CHANCERY DIVISION
London |
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B e f o r e :
(Sitting as Judge of the High Court)
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(1) BURNDEN HOLDINGS (UK) LTD | ||
(In Liquidation) | ||
(2) STEPHEN JOHN HUNT | Claimants | |
- and - | ||
(1) GARY JOHN FIELDING | ||
(2) SALLY ANNE FIELDING | Defendants |
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MR DAVID CHIVERS QC and MR MATTHEW PARFITT (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
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(Incorporating Beverley F. Nunnery & Co.)
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JUDGE HODGE QC:
"… on the evidence as it stands before me at the date of the interlocutory decision, I think the action has a real prospect of success. (a) I do not accept the submission of [counsel then appearing for the claimants] that on that material it has such a high probability of success that one can discount any order for security for costs at all: but I do think one can properly weigh in the balance as one of the factors the prospects of success of this action. (b) The transaction and the steps in the transaction are not in doubt and there has been no suggestion that any issue arises in relation to them. (c) The consequences of the transaction are not in doubt and there cannot really be any issue about the outcome of the transaction. (d) The only question, it seems to me, is whether the directors thought that the only way of securing the benefit to Holdings of a £3 million loan to be injected into its business was by conferring benefits on themselves personally worth £10.48 million. That may well have been their view and they may well have formed that view on advice, but it seems to me that there is a real prospect of the liquidator proving otherwise."
"If the time comes for a substantial Defence to be put in and if the defendants do put in such a substantial Defence, then Holdings will be in a position to see exactly what case it has to meet in answer to the prima facie case which it has pleaded out in its Particulars of Claim. The Defendants might then justifiably say: 'Now the court can see what the real issues in the action are. Now the court can see that you are able or ought to be able to obtain after the event insurance because you know exactly what the issues in the claim are.' Then, it seems to me, the Defendants might well have a proper case for bringing a properly focused application for security for costs. But I consider that the outcome of the present application must be that it is dismissed."
"No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—
(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or
(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use."
(1) the company was insolvent or of doubtful solvency at the time of the distribution of the Vital shareholding or that it became insolvent as a result of that distribution; and.
(2) that the so-called interim accounts were not interim accounts within the meaning of s.270(4) of the (then applicable) Companies Act 1985 since they did not allow a reasonable judgment to be made as to the matters listed in the statute and were not prepared with the formality contemplated by it.
(1) It is plain that the company was insolvent at the time of the distribution of the Vital shareholding or became insolvent as a result of that distribution or was of doubtful solvency and the board approached the proposed distribution without regard to the interests of the first claimant's creditors. Alternatively, insofar as they considered the position of creditors at all, the board relied on Mr Joyce, who is a solicitor with Addleshaw Goddard, to advise them and it is said that he gave no relevant advice.
(2) The so-called "interim accounts" were not "interim accounts" within the meaning of s.270(4) of the 1985 Companies Act since they did not allow a reasonable judgment to be made as to the matters listed in the statute and were not prepared with the formality contemplated by the statute.
(1) The interim accounts wrongly suggested that the company had an investment in SGI Tooling Limited worth £250,000 when the defendants admit in their amended defence (at para.26.1) that SGI Tooling Limited had been dissolved in February 2003 and now aver (at para.90(e) of Mr Fielding's third statement) that the sum of £250,000 included a receivable due from the Burnden Group Plc of £100,000 which was not an investment in a subsidiary, SGI Tooling Limited, as stated in the interim accounts but cannot otherwise explain the balance of £150,000 or why the interim accounts should show any value attributable to an investment in a dissolved company.
(2) Neither the minutes of the meeting alleged to have been held on 29th August (as exhibited to the third witness statement of Mr Fielding) in the form prior to their amendment by Mr Joyce or the meeting alleged to have been held on 12th August 2007 are said to record any discussion or approval of the adequacy or accuracy of the so-called interim accounts.
(3) The interim accounts omit any mention of guarantees given by the company to its subsidiary's bankers or trade suppliers.
(1) that the distribution was a plain breach of duty because newly disclosed company board minutes show that the directors considered the company to be of doubtful solvency but had had no regard to the interests of creditors when approving the removal of Vital from the company by way of a distribution in specie; and
(2) that the distribution was in any event unlawful because there were no interim accounts within the meaning of s.270(4) of the Companies Act 1985 in that the so-called interim accounts: (a) misdescribed and overstated the company's investment in SGI Tooling Limited, which had been dissolved; (b) were not considered or approved by the board; and (c) omitted any mention of guarantees.
"The director states that the company was put into administration as it had guaranteed debts of one trading company and would therefore become liable for these. The director states that as Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd was a non-trading company it had no way of servicing this debt.
Gary Fielding attributes the failure of the company to the guarantees given on the leases of a trading subsidiary company which has since gone into administration. This led to Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd being liable for the debt but with no way of paying this as it was a non-trading company."
"... important to emphasise that a judge, whether sitting in the Companies Court or elsewhere, should be astute to ensure that, however complicated and extensive the evidence might appear to be, the very extensiveness and complexity is not being invoked to mask the fact that there is, on proper analysis, no arguable defence to a claim, whether on the facts or the law."
"Where a company is insolvent or of doubtful solvency or on the verge of insolvency and it is the creditors' money which is at risk the directors, when carrying out their duty to the Company, must consider the interests of the creditors as paramount and take those into account when exercising their discretion."
"It is the duty of a trustee to manage the trust property and deal with it in the interests of the beneficiaries. If he acts in a way which he does not honestly believe is in their interests then he is acting dishonestly. It does not matter whether he stands or thinks he stands to gain personally from his actions. A trustee who acts with the intention of benefiting persons who are not the objects of the trust is not the less dishonest because he does not intend to benefit himself."
"Breaches of trust are of many different kinds. A breach of trust may be deliberate or inadvertent; it may consist of an actual misappropriation or misapplication of the trust property or merely of an investment or other dealing which is outside the trustees' powers; it may consist of a failure to carry out a positive obligation of the trustees or merely of a want of skill and care on their part in the management of the trust property; it may be injurious to the interests of the beneficiaries or be actually to their benefit. By consciously acting beyond their powers (as, for example, by making an investment which they know to be unauthorised) the trustees may deliberately commit a breach of trust; but if they do so in good faith and in the honest belief that they are acting in the interest of the beneficiaries their conduct is not fraudulent. So a deliberate breach of trust is not necessarily fraudulent. Hence the remark famously attributed to Selwyn LJ by Sir Nathaniel Lindley MR in the course of argument in Perrins v Bellamy [1889] 1 Ch. 797, 798:
'My old Master, the late Lord Justice Selwyn, used to say: "The main duty of a trustee is to commit judicious breaches of trust."'"
(1) That in October 2007 the company was not in a parlous financial state such that the duty to consider the interests of creditors arose. On the contrary, the company was solvent with net assets on the liquidator's figures in excess of £10 million.
(2) The wider group had cash requirements but steps had been identified and were then undertaken to cure that. The very transaction the subject of complaint was instrumental in addressing the cash flow needs of the group.
(3) The company's auditors did not raise concerns about its solvency or future solvency, notwithstanding their close involvement in the proposed transaction.
(4) There is no evidence that the directors did or ought to have determined that the company was put on the verge of insolvency or in a parlous financial state by the distribution of the Vital share. After all, the distribution made no difference to the continuing operations of the group save to bring about a cash injection of £3 million, a wholly positive step.
(5) Nor has it been, nor could it be, suggested that the directors ought reasonably to have supposed that £3 million was an insufficient cash sum to deal with the problem which had been identified by the directors.
(6) Even if the directors did not take the interests of the creditors into account, an intelligent and honest man in their position could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that the dividend in specie was for the benefit of the company – and, I would interpose to say, its creditors - because of the substantial cash injection which was going to result to the benefit of the group, and hence the company – and, I would again interpose to say, its creditors itself.
"First, the burden of establishing that a claim would be stifled by an order for security rests on the claimant. He or it must put evidence before the court of his or its means and must satisfy the court, not to a standard of certainty but at least to a standard of probability, that the claim would be stifled if security was ordered. Second, the court should not restrict its evaluation of the ability of a claimant to provide security to the means of the claimant itself. If the claimant cannot provide the security from its own resources, the court will be likely to consider whether it can reasonably be expected to provide it from third parties, such as, in the case of a corporate claimant, shareholders or associated companies or, in the case of an individual claimant, friends and relatives. If the case moves to the stage of considering whether security should be regarded as being available from third parties, the burden still rests on the claimant. He or it has to show that, realistically, there do not exist third parties who can reasonably be expected to put up security for the defendant's costs."