CHANCERY DIVISION
CARDIFF DISTRICT REGISTRY
Harbour Road, Port Talbot |
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B e f o r e :
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EVAN JAMES LLOYD DAVIES |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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DAVID JOHN LLOYD DAVIES THOMAS PETER LLOYD DAVIES ELLEN DAVIES |
Defendants |
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Malcolm Warner (instructed by Llys Cennen) for the defendants
Hearing dates: 11, 12 and 13 May 2015
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Crown Copyright ©
HH Judge Jarman QC :
"This letter is to notify you that the rent on the property will increase from the current £120 a month to £200 a month effective from the 1st December 1997. If this is not acceptable we are instructed to obtain a proper valuation of the farm to ascertain the current market value of the property. Our client is also considering charging for the water supply at the property which you currently benefit free of charge."
"There is a clear line of authority from at least Crabb to the present day which establishes that once the elements of proprietary estoppel are established an equity arises. The value of that equity will depend upon all the circumstances including the expectation and the detriment. The task of the court is to do justice. The most essential requirement is that there must be proportionality between the expectation and the detriment."
"To recapitulate: there is a category of case in which the benefactor and the claimant have reached a mutual understanding which is in reasonably clear terms but does not amount to a contract. I have already referred to the typical case of a carer who has the expectation of coming into the benefactor's house, either outright or for life. In such a case the court's natural response is to fulfil the claimant's expectations. But if the claimant's expectations are uncertain, or extravagant, or out of all proportion to the detriment which the claimant has suffered the court can and should recognise that the claimant's equity should be satisfied in another (and generally more limited) way.
But that does not mean that the court should in such a case abandon expectations completely, and look at the detriment suffered by the claimant as defining the relief. Indeed in many cases the detriment may be even more difficult to quantify, in financial terms, than the claimant's expectations. Detriment can be quantified with reasonable precision if it consists solely of expenditure on improvements to another person's house, and in some cases of that sort an equitable charge for the expenditure may be sufficient to satisfy the equity… But the detriment of an ever increasing burden of care for an elderly person, and of having to be subservient to his or her moods and wishes, is very difficult to quantify in money terms. Moreover the claimant may not be motivated solely by reliance on the benefactor's assurances, and may receive some countervailing benefits (such as free bed and board). In such circumstances the court has to exercise a wide judgmental discretion.
It would be unwise to attempt any comprehensive enumeration of the factors relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion, or to suggest any hierarchy of factors."
".. is to say little more than that the end result must be a just one having regard to the assumption made by the party asserting the estoppel and the detriment which he has experienced."
"In my judgment, this principle does not mean that there has to be a relationship of proportionality between the level of detriment and the relief awarded. What Walker LJ holds in this paragraph is that if the expectations are extravagant or "out of all proportion to the detriment which the claimant has suffered" the court can and should recognise that the claimant's equity should be satisfied in another and generally more limited way. So the question is: was the relief that the judge granted "out of all proportion to the detriment" suffered?"
"However, the fact is that, on the judge's findings, the assurances were made and the values only reflect the assurances."