CHANCERY DIVISION
7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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KIM JONES |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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LONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK |
Defendant |
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Mr Charles Bourne QC and Miss Hannah Slarks (instructed by London Borough of Southwark Legal Services) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 2-5 February 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Newey :
Narrative
"Interim settlement with Thames Water for a 3% increase in agency commission payable to Southwark for the collection of water charges w.e.f 2000/01. Further negotiations may generate additional income over the medium term or lead to a possible cessation of the agency agreement."
"1 Premises Affected
1.1 THIS Agreement covers all of the Premises where the water supply given by the Provider is not measured by a meter ('the Unmeasured Premises').
2 Liability For Charges
2.1 THE Customer shall pay for all of the Provider's charges ('the Charges') in respect of the Services provided to the Unmeasured Premises.
2.2 THE Charges will be raised by applying the relevant tariffs ('the Tariffs') for the Services, less the allowances and reductions to which the Customer is entitled under Clause 3.
2.3 THE Tariffs will be those that are in force at the relevant time by virtue of inclusion in Charges Schemes made by the Provider under Section 143 of the [Water Industry Act 1991].
3. Allowances and Reductions
3.1 THE Tariffs will be reduced by 5% in recognition of the fact that in any given year a number of the Unmeasured Premises are likely to be unoccupied for a period of less than three months.
3.2 FOLLOWING the deductions under Clause 3.1 the balance of the Charges will be reduced by a further 18% by way of the Customer's commission."
"THE Customer shall send the Provider an invoice … in respect of any Value Added Tax that is payable in respect of the Customer's commission referred to in Clause 3.2."
"The sums that Southwark pays to Thames Water are offset … by two amounts.
a. First, the charges are reduced by 5% to reflect the proportion of properties which are estimated to be empty, as no sums are due to Thames Water in respect of those properties. This is known as the 'voids' allowance. I am informed by my former colleague Patrick Fallon (Subsidy and Technical Accountant at the Council until 31 July 2015) that, although the void rate is theoretically intended to reflect the actual number of voids, it has not been reduced to reflect the decreasing level of void properties in recent years, which now stands at about 1.35%.
b. Secondly, Thames Water pays the Council a commission in return for its services collecting these sums and the fact that the Council takes on the risk of non-payment by the occupier. It also takes on the costs of collection and of enforcement where a tenant fails to pay, and deals with billing queries and complaints…. This arrangement is obviously of significant commercial benefit to Thames Water, and the Council has negotiated a commission in return for taking on these costs and risks: currently this is 18% of the total billed by Thames Water, after deduction of the 'voids' allowance."
The "commission" and "voids allowance" represent, Mr Young explained, an important source of funding for Southwark.
"we would strive to charge whatever Thames tell us, notwithstanding the discrepancies that we've uncovered".
"Due to the complexity of the [Ofogba] case, Counsel was engaged to advise on this matter. The imperative at this point is to reduce the council's potential exposure to legal challenge and financial loss (notwithstanding the outcome of current litigation). Counsel's advice is that in the long term the [2000] Agreement be terminated and a new Agreement entered into. However, in the interim the council proposes to enter into a Deed of Clarification to the Agreement, which clarifies the council's position as an agent for Thames Water rather than being a 'water reseller' as defined by the Water Industry Act 1991 and Water Resale Order 2006. Thames Water is aware of the legal challenge the council faces and have agreed to facilitate the proposed amendment. This clarification is technical in nature and will not result in any material change to the arrangements with Thames Water."
"The purpose of these arrangements is to enable [Thames Water] to collect charges from tenants in a more efficient way. The water charges are determined by [Thames Water]. The LA [i.e. local authority]/HA [i.e. housing association] then acts as an agent collecting those water charges, and also assuming the risk for any bad debt. [Thames Water] pays a commission to the LA/HA in exchange for its providing this service, and provides a void allowance intended to account for empty properties."
The legislative framework
The Water Industry Act 1991
"'consumer', in relation to a supply of water provided by a water undertaker to any premises, means … a person who is for the time being the person on whom liability to pay charges to the undertaker in respect of that supply of water would fall".
"(8) Where, in the case of any premises—
(a) the person who was liable, immediately before 1st September 1989, to pay charges in respect of a supply of water to those premises was the owner of those premises, rather than the occupier;
(b) that person was so liable (under section 54 of Schedule 3 to the Water Act 1945 or any other local statutory provision) otherwise than by virtue of an agreement; and
(c) the person who was in fact the occupier of the premises on that date has not ceased to be the occupier before the coming into force of this Act,
then the person who is the owner from time to time of those premises shall continue, until the person mentioned in paragraph (c) above does cease to be the occupier of the premises, to be the person liable and, accordingly, shall be treated for the purposes of this section as if he were the occupier of the premises."
"(a) any person for or to whom that company [i.e. a company appointed as a water or sewerage undertaker] provides any services in the course of carrying out the functions of a water undertaker or sewerage undertaker (other than a licensed water supplier); or
(b) any person who might become such a person on making an application for the purpose to the company".
The Water Resale Order 2006
"'Re-seller' means any person who is not a Relevant Undertaker but who
(a) provides to any Purchaser a supply of piped water which a Water Undertaker has supplied, directly or indirectly, to the Re-seller; or
(b) provides to any Purchaser a sewerage service which a Sewerage Undertaker has supplied, directly or indirectly, to the Re-seller, but does not include any person who uses any Relevant Pipe belonging to any Water Undertaker to transport water already belonging to that first person from a point of connection on any Water Undertaker's supply system."
The same paragraph defines "Purchaser" as "a person who occupies any dwelling and who buys from a Re-seller any water or sewerage services".
"(a) If the Purchaser's water supply is not metered, the charge for that supply shall not exceed the average bill for a water supply (and, if appropriate, sewerage service) payable by the Relevant Undertaker's own domestic customers, as from time to time published by the Director, unless the Re-seller can show that a higher charge is justified in accordance with part (b) of this sub-paragraph, sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph or with paragraph 8 below, as the case may be.
(b) Without prejudice to part (a) of this sub-paragraph if a Purchaser's water supply is not metered, the maximum charge must be calculated as follows:
(i) first, any amounts recoverable either under sub-paragraph (1) above or from any other person supplied must be deducted from the amount payable by the Re-seller to the Relevant Undertaker or licensed water supplier;
(ii) secondly, the amount still to be recovered after performing the deduction required by sub-paragraph (b)(i) above shall be apportioned –
(aa) equally among the Purchasers to whom this sub-paragraph applies; or
(bb) in proportion to the respective –
(1) rateable values of each of the affected Purchasers' dwellings;
(2) square footages of each of the affected Purchasers' dwellings;
(3) the number of occupants in each of the affected Purchasers' dwellings;
(4) the number of bedrooms in each of the affected Purchasers' dwellings; or
(cc) by calculating one half of the charge in accordance with the method stated in subparagraph (b)(ii)(aa) above and the other half in accordance with any one (but only one) of the methods set out in sub-paragraph (b)(ii)(bb)(1) to (4) above."
The parties' cases in brief summary
Issues
i) The impact of charges schemes;ii) The 2000 Agreement; and
iii) Maximum charges.
The impact of charges schemes
"Person Chargeable
a) The person responsible for payment of charges under this scheme shall be the occupier of the relevant premises to which the supply is made except where some other person is liable by agreement with Thames Water.
b) Where there are two or more people occupying the relevant premises to which the supply is made, the occupiers shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the charges.
c) Where the relevant premises to which the supply is made is let on a tenancy of less than twelve months or licence, the owner of the premises shall be regarded as the occupier and be liable for charges except where some other person has paid the charges or is liable by agreement with Thames Water."
A corresponding paragraph was to be found in the 2002 wastewater supply charges schemes, and the charges schemes for subsequent years up to and including 2009-2010 also included provisions in more or less these terms. Charges schemes of some other undertakers evidently still contain comparable provisions.
i) By virtue of Thames Water's charges schemes for 2002-2003 to 2009-2010, Southwark was liable to Thames Water for water and sewerage services provided to Flat 110 between 1 April 2002 and 31 March 2010;ii) In respect of other periods, Miss Jones bore such liability unless there was a relevant agreement to the contrary to which Thames Water was a party (such as, on Miss Jones' case, the 2000 Agreement).
The 2000 Agreement
"When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to 'what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean', to quote Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] AC 1101, para 14. And it does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words, in this case clause 3(2) of each of the 25 leases, in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the lease, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions."
i) "the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances … should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision" (paragraph 17);ii) "when it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, I accept that the less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning. That is simply the obverse of the sensible proposition that the clearer the natural meaning the more difficult it is to justify departing from it. However, that does not justify the court embarking on an exercise of searching for, let alone constructing, drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning" (paragraph 18);
iii) "while commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have agreed, not what the court thinks that they should have agreed" (paragraph 20); and
iv) "[w]hen interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances which existed at the time that the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available to both parties. Given that a contract is a bilateral, or synallagmatic, arrangement involving both parties, it cannot be right, when interpreting a contractual provision, to take into account a fact or circumstance known only to one of the parties" (paragraph 21).
i) Evidence of what was said or done during the course of negotiating an agreement cannot be used "for the purpose of drawing inferences about what the contract meant", but may be admissible for other purposes, e.g. "to establish that a fact which may be relevant as background was known to the parties" (see Lord Hoffmann's speech, at paragraph 42); andii) Evidence that the parties "habitually used words in an unconventional sense" may be adduced to support an argument that "words in a contract should bear a similar meaning" (Lord Hoffmann's speech, at paragraph 45). This:
"is the 'private dictionary' principle, which is akin to the principle by which a linguistic usage in a trade or among a religious sect may be proved".
"The position is thus that the Council had at all material times the power to enter into an agreement for the collection and recovery by the Council on behalf of a water authority or company of any water charges payable or fixed for the supply of water by the water authority or company, at least in the Council's area."
"[The judge] described the origins of the agreement as 'lost in the mists of time', but set out certain of its characteristics which are worth mention. The Council, consistently with the statutory language, claims and seeks to collect from its tenants the amounts fixed by the water company in respect of their particular properties. When it comes to accounting to the water company, the Council does so on a lump sum and discounted basis (we were told, twice yearly). The discounted lump sum is arrived at by negotiation and is based on the total water charges for all relevant Council properties, less a discount to take account of unoccupied premises and costs of collection. Presumably, although this is not stated, the discount also takes account of the risks of non-recovery, since it appears that the Council undertakes to pay the water company the discounted lump sum, irrespective of what it recovers from its tenants. We were told that the discounting means in practice, and is designed to mean, that the Council achieves for the benefit of its housing revenue account a surplus through collecting on behalf of Thames Water Utilities Limited more by way of water charges than the amount for which the Council has actually to account to that company. It is always open to an agent to contract on such a basis, and I see no objection in the present statutory context to the arrangement made between the Council and the water company. Any surplus accruing to the Council's housing account (which has been 'ring-fenced' under the relevant legislation throughout the 1990s) ensures to the benefit of all its tenants, since it enables the Council to keep rents down."
"Thus, even if perchance the ultimately correct analysis of the agreement were to be found not in agency, but, for instance, in the concept of assignment (if, indeed, the statutory claims of water undertakers on their customers can be assigned), it would seem to me that the arrangements still amounted to a collection and recovery of water charges 'on behalf of' the water undertaker."
"UU had not dropped out of the picture, it remained the water undertaker which provided the water services to the occupiers of the properties concerned, it remained responsible to those tenants for the services provided, just as those tenants remained responsible, ie liable, to pay the charges statutorily imposed on them as occupiers; the charges imposed on the tenants under their tenancy agreements were the charges fixed by UU, and the liability imposed on the tenants under their tenancy agreements was the same as their liability to UU under statute. It was simply that the mechanism for the collection and recovery of those liabilities had been undertaken by Rochdale for UU. Whether it was strictly a matter of agency or not (but I believe it was), what Rochdale agreed to do by way of the collection and recovery of the water charges was done for UU, or, as one might naturally say, on behalf of UU. One might ask: Who else but UU provided the water services? Who else but UU was owed for those services? Who else but UU fixed the price of those services? If, therefore, by arrangement with Rochdale, it was Rochdale who invoiced and collected those water charges, it could properly be said that Rochdale did so on behalf of UU."
"Whether the charges were demanded by UU, they were certainly fixed by UU, and I believe it can properly be said, if that were necessary, that they were demanded as well, albeit that was done through the collection method provided by the agreement. All this is reflected in the wording of the agreement cited above: which refers to 'charges fixed by the company' (preamble C); to 'charges for water and sewerage services provided by the company' etc (definition of 'charges' in clause 1); to 'charges due in respect of their occupation of the properties' (definition of 'Collection method' above); to customers and tenants (being the same) 'who are liable to pay water or sewerage charges to the company pursuant to sections 142 and 144 of the Act' (definition of 'Customers' above); to UU 'authoris[ing]' (the language of agency) Rochdale to collect the charges 'on behalf of the company' (clause 2.2); to Rochdale being under an obligation to carry out such collection with 'reasonable care and skill', which shows that in doing so Rochdale is acting for UU and not merely for itself (clause 3.2); to Rochdale being under a duty to UU to invoice the customers (of course, those are UU's customers even if they are also Rochdale's tenants) for the charges fixed by UU (clauses 3.3 and 4.1); and to Rochdale being under a duty to deal with billing complaints itself (but in a 'prompt, courteous and efficient manner', because in doing so Rochdale is of course dealing with complaints about UU's charges) and to refer to UU any complaints 'regarding the provision of water and sewerage services by the company' (because of course those services are being provided by UU to its customers and Rochdale's tenants) (clause 3.2). Moreover, although there is a general provision in clause 15.2 stating that nothing in the agreement constitutes UU and Rochdale as partners or principal and agent etc, there is an immediate express proviso:
'Save in respect of the collection of charges by the council, the council does not have (nor may it represent that it has) any authority to act or make any commitments on the company's behalf'.
That means that in that respect, concerning the collection of charges, Rochdale does have that authority, and to that extent therefore it is acting as an agent on behalf of its principal and may represent itself as such. Just as clause 2.2 had earlier stated in the definitive 'Agreement' clause: 'The company hereby authorises the council to collect the charges on behalf of the company by the collection method'."
"In such circumstances it seems to me to matter not a bit that, by agreement between UU and Rochdale, Rochdale pays UU in bulk and at different times from its weekly collections. To some extent it collects in advance, and to some extent it collects in arrears, of its quarterly payments to UU. Neither is significant; it is the deal between the parties. Rochdale is certainly entitled to a price for its administrative services, which is expressed as a commission, a typical word used in an agency context. Of course, the mere use of labels, or of assertive language tracking the statute (paragraph 20 of Schedule 1 to the WC(CP)A 1991), will not be decisive: but I see nothing in the provisions of the agreement to suggest a manipulative use of such labels or of language in general. It seems to me that the agreement expresses the reality of the enterprise. Nor does it matter that there is no provision for a liability to account as a fiduciary. There is a liability to account, but it is kept suitably simple, and is governed by the terms of the agreement. If, however, something went wrong and Rochdale ceased to provide the payments required, I do not doubt that it might be required to account; of course, it could also simply be sued for the contractual payments in debt."
"Because Mrs Thomas was a litigant in person, it is not entirely clear what issues were taken regarding the scheme, and therefore not entirely clear whether anything like the current ultra vires issue was before that court. In these circumstances I would be prepared to regard the Lambeth case as not amounting to an authority binding on this court on the present issue: however, this court through Mance J's judgment clearly gave close and detailed consideration as to whether a scheme such as that described by him would fall within the statutory language in circumstances where it appears that Mrs Thomas, who after all was resisting possession on Lambeth's appeal, was as it seems objecting to the principle of the thing. I would therefore regard the Lambeth case, if not formally binding on us, to be a most helpful authority to Rochdale. Mance J and Kennedy LJ clearly regarded the scheme described, essentially the same as the agreement in this case, as falling within the statutory language, as an agreement for the collection by the council on behalf of the water company of water charges fixed by the water company, and as a contract amounting to agency. I would therefore regard the Lambeth case as supporting the conclusion to which I have independently arrived in this case."
i) Clause 2.1 of the 2000 Agreement provided for Southwark to pay for "all of the Provider's charges … in respect of the Services provided to the Unmeasured Premises", reflecting a recital to the effect that Southwark would "pay for the Services in respect of the Premises". It is common ground that Southwark was thereby obliged to pay "the Provider's charges" regardless of what (if any) sums it received from its tenants. The alleged principal (Thames Water) was to have no interest in moneys collected by its alleged agent (Southwark);ii) While calculated by reference to tariffs contained in charges schemes (see clauses 2.3 and 2.3 of the 2000 Agreement), the sums that Southwark had to pay to Thames Water did not correspond to the total of the sums that tenants were required to pay. What was due from Southwark was a net sum, after "allowances and reductions" had been deducted;
iii) A linked point is that the 2000 Agreement made no provision for Southwark to account to Thames Water. That is unsurprising since the idea was evidently that Southwark should have an unconditional obligation to pay "the Provider's charges" and no liability to make any further payment. The absence of an accounting obligation is, however, significant. "[T]he duty to account is a typical feature of the agent's position" (Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 20th ed., at paragraph 1-032, citing Michelin Tyre Co Ltd v Macfarlane (Glasgow) Ltd [1917] 2 SLT 205);
iv) In other respects, too, the usual incidents of agency were missing from the 2000 Agreement. There was, for example, no provision for Thames Water to exercise any control over Southwark (compare Bowstead & Reynolds, at paragraph 1-017) or for Southwark to exercise diligence, care or skill (compare Bowstead & Reynolds, at paragraphs 1-016 and 6-017);
v) The 2000 Agreement also omitted any reference to Thames Water giving Southwark authority to collect money from the tenants. Yet it is of the essence of agency that the agent should be able to affect the principal's legal relations with third parties (see Bowstead & Reynolds, at paragraphs 1-001, 1-003 and 1-004);
vi) If I am right in thinking that Thames Water's charges schemes imposed liability for water and service charges on Southwark between 1 April 2002 and 31 March 2010 (as to which, see paragraphs 30-37 above), there can have been no possibility of Thames Water authorising Southwark to collect such charges from its tenants on Thames Water's behalf during this period. The tenants would not have owed any money to Thames Water;
vii) The 2000 Agreement referred to Southwark as "the Customer". Although I doubt whether the parties should be taken to have had in mind the definition of "customer" to be found in section 219 of the WIA, the fact remains that an agent would not generally be termed a "customer";
viii) Mr Bourne noted that an unconventional meaning can be attributed to a word in a contract if the parties habitually used the word in that sense. While, however, there is evidence that the parties sometimes used the word "customer" loosely, Southwark has not come close to demonstrating that "customer" was habitually used in a particular way that could explain a true agent being so described in a formal document;
ix) The 2000 Agreement's use of "Customer" is counterbalanced by its use of "commission". However, "the mere use of labels … will not be decisive" (see paragraph 42 of Rix LJ's judgment in Rochdale) and, unlike normal commission, this "commission" did not depend on any performance or the happening of any event. In practice, it simply served to reduce what Southwark had to pay Thames Water;
x) That leads to the next point: that the mere fact that the parties may have referred to their relationship as one of "agency" and to Southwark collecting water and sewerage charges "on behalf of" Thames Water is of no real importance. "[T]here is no magic in the word 'agency'. It is often used in commercial matters where the real relationship is that of vendor and purchaser" (Ex p White, re Neville (1871) LR 6 Ch App 397, at 399; see too Bowstead & Reynolds, at paragraph 1-032);
xi) In the Lambeth case, the focus appears to have been on whether Lambeth was acting "on behalf of" the water company for the purposes of paragraph 20 of schedule 1 to the Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 rather than on whether a relationship of agency in the strict sense existed. In any case, "it is not entirely clear what issues were taken" (see paragraph 48 of Rix LJ's judgment in Rochdale);
xii) How the parties have conducted themselves since entering into the 2000 Agreement can be of little or no significance (see e.g. Lewison, "The Interpretation of Contracts", 6th ed., at 179-189), but, in case it matters, it can be observed that the parties' behaviour has not obviously been entirely consistent with an agency relationship. By way of example, Southwark's charges to its tenants have not accorded with Thames Water's tariffs in every respect (e.g. as regards charging for garages); Southwark has considered itself to be entitled to make decisions without consulting Thames Water as to what, if any, steps it should take to recover charges from tenants; and Thames Water has sent bills to Southwark referring to its "Commitment to our customers" and "several Codes of Practice including a guaranteed standards scheme" and none to the tenants; and
xiii) Although the 2006 order may make a sale and re-sale arrangement disadvantageous to Southwark, no Water Resale Order had yet been made at the date of the 2000 Agreement.
Maximum charges
Conclusions
i) Unless and until the 2013 Deed took effect, the relationship between Thames Water and Southwark was not one of principal and agent but involved Southwark buying water and sewerage services from Thames Water and re-selling them to its tenants;ii) As a result, the 2006 Order applied and served to limit what tenants could be charged; and
iii) The amounts that Southwark charged Miss Jones exceeded the "maximum charge" allowed under the 2006 Order.