CHANCERY DIVISION
COMPANIES COURT
IN THE MATTER OF QUANTUM SURVEY MANAGEMENT LIMITED
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2006
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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JOHN CUSACK |
Petitioner |
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JAMES HOLDSWORTH QUANTUM SURVEY MANAGEMENT LIMITED |
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Mr Newington Bridges (instructed by Porter Dodson) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: 7-11 November 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr. Registrar Briggs:
Introduction
Background facts
Disputes and division
"That evening we were on separate tables [at the conference dinner] and we spoke a couple of times during the course of the evening. We discussed the split. John bought me a bloody mary and said down the line perhaps we will have more to celebrate. At that point it seemed the split was amicable"
"Extending the year we need to have a target of 3 additional months. From this we have a definite time line to plan to separate our business involvement together. ….The only real way of reducing our corporation tax liability is through the company paying into our pension. My previous e-mail of taking £120k and providing a loan of £40k I have undertaken. This will provide a reduction of corporation of tax over £40k. If you do not wish to reinvest in the company with a bridging loan of 3 months of £40k I would suggest you invest in your pension £80k before 31 March and you take the remaining £40k in the extended 3 months of the accounting period….we need to look at the company assets and agree to divide these including office equipment company vehicles…..there are a lot of things to consider and manage over the next 3 months prior to the separation."
"I am frankly appalled that you think it is OK to transfer £120k of Company funds to your personal pension, not just without my prior approval, but as you are fully aware, with my explicit disapproval….To be clear, the £120k is Company money and its transfer to your personal pension was unauthorised and is therefore unlawful. You must take immediate steps to transfer the funds back to the Company in full……Your actions beggar belief and highlight the need for us to demerge the business as quickly and as cleanly as possible and, to this end, I suggest that we arrange a meeting with professional advisors present at a mutually convenient location as soon as possible…"
Identifiable issues
22.1. Was the SHA agreed by members?
22.2. Were the university fees authorised by the Company?
22.3. Did Quantum authorise the pension payment made in favour of Mr Holdsworth (towards the end of March 2015?
22.4. Did the directors and members agree that the Company would be divided into the "North" and "South"?
22.5. Did Mr Holdsworth divert Quantum work, opportunities and employees to Project? If so, over what period and does the answer to 22.4 make a difference to a finding of wrongdoing?
22.6. Has Mr Cusack been prejudiced unfairly by the events of 2015?
Evidence
(i) Was there an agreement in respect of the SHA?
31.1. In order to determine whether a contract has been concluded in the course of correspondence one must look to the correspondence as a whole;
31.2. The parties may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further term or terms have been agreed or they may intend to be bound forthwith even though there are further terms still to be agreed or some further formality to be fulfilled;
31.3. If the parties fail to reach agreement on such further terms, the existing contract is not invalidated unless the failure to reach agreement on such further terms renders the contract as a whole unworkable or void for uncertainty.
34.1. The members jointly instructed a solicitor to draft a SHA. I infer they all intended that their relationship as members be regulated by an agreement;
34.2. There was a meeting at which all members attended and actively discussed the terms of the agreement;
34.3. Mr Cusack kept a note of the meeting and annotated the SHA with amendments;
34.4. The amendments were agreed by all members and sent back to Mr Phillips;
34.5. Mr Phillips was asked if they could print and sign. I infer from this that the reason why the question was asked was as a result of agreement between members as to the terms of the SHA;
34.6. The response from the solicitor was to ask whether the members wanted to better define the methodology for share valuation, whether a transfer to spouses could take place without a formal valuation and whether the shareholders wanted a restriction on withdrawing funds from Quantum;
34.7. The solicitor advised that the SHA be entered into at the same time as the consultancy agreement. There was no response to the invitation to let him know what the members wanted to do;
34.8. The next e-mail communication to the solicitor came from Mr Holdsworth who produced detail about the service contracts;
34.9. Nothing further was spoken about the SHA save when it may have been needed for the purpose of dealing with Mr Hargreaves's exit;
34.10. There is no communication at that time (when it was more likely that the SHA would have been challenged if it had not been agreed) to an e-mail sent from the solicitor referring to the record of an agreement at the 31 January 2012 meeting.
34.11. The queries raised were not, in my judgment, essential terms. The queries were advisory only.
(ii) Were the university fees authorised by the Company?
(iii) Was the pension payment made towards the end of March 2015 authorised by Quantum?
43.1. Mr Cusack e-mailed Mr Holdsworth voicing a strong view that a large pension payment should not be made: "Based on recent events and the state of the business I think the proposal to pay £120k into each of our pensions and then loan money back to the business is reckless and short sighted. Therefore, I do not agree to any payments to our pensions unless agreed in writing….".
43.2. after the sending of the e-mail they met with Mr Lewis in order to receive advice as to the commercial sense and viability of making a large pension payment (among other things).
43.3. At the meeting Mr Lewis reviewed the financial position of the Company and confirmed that a payment of £120,000 to each member would not endanger the business.
43.4. Mr Lewis confirmed Mr Holdsworth's understanding that a lump sum payment into a SIPP would provide tax advantages for Quantum.
43.5. the payment into Mr Holdsworth SIPP was made in or around 27 March 2015.
43.6. Mr Cusack first heard that the payment of £120,000 had been made to Mr Holdsworth on 29 March 2015.
43.7. Mr Cusack replied by e-mail on 30 March 2015, "I am frankly appalled that you think it is OK to transfer £120k of Company funds to your personal pension, not just without my prior approval but, as you are fully aware, with my explicit disapproval." He went on to state that the payment was "unauthorised and is therefore unlawful".
43.8. Mr Holdsworth accepts that he did not respond to the e-mail.
(iv) agreement to demerge the Company, diversion of business and loss of employees
"At the end of the 3 months extended period, the WIP allocated to each shareholder can then be taken away and managed going forward with our respective companies. I would suggest that the same goes with the staff and if we wish to employ them across on a Tupe agreement…. If you wish to continue to service the client base you have in the North I will continue to service the client base in the SW." (sic)
"I apologise for not telling you John and James are parting company, I was waiting for the pair of them to discuss/confirm before we announce the split. John still hasn't speak with James privately to discuss the separation (however he told you at the meeting and the staff up north)..Really not sure what his problems are, apart from he is bone idle and simply tagging along to get the benefit from James' hard work…..we will extend the accounting period by 3 months (to 30/06/2015) this should give us time to sort out the split of company (hopefully). So I will be sending over the final account in August/September the latest." (sic)
Unfair Prejudice
"the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or some part of its members (including at least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial"
""Unfairness" For the purposes of s 459 is not to be judged by reference to the subjective notions of fairness, but rather by testing whether, applying established equitable principles, the majority has acted, or is proposing to act, in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith."
"Prejudice will certainly encompass damage to the financial position of a member. The prejudice may be damage to the value of his shares but may also extend to other financial damage which in the circumstances of the case is bound up with his position as a member…The prejudice must be to the petitioner in his capacity as a member but this is not to be strictly confined to damage to the value of his shareholding. Moreover, prejudice need not be financial in character. A disregard of the rights of a member as such, without any financial consequences, may amount to prejudice falling within the section. Where the acts complained of have no adverse financial consequences, it may be more difficult to establish relevant prejudice. This may particularly be the case where the acts or omissions are breaches of duty owed to the company rather than to shareholders individually. If it is said that the directors of some of them had been in breach of duty to the company but not loss to the company has resulted, the company would not have a claim against those directors. It may therefore be difficult for a shareholder to show that nonetheless as a member he has suffered prejudice…."
"The Court of Appeal found that by 1991 the company had the characteristics identified by Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, [1972] 2 All ER 492 as commonly giving rise to equitable restraints upon the exercise of powers under the articles. They were (1) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship involving mutual confidence, (2) an understanding that all, or some, of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business, and (3) restrictions on the transfer of shares, so that a member cannot take out his stake and go elsewhere. I agree. It follows that it would have been unfair of Mr Phillips to use his voting powers under the articles to remove Mr O'Neill from participation in the conduct of the business without giving him the opportunity to sell his interest in the company at a fair price."
Lord Hoffmann explained the phrase "legitimate expectation":
"It was probably a mistake to use this term, as it usually is when one introduces a new label to describe a concept which is already sufficiently defined in other terms. In saying that it was "correlative" to the equitable restraint, I meant that it could exist only when equitable principles of the kind I have been describing would make it unfair for a party to exercise rights under the articles. It is a consequence, not a cause, of the equitable restraint. The concept of a legitimate expectation should not be allowed to live a life of its own, capable of giving rise to equitable restraints in circumstances to which the traditional equitable principles have not application."
"The concept of unfairness, although objective in focus, is not to be considered in a vacuum. An assessment that conduct is unfair has to be made against the legal background of the corporate structure under consideration. This will usually take the form of the articles of association and any collateral agreements between shareholders which identify their rights and obligations as members of the company. Both are subject to established equitable principles which may moderate the exercise of strict legal rights when insistence on the enforcement of such rights would be unconscionable."
"…In considering whether the conduct of the controllers amounts to conduct unfairly prejudicial to the interests of a member, it is also relevant to take into account any agreement, understanding or clearly established pattern of acquiescence on the part of that member which may have let the controllers to act or continue to act in a particular way, even if their action may have involved a departure from a strict adherence to the terms of the articles. In such a case, in light of their common understanding as to what conduct will be regarded as acceptable between themselves despite the terms of the articles of association, it would not be correct to characterise the action of the controllers as unfair within the context of the whole relationship between them and the member. In my view, this is a corollary of the approach to the test of unfairness adopted in the authorities to which I have referred above, whereby the agreement between the members as set out in the articles of association may be subject to equitable considerations and obligations arising out of the particular circumstances of the relationship overall. There is no good reason why such equitable considerations should not qualify, as well as add to, the expectations about how the controllers of the company ought to behave to be derived from a simple reading of the articles of association."
Conclusions on liability
Valuation and remedy