State was wrong was that there is no application for a stay in relation to Issue One or Issue Three and that the court could certainly proceed to determine whether those issues themselves justified a disqualification order. If they did, it still remained open to the Secretary of State to apply for a further disqualification order once the proceedings in Australia had been concluded.
  58. I do not accept these submissions. Ms Stonefrost was, of course, correct in identifying where it can be said that there is no overlap, i.e. the persons to whom the misrepresentations were made and the precise time periods, but I do not accept that Mr Mohyuddin's submissions were exaggerated. In my view, the overlap between the three broad areas of misconduct alleged by the Secretary of State is material and that, even with robust case management, it is inevitable that there would be a considerable amount of repetition and duplication of effort if the issues were to have to be tried separately.
  59. It also seems to me that there would be real problems with carving out the evidence and argument on Issue Two from Issues One and Three. This is particularly the case, because it is not proposed that Mr Greensill will serve his own evidence in answer to the Issue Two allegations until after the determination of the proceedings in Australia. To do so would undermine his fourth reason for seeking a stay. Judgment in the Australian proceedings is unlikely to be delivered before some time in the first half of 2027 with the real possibility of an appeal thereafter. It follows that on Mr Greensill's case there is no prospect of this court being able to reach a conclusion on Issue Two until some time in the middle of 2028 at the very earliest with the very real prospect that it will not be until 2029, more than five years after the Secretary of State originally issued her claim form.
  60. Even if there were not to be the very substantial timing issues thrown up by Mr Greensill's proposal, I agree with Mr Mohyuddin's submission that it cuts across one of the basic principles which underpins the disqualification regime. As Hoffmann LJ observed in Re Grayan Building Services [1995] Ch 241 at 253, the court's role is to consider solely the director's conduct specified in the statement of matters, but when it does so it must view that conduct "cumulatively and taking into account any extenuating circumstances" in order to decide whether it has fallen below the standards of probity and competence appropriate for persons fit to be directors of companies. The same approach is reflected in the judgment of Morritt LJ in Secretary of State v McTighe [1997] BCC 224 at page 230.
  61. Mr Mohyuddin also submitted that this basic approach is reflected in the fact that the Secretary of State is required to advance all of his evidence in support of the statement of matters at the outset of the proceedings. There is some force in that submission. I agree that splitting a trial in this way or in the way suggested is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the claim is a single claim based on the totality of a person's conduct in relation to the relevant insolvent company based on a statutory cause of action, pursuit of which is entrusted in the public interest to the Secretary of State.
  62. That is not, of course, to say that the court does not maintain control of the case management of such claims; of course it does. Nor is it to say that it will not exercise its powers to ensure that the way in which they are pursued are not abusive or otherwise contrary to the overriding objective; of course it will. This is entirely clear from cases such as Athena Capital v the Secretary of State for the Holy See in a passage to which I was taken by Ms Stonefrost in reply.
  63. In my view, it is very difficult to see how the Secretary of State can comply with the duty with which he has been entrusted by the legislation if the effect of the stay is to split the proceedings into separate trials in the manner sought. The court would then be disabled from considering all of the matters relied on by the Secretary of State in relation to the relevant conduct in the round. This is also more likely to add to the expense and complexity of these proceedings than it is to ensure that they are conducted at proportionate cost as required by the overriding objective. There will have to be two rounds of evidence, both in answer and reply, and two separate trials with a material amount of the same ground having to be considered by the court twice. This will only not occur if the case settles.
  64. In my view, such a course of action is difficult to reconcile with the principle that the court must consider an disqualification application, having regard to the matters relied on by the Secretary of State as a whole. Ms Stonefrost submitted that this was not a particular difficulty in the present case. She says that what would happen if Issues One and Three are tried first and Mr Greensill is then disqualified is that the Secretary of State could simply apply for a further disqualification order in relation to Issue Two. She relied on Re Abassi [2024] EWHC Crim 457 and the provisions of section 1(3) of the CDDA to demonstrate how that might be done and the jurisdiction to do so. However, as Mr Mohyuddin pointed out, Abassi was a different case. It simply established that, where a person was already subject to a disqualification undertaking, the court can make a further disqualification order in exercise of the criminal jurisdiction under section 2 with the effect that the total period of disqualification was for more than 15 years.
  65. I think Mr Mohyuddin was correct to point out that distinction. The current case is one in which Mr Greensill's proposal would involve the Secretary of State coming back for a further trial of a separate issue on unfitness arising out of conduct relating to the affairs of the same company in respect of which Mr Greensill has already been disqualified. That seems to me to be contrary to the approach mandated by Grayan Building and is not one which the court should contemplate save in the most unusual of circumstances.
  66. Two questions can be posed to illustrate the broader point. What if the findings on any two of the main issues would not justify disqualification but the findings on all three would? What if the findings on Issues One and Three justify disqualification for six years and the findings on Issue Two alone also justify disqualification for six years, but that once the findings on all the issues are aggregated it can be seen that the maximum of 15 years should have been imposed? Even if splitting the trial were otherwise to be an efficient way of proceeding, there is no obvious basis on which the court could start again to assess an appropriate alternative disqualification period once it has already imposed six years for Issues One and Three without exposing the defendant to double jeopardy.
  67. The third of Ms Stonefrost's grounds was that, if the applicants lose in the Australian proceedings, their claims against a solvent insurer will be replaced by unsecured claims against the insolvent GCUK. This was the fourth ground in Mr Greensill's application notice.
  68. Ms Stonefrost submitted that there was evidence that, if the Insurers were to succeed in their defences in Australia, the increase in claims by the applicants would lead to a reduction in the dividend to unsecured creditors at GCUK from 16 cents in the dollar to 6 cents in the dollar. Mr Mohyuddin did not dispute anyway in general terms that the effect of failure for the applicants in the Australian proceedings would be to reduce the dividend for unsecured creditors. However, he submitted that the evidence does not explain how creditors' interests are better served by the disqualifications being determined after the Australian proceedings or why those interests should be preferred or prioritised.
  69. Mr Greensill said that the answer to this is that the prospects of a dividend reduction would be increased by matters coming into the public domain in relation to Issue Two in the disqualification proceedings before determination of the Australian proceedings. It was said that on the current timetable he will be cross-examined in this court before the commencement of a trial in the Australian proceedings and it is quite possible that judgment may be handed down before the conclusion of the Australian proceedings. Therefore, the essence of Mr Greensill's case was that, if Issue Two were to continue to trial in these proceedings without a stay, there was a real risk that the Insurers would obtain additional material to enhance their case in the Australian proceedings to the detriment of the unsecured creditors of GCUK.
  70. Mr Mohyuddin submitted that the way this is put makes clear that Mr Greensill's case is that the Australian applicants' prospect of success and the Insurers' prospects of losing are improved if he can persuade this court to delay the service of his own evidence, his cross-examination and the giving of judgment on Issue Two in the disqualification proceedings. In short, it appears that it is Mr Greensill's case that, if he gives evidence and makes submissions in the course of the disqualification proceedings, the Insurers may either win or get a better commercial deal in settlement of the Australian proceedings to the detriment of creditors because one of their defences is more likely to have been vindicated.
  71. I think that Mr Mohyuddin is correct to characterise Mr Greensill's case on this point as being an invitation to this court to orchestrate a delay in the determination of Issue Two in these proceedings in order to facilitate a better commercial deal for the applicants in the Australian proceedings. Even if there were to be any evidence that GCUK's insolvent officeholders, GCUK's unsecured creditors or the Australian applicants, all of whose interests Mr Greensill purports to advance in making the submission, support what he has to say (and I should say there is no such evidence), I think that Mr Greensill's argument on this point has very little merit. It can be no part of this court's approach to the proper case management of these disqualification proceedings, brought as they in the public interest, to give material weight to the possibility that the stay sought by Mr Greensill may improve the commercial position of one party or the other in the Australian proceedings to which neither the Secretary of State nor Mr Greensill are themselves party.
  72. I should also mention one other aspect of the evidence which was not developed in written or oral submissions. It was said by Mr Greensill's solicitor that his client's simultaneous involvement in the disqualification proceedings and a range of other civil litigation and investigations arising out of the collapse of the Greensill group is placing very considerable demands on his time and resources and is putting him under considerable personal strain. I can quite understand why that might be, but it was not said on this application that this is a reason why only part of the disqualification proceedings should be stayed. I therefore need say no more about that point.
  73. Stepping back and looking at the case in the round it is clear to me that the relief sought by Mr Greensill would be likely to lead to significant delay and complication in the final determination of all the disqualification issues against him, with insufficient material countervailing case management benefits. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the course proposed by Mr Greensill is neither a just nor a proportionate means of resolving the proceedings in an expeditious manner. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the right answer is for the application to be dismissed.

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