Neutral Citation Number: [2023] EWHC 843 (Ch)
Case No: BL-2023-000449
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 14/04/2023
Before :
MR JUSTICE MILES
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Between :
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CHELSEA MIDCO 1 LIMITED |
Claimant |
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HARWOOD CHELSEA INVESTMENT LP |
Defendant |
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Adam Deacock (instructed by Keystone Law) for the Claimant
Edmund Cullen KC (instructed by Dentons UK and Middle East LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 31 March 2023
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JUDGMENT APPROVED
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 am on 14 April 2023 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives.
Mr Justice Miles :
Introduction
Factual background
i) a £15m business loan facility (the Oaknorth facility) by Oaknorth to Bidco the terms of which (including significant restrictions and financial covenants) were negotiated by Harwood partners or staff including Mr Wilson and was signed on behalf of Bidco by Mr Wilson;
ii) the issue of the loan notes in the sum of £26.9m odd by the claimant to the defendant under the LNI. This was secured by a debenture by the claimant in favour of the defendant, a guarantee from Topco and a charge by Topco over the shares in the claimant. The LNI and the security was signed on behalf of the claimant and Topco by Mr Wilson; and
iii) the loan of substantially the whole of the sums advanced under the loan notes by the claimant to Midco 2 and by Midco 2 to Bidco pursuant to intercompany loans which were also signed by Mr Wilson.
The parties’ submissions in outline
i) the representatives of Harwood had repeatedly advised the claimant that the quarterly interest could not be paid. This advice was wrong and was negligent;
ii) the Harwood representatives gave assurances that the non-payment of the interest was not a problem and that interest would not be treated as payable until Bidco was able to make payments as Permitted Distributions in accordance with the Oaknorth covenants;
iii) the advice and assurances by Harwood personnel were not merely made in their capacity as officers of the claimant or other group companies but on behalf of Harwood and hence the defendant. In this context Mr Wilson and Mr Aziz attended what were called “board meetings” of MFS - but these were really meetings of the group (and with Harwood as investors). Mr Wilson and Mr Aziz were never directors of MFS, but were directors of the companies in the group from Bidco upwards. Moreover Mr Aziz attended meetings after he ceased to be a director of any of the group companies, and Mr Brade attended before he ever became a director of any of the group companies. Mr Wilson, Mr Aziz and Mr Brade did not deal with the non-Harwood directors as directors but as representatives of Harwood and the weekly Teams meetings between Mr Carey and Mr Wilson (and sometimes Mr Aziz) were specifically meetings with Harwood to update Harwood and receive Harwood’s views. Numerous emails from Mr Wilson referred to the position or views of Harwood expressly; and
iv) as a result, the defendant assured the claimant that it would not rely on the requirement to pay interest strictly by the end of each quarter, but would wait until payment could be made as Permitted Distributions in compliance with the Oaknorth covenants. The defendant therefore waived the right to treat non-payment of loan note interest as a breach of the LNI or an EoD.
“It has been said that, as a matter of construction, unless the contract clearly provides to the contrary it will be presumed that it was not the intention of the parties that either should be entitled to rely on their own breach of duty to avoid the contract or bring it to an end or to obtain a benefit under it. This presumption applies only to acts or omissions which constitute a breach by that party of an express or implied contractual obligation, or (possibly) of a non-contractual duty, owed by them to the other party. Breach of a duty, whether contractual or non-contractual, owed to a stranger to the contract will not suffice. However, such a “principle of construction” appears to be somewhat different in nature from the principle that a document will be construed against the grantor. It may therefore be that it is better regarded as depending on an implied term of the contract in question or as one illustration of a more general principle that “[a] man cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong”. .
i) there is no real difference between waiver and equitable or promissory estoppel (see Chitty at [6-113]);
ii) that the assurance or promise required for any estoppel or waiver must be clear and unequivocal (see Chitty at [6-008 to 6-009]); and
iii) that any relevant waiver or estoppel is generally only suspensory in nature (see Chitty at [6-014]) and the touchstone of any estoppel is that the estopped party is prevented from inequitably going back on its assurance or promise (see Chitty at [6-013]).
i) the claimant had failed to show that the defendant had given any relevant assurances or promises. Mr Wilson and Mr Aziz were acting as directors of the group companies, including Bidco. They did not give any assurances as to the defendant’s exercise of its rights;
ii) the claimant had failed to establish that there was a clear and unequivocal promise or assurance. At the most favourable view for the claimant’s case, Mr Wilson gave comfort as to the defendant’s current intentions from time to time. But he never gave any assurance or promise that the defendant would not be able to call or would not call a default or exercise its security;
iii) in any case any estoppel could only suspend the defendant’s rights and from November 2022 onwards the defendant made clear that it reserved the right to take steps based on the failure of the claimant to make quarterly payments. By any standard the claimant has had more than a reasonable period of time since then to repair the default;
iv) there is no realistic claim for negligence: there was no duty of care; Mr Wilson and Mr Aziz were acting as directors of Bidco when expressing their views about its ability to make upstream payments to the claimant; it was always open to the other directors to take another view;
v) in any case the claimant would not be able to set off a liability for damages against the sums payable under the notes;
vi) even if it could assert a set off, the claimant would not be able to rely on a claim for unliquidated damages as an answer to the enforcement of security by the defendant as a secured party: see National Westminster Bank v Skelton [1993] 1 WLR 72 and Barclays Bank v Choicezone [2011] EWHC 1303 (Ch);
vii) there was no room for the application of the principle that a party may not rely on its wrong, since there was no relevant wrong which had caused loss to the claimant; and
viii) nor was there any room for the implication of a duty of good faith: the notes are commercial debt instruments and they are tradeable securities. In any case there has been no breach of any such putative duty.
Application for an injunction
Disposition